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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines how American cultural and informational diplomacy policy was 
formulated during the 1936-53 period. The central line of enquiry is to determine 
how the language in which policy initiatives were debated and implemented 
determined the kinds of cultural and informational strategies that Washington 
adopted, and how these linguistic practices in turn shaped Washington’s posture of 
global hegemony after the Second World War. I interpret the emergence of the Cold 
War propaganda struggle in US grand strategy as an outcome of the ways in which 
US officials had represented America as the dominant cultural and informational 
actor within the post-war global order. In the course of developing this overarching 
argument, my study emphasises the key role played by the concepts of liberalism and 
American exceptionalism in constituting Washington’s foreign relations during the 
period under review. I draw on constructivist theories of International Relations to 
interrogate the enabling and constitutive functions of discourse in foreign policy­
making. There are three case studies, which are structured provide a cross sectional 
view of Washington’s cultural and informational programs: American bilateral 
cultural diplomacy; the informational diplomacy of the Voice of America radio 
station; and US diplomacy within the multilateral United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation. Through an analysis of archival records from 
each of the programs I compare how US foreign policy was articulated within the 
context of these three aspects of US cultural and informational diplomacy.
vii
INTRODUCTION
Never before in the history of the United States, or of the Revolution 
which produced it, has the basic idea of that Revolution, the creative 
idea of that history, dominated the world as it does today.. .the people 
[are] on the march throughout the world.. .the idea of the people- the 
idea of the liberty and value of the people... on the march throughout 
the world.. .the idea of the people will be the final victor when this war 
is done.1 2
2
Annuit Coeptis.
With the American entry into the Second World War on December 8, 1941, United 
States foreign policy was set on a course that brought about foundational changes to 
the practices and principles of international politics. For at least four decades the US 
had possessed the world’s largest economy and had pursued steadily deepening 
foreign policy ties with the Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Europe. Despite this, 
before 1941 Washington’s vast capacity for influence within world politics had not 
been fully realised. This changed with the extensive national effort that the Second 
World War drew from the US government, as it mobilised an extensive military 
campaign on two continents, underwrote the rebuilding of economically devastated 
regions after the war, and sponsored the formalisation of the war’s settlement within a 
range of multilateral global institutions.
Underlying Washington’s effort to reconstitute the international order at the 
end of the Second World War was a relatively new and still-crystallising acceptance 
of the idea that to ensure America’s future stability and prosperity, alongside that of 
other nations, US power must remain firmly embedded within the international 
system. The process of embedding US power globally differed from simply 
projecting influence because it naturalised a posture of international engagement 
within US foreign policy, and because US power was deployed to underpin new 
institutions, regimes, and behavioural norms within the international system. The 
cultivation of this kind of engagement in world politics rested in turn upon the idea 
that America’s political purposes and spiritual promise had global resonance, and that
1 Archibald MacLeish, “The American Certainty,” Department o f State Bulletin 2269, (February 18, 
1945), p. 239.
2 Reverse of the Great Seal of the United States, translation: Providence has favoured our 
undertakings.
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the terms upon which Washington would assume a posture of hegemonic engagement 
with world politics could be cognisant with the spirit of American politics and 
culture. As H. W. Brands has reflected, and as the quotations above suggest, the 
singularity US foreign policy during the Second World War period is that it was 
founded on the idea of global ‘vindicationism.’ Seeking vindication of the self 
through global engagement, according to Brands, stemmed from an “abiding belief 
that the United States has an obligation to improve the world.” The turn to 
vindicationism rested upon on a sensibility, not exclusive to the United States but 
nonetheless one to which its political culture is particularly conducive, that cast 
America’s global position in exceptional terms: as a political order that was at once 
singular and universal, whose foreign policy in this moment of upheaval was not 
guided by parochial self-interest, but rather by an ability to bring about the 
regeneration and betterment of other societies. “[I]n seeing the welfare of the world 
and the welfare of the United States as being of a piece,” America’s post-war foreign 
policy was thus to be envisaged, and indeed lauded, as a “forward defence of 
democracy” and a “beacon of virtue.”3
This study examines the ways in which the shift in 1936-53 toward a posture 
of American hegemony and vindicationism was enabled by a process of internal 
debate that altered the shared ideas about America’s role in world politics. 1 survey 
the terms of this identity shift through the lens of the State Department’s cultural and 
informational diplomacy programs. I shall argue that these areas of foreign policy, 
which are, by definition, bound up with the pursuit of ideological influence and 
legitimacy within global public opinion were highly conducive to dialogue about the 
sources of America’s influence and the nature of its singularity as a world power 
during the 1936-53 transition. As my analysis of foreign policy-making within these 
programs will show, the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy were a key 
site at which American history and political culture, its intellectual resources and 
cultural transitions, were fashioned into constitutive principles for a post-war global 
order underwritten by American power.
3 H. W. Brands, “Exemplary America versus Interventionist America,” in At the End o f the American 
Century: America's Role in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Robert L. Hutchings, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 30-1. See also, Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An 
Anatomy o f  American Nationalism, (Harper Perennial: London, 2005).
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In adopting cultural and informational diplomacy as a vantage point from 
which to survey the connections between conceptions of American identity and US 
foreign policy, my study takes a rather different view of the practices of international 
persuasion than the prevailing contemporary approaches. I differ in my conceptual 
framework from studies of ‘soft power’ and ‘public diplomacy’ in that I treat the 
diplomacy of public persuasion not simply as a tool of state influence, but also as a 
policy practice through which a state’s position and interests as an international agent 
are articulated, fixed, and at times contested and altered.4 This study draws instead 
on a major theoretical movement within International Relations that explains state 
behaviour in terms of how collectively shared perceptions of ‘self shape the 
determination of national interests, and sees ongoing interactions between states as a 
source of inter-subjective understandings that structure international behaviour. This 
‘constructivist’ theoretical perspective is underpinned by the proposition that a key 
feature of power in world politics inheres within the “social relations [between 
international agents, that] define who the actors are and what capacities and practices 
they are socially empowered to undertake.”5 Foreign policy, in this view, is a 
practice that is bound up with the social construction of international relations, since 
in the process of articulating policy imperatives state officials “populate...[the 
international realm] with objects and subjects, endow those subjects with interests, 
and define the relations between those objects and subjects.”6 The constructivist 
conception of power, as partly deriving from how agents are endowed with capacities 
by virtue of their social position, is central to my argument about the changing self­
perceptions that account for America’s changing posture toward international politics 
during 1936-53. In so doing, I shall attempt to demonstrate that cultural and 
informational diplomacy represents a particularly appropriate site at which to study 
the social aspects of power in international relations that constructivists engage with.7
4 I survey these approaches and how I differ from them in the discussion below, and in chapter one. 
See, e.g. Joseph Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004); on ‘public diplomacy’ as a tool of international influence see Jan Melissen, “The New 
Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in 
International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
5 Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International 
Organization 59, (no. 1, Winter 2005), p. 46.
6 Jutta Weldes, et. al., “Introduction: Constructing Insecurity,” in Jutta Weldes, et. al. eds. Cultures o f 
Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production o f Danger, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 14.
7 The account of the forms of power in international relations that I draw on in this argument is: 
Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics.” On identity see also: Alexander Wendt,
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In assessing the implications of these dialogues about America’s identity 
and how Washington should relate to the international during the formulation of the 
US cultural and informational diplomacy programs, my study sits alongside a broad 
range of other studies covering the 1936-53 period, most of which have examined 
Washington’s deployment of other forms of power such as military influence, 
economic power, and structural dominance via international institutions.* 8 This 
study’s account of how Washington set about courting international public opinion, 
and how new ideas about America’s rightful role and prerogatives as a world power 
were articulated in the process, can illuminate an aspect of US power that can 
complement existing studies of the deployment of more material forms of 
international influence by Washington during this period.9 As such, I do not attempt 
to supplant existing historiographies of the military, economic, and institutional 
aspects of US foreign policy during the broader Second World War period. Rather, 
my aim here is to show that American policy in the arenas of cultural and 
informational diplomacy can illustrate how more diffuse identity conceptions that 
were cultivated, both internationally and endogenously, helped to enable 
Washington’s changing material position in global politics during 1936-53.
“Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review 88,
(no. 2: June, 1994).
8 On the projection of American military influence see: John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the 
Origins o f the Cold War 1941-1947, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis 
Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar American National Security 
Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). On the projection of American economic power 
see, e.g. Louis W. Pauley, Who Elected the Bankers? Surveillance and Control in the World Economy, 
(Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy o f American 
Diplomacy, new ed., (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972). On institutions see: Susan Strange, 
States and Markets, 2nd ed., (London: Pinter, 1994); G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, 
Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding o f Order After Major Wars, (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001); John Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the 
New Era, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). An important study that examines both 
elements of structural influence and the projection of ideological or ‘soft’ power in relation to 
Washington’s global hegemonic role is Robinson’s study of the democratising project within US 
foreign policy: William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and 
Hegemony, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
9 Key examples that also deal with this aspect of America’s hegemonic moment will be discussed 
below. See, e.g. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f 
Identity, rev. ed., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Christina Klein, Cold War
* Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2003); Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics o f North-South Relations, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: 
German Reconstruction and the Invention o f the West, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
2006).
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The policies of international persuasion that the US adopted during 1936-53 
had two broad dimensions: cultural diplomacy programs consisting of cultural and 
educational exchanges, cultural exhibits and the provision of cultural institutions; and 
international informational diplomacy, the cornerstone of which was international 
radio broadcasting. The cultural program was initially confined to an inter-American 
context after its establishment in 1936, while US informational diplomacy, which 
began with operations in Europe, the Americas and Asia, was founded in 1941. Both 
programs were extended geographically according to the requirements of the war and 
its settlement, yet they remained relatively modest in cost and scale, compared to the 
programs of other great powers, throughout the 1936-53 period. The American 
cultural diplomacy program expanded to include US involvement in the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) from 1944, which 
is scrutinised here as a case study in its own right because it illustrates how American 
cultural diplomacy was practised within a multilateral context.
That cultural and informational diplomacy provides such an important 
aperture onto the changing propositions about American identity as a world power is 
partly attributable to the fact that during the Second World War period these were 
new and somewhat controversial policies in Washington. Although propaganda was 
a routine and widely accepted feature of European statecraft by 1939, for almost two 
decades after the First World War official persuasion was deemed in many spheres of 
American popular and academic opinion an undemocratic practice at both the 
domestic and international levels. This position was generally staked upon American 
public criticism of the perceived excesses of Woodrow Wilson’s domestic 
propaganda policy during the war.10 With the success of Axis international 
propaganda in the mid-1930s, the idea of an American policy of international public 
advocacy began to gain a measure of qualified public and political acceptance. 
Nonetheless, with this background of public and academic critique of propaganda, the 
founding of an official cultural and informational diplomacy programs was bound up 
with lingering questions in the minds of US officials as to how they might effectively 
address the moral and political quandaries that were bound up with the practice of 
international public persuasion.
10 I survey these inter-war debates in chapter two. In it I shall draw on J. Michael Sproule’s exhaustive 
study of US academic perspectives on propaganda and mass communications. J. Michael Sproule, 
Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience o f Media and Mass Persuasion, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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Furthermore, Washington’s engagement with US cultural and informational 
diplomacy provides insight into the endogenous constitution of American hegemony 
by virtue of the idealistic and long-term scope of international persuasion activities. 
In other words, despite the seemingly peripheral role of international persuasion 
practices in relation to matters of high politics, it was precisely these areas of foreign 
policy in which a long-term vision for the global order and moral justifications for 
American power could be articulated freely. Numerous bureaucratic reorganisations 
and a general hostility toward international persuasion policies on the part of 
Congress did not dampen the tendency among cultural and informational diplomats to 
represent American cultural and informational practices as central to the fulfilment of 
America’s international moral and political obligations. The archival record of US 
cultural and informational diplomacy is replete with instances in which US policies 
were rendered in the most evocative and far-reaching of terms, such as Assistant 
Secretary of State William Benton’s assertion that:
The United States is the only country which combines the qualities 
of moral leadership with the resources necessary to carry out a program 
of international information and cultural affairs based on principles 
international in their validity, free from narrow bias and from special 
pleading. Our leadership can be vital at a time when the world is in the 
midst of. ..a ‘riot of propaganda.’11
Similar sentiments were expressed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, when he 
claimed that America’s culture and ideas served to highlight “the essential bond of 
common beliefs, and common interests that underlie differences in national customs 
and circumstances.” The stated repudiation of ‘propaganda’ as a description of US 
policies served to highlight America’s special propensity for the cultural and 
informational enlightenment of others. The first director of the US’s cultural 
diplomacy programs, Ben M. Cherrington, had thus charged that US policies could 
not be considered “propaganda in the popular sense of the term which carries with it 
implications of penetration, imposition and unilateralism,” but rather as a program 
“definitely educational in character which emphasises the essential reciprocity in
11 William Benton (1947) quoted in James R. Vaughn, The Failure o f American and British 
Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57: Unconquerable Minds, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), pp. 238-9.
12 Dean Acheson, “Support for an Expanded Information and Education Program,” Department o f 
State Bulletin 3913, (July 17, 1950), pp. 100-1.
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cultural relations.”13 As Adolf Berle, a prominent figure in the Franklin Roosevelt 
State Department, put it in 1939: “we have looked at conventional propaganda and 
regard it as unworthy of respect. In its place we have discovered the enrichment that 
comes from the sharing of our intellectual inheritances.”14 US Assistant Secretary of 
State George V. Allen similarly contended that the US was a singular agent in the 
field of international persuasion in that it would not suffer from portraying itself 
truthfully: Americans were “not obliged to present ourselves to the world as models 
of perfection.. .the United States has so many virtues to overcome the shortcomings 
that we need not fear the effect of our being thoroughly known abroad.”15 The shared 
premise here was that the “American concept of democracy is rooted in the very 
nature of the people themselves,”16 and thus:
Our strongest asset continues to be truth- truth about our 
world-wide motives and objectives, truth concerning these 
facts and events which have a bearing on our policy and which 
are denied to others, truth concerning the consequences of 
systems of government and policies based on other than 
democratic and peaceful principles.17
Such rhetorical commonplaces in US cultural and informational policy debate 
indicate that cultural and informational diplomacy was highly conducive to far- 
reaching debate on the nature of America and its significance within the global order. 
This study is structured as an analysis of the impacts and implications of these 
debates.
13 Ben M. Cherrington quoted in J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings o f US Cultural 
Diplomacy 1936-1948, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 140.
14 Adolf Berle, “Cooperative Peace in the Western Hemisphere: Address by Assistant Secretary of 
State Adolf Berle Delivered at George Washington University Winter Conference on Inter-American 
Affairs, Washington DC, December 5, 1939,” Department o f State Bulletin 1413, (December 9, 1939),
p. 662.
15 George V. Allen, quoted in Lloyd Leheras, “Information Please, International,” The American 
Foreign Service Journal 25, (no. 9, 1948), p. 10.
16 Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, “Operational Guidance on OW1 
Documentary Films. Nov 24, 1944,” p. 3; Chronological File, 1944-45; Records of Archibald 
MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, 
College Park, MD.
17 “US Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda,” (no author), Dec 1, 1947, p. 2; 
Records of the International Information Activities 1938-1953; [Box 122]; Records Relating to the 
International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record 
Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.
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The Research Program and Objectives of this Study
My study seeks to show how, in the course of formulating strategies for 
cultural and informational diplomacy, American foreign policy-makers discursively 
represented America and its changing global role during 1936-53. The basic insight 
underpinning my focus on language and foreign policy-making is that the kinds of 
discursive frameworks within which US policy-makers operated shaped the kinds of 
cultural and informational policies could be contemplated and adopted within the 
programs. Moreover, in undertaking to show how American cultural and 
informational practices were constituted by the language in which policy was 
articulated, my analysis can be extended rather further to suggest how this process of 
articulating America’s approach to cultural and informational diplomacy was 
implicated in the transformation of Washington’s foreign policy posture at a more 
general level. I develop this argument through an investigation of the following two 
research questions:
1. What were the key developments in American cultural and informational 
diplomacy during the 1936-53 period?
2. How did the articulation of US cultural and informational policy enable the 
cultivation of international influence by Washington during 1936-53?
In answering these questions, I show how Washington’s post-war posture of 
engagement with the international system was constituted, and how it was to an 
extent made possible, by shared self-perceptions that were fixed and reproduced in 
the course of cultural and informational diplomacy debates and announcements. 
Policy debates within the areas of US cultural and informational diplomacy at the 
founding of the programs drew on existing principles of American political culture. 
These principles in turn nourished the kinds of self-perceptions that were needed for 
Washington to step into a hegemonic global role as the end of the Second World War 
drew close. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the kinds of self­
perceptions that cultural and informational diplomats articulated during the early 
phases of their work found a particularly strong resonance in the context of US plans 
to restructure the international order according to liberal principles. It is significant,
8
too, that the language in which US cultural and informational policies were 
formulated during the Second World War and its aftermath were subsequently 
generative of the Manichaean terms of the ideological rivalry that developed between 
the US and the USSR during the 1940s.
In drawing on the traditions of American political culture to structure 
Washington’s cultural and informational diplomacy, two themes were particularly 
resonant: liberalism; and the idea that America’s historical and political experience 
was exceptional. In drawing on these pre-existing traditions of American thought as a 
prism through which contemporary foreign policy challenges were understood, US 
cultural and informational officials fashioned symbolic tools and constituted a 
conception of the American ‘self that had profound implications for the way in 
which America’s cultural and informational diplomacy programs were constituted. 
Liberalism and exceptionalism were mobilised in the course of US cultural and 
informational policy-making within several general types of discursive practice, all of 
which functioned in different ways to constitute subjects and organise experience 
pertaining to foreign policy. In the chapters to follow I will thus show how 
liberalism, exceptionalism and several related propositions were situated within 
patterns of discursive representation. These include the location of subjects in the 
context of their historical narratives; the ‘framing’ of issues and policies according to 
shared premises or particular interpretations; the positioning and classification of 
subjects in relation to each other; and the production of conceptions of ‘self in 
relation to its ‘other.’
Investigating Cultural and Informational Discourse: Theoretical Context of this 
Study
In undertaking to make this kind of argument about the themes and forms of 
linguistic self-representation that served to enable US cultural and informational 
diplomacy, my study draws upon broader debates about the constitution of agents, the 
sources of state interests, and the nature of power itself within International Relations 
(IR) theory. As noted above, the construction of US hegemony involved the
18 I capitalise ‘International Relations’ when referring to the academic discipline, and use ‘international 
relations’ to refer to the realm of international interaction in general. Similarly, ‘Diplomatic History’ 
refers to the discrete sub-field of history that engages with the development and implementation of
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deployment of several forms of power by Washington, such as military capabilities, 
economic power, and the establishment of institutional frameworks of international 
interaction that enshrined American global dominance. An important part of the story 
of the founding American hegemony was also Europe’s extensive wartime 
devastation and the subsequent willingness on the part of European leaders to accept 
US economic influence and an ongoing American military foothold within the 
European continent.19 But while acknowledging that these factors were key central to 
the construction of Washington’s post-war global hegemony, my study charts an 
additional dynamic that shaped the form US hegemony ultimately took, namely the 
acquisition of what Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall refer to as socially 
‘productive’ power. This understanding of power is based on the capacities agents 
are endowed with via the constitution of inter-subjective meanings and the 
assumption of mutually understood roles within a social system.20 The wish to see 
fulfilment of the political and moral creeds of the ‘self through the communication of 
these principles abroad- the posture of vindicationism- was an important source of 
productive power. It was through this new sense of self that Washington conceived 
of and pursued a hegemonic posture of engagement with the international order 
during 1936-53.
Stefano Guzzini has summarised this view of power, which is strongly 
identified with the constructivist theoretical perspective in IR scholarship, as a shift 
away from traditional conceptions in IR about ‘what power means,’ to an interest in 
determining ‘what power does' in terms of enabling agents to conceive of action and 
legitimately act in the international system.21 In articulating this position, 
constructivist theories of IR seek to problematise the prevailing rational-actor 
assumptions and materialist conceptions of the ontology of world politics. Rationalist
foreign policy, whereas ‘diplomatic history’ refers to the development and implementation of 
particular foreign policy initiatives over time.
19 Gier Lundestad’s well-known thesis on America’s ‘empire by invitation’ is not entirely discounted 
by my study. His analysis is an important corrective to the historiography of the post-war settlement 
which has tended to focus solely on US agency in this phase of world politics. How does my study sit 
with his argument? The ‘invitation’ that was made to extend US economic assistance in the post-war 
years was received as positive feedback to the hegemonic posture that was resonant within cultural and 
informational policy debates from 1936. Washington’s responsibility to supply Europe with ongoing 
security and economic assistance confirmed the vindicationist premise that had been articulated within 
the discourses of US cultural and informational diplomacy. Gier Lundestad, “’Empire By Invitation’ in 
the American Century,” in The Ambiguous Legacy: US Foreign Relations in the ‘American Century, ’ 
ed. Michael J. Hogan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
20 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics.”
21 Stefano Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations,” European 
Journal o f International Relations 6, (no. 2, 2000), p. 171.
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approaches are seen in this light as united by the presumption that national interests 
can be exogenously determined because states are self-interested actors that engage 
strategically with the international realm. When states act within the system of 
international ‘anarchy,’ rationalists expect that strategic, utility-maximising 
calculation will determine the content of national interests. Hence, predictions about 
state behaviour can be made with reference to a state’s position within the 
international system- for example, a position within a balance of power, or a situation 
of inter-dependence with other states through institutional, security or economic 
ties.22
The social constructivist perspective in International Relations is a diverse 
theoretical approach united by a commitment to the critical point that, in practice, 
state interests cannot be explained entirely on the basis of utility-maximising 
calculations, as rationalists expect. Rather, for constructivists, state behaviour derives 
from shared knowledge and norms that give meaning to action. Endogenous 
processes of self-representation and the inter-subjective meanings that develop in the 
course of ongoing international interaction lead to the development of state 
‘identities,’ which shape the content of their national interests.23 As Alexander 
Wendt’s often-quoted critique of rationalism charged; “anarchy is what states make 
of it,” because states
act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the 
meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently 
toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies 
are threatening and friends are not. It is collective meanings 
that constitute the structures which organise our actions... 
Actors acquire identities- relatively stable, role-specific
22 A good summary of the constructivist critique of the two main rationalist theoretical perspectives in 
International Relations: neorealism and neoliberalism, can be found in Christian Reus-Smit, 
“Constructivism,” in Theories o f International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill et. al., 3rd edition, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); see also, on the neo-utilitarian orthodoxy in IR scholarship: 
John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52, (no. 4: Autumn 1998). On the inferred 
character of national interests in rationalist theory see also Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: 
Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in The Culture o f National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
Jennifer Milliken’s account of the discursive practices approach also provides a useful critique of the 
notions of scientism within rationalist approaches. Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in 
International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,” European Journal o f International 
Relations 5, (no. 2, 1999). A brief history of the national interest as an analytical concept in 
International Relation scholarship is supplied in James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study o f Foreign 
Policy, (New York: The Free Press, 1971), Ch. 8.
23 Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” pp. 216-7.
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understandings and expectations about self- by participating in 
such collective meanings.24
The collective meanings that constitute state identities arise from ongoing patterns of 
international cooperation and interaction, which socialise states into adopting 
particular interests, as well as from the ways in which national leaders and officials 
conceptualise their place in the international order through the policy debates, 
declarations and rituals that accompany the practices of foreign policy and diplomacy.
This broadens our understanding of what kind of process foreign policy­
making actually is. A constructivist account of foreign policy does not simply seek to 
explain how particular foreign policy decisions are made, but also how the various 
possibilities that are contemplated in the context of foreign policy decision-making 
are mediated by state identities. Shared meanings and representations determine what 
policy-makers view as the possible options from which policy decisions can be made 
by orienting the practice of decision-making within a set of collectively shared 
propositions about the national subject on whose behalf they are acting and the 
international ‘realities’ they face.25 The key implication of this move is that foreign 
policy is viewed not simply as a site of utility-maximising behaviour driven by the 
material interests of states, but rather as a practice through which subjects within 
world politics are themselves:
produced, reproduced and transformed through the discursive 
practices of [policy] actors. More specifically, interests emerge 
out of the representations that define for actors the situations 
and events they face...Meanings are produced in representations 
made possible by particular discourses- that is, intersubjective 
structures of meaning-in-use- that provide categories through 
which we represent and understand the world.2
24 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.” 
International Organisation 24, (no. 2, Spring 1992), pp. 396-7. Elsewhere, Wendt identifies three core 
propositions of constructivism, which my study and other accounts that focus specifically on discourse, 
largely concur with. “(1) States are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) 
the key structures in the states system are intersubjectives, rather than material; and (3) state identities 
and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously 
to the system of by human nature or domestic politics.” Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation,” p. 
385. See also Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International 
Theory and Constructivism,” European Journal o f International Relations 4, (no. 3, 1998), pp. 266-7.
25 Jamie Gaskarth, “Discourses and Ethics: The Social Construction of British Foreign Policy,” 
Foreign Policy Analysis 2, (vol. 4, 1006), p. 326. On ‘how possible’ explanations in social science see 
also Doty, Imperial Encounters, ‘Introduction;’ Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, Ch. 2.
26 Jutta Weldes, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment,” Mershon International 
Studies Review 42, (no. 2, November 1998), p. 218.
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Discursive representation is important within foreign policy-making because “the 
possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses 
of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, 
must already be in place,” and the language in which agents operate is indicative of 
these meanings.27 As Roxanne Doty contends, linguistic “representation is an 
inherent and important aspect of global political life...[international relations are 
inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation 
representations that are taken as ‘truth. ’” 28 The discursive representations studied 
here thus illustrate how new truisms about the content of American national interests 
gained traction within the cultural and informational diplomacy programs and also 
permeated beyond them, based on how the language of foreign policy reflected the 
emergence of new “systems of knowledge through which meaning [was] produced, 
fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed.” 29 Of particular importance in the 
generation of meanings is the extent to which international agents understand and 
articulate their identities in relation to others, and this is one of the key processes that 
the discursive practices approach seeks to engage with.30 As I shall illustrate in the 
forthcoming chapter, the existing constructivist literature that has explored the 
connections between discursive representation and the formulation of foreign policy 
provides some general analytical tools to engage in a structured way with empirical 
cases. I use four key tools for the purposes of this study: the location of ‘self in 
relation to its ‘other’; the situating of subjects in the context of historical relationships 
and developments; the framing of policies and issues according to figurative 
premises; and the positioning of subjects and objects in relation to each other. A
27 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly 37, (no. 3, 1993), pp. 
168, 298-9. Mattern’s analysis of the connections between identity and causal explanation also fleshes 
out how this ‘how-possible’ mode of explanation is constructed. See Janice Bially Mattem, Ordering 
International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force, (New York: Routledge Book, 
2005), Ch 1.
28 Doty, Imperial Encounters, p. 5.
29 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 55.
3U In emphasising the relational conception of identity, Lene Hansen’s account of discursive practices 
and foreign policy diverges from Wendt’s rendition of constructivism. It is thus significant to note that 
while I have located the discursive practices approach within a broader constructivist framework, work 
such as Hansen’s also problematises the idea that states can bring ‘pre-social’ identities to international 
interaction. There are thus some points of ongoing debate between within the constructivist approach. 
See, Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (London: 
Routledge, 2006), Ch. 2.
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more detailed examination of this conceptual framework and how I intend to 
implement it shall be discussed in the next chapter.
One of the most important implications of the account of power and the 
connections between discourse and foreign policy-making that has been developed by 
these constructivist scholars is that a broader understanding of the nature of 
America’s global hegemony can be developed.31 This is because the kind of 
subjectivity- that is, the shared conceptions of what America was and what it stood 
for in the context of global politics- that informed how Washington constructed its 
hegemonic position in global politics after 1945 can be elucidated within the terms of 
a constructivist theoretical framework. A constructivist approach can illumate the 
way in which US cultural and informational diplomacy practices rested upon 
particular beliefs about international social subject positions, and how Washington set 
about constructing its authority within the hearts and minds of foreign publics 
accordingly. Most importantly, in terms of this study, adopting a constructivist 
approach can show how US hegemony was enabled by an endogenous “self- 
referential or self-justifying” process that legitimated the projection of America’s
31 In emphasising the inter-subjective aspect of hegemony, my work differs from the (largely 
economic) conception of American hegemony mobilised within the ‘hegemonic stability thesis’ that 
was influential in debates on US power and the international system during the 1980s. I emphasise the 
social and discursive foundations of hegemony, while the hegemonic stability thesis instead focuses on 
how the material fact of hegemony shapes the rational incentive structures of states in favour of 
cooperation. In emphasising the social and discursive foundations of hegemony, I share many of the 
interests of the ‘neo-Gramscian’ conception of hegemony (drawing on the conception of the ‘historic 
bloc’ or ‘hegemonic bloc’ articulated in the 1920s by the Italian Marxist scholar Antonio Gramsci), but 
do not accompany these scholars in their Marxian argument that the ideological and discursive 
elements of hegemony are wholly function of economic domination. On hegemonic stability see: Paul 
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 
to 2000, (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, America and 
the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1973); Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence: 
World Politics and Transition, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1977); Robert O. Keohane, After 
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). An important critique of the hegemonic stability thesis is: Bruce Russet, “The 
Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?,” International 
Organization 39, (no. 2, Spring 1985). A rationalist account of hegemonic stability and US power that 
sought to take into account ‘socialisation’ is: G. John Ikenberry, and Charles A. Kupchan, 
“Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44, (no. 3, Summer 1990). Among 
neo-Gramscian studies of hegemony, two of the best accounts that pertain to US hegemony are: 
Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics o f Mass 
Production and American Global Power, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also 
Antonio Gramsci, Selected Writings 1916-1935, ed. David Forgacs, (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 
1988).
14
• 32influence globally. In the forthcoming chapters I shall thus reflect extensively on 
the nature of American hegemony and how it was constructed in 1936-53, especially 
in terms of how the endogenous, self-justifying, and socially productive functions of 
foreign policy discourse helped to found the hegemonic structure of post-war 
authority and dominance upon which post-war US foreign relations were based. In 
the next section I will indicate how I structure this study in terms of its case studies, 
methodology, terminology, and the layout of the argument in the chapters to follow.
Design of this Study: Methodology and Case Studies
Case Studies
This study is structured as a cross-sectional comparison of three case studies 
from within the US cultural and informational diplomacy programs from 1936-53: the 
State Department’s Division of Cultural Relations; the Voice of America radio 
station; and the US’s diplomatic mission to Unesco.33 Considered together, these 
policy divisions reflect the spectrum of the State Department’s approaches to the 
diplomacy of international persuasion in the period studied here. The rationale 
behind structuring the case studies in this way is that synchronic, cross-sectional 
analysis can generate a detailed account of the patterns of discursive continuity and 
change at a particular historical moment. The ways in which policy-makers in each 
program comprehended and responded to international challenges can be charted and 
compared across the cases, and in this context I can compare how discursive 
representations within each of the programs were shaped by the same international 
issues, such as: the Second World War; the construction of a post-war settlement and 
the founding of the United Nations Organisation; the rise of fears about Soviet 
dominance within Europe in 1947-48; and Washington’s assumption of the role of 
Cold War protagonist after 1948. The year 1953 is selected as the end of the period
32 Here I draw on work in International Relations that is influenced by Max Weber’s insight that actors 
who wish to act through authority perform rituals to legitimate their power. See: Rodney Barker, 
Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations o f Rulers and Subjects, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), p. 13. Although critical of aspects of this Weberian account of legitimacy, 
another summation of the legitimation activities of powerful agents is noted in: David Beetham, The 
Legitimation o f Power, (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991), pp. 28-31; 
Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy.
33 So as not to disrupt the flow of the text, and in keeping with the usage of the term in official Unesco 
documents of the time, this acronym is not capitalised in my study.
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under review due to the extensiveness of President Dwight Eisenhower’s 
administrative reforms to the information programs, and the fact that these 
symbolised how cultural and informational diplomacy issues had migrated to the 
centre of US grand strategy concerns during the Cold War.
Several caveats with regard to those areas of policy that are not covered in 
my study are warranted. First, during 1936-53 the State Department also established 
a separate program of educational diplomacy after 1946: a consequence largely of 
Senator J. William Fulbright’s vision for bringing about deeper bonds of international 
understanding after the ravages of the Second World War. Although Fulbright’s 
eponymous educational diplomacy program has come to be regarded as one of the 
US’s most worthwhile policies of international persuasion, for reasons of scope it has 
not been possible to adopt it as a separate case study in this dissertation. However, 
my study is not wholly blind to the State Department’s engagement with international 
educational exchange practices: educational exchange activities were overseen by the 
Division of Cultural Relations for much of the 1936-53 period, and Unesco’s ideals 
and program, which are studied here, were also heavily concerned with international 
educational interchange on a multilateral scale.34
Secondly, it is common to encounter studies that apply the moniker ‘cultural 
diplomacy’ to the covert and subversive operations that the superpowers engaged in 
during the Cold War. I focus, for reasons of scope, on the ‘civilian’ programs that 
Washington implemented, although as Frances Stonor Saunders’ detailed study of the 
US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Cold War activities indicates, the covert 
cultural programs were replete with similar generative representations in the context 
of the Cold War to those studied here.33 The US radio operations Radio Free Europe 
and Radio Liberty are well known to scholars of the Cold War, but as they were
34 Neither are the State Department’s censorship operations adopted here as a case study. Censorship 
was an important adjunct to the cultural and informational programs during the Second World War, but 
they were largely a domestic operation.
35 In the period covered here, several US agencies conducted cultural activities as a form of 
psychological warfare, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s espionage and psychological 
operations in Latin America prior to the Second World War. The US’s wartime intelligence office, the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) included a small operational section (the Special Operations 
Branch), and presided over fairly extensive research into psychological warfare techniques (the 
Research and Analysis Branch). OSS was disbanded in 1945 and reformed as the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) in 1947. The CIA undertook extensive cultural and intellectual activities from the late 
1940s, outlined with great clarity and detail in: Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The 
CIA and the World o f Arts and Letters, (New York: The New Press, 1999).
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initially covert initiatives, and they thus operated under very different assumptions 
from the ‘civilian’ State Department programs that are adopted as case studies here. 
For the same reason, covertly sponsored multilateral cultural and intellectual 
initiatives such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom fall beyond the scope of my 
study.36
Methodology
As will be clear from the foregoing discussion, I draw extensively within the 
historical chapters on foreign policy archives and other primary sources in order to 
show how the articulation of US foreign policy initiatives evolved between 1936 and 
1953. In developing this basic historical narrative I draw on the available reports, 
memoranda and correspondence from the archives of US foreign relations, as well as 
published memoirs, oral histories and other sources that chart the formation US 
cultural diplomacy and international information policy. The methodology adopted 
in these chapters utilises historical description and interpretation to establish an 
accurate account of the broad outlines of cultural and informational policy initiatives 
as well as to gather evidence of how US officials represented their work in their own 
words. In order to answer the theoretical questions within this study, I combine this 
historical mode of enquiry with an analysis of how particular general forms of 
linguistic representation that are identified within contemporary studies of discursive 
practices in foreign policy featured within the discursive representation of US cultural 
and informational policy in this period.
36 On the CIA-sponsored short-wave radio stations Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty see: George 
R. Urban, Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit o f Democracy: My War Within the Cold War, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). Good accounts of the CIA’s relationship with youth and student 
organisations are supplied in the following: Joel Kotek, “Youth Organisations as a Battlefield in the 
Cold War,” in The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 7945-1960, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans 
Krabbendam. (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Karen Paget, “From Stockholm to Leiden: The CIA’s Role 
in the Formation of the International Student Conference,” in The Cultural Cold War in Western 
Europe 1945-1960, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam. (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Giles 
Scott Smith, The Politics o f Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and 
Postwar American Hegemony, (London: Routledge, 2002). On philanthropic activities, particularly 
the Ford Foundation, and the cultural Cold War, see: Volker R. Berghahn, America and the Intellectual 
Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy and Diplomacy, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001); Volker R. Berghahn, “Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the 
‘American Century,” Diplomatic History 23, (no 3, Summer 1999).
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Terminology
In light of the empirical parameters of this study just outlined, I shall almost 
always use the phrase ‘cultural and information diplomacy’ to refer collectively to the 
three policy programs I have identified as case studies. ‘Public diplomacy’ and 
‘political communication’ are terms generally applied to international persuasion 
policies in contemporary IR debates, however neither term was in routine use during 
1936-53 and so they are rarely used here. I frequently use the terms ‘rhetoric,’ 
‘discourse,’ and ‘narrative’ as each corresponds to a slightly different kind of 
linguistic function in the context of policy-making. ‘Rhetoric’ is a process of 
persuasive argument or ‘representational force,’ used when agents seek to persuade 
others to adopt particular renditions policy intentions or approaches over others.37 
‘Discourse’ and ‘discursive practice’ refer here to the propagation of shared 
representations that capture the premises of foreign policy-making. Following Doty’s 
usage, I deem discourse to be productive in its functions (as opposed to rhetoric, 
which is persuasive), consisting of interlocking representations which “underlie the 
production of knowledge and identities and...make various courses of action 
possible.”38 ‘Framing’ practices sit within discourses as premises, figurative 
assumptions or background knowledge through which particular policies or issues 
were articulated. Finally, ‘narratives’ pertain to discourses that establish overarching 
‘stories’ of foreign policy by plotting subjects within chronological trajectories and 
historical relationships.39
Establishing a clear definition of ‘culture’ as it is used in this study is 
particularly important, given the diverse and contested connotations of the term in 
social science usage.40 I use the term here in a way that owes much to the
37 In this I follow Mattern’s work in particular. Mattem, Ordering International Politics.
38 Doty, Imperial Encounters, p. 5
39 Campbell, Writing Security; Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in 
Regional Order, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
40 For many constructivists, culture is used as a term for the dispositional environments within which 
state interests are defined and agency takes place- a ‘decision-making culture.’ I do not adopt the 
constructivist definition here. On the constructivist view of decision-making or ‘strategic’ culture see, 
e.g.: Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in 
National Security,” in The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. 
Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy 
and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” pp. 210-1. In this sense, 
constructivists adopt a sociological view of culture, not an anthropological one, and have been inspired
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anthropological definition of culture as a cluster of national aesthetic dispositions 41 
To adopt this definition is not to settle the extensive social scientific debates about the 
nature of culture- an ‘essentially contested concept’ as Clifford Geertz puts it- but 
rather to chart the aesthetic and political judgements that policy-makers made about 
American culture in the course of framing cultural diplomacy strategies.42 ‘Culture’ 
in my usage is an artefact of foreign policy discourse: specific assessments about 
what was most emblematic of ‘America’ were made from a wide spectrum of cultural 
artefacts or propositions available to policy-makers for their international purposes.
‘Political culture’ is a term that will be used frequently in this study. 
Although the study of political culture within comparative politics has been subject to 
some significant critiques since the 1960s, the term is useful for the purposes of this 
analysis. In the course of framing definitions of ‘America’ to export, policy-makers 
made judgements about the ‘character of mind’ in which Americans engage in 
political life, and reflected on how these ideas and practices might be mobilised 
within world politics.43 ‘Political culture’ has in some work been cast as an 
alternative term to ‘ideology,’ since the latter refers to a set of beliefs a subject 
actively subscribes to, as opposed to the ‘political culture’ populations are socialised 
into. But since this dissertation is concerned with the definitional process of how 
political dispositions were represented in the context of policy-making, drawing this 
type of distinction between political culture and ideology creates needless
by work such as that of Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American 
Sociological Review 51, (no. 2, 1986).
41 On the anthropological view of culture see: Julie Reeves, Culture and International Relations: 
Narratives, Natives and Tourists, (Abington: Routledge, 2004).
J" Following Lapid’s suggestion that culture be considered an ‘emergent’ concept, and Clifford 
Geertz’s warning of the perils of seeking closure for an ‘essentially contested concept,’ however, I 
acknowledge the limitations of this anthropological definition beyond the confines of this account. 
Yosef Lapid, “Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory,” in The 
Return o f Culture and Identity in IR Theory, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1996); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford 
Geertz, (London: Huchinson, 1975).
43 One of the most influential definitions of political culture (as ‘civic culture’) see: Gabriel A. 
Almond, “The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept,” in The Civic Culture Revisited, eds. 
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. (London: Sage, 1989). The foundation for studies of US 
political culture as the American ‘character of mind’ see: Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in 
America and Two Essays on America, trans. Gerald E. Bevan, Penguin Edition (London: Penguin, 
2003). On the development of the concept in comparative politics and its failure to achieve a workable 
operational definition see: Ruth Lane, “Political Culture: Residual Category of General Theory?,” 
Comparative Political Studies 25, (no. 3, October 1992). A recent collection of essays draws on 
national collective memory, and as such usefully engages with the implications of political culture and 
national identity in foreign policy. See: Duncan Bell, “Introduction: Memory, Trauma and World 
Politics,” in Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Refections on the Relationship Between Past and 
Present, ed. Duncan Bell, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
19
complexity. I use both terms to refer to the storehouse of US political principles and 
practices that US cultural and informational officials drew on to represent America to 
other populations and as self-perceptions. The term ‘political culture’ differs from 
‘mass culture’ or ‘popular culture’ in the vocabulary of this study. American 
mass/popular culture was often projected alongside the communication of precepts of 
US political culture, or framed in official practices as an illustration of US political 
culture. But mass/popular culture are terms used here for the artistic and 
entertainment products produced and consumed by American society, some of which 
may convey elements of US political norms, but not by necessity.
Finally, ‘propaganda’ is understood for the purposes of my analysis as a 
straw figure of US foreign policy discourse, rather than as a practice with essential or 
inherent characteristics to distinguish it from cultural diplomacy or international 
information. The history of propaganda and the tradition of American propaganda 
critiques will be surveyed in some depth in chapter two, and I defer giving a detailed 
account of the origins of the term and practices until then. It shall suffice to note here 
that in seeking to understand how the constitution of American identity took place 
through the representation of American policy, the construction of ‘propaganda’ as a 
category of action, distinct in particular ways from Washington’s innovative and 
singular ‘cultural diplomacy’ or ‘informational diplomacy,’ is an objective of this 
study. Hence, propaganda is not defined as an inherently manipulative practice or in 
practical terms as essentially different from cultural and informational diplomacy 
within in my discussion.44 A basic general definition of propaganda as international 
political advocacy through informational or cultural mechanisms will suffice.
The Layout o f This Study
In chapter one I elucidate the threads of my study’s argument and the nature 
of its contribution to IR, illustrating in more depth the overarching thesis developed in 
my work concerning the constitutive significance of cultural and informational 
diplomacy discourse in relation to Washington’s wider role as an international agent.
44 The term ‘propaganda’ had religious origins as a non-pejorative term for propagating ideas or truth. 
However, during the 1930s the term had acquired its pejorative definition in America and Britain. In 
chapter two I engage with the intellectual history of the US ‘anti-propaganda’ debates, and the 
discursive process through which US policy-makers overcame this prevailing sentiment is charted in 
the case study chapters.
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I elaborate on the role that discourses of liberalism and American exceptionalism 
played in terms of how new ideas about America’s global role were articulated, 
drawing on the insights of constructivist theories of foreign policy. My conceptual 
framework, drawn from the discursive practices literature within constructivism, will 
be illustrated. I shall show how the discourses of US cultural and informational 
diplomacy fall into various categories of discursive practice, such as: the articulation 
of self/other, or ‘alterity;’ narratives; the framing of policies and issues; and the 
positioning of subjects through grammatical ‘predication.’ In the forthcoming 
chapter I also specify the relationship between my work to other contemporary 
accounts of cultural and informational diplomacy within the disciplines of 
International Relations and Diplomatic History.
Chapter two constitutes the beginning of this study’s historical component.
I chart the rise of propaganda as an instrument of international politics and the 
political debates in the US and Europe that accompanied these new foreign policy 
practices. The discussion also surveys the use of cultural and educational interchange 
in Europe, China and Latin America by American philanthropic organisations and 
other non-government institutions, since these practices served as a basis for the 
official programs. My discussion also traces the extension and deepening of US 
foreign relations in general during the inter-war years, questioning in the process the 
‘isolationist’ moniker that is often applied to US foreign relations during this period. 
This sets the stage for the case studies to follow, in which I survey the establishment 
of the American bilateral cultural diplomacy, international information, and Unesco 
programs.
My first case study is surveyed in chapter three, in which I examine the 
founding and expansion of bilateral cultural diplomacy administered by the State 
Department’s Division of Cultural Relations.45 The Division was initially founded to 
implement five educational and cultural exchange treaties signed at the 1936 Pan 
American Conference in Buenos Aires. Prevailing discourses of American cultural 
diplomacy in this early phase emphasised the long-term diplomatic impacts of the 
search for inter-American cultural understanding. The extension of the cultural 
diplomacy program to a global scale was prompted by US involvement in the Second 
World War. Cultural operations were extended first to China, then to the Middle
45 The Division was subject to several name changes throughout the period surveyed here.
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East, South Asia and Western Europe, and in the immediate post-war period to the 
defeated and Allied-occupied Axis regions as part of a wider policy of ideological 
reorientation. I argue that representations of American culture as embodying 
universal, liberal democratic principles were implicated in the construction of 
Washington’s new role as a globally dominant power within the post-war order. I 
will also show how representations of American cultural diplomacy practices as 
singularly democratic and a symbol of historical progress in this post-war phase were 
implicated in the kind of cultural struggle that developed between Washington and 
Moscow in the early phases of the Cold War.
The functions of the Voice of America (VOA) radio station from 1941 to 
1953 are examined in chapter four. VOA was founded as a direct result of the US 
entry into the Second World War, and was intended to foster allied morale and 
counter the propaganda and psychological warfare policies of the Axis powers. 
Policy debates within VOA throughout the war and its aftermath were fraught with 
quandaries over how the manipulative practices of ‘propaganda’ could be avoided, 
given the station’s role as an apparatus of international persuasion on behalf of the US 
government. In this context I chart how VOA’s staff sought to characterise their 
work as ‘journalism’ rather than outright persuasion, particularly in response to 
frequent policy directives from Washington that VOA should be primarily attentive to 
its diplomatic functions during the war. US informational officials resolved this 
tension between the ‘informative’ and ‘diplomatic’ functions of VOA by emphasising 
America’s singular ability, as a symbol of historical progress, to simultaneously 
persuade and enlighten foreign audiences. Similar dynamics to those observed within 
the cultural diplomacy programs are evident in the context of informational 
diplomacy during the early Cold War. Prevailing ideas about Washington’s approach 
to international information as a vehicle of free speech and democracy, and 
conversely of the distortion of international information by the Soviet Union, are 
shown to have helped generate a posture of global ideological antagonism within US 
foreign policy.
The final case study within this dissertation is the US’s diplomatic mission 
to Unesco, examined in chapter five. This case contributes some distinctive insights 
in the context of the study as a whole. Unesco’s multilateral structure forced the US 
delegates to engage with the perceptions and intentions of its co-members of Unesco 
in a more direct way than the bilateral cultural policies or the unidirectional radio
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practices necessitated. The period covered within this chapter encompasses the 
formulation of Washington’s interest in multilateral cultural cooperation prior to 
Unesco’s establishment in 1944-45, as well as the early phase of Unesco’s operation 
after 1946. Significant discursive practices in this case include US efforts to promote 
freedom of international information through Unesco and the emergence of the US’s 
self-perception as a Cold War protagonist after 1948. Both highlight the extent to 
which the representations that informed US cultural policy endogenously largely 
failed translate into an effective co-optive discourse in a multilateral context. This 
suggests that while the ‘universalism’ of America’s cultural and informational 
programs was a claim that had clear resonance for US policy-makers themselves, it 
did not necessarily translate into a policy consensus and compromise at the 
multilateral level.
The conclusion of my study will review the key insights and reflect on the 
implications of the discursive processes charted in the proceeding chapters. In it I 
will summarise and account for key similarities and differences in the articulation of 
America’s global role across the three case studies by considering how US cultural 
and informational diplomacy was articulated in relation to the Third World, the USSR 
and Europe. The wider impacts of the discursive representation of cultural and 
informational diplomacy in relation to US hegemony and Cold War grand strategy 
will also be considered. In this context I identify how cultural and informational 
discourse provided an arena in which the tensions and contradictions associated with 
the transformation of US foreign policy toward hegemony during 1936-53 were 
articulated and resolved.
With such complex factors at work, the constitutive and enabling functions 
of cultural and informational discourse on US hegemony must be understood as part 
of a much more diffuse process of historical change. But this study finds that there 
are, nonetheless, grounds for suggesting that the production of a new collective 
identity did inform Washington’s embrace of hegemony and vindicationism in the 
period under review here.46 Given the foundational role played by cultural and 
ideological antagonisms in the early Cold War, the way in which America was 
represented by cultural and informational diplomats can be seen to have had a
4(1 On this Cold War literature see especially: Nigel Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural 
Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 27, (no. 2, April 2003); Scott Lucas, Freedom's War: The American 
Crusade Against the Soviet Union, (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
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palpable wider significance. Even as Washington sought to stridently denounce 
Communist absolutism during the late 1940s, the themes of liberal evangelism and 
American exceptionalism that were mobilised within the programs can be seen to 
have led Washington down a similarly absolutist path. Having constructed a morally 
privileged global role for America since the early days of cultural and informational 
diplomacy, the representation of America in the context of these programs served, 
despite the lofty intentions of the individual officials involved, to deepen the 
ideological antagonism.47
In the final section of the conclusion I shall highlight the contributions made 
by my study in calling for the development of a broader, theoretically-informed 
research agenda into cultural and informational diplomacy. I show how discursive 
practices analysis and the broader constructivist theoretical project should take note 
of cultural and informational diplomacy as sites in which the constitution of states, 
internationally and self-reflexively, as subjects of international relations takes place. 
This discussion shows how new space has been opened for considering the self- 
constitutive functions of cultural and informational diplomacy as practised by other 
states, and in particular how American exceptionalism has been, and remains, an 
important concept in understanding of identity of America as a hegemonic subject.
47 Readers familiar with Reinhold Niebuhr’s work will note that my argument moves toward that 
developed in The Irony o f American History. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony o f American History, (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952).
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CHAPTER ONE
ARTICULATING US CULTURAL AND INFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY: 
LIBERALISM, EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE DISCURSIVE PRACTICES
OF US FOREIGN POLICY
This study develops an account of the formulation of US cultural and informational 
diplomacy strategies during 1936-53 and assesses the broader significance of these 
practices in the context of US foreign relations. In it I draw broadly on a 
constructivist theoretical approach to IR that asks how states acquire identities as 
agents in world politics, and I aim specifically to show how the functions of discourse 
in formulation of US cultural and informational diplomacy policy can be explained 
within the terms of a constructivist approach. Constructivist theory, as I indicated in 
the foregoing chapter, takes the inter-subjective construction of state interests and the 
impact of shared ideas and norms on state behaviour as its key object of analysis. 
Foreign policy, in this view, is not only a process in which particular courses of 
action are weighed up in terms of their costs and benefits, but also a site at which the 
identity propositions and interests that are implicit within policy decision-making are 
inter-subjectively constituted.1 Moving beyond approaches to foreign policy analysis 
that see bargaining between rational bureaucratic actors with pre-given preferences as 
the substance of foreign policy-making, the approach utilised here sets out to
1 This view of interests as dynamic and inter-subjectively constituted is often presented by 
constructivist scholars as stemming from an initial critical turn away from the neo-utilitarian view of 
state interests as fixed as immutable. A useful summary of the constructivist challenge to it is 
developed in John Gerard Ruggie’s article: “What Makes the World Hang Together?.” Ruggie’s 
underlying critique of neo-utilitarianism is ontological. It contends that within this orthodoxy 
“ideational factors, when they are examined at all, are rendered in strictly instrumental terms, useful or 
not to self-regarding individuals (units) in the pursuit of typically material interests, including efficacy 
concerns.” Constructivists, on the other hand, proceed to develop a richer ontology of world politics in 
that they argue that ‘social facts’ shape international outcomes. John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes 
the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International 
Organization 52, (no. 4, Autumn 1998), pp. 855-6. Jutta Weldes situates the critical turn that 
constructivists embarked upon in viewing national interests as constructed not in terms of ontology but 
the explanation of foreign policy decisions: “As many critics have noted, the deductive determination 
of national interests...has led to a conception of those interests which is ‘too broad, too general, too 
vague, too all-inclusive’ to explain state action.” Weldes also notes that policy-makers and officials at 
the state level should comprise the main focus in an analysis of state interest-formation, as is 
undertaken in my study. Jutta Weldes, “Constructing National Interests,” European Journal o f 
International Relations 2, (no. 3, 1996), p. 278.
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determine how shared ideas about the content of state interests are “produced, 
reproduced and transformed” in the course of policy debate and implementation.2
Within the context of this constructivist theorisation of foreign policy, I 
draw on a strand of existing research that applies discourse analysis to the study of 
foreign policy as the conceptual framework for my analysis. Discursive practices 
analysis adopts the premise that language comprises a key mechanism through which 
the shared identities, interests, and role conceptions that inform foreign policy are 
(re)constituted, and in turn shape state behaviour. As Roxanne Doty summarises, a 
discursive practices approach to foreign policy analysis is attentive to the fact that:
Policy makers...function within a discursive space that imposes 
meanings on their world and thus creates reality...An approach 
that focuses on discursive practices as a unit of reality can get at 
how this ‘reality’ is produced and maintained and how it makes 
various practices possible.3
Language has further significance within this approach in that it famishes agents with 
symbolic tools or rhetorical capacities that enable actions in a social context such as 
policy-making.4
The historical analysis of US foreign policy that will be presented in the 
forthcoming chapters is structured around these premises, as I seek to emphasise how 
the practices of American cultural and informational diplomacy practices were 
constituted and enabled by the language in which policy initiatives were articulated, 
debated and implemented. As I suggested in the preceding chapter, the available 
archival sources charting the formation of US cultural and informational diplomacy
2 Jutta Weldes, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment,” Mershon International 
Studies Review 42, (no. 2, November 1998), p. 218. Good summaries of the kind of approach to 
foreign policy analysis entailed by a discursive practices approach are also supplied in the following: 
Jamie Gaskarth, “Discourses and Ethics: The Social Construction of British Foreign Policy,” Foreign 
Policy Analysis 2, (vol. 4, 2006); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy: German 
Reconstruction and the Invention o f the West, (Ann Arbor, Ml: University of Michigan Press, 2006). 
On the development of the rational choice approach to Foreign Policy Analysis as actor-specific theory 
and the limits of rational choice analysis within this approach, see: Valerie M Hudson, with 
Christopher S. Vore, “Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” Mershon 
International Studies Review 39, (no. 2, October, 1995). In other work Hudson has defended the key 
tenets of the rational choice approach, but nonetheless acknowledges the contribution of constructivist 
insights to some empirical problems within the study of foreign policy-making: Valerie M. Hudson, 
“Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,” Foreign 
Policy Analysis 1, (no. 1,2005), pp. 3-4.
3 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly 37, (no. 3, 1993), p. 303.
4 Weldes, “Bureaucratic Politics,” pp. 217-9.
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policy during 1936-53 indicate that policy debates within these programs were replete 
with patterns of self-reflection and discussion about the sources of moral and 
historical progress on an epochal scale. The argument made here is that these 
discourses had significant implications for the kinds of policies that were actually 
pursued within the cultural and informational programs as well as, more diffusely, 
shaping the hegemonic global posture that Washington pursued at a more general 
level during and after the Second World War and into the Cold War. I shall show 
how cultural and informational officials set about cultivating and propagating new 
ideas about the nature of America and how it should behave as a hegemonic world 
power, and suggest how these shared propositions fitted into the transformation of 
Washington’s posture of foreign relations during the Second World War. My 
analysis of the origins of American hegemony thus draws on a conception of power 
as partially determined by the social identities that agents acquire in the course of 
ongoing international interactions. In this sense, this study scrutinises the way in 
which Washington claimed a new identity in world politics and was thus able to draw 
on a set of concomitant international social capacities that went with it.
There are several strands of the existing literature within International 
Relations and Diplomatic History that my work draws upon and has implications for. 
Although my work has some bearing on the concerns adopted by contemporary 
public diplomacy studies and also draws heavily on the recent research into cultural 
and informational diplomacy in the field of Diplomatic History, the theoretical 
interests and purposes that I adopt largely differ from the existing perspectives within 
these fields. In taking up a conceptual framework that emphasises the constitutive 
functions of discourse and a conception of power in world politics as deriving from 
state identities and the social capacities they entail, my study is shaped by the 
theoretical interests and substantive concerns of the discursive practices research 
agenda within constructivist International Relations scholarship.5 In the kinds of 
conclusions that I draw concerning what kinds of shared ideas structured US foreign 
relations, this work also joins a burgeoning contemporary research agenda among 
scholars of US foreign policy that analyses the particular cultural, political and
5 I take the term ‘discursive practices approach’ from the work of Roxanne Doty. A summary of this 
approach is provided at a later stage in my discussion, so 1 will defer listing key examples at this point. 
See, e.g. Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics o f North-South Relations, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
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historical determinants of American foreign relations.6 This recent literature has 
sought to revisit the history of American foreign relations with an analytical interest 
in the singularity of US foreign policy doctrines in mind, and amounts to a renewed 
interest, in the parlance of John Gerard Ruggie, in the extent to which the fact of 
“American hegemony was every bit as important as American hegemony in shaping 
the...[post-1945 world] order.”7 In doing so, this contemporary engagement with the 
issue of whether there is a distinctive American style of foreign policy joins a more 
longstanding tradition of academic reflection on the nature and significance of 
America’s ideological traditions, of which the work of Louis Hartz and Reinhold 
Niebuhr is particularly illustrative. As Hartz memorably framed his assessment of 
American foreign relations, and in terms that point toward the fundamental argument 
of this study:
When one’s ultimate values are accepted wherever one turns, the 
absolute language of self-evidence comes easily enough. This then 
is the mood of America’s absolutism: the sober faith that its norms 
are self-evident. It is one of the most powerful absolutisms in the 
world.. .It was so sure of itself that it hardly needed to become 
articulate, so secure that it could actually support a pragmatism 
which seemed on the surface to belie it. American pragmatism has 
always been deceptive because, glacierlike, it has rested on miles of 
submerged conviction.8
In this chapter I shall elaborate on the theoretical and historical argument 
that will be made within my study, and specify the conceptual framework that I adopt 
in more detail than was possible in the foregoing chapter. My argument turns on 
what I find to be the most significant constitutive and enabling functions of the 
discursive representations mobilised during the formulation of US cultural and
6 1 supply a more detailed survey of the key contributions to this debate as this chapter proceeds.
7 Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?,” p. 863.
8 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation o f American Political Thought 
Since the Revolution, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1955), pp. 58-9. See also: Reinhold 
Niebuhr, The Irony o f American History, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952). For a survey of 
American literature that reflects on the distinctiveness of America’s history and culture, see: Sacvan 
Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). Some of 
the writing of Hans Morgenthau also reflects on the peculiar and distinctive strength of moral 
imperatives in US foreign policy thinking, see: Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Mainsprings of American 
Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions,” The American Political Science Review 
44, no. 4 (December, 1950).
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informational diplomacy. I thus aim to determine what particular kinds of linguistic 
representations opened and maintained possibilities for Washington to make ongoing 
use of the cultural and informational instruments of international persuasion during 
1936-53. I also suggest how emerging ideas about the nature of America as a global 
cultural and informational subject helped to facilitate Washington’s embrace of a 
posture of embedded global hegemony during this period. The formulation of US 
cultural and informational policy was not always a straightforward process, however, 
and one of key findings of my analysis is that US cultural and informational 
diplomacy were sites at which several contending ways of constituting ‘America’ and 
its national interests were debated by foreign policy-makers. In the paragraphs to 
follow I shall also explore the parameters of the conceptual framework adopted for 
this study, which I draw from the existing constructivist literature that applies a 
discursive practices approach to the analysis of foreign policy. Lastly, in this chapter 
I shall situate my work in relation to other approaches within International Relations 
and Diplomatic History that have engaged with the practices of cultural and 
informational diplomacy, highlighting in the course of my discussion how my work 
differs both theoretically and methodologically from these existing accounts. In this 
final section I will also specify how my work extends the explanatory range of 
discursive practices approach.
The Functions of Discourse in US Cultural and Informational Diplomacy: The 
Argument of this Study
As I outlined in my introductory chapter, I adopt two research questions to 
guide my investigation of the discursive basis of US cultural and informational 
diplomacy and my assessment of the wider implications of cultural and informational 
discourse for US foreign relations. In order to establish an overarching historical 
account of the development of American cultural and informational policies I initially 
ask: what were the key developments within US cultural and informational diplomacy 
during 1936-53, the period during which the tools of international persuasion were 
first taken up on an ongoing basis by Washington? The second research question 
animating this study draws on the concepts of discursive power articulated within 
constructivist theorisation of foreign policy making, and calls for an enquiry into the 
functions of language in the context of US cultural and informational diplomacy.
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Specifically, I ask to what extent did the articulation of cultural and informational 
initiatives by US policy-makers function to encourage and enable the projection and 
embedding of American power within international system?
My study answers the latter question in two ways. First, I chart and analyse 
the key features of foreign policy discourse within the US cultural and informational 
diplomacy programs, and aim to show how the practice of discursive representation 
enabled certain kinds of policy strategies to be contemplated and rendered others less 
desirable, or indeed unthinkable, within the context of Washington’s cultural and 
informational diplomacy programs. In this way I shall be able to chart what kinds of 
moral, cultural and political representations constituted Washington’s posture of 
cultural and informational diplomacy. The 1936-53 period was a time of extensive 
changes to the international system, and my study illustrates how the shared ideas that 
informed US cultural and informational diplomacy evolved alongside the global 
transformation that the Second World War brought about.9
Secondly, and in addition to my primary goal of assessing representations of 
America and its national interests within the context of cultural and informational 
practices, I shall extend my analysis to suggest some connections between the 
discursive representations mobilised in the course of cultural and informational 
diplomacy and the transition toward embedded global hegemony as the overarching 
posture of US foreign relations. The discursive representation of US cultural and 
informational diplomacy is taken here as a condition of possibility that shaped the 
kind of hegemonic role and global ideological posture that Washington adopted after 
1945. Hence the unfolding representations of cultural and informational diplomacy 
surveyed here are taken as evidence of “new beliefs [that created] new policy choices, 
even policy imperatives” at the level of US grand strategy.10
9 As I noted in the foregoing introductory chapter, the assumption of a posture of global hegemony by 
Washington has been surveyed extensively within IR scholarship in relation to other aspects of 
American power such as the extension of US military capabilities; the achievement of US economic 
hegemony and the establishment of institutions to bind other states to US power over the long term. 
While a number of excellent studies of how the extension of US cultural and ideological power was 
contemplated during this transition already exist (notably Frank Ninkovich’s Diplomacy o f Ideas) the 
cultural and informational foundations of American hegemony lamentably remain an under-explored 
feature of the post-war moment in International Relations scholarship. Frank Ninkovich, The 
Diplomacy o f Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981).
10 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose o f Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use o f Force, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 14-5. I use the term 'grand strategy’ here in a general way, to 
denote the general posture of engagement that Washington took up, rather than in a strict 
military/strategic sense. 1 agree somewhat with Robert J. Art’s broader use of the term to encompass
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Seeking to assess the wider impacts of the discursive representations 
mobilised by US cultural and informational diplomats- in terms of their generating or 
enabling functions for the projection of American global hegemony- brings with it 
some important caveats. There is a danger of placing undue emphasis on cultural and 
informational discourse as a direct, causal factor in changes to US grand strategy, 
during what was a phase of immense global upheaval and extensive domestic debate 
on foreign policy issues within the United States, and in which significant material 
factors were also crucial to how Washington contemplated its post-war role. The 
material base of America’s post-war hegemony is not denied within the terms of my 
analysis. What I instead ask is how shared propositions concerning the purposes 
behind the projection America’s material power evolved. Furthermore, most 
accounts of how discursive practices shape global politics emphasise that linguistic 
representations constitute international subjects in a diffuse fashion; in terms of 
enabling certain possibilities to be contemplated rather than operating as specific 
causal instances." Since my argument identifies how foreign policy possibilities 
were constituted rather than how changes to US policy were ‘caused,’ I seek to show 
in the pages to follow that the policy debates examined here were one part of a much 
more diffuse and complex tapestry of changing ideas about America and its global 
role that developed in the political and public spheres during 1936-53. “ My study
non-military ends, but expand my conception of grand strategy to also encompass the non-military 
means of US foreign relations. Although the term brings with it some association with strategic 
studies, it is also a very useful short-hand term for the kinds of broad postures in US foreign policy that
I am interrogating within this study. See Robert J. Art, “A Defensible Defence: America’s Grand 
Strategy After the Cold War,” International Security 15, (no. 4, Spring 1991), pp. 6-7.
II Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International 
Organization 59, (no. 1, Winter 2005); Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction.” Weldes 
describes the kind of causality captured by this approach as how identities constituted certain forms of 
action as ‘warranted’ rather than directly causing outcomes: Weldes, “Constituting National Interests,” 
p. 282. On ‘how possible’ arguments, see Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” pp. 298-9. 
The specific causal implications of ideas are not discounted within my approach, however. Studies of 
rhetoric and of ideas as ‘symbolic technologies’ within the discursive practices approach chart how in 
certain relational contexts language attains a high degree of causal specificity. See Mattem on 
representational force: Janice Bially Mattem, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force 
and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Millennium 33, (no. 3, 2005); on 
symbolic tools see: Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, “Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies 
in the Study of International Relations,” European Journal o f International Relations 3, (no. 2, 1997).
12 For example, this was an era of extensive and influential media debates on US grand strategy and 
foreign policy, of which Henry Luce’s 1941 Life Magazine editorial lauding the twentieth century as 
the ‘American century’ is emblematic. A good historical work that assesses the impacts of Luce’s 
claim is Donald White, The American Century: The Rise and Decline o f the United States as a World 
Power, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). In focusing on the kinds of debates on America’s 
cultural and informational role primarily conducted among policy-makers, but also incorporating 
media and academic comment, this study complements these existing accounts about the 
transformation of US foreign policy.
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illuminates how, with these significant material shifts and broader domestic policy 
debates also at work, conceptions of US cultural and informational diplomacy were 
nonetheless significant in constituting the posture of embedded global hegemony that 
Washington cultivated towards the end of the Second World War and its aftermath.
The 1936-53 phase of American diplomatic history constitutes a phase of 
fundamental transformation in terms of how deeply the connection between American 
security/prosperity and that of the world order was envisaged. My study illustrates 
how cultural and informational discourses naturalised the idea that American power 
must be embedded within the world order in the closing stages of the Second World 
War. This was a period during which American foreign policy-makers began to 
articulate plans for a peace settlement that involved a far-reaching set of reforms to 
the global order, precisely the kinds of progressive ideals that cultural and 
informational diplomats were routinely situated as an integral foundation for a 
durable post-war settlement in an interdependent and ideologised world. The 
representation of US cultural and informational diplomacy thus helped to define 
terms according to which Washington envisaged and pursued the reordering of the 
global order after 1945. Furthermore, part of what was distinctive about US foreign 
policy during the post-1945 settlement was that it was at the end of the Second World 
War that Washington began to see the need to systematically pursue an ongoing 
engagement with the international order by means of authority and legitimacy, rather 
than outright domination or imperialism. The articulation of US cultural and 
informational diplomacy in this founding of the post-1945 world order provides an 
interesting view onto how Washington sought to construct a position of world 
authority and claimed a legitimate right to global influence during 1936-45.
The emergence of the Cold War as an ideological struggle during the 1940s 
provides an important indication that the prevailing conceptions of ‘America’ 
articulated within the cultural and informational programs had a constitutive influence 
on US foreign policy and grand strategy. To restate this central point: the kinds of 
moral, cultural and historical questions that had preoccupied US cultural and 
informational officials in the early phases of the programs are observed as having 
moved into the centre of US grand strategy thinking as a response to American 
antagonisms with the USSR. My study takes this as testament to the kinds of 
generative and enabling functions that US cultural and informational practices 
performed in terms of how Washington was constituting its position and interests in
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world politics. Washington’s emergence as a protagonist in the Cold War 
propaganda struggle highlights how self-understandings of American cultural and 
political identity had become central to Washington’s sense of itself as a global 
hegemon.
As the chapters to follow will show, however, policy debates within the US 
cultural and informational programs indicate that the assumption of a Cold War 
posture of ideological conflict was not straightforward or uncontested: there were 
officials in all three case studies adopted here who felt that Washington should not 
partake of ideological antagonisms in an instrumental or overly strident manner. At a 
basic level, however, the fact that cultural and informational programs themselves 
had come to be regarded by these Cold War dissenters as symbols of America that 
must not be pressed into the service of propaganda warfare reinforces my central line 
of argument. These controversies indicate that cultural and informational diplomacy 
were practices that both sides of the debate on America’s Cold War strategy sought to 
definitively interpret, and thus they had some value as constitutive principles of 
American power and purposes in the global order.
The argument developed here complements a set of existing historical 
explanations of the sources of Cold War antagonisms. As the work of Nigel Gould- 
Davies, Scott Lucas, Robert L. Ivie, and especially David Campbell have all in 
various ways contended, from the first stages of the Cold War the ideological 
implications of Soviet expansionism were seen in Washington as an inherent threat to 
both US national security and the integrity of the post-war order. 13 As Washington
13 Nigel Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 27, (no. 2, 
April 2003); Scott Lucas, Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union, (New 
York: New York University Press, 1999); Robert L. Ivie, “Fire, Flood and Red Fever: Motivating 
Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, 
(no. 3, September 1999); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the 
Politics o f Identity, rev. ed., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). A further illustration 
of my overall point has been made by Reinhold Wagonlietiner, who has argued: “The wartime 
bureaucratisation and formalisation of the cultural programs of the Department of State, after a short 
crisis immediately after World War II, allowed the complete integration of cultural diplomacy into the 
wider objectives of America...In the cultural Cold War consensus, liberal ideas could acquire an 
apologetic function for political conservative.” Reinhold Wagonleitner, “Propagating the American 
Dream: Cultural Policies as a Means of Integration.” American Studies Internationalism 24, (no. 1, 
April 1986), p. 78. On the emergence and central role of ideological struggle in US foreign policy 
thinking see also, David Ryan, “Mapping Containment: The Cultural Construction of the Cold War,” 
in American Cold War Culture, ed. Douglas Field (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005); 
James R. Vaughn, The Failure o f American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945- 
57: Unconquerable Minds, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), ‘Introduction;’ Ninkovich, The 
Diplomacy o f Ideas-, Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World o f Arts
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and Moscow faced the successive geopolitical quandaries that emerged out of the 
post-1945 European settlement with deepening mutual animus, the Soviet intention to 
establish a sphere of ideological influence within Europe was increasingly regarded 
by US policy-makers as inherently untenable on moral and ideological grounds. The 
March 1947 declaration of the ‘Truman Doctrine’ to forestall the extension of the 
USSR’s European geopolitical influence constituted an especially clear signal that 
ideology had come to be regarded as the currency according to which the post-war 
balance of geopolitical influence would be measured. As Truman’s address to 
Congress charged:
We shall not realise our objectives...unless we are willing to help 
free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national 
integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon 
them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition 
that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or 
indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace 
and hence the security of the United States.14
and Letters, (New York: The New Press, 1999). On official national security thinking on propaganda 
see: United States National Security Council, “Newly Declassified Annexes of A Report to the 
National Security Council by the Executive Secretary of United States Objectives and Programs for 
National Security: April 14, 1950,” with Comments by James H. McCall, SAIS Review 29, (no. 1, 
Winter/Spring 1999). John Lewis Gaddis foreshadows this kind of reading, particularly Ivie’s account 
of the Truman Doctrine, within his touchstone history of the Containment doctrine in US grand 
strategy. He emphasises the important point that the concept of ideological struggle was partly 
intended to convince the American public to support US foreign policy initiatives to halt the extension 
of Soviet power. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War 1941-1947, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 348-51. On US public opinion and the 
administration’s rationale and strategy for gaining public support for the Cold War, see also: Steven 
Casey, “Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of 
Mobilisation, 1950-1,” Diplomatic History 19, (no. 4, September, 2005).
14 Harry Truman, “Address: Truman Doctrine,” in The Truman Administration: A Documentary 
History, eds. Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, (New York: Harper & Row, [1947] 1966). As 
Robert Irvie has argued, the Truman Doctrine address has come to be seen as one of the most 
important foundations for America’s ‘rhetorical vision’ of the Cold War, as the site in which the basic 
configuration of Washington’s Cold War motives was set out. He traces the use of metaphors of 
disease, fire and flood within Dean Acheson’s early drafts of the speech and their fruition in Truman’s 
eventual announcement to Congress, noting how the ‘terminology of motives’ that the disease 
metaphor implied staked out the Cold War as an exceptional kind of international emergency in which 
global containment represented the only feasible course of action. Within this totalising, exceptional 
kind of crisis scripted within this foundational Cold War discourse, communist ideology was the 
underlying contagion that the United States was charged with containing. Depictions in US anti- 
Communist rhetoric of the shadowy, subversive apparatus that the USSR had transmitted to the 
Western democracies also fits with this image. Ivie, “Fire, Flood and Red Fever.” The emergence of 
Cold War rhetoric and sensibilities within the US has thus been characterised as ‘prophetic dualism,’ 
which “divides the world into two camps...One side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at 
one with God’s will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between them is resolved only 
through the total victory of one side over the other.” See: Phillip Wander, “The Rhetoric of American 
Foreign Policy,” in Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, Ideology, eds. Martin J. Medhurst et. al., 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 157.
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The fact that Communist ideology was cast by these prevailing representations as a 
threat in itself to American interests indicates that the questions that had deeply 
preoccupied US cultural and informational diplomats- such as, which moral and 
political values Washington stood for, and how it should extend these within world 
politics- had by the late 1940s become one of main lenses through which Washington 
understood its strengths and challenges in relation to Cold War geopolitics.
The historical period surveyed within my study concludes just before the 
Eisenhower presidential campaign. Eisenhower’s foreign policy rhetoric during this 
campaign was interesting because international information and psychological 
warfare policies were stated to be a key national security issue for America.15 As a 
result of several high-level reviews of US informational diplomacy called 
immediately after Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, an Executive Agency, the 
United States Information Agency (USIA), was founded and remained in operation 
until the 1990s.16 The situating of the Cold War propaganda struggle as an election 
issue and the founding of USIA constitute a logical end-point to my analysis. 
Eisenhower’s national security posture signals that the articulation of America as an 
international cultural and informational agent had well and truly become a central 
feature of US grand strategy and geopolitics, and that the cultural and informational 
diplomacy programs had also largely settled on a paradigm of Cold War ideological 
warfare as the format of their operations. The phase of transformation that went 
before 1953 is thus interesting because it encompassed such significant elements of 
promise, frustration and contradiction within the global order. Periods of transition
15 The most comprehensive account of the role of propaganda in Eisenhower’s foreign policy thinking 
and first presidential campaign is Shawn J. Parry-Giles, The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and 
the Cold War, 1945-1955, (Westport CT: Praeger, 2002). John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f 
Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar American National Security Policy, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), pp. 154-61; Holly Cowan Shulman, The Voice o f America: Propaganda and 
Democracy, 1941-1945, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 50-1.
16 Leo Bogart, Cool Worlds, Cold War: A New Look at USIA 's Premises for Propaganda, revised ed., 
(Washington DC: American University Press, 1995); Kenneth A. Osgood, “Form Before Substance: 
Eisenhower’s Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy,” Diplomatic 
History 24, (no. 3, Summer 2000); Wilson P. Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story o f the US 
Information Agency, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); R. E. Elder, The Information Machine: The 
United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy, (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1968); John W. Henderson, The United States Information Agency, (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1969); Walter Hixon, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Lois Roth, “Public Diplomacy and the Past: The Search for an 
American Style of Propaganda (1952-1977),” Fletcher Forum 8, (no. 2, 1984); Hans N. Tuch, 
Communicating With The World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1990).
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throw the functions of discourse into clear relief, as we shall see in successive stages 
of the US cultural and informational programs when policy-makers sought to fashion 
out of existing representations new ways of comprehending and responding to the 
rapidly changing global conditions of 1936-53.
Let us review the foregoing points. The overarching argument within this 
study is that the discursive representation of US cultural and informational diplomacy 
helped to generate and generalise the kinds of identity principles that were necessary 
for Washington to adopt the posture of embedded, vindicationist hegemony that as 
cultivated in the post-war period. That cultural and informational diplomacy were 
adopted during the course of the Second World War at all was a significant departure 
within US foreign policy, and the discursive practices scrutinised here show how 
these new policies were symbolically enabled and naturalised as legitimate features of 
US foreign policy through discursive representation. The justifications that were 
articulated for continuing the US cultural and informational programs into peacetime 
also illustrate the transition from Washington’s ad hoc approach internationalism 
during the inter-war years to a posture of embedded hegemony after 1945.17 The 
initially modest but, after the US entered the war, steadily growing acceptance within 
Washington that an ongoing cultural and informational diplomacy program was 
necessary for American foreign policy accompanied and, I argue, played a role in 
enabling this much broader shift in US foreign relations toward the cultivation of a 
posture of hegemony. Furthermore, I argue that conceptions of America’s cultural 
and informational influence had profound implications for the emergence of the Cold 
War as the overarching rationale of US grand strategy.
Two themes stand out as having particular constitutive and symbolic 
resonance within the articulation of US cultural and informational diplomacy 
practices during 1936-53: liberalism and exceptionalism.18 In the chapters to follow I 
shall trace how these two themes were drawn on in relation to specific policy 
initiatives within US cultural and informational diplomacy, and also highlight how
17 I shall survey US foreign policy in the inter-war period in the forthcoming chapter, and in this 
discussion 1 depart from the conventional image of inter-war ‘isolationism’ in emphasising the 
extension of US influence, especially in Asia and Latin America.
18 As it happens, recent work by Vibeke Pedersen characterises liberalism and exceptionalism as the 
two cardinal, and fundamentally oppositional, traditions in US foreign policy thinking. Vibeke Schou 
Pedersen, “In Search of Monsters to Destroy? The Liberal American Security Paradox and a 
Republican Way Out,” International Relations 17, (no. 2, 2003).
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they were conveyed within different kinds of discursive practice in the context of 
policy-making. I shall summarise my argument concerning the significance of these 
two themes in the sections below.
The Substance of American Self-Representation: Liberalism and Exceptionalism 
in the Discursive Representation of US Cultural and Informational Diplomacy
Cultural and Informational Practices as Liberalism
As the material presented in the chapters to follow will illustrate, liberalism, 
and in particular the conception of ‘freedom’ entailed by liberal discourse, was an 
important symbolic resource for cultural and informational policy-makers as they 
articulated and debated policy initiatives and challenges. 19 As a key strand within US 
cultural and informational discourse, shared representations of America’s liberal 
political culture and its implications for how Washington should behave as a liberal 
power served to enable the extension of American power within the global order after 
the war. The lexicon of liberalism, as applied to American cultural and informational 
practices, scripted limits for the exercise of US power and signified Washington’s 
reluctance to pursue self-aggrandisement through formal imperialism or naked global 
domination. Just as the domestic powers of the government of the United States had 
been purposely fragmented to guarantee the American people their political freedom, 
so too were the liberal scripts mobilised by US cultural and informational officials 
intended to convey Washington’s intention to establish a consultative post-war order 
in which US influence would be bounded by regulating institutions. The 
articulation of American liberalism in this way was not solely intended to cast 
America’s intentions in a favourable light to global public audiences, however. The 
liberal scripts of US cultural and informational diplomacy will be shown to have also 
been directed internally, during between policy-makers, to address lingering
19 In the argument to follow 1 draw on the work of Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, and also on the path­
breaking work of Anne Swidler, to argue that ideas can endow agents with particular capacities in the 
context of social action. Ideas are thus ‘inextricably embedded’ in the kinds of material practices and 
relations of power that agents function within. Laffey and Weldes, “Beyond Belief,” pp. 209-10; Ann 
Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51, (no. 2, 1986).
20 Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in 
the Twentieth Century, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). See also: G. John Ikenberry, 
After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding o f Order After Major Wars, 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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questions as to how US political culture would be expressed within the increasingly 
extensive post-war global role that was being contemplated in Washington during the 
Second World War.
The mobilisation of liberalism as a constitutive principle of US cultural and 
informational diplomacy was particularly evident as US policy-makers and diplomats 
sought to repudiate the term ‘propaganda’ as a description of their own cultural and 
informational activities. Instead, US officials represented American practices in 
singular terms, as a manifestation of truthful, progressive and apolitical intentions 
rather than self-aggrandisement or manipulation. In this way, US officials explicitly 
contrasted their actions with the deceptive practices of other states, particularly (but 
not solely) the Axis and the USSR. As the head of the US Office of War Information 
Elmer Davis had reflected in relation to US informational activities:
It may be said that [State Department programs] must be propaganda 
in intention, otherwise why should the State Department conduct it?... 
the intention is to see that foreign countries get a complete picture of 
what is going on in America...[I]n the long run that the total picture 
will create a good impression of the United States.21
Within the cultural diplomacy programs, this commitment to presenting an open, 
truthful face to the world by instituting reciprocal cultural interchange was one basis 
upon which US officials sought to naturalise cultural programs within US foreign 
relations by connecting them to the liberal traditions of US political culture. Liberal 
principles were called upon in a similar way by policy-makers within the US 
informational diplomacy program. By adopting a truthful, journalistic paradigm the 
programs could thus “take into account the nature of the hostile propaganda, its 
effectiveness, and take specific measures to offset it without feeling that we are 
betraying our principles by so doing.” 22 The nature of American culture itself, as a 
‘civic’ ethos constituted around liberal principles rather than an exclusive ethnic 
identity, was also a significant manifestation of the liberal script that had been 
attached to cultural diplomacy programs. In many cases, the cultural openness and 
pluralism that America’s liberal creed had nurtured was represented as the source of
21 Elmer Davis, “Address of Elmer Davis to the Chicago Rotary Club, 26 February, 1940,” p. 9; Box 4; 
Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.
22 W. R. Tyler, to William T. Stone, “Notes on the OIC Program,” 22 April, 1947, p. 3; Records 
Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of 
State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.
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Washington’s potential to regenerate world politics after the destructive nationalist 
hatreds that had ignited the Second World War.23
As a symbolic technology utilised in the context of policy-making, the 
explicit repudiation of ‘propaganda’ and the assertion that America’s culture itself 
was civic rather than ethnic rendered acceptable the practices of cultural and 
informational diplomacy acceptable according to the established creeds of US 
political culture. What is especially interesting in this regard is that categorising 
‘propaganda’ in pejorative terms within US policy debate functioned as a discursive 
strategy that actually situated America’s tools of international persuasion within the 
liberal critique of propaganda, and thus superior to the narrow, manipulative policies 
of other states. In articulating US cultural and informational diplomacy in this way, a 
sense of moral and political license was symbolically claimed for the cultural and 
informational programs by their staff. The analysis that I develop in the following 
chapters also shows how this sense of superiority constrained informational and 
cultural policy choices. By fixing a vocabulary of US cultural and informational 
diplomacy that signalled America’s liberalism in such an overt way, there was by the 
late 1940s only limited scope for self-criticism and dissenting voices to be 
incorporated within to the terms of US cultural and informational diplomacy debates. 
Even as American cultural and informational practices edged closer to a selective and 
manipulative ‘propaganda’ posture during the Cold War, many American cultural and 
informational officials continued to laud the openness, the reticence, and the tolerance 
of debate that had led Americans to have a ‘traditional’ aversion to propaganda.24 I 
contend here that in this respect the Manichaean tone of the Cold War ideological 
struggle was encouraged rather than diffused within the terms of America’s ‘liberal’ 
cultural and informational practices. This was because the representation of America
24 See Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. Sacvan Bercovitch effectively summarises the 
expansive implications of this doctrine of America’s civic culture within the American political 
tradition: “Of all symbols of identity, only America has united nationality and universality, civic and 
spiritual selfhood, secular and redemptive history, the country’s past and paradise to be, in a single 
synthetic ideal.” Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad, p. 176.
24 The work of Roxanne Doty and Patrick Jackson on discursive ‘fixity’ and ‘rhetorical 
commonplaces’ resonates in the context of this argument. Doty suggests that the most reified, 
accepted terms within policy discourse are often the most contentious, politicised and hegemonic 
representations to sustain. The prevalence of the idea that America ‘inherently’ rejected the practices 
of propaganda indicates that the effects of this discursive practice was far-reaching, and that the anti­
propaganda discourse was laden with some important judgements about the nature of America as a 
hegemonic subject. It tied into the notion of American exceptionalism, and had important implications 
for the way the Cold War developed in the late 1940s. In the chapters to follow this idea is further 
illustrated and developed. See, Doty, Imperial Encounters, ‘Introduction;’ Jackson, Civilizing the 
Enemy, ‘Ch 1.’
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in such singular terms seemed to suggest an antithesis: and the USSR thus came to be 
understood as an illiberal, immoral and inherently obstructive subject.
Washington’s involvement in Unesco’s founding and post-war development 
was also constituted around a lexicon of American liberalism. In the forthcoming 
chapter on US diplomacy within Unesco I shall emphasise how the principles of 
multilateralism; the free distribution of international information; and non­
governmental ism were themes that drew on liberal principles and became integral to 
the way in which Washington’s interests in relation to cultural multilateralism were 
articulated. By emphasising Unesco’s liberal functions as a clearing house for 
international cultural interchange, multilateral cultural cooperation could be justified 
by Unesco’s supporters as an essential component of the liberal orders that were 
being fostered in other spheres of international cooperation. As Elmer Davis once 
again asserted, Washington’s posture toward the Organisation should serve as 
testament to America’s historical commitment to liberal freedoms:
What we have got to be everlastingly vigilant about is the safeguarding 
of our moral and still more our intellectual base, for that- with our 
economic and military power behind it- is the real citadel of the free 
world.. .1 doubt if we could win a world war if we were not fighting 
for freedom- above all the freedom of the mind; there would be little 
temptation for others to be on our side if we were no better or little 
better than the opposition.
However, the liberal script that was thus applied to Unesco also functioned as 
symbolic license to the pursuit of American diplomatic and ideological dominance 
within the Organisation. Once again, the sense of superiority and entitlement that 
was bound up with celebrations of liberalism within foreign policy discourse appears 
to have inhibited the scope for self-correction in relation to the domineering way in 
which the US delegation was seeking to tum Unesco into an instrument of the Cold 
War struggle. As I shall show, established representations of America as a liberal 
global subject enabled US officials to unreflectively regard themselves as tolerant of 
open debate, political freedom and multilateral compromise, even as the US 
delegation worked in practice toward severely restricting opportunity for debate on 
Cold War non-alignment and social democracy within Unesco.
■5 Elmer Davis, “Address Delivered to a Meeting of the United States National Commission to Unesco, 
26 January 1952,” pp. 5-6; Box 4; Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.
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In the process of unpacking the functions of liberal self-representations 
within the discourses of US cultural and informational diplomacy, my argument 
highlights the permeability between America’s domestic political culture and the 
formulation of foreign policy. The work of John Gerard Ruggie develops a similar 
point: the post-1945 world order instituted by Franklin Roosevelt was, in Ruggie’s 
account, enabled by the “congruence between the vision of world order invoked... and 
the principles of domestic order at play in America’s understanding of its own 
founding, of its own sense of political community.”26 My own argument concerning 
the symbolic power of American liberal creeds in relation to US cultural and 
informational diplomacy reinforces Ruggie’s thesis. I show how the mobilisation of a 
liberal vocabulary enabled the initial adoption of cultural and informational 
diplomacy by situating these new diplomatic practices within the terms of existing 
liberal debates condemning ‘propaganda’ according to the tenets of US political 
culture itself. Liberalism also featured strongly in the representation of US cultural 
and informational objectives during implementation of the post-1945 peace 
settlement. The depictions of American cultural openness and universalism that were 
mobilised within the programs provided a warranting argument in favour of the 
projection and emedding of American political influence within the global order after 
1945. The idea of ‘freedom’ entailed by liberalism was a symbolic tool, articulated 
not in terms of “a series of liberal freedoms individuals (or even nations) possess, but 
[rather the] ... deployment of freedom as a power to do, make and act.”27 This 
illustrates one of the paradoxes of American foreign policy that my study probes: 
within the practices of US cultural and informational diplomacy liberalism became a 
claim to influence and a symbolic license to act as much as it was a self-imposed 
stmcture against the exercise of outright domination. Hence, the cases analysed in 
forthcoming chapters draw attention to the way in which the symbolic license entailed 
by liberal discourses of US foreign policy served as an inducement to the Cold War 
ideological conflict. The irony that liberalism could be fashioned into a justification 
for the projection of power was noted by Reinhold Niebuhr in the early 1950s. That 
Washington emerged as a protagonist in the Cold War conflict by mobilising its 
commitment to liberalism was for Niebuhr an irony of the most profound kind:
26 John Gerard Ruggie, “Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy,” 
International Security 21, (no. 4, Spring 1997), p. 93.
"7 Anthony Burke, “Freedom’s Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War,” Social 
Identities: Journal for the Study o f Race, Nation and Culture 11, (no. 4, July 2005), p. 327.
41
Our modem liberal culture, of which American civilization is such 
an unalloyed exemplar, is involved in many ironic refutations of its 
original pretensions of virtue, wisdom and power.. .we are involved 
in the double irony of confronting evils which were distilled from 
illusions, not generically different from our own.28
Exceptionalism and the Construction o f Cultural and Informational Diplomacy.
Closely tied to mobilisation of liberal discourse during the articulation of US 
cultural and informational diplomacy was a tendency to situate America in the 
context of world history as a singular moral and political subject that at the same time 
had universal resonance as a beacon to other states. These exceptionalist sentiments 
sprang from a longstanding tendency within US literary and political traditions to 
ascribe spiritual meaning to America’s historical and political break from Europe.29 
Niebuhr’s sense of irony that Washington’s efforts to wage ideological warfare 
during the Cold War were undertaken in liberalism’s name is more comprehensible 
when it is considered as a manifestation of this underlying conundrum of 
exceptionality within US political culture. The effort to actually turn American 
critiques of the illiberal impacts of propaganda into a lexicon of cultural and 
informational diplomacy that actually licensed Washington to use similar practices 
constituted a solipsism that was anchored within the logic of American 
exceptionalism.
In keeping with the terms of my theoretical framework, I define American 
exceptionalism in this study as a representational commonplace; a reflection of the 
shared meanings through which US officials comprehended and debated American 
foreign policy. As such, I depart from some of the existing work on American 
exceptionalism that has set out to defend the proposition that, due to its revolutionary 
birth, American democracy, economic policy, intellectual traditions, religious 
observance and party politics are qualitatively different from those of other states. 
This approach, associated with the work of Seymour Martin Lipset on America as the 
‘outlier case’ in particular, has already been subject to an insightful and convincing
28 Niebuhr, The Irony o f American History, p. viiii.
2l) Perry Miller, Errand Into The Wilderness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956); 
Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad.
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historiographical critique by Ian Tyrell, the terms of which shall not detain us here.30 
Instead, and to place my account of exceptionalism on firmer empirical ground, the 
work of Louis Hartz and Reinhold Neibuhr, and more recently that of H. W. Brands, 
Sacvan Bercovitch and John Gerard Ruggie, informs the account of American 
exceptionalism presented here.31 Brands’s term ‘vindicationism’ neatly captures my 
view of exceptionalism in the sense that it describes the solipsistic way in which US 
intentions were constituted in the aftermath of the Second World War, rather than 
articulating a substantive hypothesis about comparative US foreign policy 
behaviour.32
30 See especially: Seymor Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and
Comparative Perspective, (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963); Seymor Martin Lipset, American 
Exceptionalism: A Double Edged Sword, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996). To be sure, 
much of Hartz’s work can be read as part of this tradition: Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. 
On the ‘insuperable logical difficulty’ of this hypothesis see: Ian Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in 
an Age of International History,” The American Historical Review 96, (no. 4, October 1996), 
especially p. 1034; Michael Kämmen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A
Reconsideration,” American Quarterly 45, (no. 1, March 1993). A survey of three works that explores 
how exceptional US foreign policy has been that finds some merit in the idea of ‘exceptionalist 
rhetoric’ as a feature of American foreign relations is: Akira Iriye, “Exceptionalism Revisited,” 
Reviews in American History 16, (no. 2, June 1988). A rather provocative thesis on the nature of 
American exceptionalism, but which falls into some of the solipsisms of Lipset’s work, in relation to 
foreign policy was Robert Dallek, The American Style o f Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and 
Foreign Affairs. (New York: Mentor, 1983).
31 Hartz The Liberal Tradition in America', Niebuhr, The Irony o f American History-, H. W. Brands, 
“Exemplary America versus Interventionist America,” in At the End o f the American Century: 
America's Role in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Robert L. Hutchings, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1988); Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad', Ruggie, “Past as Prologue?”; John 
Gerard Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996). See also: Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist 
Looks at America, expanded edition, (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1965); Stanley Hoffman, 
“American Exceptionalism: The New Version,” in American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. 
Michael Ignatieff, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the 
Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in US Strategy” International Security 
29, (no. 4, 2005).
32 Brands, “Exemplary America versus Interventionist America.” In other research that probes the 
domestic antecedents to US foreign policy, John Gerard Ruggie adopts a similar view of 
exceptionalism, as a process of habitually seeking American moral and political self-fulfilment through 
foreign policy, in relation to the planning stages of the United Nations Organisation. Ruggie highlights 
the symbolic inducement that the lexicon of America’s singular commitment to democracy and 
progress supplied to US foreign policy in the post-1945 phase, noting the tendency among US officials 
in this period to conceptualise international issues according to a presupposed continuum between 
domestic American political culture and the future trajectory of international progress. “Old-World 
balance of power reasoning.. .had little allure for the American people...So Roosevelt framed his plans 
for winning the peace in a broader vision that tapped into America’s sense of its self as a nation...For 
Roosevelt’s successors countering the Soviet threat reinforced the mission...American exceptionalism- 
pursuing an international order that resonated with values the American people saw as their own- 
became the basis for a global transformational agenda whose effects are unfolding still.” John Gerard 
Ruggie, “American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism, and Global Governance,” in American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. Michael Ignatieff, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005), p. 304.
43
My argument concerning the role of vincidationism/exceptionalism in the 
context of my three case studies is that there was a persistent ‘submerged conviction,’ 
as Hartz described it, that America’s singularity and historical advancement conferred 
moral distinction on the US cultural and informational diplomacy programs that was 
not shared by the policy programs of other international agents. US cultural and 
informational diplomacy policy was informed by a shared premise that American 
practices of international persuasion had the singular distinction of delivering 
modernity and moral enlightenment to its international audiences. A posture of self­
vindication through foreign policy premised claims about ‘America’s certainty’ of its 
right to exercise global leadership after 1945 by Assistant Secretary of State 
Archibald MacLiesh.33 Vindicationism also underpinned public statements such as 
Stanley Hombeck’s concerning America’s special ability to represent the 
international general interest in its proposals for the post-war settlement:
It is not our American concept that there should be a static world 
or a frozen status quo. As a nation we have always had in mind 
the evolution of society, of political institutions, or economic 
instruments and devices accomplished through cooperation and 
conciliation, through the pacific settlement of controversies and 
through the general improvement of all conditions, national and 
international, by peaceful methods and processes.34
The idea that there was a progressive, vindicationist basis for the exercise of US 
influence emerges as a key premise of US cultural and informational discourse in 
relation to Third World/modemising states in a particularly clear way. US 
information practices were, for instance, represented in planning documents as 
attempting to show the people of China how to “realise the principles of individual 
human dignity and equality, liberty and thought and expression...which are bases of 
the democratic way of life.”35 So too did depictions of America, as opposed to
33 A detailed survey of MacLeish’s rhetoric is provided in the ensuing chapters, particularly chapter 
three. See, e.g.: Archibald MacLeish, “The American Certainty,” Department o f State Bulletin 2269, 
(February 18, 1945).
34 Stanley K. Hornbeck, “Why We are Fighting and For What.” Department o f State Bulletin 1745, 
(May 23, 1942), p. 462; Henry S. Villard, “The Positive Approach to an Enduring Peace,” Department 
o f State Bulletin 2256, (January 28, 1945).
35 Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, “Guidance for OWI Informational Work in 
Unoccupied China, Oct 24, 1944,” pp. 1-2; Chronological File, 1944-45; Records of Archibald 
MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, 
College Park, MD. Strengthening the democratic consciousness, as well as appealing to the aspirations
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Europe, as the cultural and political apogee of the ‘West’ draw on a premise that 
America had an exceptional role, conferred by historical forces, to play in 
reconstituting global politics after the war, as the case studies to follow illustrate.
I shall also argue in the chapters to follow that the idea of self-vindication 
through foreign policy became a potent symbolic tool within US cultural and 
informational policy-making discourse precisely because of the contradictions it 
entailed.36 On the one hand, America was seen as singular, unique as the pinnacle of 
historical progress and political fulfilment. On the other, the US constituted a global 
symbol: it was the apex of political, economic and cultural modernity and, in the post- 
1945 context, the guarantor of these values of behalf of all people.37 This dialectic 
between singularity and universalism within the discourses of US cultural and 
informational diplomacy constituted, to draw on Vibeke Pedersen’s terms, an 
‘inducing rhetorical structure,’ which represented America as a political ‘culture on
T O
an errand.’ This is not to suggest that the United States has been the only state to 
understand its foreign policy in vindicationist terms: Anatol Lieven, for instance, 
detects similarities between American exceptionalism and nationalist foreign policy 
discourses in Israel.39 My study does, nonetheless, develop the line of argument that 
there was a depth and potence to the dialectic of American exceptionalism in this 
period that unlocked America’s energies for the pursuit both of cultural and 
informational influence and global hegemony on a wider scale. The representation of
and emotions, of the Chinese people was also alluded to in an undated report by Gerald F Winfield, an 
OWI field officer in Chunking: Gerald F. Winfield, “OWI Program in China: A Report and Tentative 
Suggestions;” Records Relating to the China, Burma and India Theatre 1942-5, Records of the 
Historian; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208, National Archives and 
Records Administration, College Park MD. See also: “Objectives and Principles of the International 
Information and Cultural Program,” (no author), (July 11, 1946), pp. 2-3; Records Relating to the 
International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record 
Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.
36 The palpable impacts of this contradiction are also emphasised in the work of Bercovitch and 
Pedersen: Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad; Pedersen, “In Search of Monsters to Destroy?”
37 This contradiction is also reflected on in Pedersen, “In Search of Monsters to Destroy?,” pp. 215, 
221-3.
Ibid., pp. 214-5,220-1.
39 Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy o f American Nationalism, (London: Harper 
Perennial, 2003), pp. 17-8. Michael Barnett’s work highlights how the Israel’s Zionist identity has 
informed exceptionalist rhetoric in the context of Israeli foreign policy: Michael N. Barnett, “Culture, 
Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Journal o f International 
Relations 5, (no. 1, 1999). The antagonism between the American and Iranian exceptionalisms is also 
explored in William O. Beeman, The “Great Satan” vs. the ‘‘Mad Mullahs:” How the United States 
and Iran Demonize Each Other, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). French exceptionalism is explored in 
Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought, trans. 
Catherine Porter, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). There seems to be some 
continuity across these studies, and with the American case, in that they all deal with nations that see 
themselves as born by revolutions.
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US cultural and informational diplomacy in exceptional terms shaped the 
transformation of US foreign policy during 1936-53, serving as an inducement to 
embed and vindicate American politics and culture on a global scale.
In sum, the three threads of my argument about the significance of cultural 
and informational discourse run as follows. First, I argue that shared ideas about the 
nature of ‘America’ as an international subject that were mobilised by cultural and 
informational diplomats during the early stages of the programs moved toward the 
centre of US grand strategy during the post-1945 period. This took place in 
conjunction with the embedding of American military, economic and institutional 
influence, and helped to justify the projection of these forms of material power by 
reformulating American political culture as principles for American hegemony on a 
global scale. Second, the lexicon of liberalism had strong symbolic currency in the 
context of the cultural and informational programs. Liberal scripts, which had enabled 
the cultural and informational diplomacy programs to be established in the first place, 
were crucial in shaping how cultural and informational diplomacy were seen to 
support the reorientation of US foreign policy toward an embedded posture of global 
hegemony after 1945. Finally, the grammar of exceptionalism/vindicationism- a 
dialectical and solipsistic way of characterising American foreign relations- will be 
shown to have informed the kind of cultural, informational and broadly hegemonic 
agent Washington became during the period surveyed in this study.
Representing Foreign Policy: The Discursive Practices Approach as Foreign 
Policy Analysis
Having illustrated the three arguments I develop within this study, it is 
necessary at this point to clarify the conceptual framework and mode of enquiry upon 
which my empirical research in forthcoming chapters rests, and ground my use of this 
framework within the context of existing approaches. The basic constructivist 
theoretical claim informing my study is that there are extensive connections between 
inter-subjective meanings, language and foreign policy decision-making. The process 
that this conceptual framework illuminates is how foreign policy-makers “use role 
and identity conceptions... to form an idea of their state as a unit.” Hence “we cannot 
understand state identity without learning something about the political,
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philosophical, and legal discourses that give it meaning.” 40 Within the discursive 
practices approach, from which I establish a conceptual framework for this study, the 
agents and objects that comprise “[t]he international system [are taken to] represent... 
not innocent sets of objects attracting orderly speech practices; they are parts of a 
system that has been conjured up in policy-related speech practices.” 41 Explanations 
of foreign policy that adopt this approach aim to specify how linguistic 
representations give rise to the range of possibilities- and the criteria for evaluating 
these possibilities according to the inter-subjectively understood ‘identity’ of the 
national subject they pertain to- contemplated by officials in the course of foreign- 
policy making.
There is a basic ontological premise underpinning the discursive practices 
approach, which is that discourses reflect the shared ‘structures of meaning’ that 
function to ‘organise social relations.’ Discourses organise social relations in two 
ways: as a shared underlying representational system that configures meanings across 
the spectrum of policy texts, and as rhetorical commonplaces that have strong 
symbolic or persuasive force in the context of particular actions 42 As a consequence 
of this ontological move, one of the central concepts of International Relations 
scholarship, power, is recast within this conceptual framework. As I foreshadowed in 
my introduction, in addition to the material transactions (such as coercion, 
compensation or institutional structures) that are generally understood by IR scholars 
as comprising relations of power, power is also a property of specific social relations 
between international agents. This kind of situated social power arises from ‘diffuse 
social processes’ that determine what kinds of inter-subjective meanings and forms of 
knowledge are ‘taken for granted’ at a particular time, and thereby enable certain 
kinds of action to be contemplated and preclude others.43 My study mobilises these
40 Mlada Bukovansky, “American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812.” 
International Organization 51, (no. 2, Spring 1997), p. 210.
41 Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics o f Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, 
and Policy Analysis, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 95. My own emphasis added. 
A good summary of the ontology of this approach is to be found in: Lene Hansen, Security as 
Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (London: Routledge, 2006).
42 Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction.” To flip this distinction between the configuration of 
meanings and persuasive force, John Kenneth Galbraith defines these kinds of social relations from the 
perspective of its objects as ‘conditioned power,’ which “is the product of a continuum from objective, 
visible persuasion to what the individual in the social context has been brought to believe is inherently 
correct.” John Kenneth Galbraith, The Anatomy o f Power, (London: Corgi Books, 1983), p. 43.
43 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” pp. 55-6. A helpful discussion of productive 
power is also: Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of 
Research and Methods,” European Journal o f International Relations 5, (no. 2, 1999), p. 231. Laffey
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theoretical points for the purposes of my analysis of policy-making within the US 
cultural and informational programs. Diffuse social processes, reflected in the kinds 
of discourses policy-makers utilised, led to the embedding of new understandings of 
the scope and nature of US foreign relations among policy-makers. I explore this 
process, and show how the understandings they reflect in turn made it possible for 
Washington to define and claim the posture of post-war vindicationist hegemony that 
it did after 1945.44
As an account of foreign policy-making, the discursive practices approach 
surveys these productive or constitutive processes, and thus promises “to broaden our 
understanding of what foreign policy making is," envisaging policy-making as “a 
practice that produces a social order as well as one through which individual and 
collective subjects themselves are produced and reproduced.” As such, discursive 
practices analysis has significant implications for the parameters of IR scholarship in 
that it supplies a critique of rational-actor approaches that “take as unproblematic the 
possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen.” Rather, what 
is to be explained here “is not why a particular outcome obtained, but rather how the 
subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were constructed such that certain 
practices were made possible.”45 To put this another way, Patrick Jackson has 
summarised discourse analysis as an effort to understand how language is implicated 
in:
the production and reproduction of boundaries o f action. The 
central issue is how the limits of acceptability are drawn; a 
legitimation process constructs spheres within which certain 
actions can be performed, and it cordons off others as falling 
beyond the pale...One distinguishing characteristic of these 
boundaries is that by limiting action, they produce an actor, 
demarcating a sphere in which that actor can legitimately act.46
and Weldes highlight the productive capacity of discourse by pointing that discourses provide actors 
with ‘symbolic technologies’ in the context of social action: Laffey and Weldes, “Beyond Belief,” p. 
209.
44 Here I draw on the insights of Rodney Barker in his study of political authority as a kind of claim or 
performative act, rather than an attribute of government. As observed in the foregoing chapter, the 
account of US hegemony developed here applies the following insight at the level of the American 
state: “The claim of rulers to special status or qualities, and the actions they take in cultivating this 
claim, are the central part of endogenous legitimation, of the self-justification of rulers by the 
cultivation of an identity distinguished from that of ordinary men and women.” Rodney Barker, 
Legitimating Identities: The Self-Preservation o f Rulers and Subjects, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), p. 3.
45 Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction,” p. 298.
46 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, pp. 24-5.
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Drawing on this conceptual framework, my argument concerning the constitutive role 
of liberalism and exceptionalism/vindicationism within American cultural and 
informational diplomacy suggests that discursive representations made possible the 
broadening scope of US foreign policy during 1936-53. In adopting a conceptual 
framework that asks how foreign policy practices were made possible by inter- 
subjective dispositions and discursive practices, my study joins this existing research 
agenda within constructivist IR scholarship.
Although the functions of discourse in constituting states as knowing 
subjects of international relations are seen to be diffuse (i.e. enabling or warranting) 
rather than specific in their ‘casual’ impacts, discourse analysis provides at the same 
time a conceptual framework that is attentive to the role of individuals as discursive 
agents within foreign policy-making. By assuming that “the world does not issue a 
summons to speak in a particular way but rather ways of speaking are implicated in 
world making,” the discursive practices framework emphasises the ongoing enabling 
and productive functions that individuals perform when they uphold or diverge from 
the prevailing representational order.47 Patrick Jackson has recently taken this 
emphasis on the representational practices undertaken by individuals within the 
context of foreign policy-making one step further, emphasising the representational 
transactions that individuals participate in during the course of foreign policy­
making. Jackson calls attention not only to how options were opened up as policy 
possibilities through processes of representation, but also how struggles over the 
acceptability and legitimacy of particular avenues under consideration played out in 
the rhetorical exchanges that punctuate foreign policy-making. As Roxanne Doty 
has also emphasised, “any meaningful discussion of [individual] agency must 
perforce be a discussion of representation.”49 In the case studies to follow I shall 
draw heavily on primary archival sources and the secondary literature within the 
discipline of Diplomatic History in order to expose the kinds of representational 
practices that individual agents within the US foreign policy process engaged in.
47 Michael Shapiro, The Politics o f Representation, p. 123. In fact, to the considerable degree that 
post-structuralist philosophy has informed the discursive practices approach, the ongoing production of 
meaning is necessary and enforced by the fact that language is ‘inherently unstable;’ it never achieves 
complete fixity over reality. Consequently, ongoing individual action is crucial to sustaining particular 
meanings and practices. See Hansen, Security as Practice, pp. 20-1.
48 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, pp. 15-6, Ch. 2.
49 Doty, Imperial Encounters, p. 164.
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What kinds of analytical tools does the discursive practices approach offer 
to understand the constitutive and enabling functions of discourse in US foreign 
policy-making? In this section I shall extract a ‘toolkit’ of analytical insights from 
the existing literature within the discursive practices approach that will allow me, in 
the forthcoming chapters, to assess how particular representational practices 
functioned to constitute subjects and symbolically enable action within the cultural 
and informational programs. These analytical tools within the discursive practices 
approach include: relational identity propositions or ‘logics of alterity;’ processes of 
narration and rhetorical framing; and the situating of actors within grammatical 
relationships of predication, which lead to the classification or hierarchical 
positioning of subjects.
Self/Other: Alterity and the Making o f Foreign Policy
One of the most significant analytical concepts that has been advanced 
within the discursive practices approach is that policy-makers and other international 
agents habitually engage with other international actors in terms of endogenous 
relational identity propositions about the ‘self and its ‘other.’ One of the most 
influential texts to apply self/other relations to the international sphere was Tzvetan 
Todorov’s Conquest o f America, which set out a conceptual framework that has since 
been taken up by IR scholars such as Iver Neumann and Jacinta O’Hagan.50 
Published in 1982, Todorov’s study considered how propositions about identity 
shaped the behaviour of ‘civilized’ Europeans during their encounter with the 
‘uncivilized’ indigenous Americans after the conquest of 1492. Todorov 
demonstrates how the conquering encounter was embedded, for the Europeans, within 
a series of interlocking and relational logics of opposition (or alterity) pertaining to 
the Spanish and indigenous civilizations. In this encounter, the kind of claims about 
the ‘self that Europeans made encompassed a set of related presuppositions that
50 Iver B. Neumann, The Uses o f the Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Iver B. Neumann, “Deep Structure, Free-Floating Signifier, or 
Something in Between? Europe’s Alterity in Putin’s Russia,” in Identity and Global Politics: 
Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Jacinta O’Hagan, “’The Power and the Passion’: Civilizational Identity 
and Alterity in the Wake of September 11,” in Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical 
Elaborations, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
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denigrated and estranged the indigenous ‘other’ and thereby legitimated the violent 
subordination of the peoples of indigenous America. The conquest has broader 
significance for Todorov as an exemplar of the logic of alterity at work in the context 
of international relations:
the discovery of America, or of the Americans, is certainly the most 
astonishing encounter of our history. We do not have the same sense 
of radical difference in the ‘discovery’ of other continents of other 
peoples.. .the discovery of America is essential for us today not only 
because it is an extreme, and exemplary, encounter.51
In asserting the discursively constructed and contingent nature of otherness as a 
category in international politics, Todorov identifies three processes of judgement 
that compose relations of alterity: international subjects are positioned along 
axiological, praxaeological and epistemic axes. In this context, axiological logics 
determine how the other is considered in terms of value judgements such as good/bad 
or equal/inferior. Second, praxaeological alterity specifies the degree of closeness 
between the ‘self and ‘other,’ thereby determining the intensity or significance 
self/other relations. And third, epistemic alterity is framed according to the level of 
ignorance or knowledge of the ‘other’ that the ‘self possesses in the context of any 
given encounter or relationship.53
51 Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest o f America: The Question o f the Other, trans. Richard Howard, 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 4-5.
52 In addition to The Conquest o f America, see also: Todorov, On Human Diversity, Ch. 4.
53 Todorov, The Conquest o f America, p. 185. Several other scholars have drawn on the concept of 
alterity in world politics to effectively engage with a broader repertoire of case studies. Most notably, 
Iver Neumann has developed the concept of alterity in relation to European encounters with the 
‘other,’ through which notions of the European civilisational ‘self were constituted. In The Uses o f 
the Other, Neumann shows how Europe’s encounters with its proximate neighbours: the Turkish and 
Russian ‘others,’ have been represented in the context of foreign policy discourses. He emphasises the 
political purposes in which these representations are embedded- the European idea of Russia, for 
instance, is varied, dynamic and encompasses numerous contradictions, with Russia constituted 
simultaneously as anomalous to and placed within the taxonomy of ‘Europe.’ Neumann emphasises 
the primacy of the identification o f ‘self within the logic of self/other representations: thus he draws 
the rather counter-intuitive conclusion that since the end of the Cold War the estrangement of the 
Russian ‘other’ from the European ‘self has become more pronounced because “the temptation 
remains...to play up the alterity of Russia in order to increase the integration of the European self.” 
The multifaceted analysis that the tripartite axes that compose relations of alterity is crucial, as 
Neumann’s work demonstrates, for comprehending complex, varied and long process of historical 
interaction such as the European/Russian one. Neumann, The Uses o f the Other, pp. 107-12. In recent 
work William O. Beeman has adopted the general insights of Todorov and Neumann to analyse the 
generation o f ‘self/other’ representations in US/Iran relations as a function o f ‘master myths’ in foreign 
policy. These myths comprise a ‘repertoire of cultural dynamics’ within which the representation of 
the ‘self for the purposes of consolidating the domestic ‘imagined community’ has primacy. Beeman, 
The “Great Satan ” vs. the “Mad Mullahs, ” Ch. 2.
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How might the representational practices that attended the formation of 
American cultural and informational policy be interpreted in terms of the construction 
of alterity? In the chapters to follow I shall contend, for instance, that the rise of the 
Soviet Union as America’s ideological antagonist was increasingly constituted 
through logics of alterity mobilised within US cultural and informational discourse. 
As Roxanne Doty has also observed, during the Cold War the USSR was regarded as 
axiologically opposed to the United States within US foreign policy texts, and was 
increasingly cast as an immoral, uncivilised, and aggressive world power. 
Simultaneously, the magnitude of the Soviet threat was perceived as great because the 
USSR was situated as close to the US on the praxeological and epistemic axes: the 
USSR had a similar capacity for global influence to that of the US, and was also 
closely studied and scrutinised to the extent that its intentions were thought to be well 
known in Washington.54 In this reading, the multifaceted nature of American Cold 
War discourse can be unpacked into its constituent axes of judgement, and thus the 
origins of the globally-encompassing and Manichaean tone of the conflict can be 
engaged with greater precision.
What makes the self/other connection significant is that it opens space for 
considering the constitutive processes that occur when foreign policy-makers reflect 
upon the interests, values and character of the national subject in whose name they 
speak and act, and assess the implications of this self-representation for foreign policy 
relationships. In the context of American cultural and informational discourse, 
which, as I have already noted, drew heavily on existing doctrines of American 
liberalism and exceptionalism/vindicationism, the construction of the American self 
as the liberal democratic Cold War protagonist through its alterity with the USSR can 
be surveyed. Drawing on the concept of alterity, I shall also suggest in the 
forthcoming chapters that the construction of a Third World/modemising ‘other,’ by 
refashioning prior representations of the modem, advanced American self, also 
shaped the tone of US cultural and informational diplomacy in these regions. The 
alterity of the modernising other in relation to America- China, in particular- as 
backward and hence highly prone to subversion by Axis and Communist propaganda 
functioned in such a way as to encourage the embedding of American material and
54 Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction.”
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ideological influence within these regions during and after the Second World War.55
Narrating Identities: Situating the Self In Time
The functions of discourse in the self-constitution of subjects in world 
politics have also been emphasised in the context of narrative practices in foreign 
policy discourse, as emphasised by David Campbell, Vibeke Pedersen, Michael 
Barnett, Christina Klein and others.56 The exegesis of the concept of narrative in the 
work of Campbell, Klein and Pedersen is instructive here since these writers also 
undertake to enquire into US foreign policy, thereby suggesting not only how the 
concept of narrative can be operationalised as an explanation of foreign policy at the 
general level, but also that narrative practices have been resonant in the case of the 
United States. For Campbell, American ‘foreign policy’ is constituted by what is 
articulated as a ‘threat’ to the American ‘self,’ with both conceptualised as a racial 
and religious categories. Hence, Campbell’s work seeks to expose and analyse how 
the narration of US foreign policy has shaped the prevailing terms of American 
national identity, and how these in turn have determined where US policy-makers
55 The interventionist impulse in relation to small states that the United States acquired in the context 
of the Cold War can also be understood as a product of representational practices. As Michael Shapiro 
contends, military coercion was so frequently resorted to by the US in its relations with Central 
America during the 1970s and 1980s because discourses of international ‘anarchy’ entrenched 
concepts of instability, difference and “relations of [US] superiority and [Latin American] inferiority” 
within US foreign policy thinking. Shapiro also detects in US foreign policy planning texts a 
pervasive “bureaucratic/managerial imagery which has lent the [US’s] foreign-policy discourse the 
identity of the conflict manager.” This discourse self-reflexively constituted the US as a morally and 
rationally ‘privileged’ actor within the international system, contributing to the ways in which US 
national interests were rendered in globally expansive and deeply ideological terms during the Cold 
War. The ‘bureaucratic managerial’ and ‘interventionist’ impulses in US foreign policy in relation to 
the Western Hemisphere were derived from “a narrative built around the myth that America is a nation 
created out of a search for ‘freedom’ (as opposed to more favourable tax status, better land, etc.). This 
notion fuels an interventionist, state-centric foreign policy by casting America as a defender of 
freedom, an actor committed to helping others achieve a similar destiny.” Although my study surveys 
a phase of the Cold War in which intervention in small states was still developing as a mode of Cold 
War engagement, to a significant degree the ‘managerial’ element within US policy toward the Third 
World is evident in the material on China and other non-Western states that will be presented in the 
forthcoming chapters. Shapiro, The Politics o f Representation, pp. 101-2 & 115-7.
5(> Campbell, Writing Security, Pedersen, “In Search of Monsters To Destroy?”; Barnett, “Culture, 
Strategy and Foreign Policy Change”; Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow 
Imagination, 1945-1961, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Kevin C. Dunn, “Narrating 
Identity: Constructing the Congo During the 1960 Crisis,” in Identity and Global Politics: Empirical 
and Theoretical Elaborations, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004); Robert W. Haddow, Pavilions o f Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in 
the 1950s, (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997); Laura A. Belmonte, “A Family 
Affair? Gender, the US Information Agency, and Cold War Ideology, 1945-1960” in Culture and 
International History, eds. Jessica C. E. Geinow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2003).
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identify threats to US ‘national’ security within the international realm.57 Campbell’s 
premise is that US foreign policy initiatives are always articulated in such a way as 
“to discipline the state.” 58 States themselves are artificial or ‘imagined’ 
communities: states “do not possess pre-discursive, stable identities,” and this 
“renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart 
from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to 
be) always in a process of becoming.” 59
Michael Barnett, whose work centres on Middle Eastern regional politics, 
has also provided a lucid account of the self-constitutive functions of narrative in 
foreign policy discourse. He defines narrative as “a story that is joined by a plot,” 
which shapes the state’s subjective identity as “lived hi story... [that] continues a 
storyline from the past through the present and some imagined future.” 60 Accounts of 
narrative in political contexts have also emphasised their metaphorical or figurative 
meaning (the concept of ‘plotting’ in Barnett’s definition). As David B. Edwards has 
also noted, the metaphorical functions of narrative have a ‘controlling’ effect by 
situating actors within prescribed roles according to the ‘organising logic’ of a 
political system.61 In the chapters to follow I shall show how narratives that depicted
57 Cambpell. Writing Security, p. 4.
™ Ibid., p. 51.
59 Ibid., p. 12. The ‘inherently unstable and contingent’ basis of national identity is taken as a key 
premise in Doty’s work on British immigration discourses: Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Immigration and 
National Identity: Constructing the Nation,” Review o f International Studies 22, (no. 3, 1996), pp. 238- 
240.
60 Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change,” p. 12. Tzvetan Todorov and Hayden White 
have both, like Barnett, emphasised the storytelling form of narratives, while White also notes that the 
primacy of the seifs subjectivity is a feature that characterises narrative as a particular kind of 
discourse. Todorov emphasises how the narrative form encompasses chronology and description, and 
situates the relationship between the protagonists as one of interaction and transformation. Tzvetan 
Todorov, “The 2 Principles of Narrative,” Diacritics 1, (no. 1, Autumn 1971), pp. 38-9. In his 
discussion of subjectivity, Hayden White has noted that narrative is nonetheless a transcultural 
medium: “far from being a code among many that a culture may utilise for endowing experience with 
meaning, narrative is a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages 
about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted.” White’s work on ‘genre’ and ‘narrative’ also 
reflects on the significance of both frameworks in the study of history, and thus provides some 
corroboration for the methodological approach taken here. Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity 
in the Representation of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 7, (no. 1, Autumn 1980), pp. 6-7. Kevin C. Dunn 
has emphasised the identity-forming function of narrative: “Identities are formed by the gradual 
layering on and connection of events and meanings, usually through three steps: the selection of events 
themselves, the linking of these events to each other in causal and associated ways (plotting), and 
interpreting what the events and plots signify.” Dunn, “Narrating Identity,” p. 124. On the ‘narrative 
turn’ in International Relations scholarship and the properties of narrative, see also: Geoffrey Roberts, 
“History, Theory and the Narrative Turn in 1R,” Review o f International Studies 32, (no. 4, October 
2006).
61 Edwards argues that metaphor is particularly significant because of the frequency with which 
metaphors emerge in ‘polemical’ contexts. As such the use of metaphor is connected to contexts of
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Washington’s unfolding historical relationships with other nations and geographical 
regions supplied organising logics for the cultural and informational diplomacy 
programs, and for US hegemony at a broader level.
The constitutive functions of narrative are examined in some detail within 
Campbell’s Writing Security, which develops a historical analysis of US national 
security policy that is attentive to:
the roles danger and difference play in constituting the identity 
of the United States [which] involves a deconstruction of 
conventional discourse and its self-preservation...the argument 
proposes that United States foreign policy be understood as a 
political practice central to the constitution, production, and 
maintenance of [domestic] political identity.62
Singled out for particular emphasis in Campbell’s account is the narrative structure of 
the political sermon, or ‘jeremiad.’ Articulating US national security policy within 
the format of the jeremiad provided a strong inducement to Americans to partake of 
the Cold War as an ideological crusade, combining “searing critiques with appeals for 
spiritual renewal... preaching the omnipresence of sin so as to instil the desire for 
order.”63 Hence, in key Cold War national security texts such as National Security 
Council Report 68, issued in April 1950:
while one might have expected few if any references to national 
values or purposes in confidential documents prepared for the inner 
sanctum of national security policy (after all, don’t they know who 
they are or what they represent?), the texts of foreign policy are 
replete with statements about the fulfilment of the republic, the 
fundamental purpose of the nation, God-given rights, moral codes,
acute struggle or historical transformation and the kinds of radical agency pursued at these moments. 
David B. Edwards, “Mad Mullahs and Englishmen: Discourse in the Colonial Encounter,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 31, (no. 4, October 1989), p. 651. Jennifer Milliken’s 
discussion of the possibility of metaphor analysis in the discourse practices approach also approaches 
these figurative/metaphorical issues in the language of foreign policy. Milliken, “The Study of 
Discourse in International Relations,” p. 235.
62 Campbell, Writing Security, p. 8.
63 Ibid., p. 32. On the Eisenhower administration’s use of this narrative, see ibid., p. 149. America’s 
frontier myth is also highlighted in the context of Campbell’s discussion as a theme of narratives that 
connected America’s past expansionism to contemporary ‘progressive’ trajectories. The frontier 
constituted a key figurative element of the US’s Cold War identity: “At the core of the Myth is the 
belief that economic, moral, and spiritual progress are achieved by the heroic foray of civilized society 
into the virgin wilderness.” This allowed the Soviet Union and subversive elements inside the US 
during the Cold War to be cast in resonant ways as a barbarian element, a threat that “only understands 
force and cannot be reasoned with.” Richard Slotkin cited in ibid., p. 146.
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the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual 
loss, and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming 
example of America. In this sense, the texts that guided national 
security policy did more than simply offer strategic analyses of the 
‘reality’ they confronted: they actively concerned themselves with 
the scripting of a particular American identity.64
A similarly central role for narrative practices in foreign policy discourse is 
suggested in recent work by Vibeke Pedersen. In work that once again deals with 
American security strategy, Perdersen characterises American foreign policy thinking 
as a “restless mode of imagination,” shaped to a large degree by the jeremiad’s 
“distinctively inducing communicative tradition,” which served to encourage the 
pursuit of international interventions in post-1945 US foreign policy. Pedersen notes 
one significant implication of the narrative tradition in US foreign policy discourse: it 
has located US foreign relations as a way to cultivate the global telos. American 
foreign policy texts often reproduce this exceptionalist narrative of self-fulfilment, 
serving “to constitute America as a special entity, stressing its otherness in terms of 
time- America is different because it is advanced, ahead, avant-garde.”65 In her 
account Pedersen argues that this extant self-conception has guided Washington into 
an ongoing search for international ‘threats’ within the post-Cold War world order, 
since the script of crusade and redemption remains the prevailing mode through 
which US foreign policy has been represented and understood.
64 Ibid., pp. 31-2. In other work, Campbell likens these constitutive practices to drawing of an
American moral cartography for the Cold War, in which “the responsibility for evil was located in the 
other and the responsibility for combating it was the burden of the self...One of the effects of this 
moral cartography was the currency attached to the idea that no international action was possible 
without US leadership.” David Campbell, “Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty,
Responsibility,” in The Return o f Culture and Identity in IR Theory, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich 
Kratochwil, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 163. In this particular contribution to debates 
about culture, discourse and identity in international politics Campbell traces the legacy of the Cold 
War moral cartography on post-Cold War debates on military intervention, particularly in relation to 
the Balkans Wars during the 1990s. As in earlier periods, American statehood still lacked ‘ontological 
being’ and required a ‘geography of evil’ to consolidate its subjectivity. In the post-Cold War era the 
process of sketching threats and dangers was undertaken through debates about the ‘national interest’ 
and a “casting around for the form that new dangers and recalcitrant threats might take.” Campbell, 
“Violent Performances,” p. 167-8.
65 Pedersen, “In Search of Monsters to Destroy?,” pp. 215-7. One of Pedersen’s most important points 
is the sense of virtue the jeremiad established. It bears acknowledging that much of Pedersen’s 
discussion is inspired by Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad. An emphasis has been placed on the 
redemptive element in puritan jeremiad formats in the work of Perry Miller: “The demand made upon 
benighted human nature in the covenant of grace is not exorbitant, and demonstrates ... how solicitous 
God appears as He is pictured by this school. It is indeed a little surprising to the modern student to 
find how large a part of Puritan sermons was devoted to proving to people that they need not be 
weighed down with too great a sense o f sin." My own emphasis added. Miller, Errand Into the 
Wilderness, p. 83.
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Whereas Campbell and Pedersen have emphasised how narratives danger, 
opposition and interventionism are present in US national security discourse, in Cold 
War Orientalism Christina Klein notes how narratives were mobilised in the context 
of US foreign policy discourse to enable the pursuit of an interdependent international 
order after 1945. In this work Klein exposes the logics of integration and pluralism 
that were mobilised within US foreign policy thinking and, subsequently, US popular 
culture to gamer public acceptance for the US’s post-war grand strategy within the 
Asia Pacific. In an account that regards popular culture as a rich source of ‘foreign 
policy texts’ and thereby attests to the ‘diffuseness’ of socially constitutive practices 
in international relations, Klein contends that:
[t]he exercise of political, economic, and military power always 
depends upon the mechanisms o f ‘culture,’ in the form of the creative 
use of language and the deployment of shared stories... [F]ar from 
being wholly separate from the realm of politics, [culture] offers a 
privileged space in which politically salient meanings can be 
constmcted and questioned, where social categories can be defined 
and delimited, where shared values can be affirmed and contested.66
The images of Asians regularly presented in US popular entertainment during the 
early Cold War are taken in Klein’s analysis as symptomatic of a broader 
representational shift in US public discourse that “helped to construct a national 
identity for the United States as a global power.” A crucial part of the ‘work’ that 
popular entertainment performed was to harmonise two ‘complicated’ aspects of 
America’s post-war role for the US domestic audience: the transition to global 
hegemony in the face of residual domestic sentiments of isolationism, and the self- 
image that Americans had cherished as an anti-imperialist, democratic nation.67
Klein identifies three key narratives within this post-war American 
representation of Asia that functioned to resolve this contradiction, including, firstly, 
the situating of Asia cartographically as contested space of geopolitical struggle 
between the great powers in need of ordering and securing, and secondly the
66 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, pp. 6-7. I would clarify here that Klein’s survey o f ‘popular culture’ 
is not explicitly framed as an engagement with the ways in which US foreign policy officials pursued 
‘cultural diplomacy.’ Rather, Klein’s objective here is to show how the highly diffuse perceptions of 
Asians within US popular culture in general represented a worldview that informed Washington’s 
general posture of foreign policy. In other words, her work surveys the broad sphere of popular public 
perceptions, whereas my work surveys the very specific stock of perceptions that informed a narrow 
segment of US policy-makers.
67 Ibid., p. 9.
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propagation of stories of Americans benignly encountering Asia with progressive, 
modernising intentions. The third narrative told a story about America’s liberal 
democratic exceptionality, plotting how:
Washington defended democracy during the [Second World] war 
as a universal political philosophy applicable to all peoples 
regardless of race, and by doing so it helped move into the 
mainstream the idea of America as a harmonious nation made up 
of people from diverse ethnic, racial, national, and religious 
backgrounds... The United States thus became the only Western 
nation that sought to legitimate its world-ordering ambitions by 
championing the idea (if not always the practice) of racial equality.68
In this way the US’s engagement with Asia came to be politically and publicly 
understood as an historically progressive, pluralist encounter, summarised in that 
Klein terms as a ‘narrative of American anti-conquest. ’69
The development of Klein’s argument about the function of 
integrative/pluralist narratives within post-war American foreign relations is a line of 
enquiry that warrants some emphasis here. The narrative representation of US 
cultural and informational diplomacy often adopted the kind of integrative tone that 
Klein detects. My work follows Klein’s path of enquiry in that I do not presuppose 
that the articulation of foreign policy narratives necessitates the estrangement, 
denigration or persecution of the international other.70 Although the representation of
98 Ibid., pp. 10-11. I shall show in forthcoming chapters how the principle of Third World self 
determination was mobilised in this way by cultural and informational diplomats. Klein develops a 
provocative and interesting point in her account that I have chosen (for reasons of scope) not to take up 
in the context of my study. She draws attention to emotion as a salient feature in political discourse. 
Sentimentalism played a key role in the narration of US-Asian interactions as an emotional core for the 
‘narratives of anti-conquest,’ which celebrated the forging of bonds across divides of racial, national 
and religious difference, and the development of “human connections...characterised by reciprocity 
and exchange, often of a personal, intellectual or material nature.” Klein also connects these 
representations to geopolitical functionality: “[t]he power of sympathy could be a double-edged one, 
however: in forging emotionally satisfying bonds across the divides of difference and in providing 
access to another’s subjectivity, the sentimental could serve as an instrument for exercising power.” 
Logics of integration/pluralism and sentimentalism thus also served as narratives that legitimated the 
binding of other societies to American power. The study of emotion in international relations is an 
important and innovative research agenda, however incorporating a theory of emotional with the 
discursive practices approach adopted here simply raises too many additional issues and would 
complicate what is already an eclectic theoretical framework. Ibid., pp. 13-15. On racial equality and 
foreign policy, see also Thomas Borstelmann, “Jim Crow’s Coming Out: Race Relations and American 
Foreign Policy in the Truman Years,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 29, (no. 3, September 1999).
69 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, pp. 13-15.
70 This argument regarding the multiple definitions of the other has also been illustrated in recent work 
by Lene Hansen. In a recent critique of the substantive concerns of the discursive practices approach, 
particularly Campbell’s Writing Security, Hansen draws attention to the tendency among scholars to
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America as the locus of international integration and inter-dependence undoubtedly 
belied the underlying structures of American domination within the Third World, the 
ideals of international integration and pluralism will be shown to have exerted a very 
powerful influence over what kinds of cultural and informational strategies were 
adopted within the programs studied here and over the kind of hegemon that 
Washington perceived itself to be after the war.71 What unites Campbell, Petersen 
and Klein’s accounts, however, is their shared emphasis on the narrative form itself as 
an influential feature of foreign policy discourse, and the extent to which all three 
bring out the solipsistic nature of the foreign policy perceptions that have been 
constituted through the narrative representation of America as a world power.
Framing Imperatives: Premises and Policy-Making
Returning to the work of Michael Barnett, it is instructive to note how the 
concept of discursive ‘framing’ has been utilised by Barnett to engage with the 
persuasive functions of discourse in the context foreign policy-making. Barnett’s use 
of the term draws on broader work within the context of discourse analysis that 
defines the function of frames in social action as “specific metaphors, symbolic 
representations, and cognitive cases used to render or cast behaviour and events in an 
evaluative mode.” 72 Barnett’s analysis of Israeli defence policy, for example, 
suggests that political actors tend to discursively frame particular international issues
identify the other in foreign policy discourse as a ‘radical other’ only. She notes that the other can be 
seen as “constituted through multiple links” and as such “even when security discourses articulate a 
radical Other, it is one potentially constituted through links to more ambiguous less-than-Radical 
Others...the antagonistic Other is not the only Other constituted through security discourse. States also 
articulate and rely upon ‘constitutive Others’ who might be formal or ‘identity’ allies (‘Allied Others’) 
or the benefactors of humanitarian policies (‘Assisted Others’). Constitutive Others are not constituted 
as threatening ‘instrumental’ objects, but as subjects whose recognition -  in the form of assistance and 
similarity from ‘Allied Others’ or gratitude from ‘Assisted Others’ -  confirm crucial elements of the 
Self.” Given the interest taken here in how Washington constructed its foreign policy in integrationist, 
pluralist and benign terms, Hansen’s argument is significant as a call to extend the substantive 
parameters of the discursive practices approach. Lene Hansen, “The Clash of Cartoons? The Clash of 
Civilizations? Visual Securitization and the Danish 2006 Cartoon Crisis,” Paper presented at the 48th 
Annual International Studies Association Convention, Chicago, USA, February 28 - March 3 2007, p. 
5.
71 Indeed, there is some overlap here with the kinds of representations that Roxanne Doty and Michael 
Shaprio examine in relation to US stewardship and management of backward or ‘childlike’ Third 
World Nations. See Doty, Imperial Encounters-, Shapiro, The Politics o f Representation.
72 Zald quoted in Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change,” pp. 15, 25. In his work on 
Arab regionalism, Barnett has contended that frames were modes of ‘organising events’ deployed 
strategically by Arab governments as they sought to fix prevailing purposes and norms of regional 
order. See, Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998), Ch. 1.
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as a deliberate, strategic move. In discursively framing an issue or subject, agents 
seek to ‘fashion shared understandings,’ ‘fix meanings’ and ‘organise experience.’ 
Frames are specifically tied to agency in the sense that they are deployed as premises 
that enable certain courses of action over others, or cast the implications of certain 
courses of action in favourable ways, according to established discourses and 
beliefs.73
The concept of discursive framing is utilised quite broadly in my study, to 
describe not only the deployment of symbols in a strategic way, but also the more 
general way in which US policy documents built on shared symbolic, figurative and 
evaluative premises that served to bound the scope of their discussion. For instance, 
we shall see in the case studies to follow Washington’s repudiation of ‘propaganda’ 
and the range of ideas about the American subject this implied was a common 
discursive frame through which cultural and informational policy initiatives were 
represented. In this context, my use of the concept of framing draws on Mark Laffey 
and Jutta Weldes’ recent discussion of ideas as ‘symbolic technologies’ whereby 
shared ideas are seen to be fashioned into tools that enable social action, and on 
conceptions of rhetoric and policy-making developed in the recent work of both 
Patrick Jackson and Janice Bially Mattem.74
Predication: Situating the Self in Hierarchies and Categories
In addition to the scripting of self/other relations and the narration and 
framing of policy initiatives, one of the key functions of discourse in US cultural and 
informational diplomacy was the positioning of international subjects according to 
Washington’s developing vision of post-war ideological and political reform. 
Examining these positioning functions illustrates in a particularly clear way the 
proposition that discourse structures relationships of power in world politics. One of 
the key contributions within the discursive practices literature that develops this 
insight is Roxanne Doty’s Imperial Encounters, in which Doty determines how the
73 Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change,” p. 15.
74 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “ Whose Identity? Rhetorical 
Commonplaces in ‘American’ Wartime Foreign Policy,” in Identity and Global Politics: Empirical 
and Theoretical Elaborations, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004); Mattem, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft”; Janice Bially Mattem, Ordering 
International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force, (New York: Routledge, 2005); 
Laffey and Weldes, “Beyond Belief.”
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Subordination of the ‘Third World’ has been affected through its subordinate 
representation as a category of prevailing Western foreign policy discourses. Within 
this account, British colonialism and post-war US foreign policy in relation to the 
‘Third World’ are both understood as structures that were contingent upon the 
asymmetric constitution of the dominant Western subject and its subordinate, Third 
World other.75 In this context the ‘hegemonic’ purposes that the US and imperial 
Britain pursued in the Third World were enabled by denying ‘Third World’ societies 
the attributes of rationality, democratic sensibility, modernity and civilization within 
political discourse, and thereby inviting the exercise of Western power by rendering 
these societies inherently incapable of shaping their own destinies.
The conceptual approach adopted by Doty inquires into the ways in which 
international subjects acquire identities and social capabilities by virtue of how they 
are routinely positioned in relation to each other within the grammatical structures of 
language.76 Imperial Encounters breaks down these positioning grammars into three 
‘capacities.’ Generative capacity exists within foreign policy discourse, according to 
Doty, when the prevailing representations cast particular identities or ideas as 
‘natural.’ In this context, discourse reinforces or “creates background knowledge that 
is taken to be true... [and] entails an implicit theorisation of how the world works and 
also an elaboration of the nature of its inhabitants.” Associated with this process of 
presupposition is a second generative function: classification, which places agents or 
“human beings into the categories in which they ‘naturally’ belong. Hierarchies are 
often established based upon the presumed character of various kinds of human 
beings.” 77 Finally, discourses of foreign policy-making also generate meanings about 
the international ‘realities’ within which actors operate by positioning subjects and
75 In hinging her study on the analysis of representations mobilised by dominant states during moments 
of colonial insurgency, Doty’s approach mirrors Todorov’s insight that moments of conflict are 
particularly significant for advancing the study of discourse and identity in world politics. See: Doty, 
Imperial Encounters; Todorov, The Conquest o f America.
76 Doty’s emphasis on how discourses constitute a form of power owes much to the pioneering work of 
Edward Said. Imperial Encounters presents many similar insights to Said’s highly influential 
Orientalism, particularly the centrality of a positional reading of power in social contexts, and the ways 
in which vested interests coalesce around the dominant intellectual and discursive frameworks, and 
constitute enduring structures of ‘hegemony,’ defined in neo-Gramscian terms. Doty, Imperial 
Encounters, pp. 5-7. See also Antonio Gramsci, Selected Writings 1916-1935, ed. David Forgacs, 
(Lawrence & Wishart: London, 1988); Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).
77 Doty, Imperial Encounters, p. 10. Doty also identifies two additional discursive processes that are 
particularly relevant to the ways in which knowledge shapes the North-South relations that she 
examines: surveillance and negation. From her discussion of these points (p. 11), it is unclear how 
these processes could be thought to relate to the formation of policy for US cultural and informational 
diplomacy and so I do not import them into my framework of analysis.
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objects relationally: “[w]hat defines a particular kind of subject is, in large part, the 
relationships [a] subject is positioned in relative to other kinds of subjects... [sjome of 
the important kinds of relationships that position subjects are those of opposition, 
identity, similarity, and complementarity.”78
Jennifer Milliken’s survey of the discursive practices approach further 
clarifies this view of discourse as a mechanism for (re)constituting the positional 
relationships between international subjects during the course of foreign policy­
making. The grammatical analysis typified by Doty’s work is termed ‘predicate 
analysis’ in Milliken’s survey, since this framework seeks to determine how 
“[pjredications of a noun construct the thing(s) name as a particular sort of thing, with 
particular features and capacities.” Foreign policy texts are scrutinised in relation to 
their ‘object space,’ encompassing the “predications attaching to the subjects the text 
constructs” and the basis from which “subjects are distinguished from and related to 
one another.” There is some overlap between predicate analysis and the kinds of 
relational subject positioning that alterity brings about; as illustrated, for instance, in 
the triangular relationship between the US, Soviet, and Third World subjectivities that 
I noted above. I draw on both concepts in the case study analysis to follow, 
distinguishing between alterity as a foundational and relatively fixed self/other 
categorisation, and taking the process of predication as a more fluid and dynamic 
process of textual positioning. I thus use the term ‘predication’ in a general sense to 
refer to the generation of subjects and their relational positions (which differs from 
‘representation’ in the general sense since predication has an explicitly positional 
logic), as well as noting how international subjects were ‘classified’ or ‘characterised’ 
within the discursive construction of cultural and informational diplomacy.
One of the most prevalent presuppositions that is traced in Doty’s work is 
the way in which American anti-imperialism was articulated in the context of post- 
1945 US foreign policy, which cast the global extension of US power in such a way 
as to affirm America’s tradition of opposition to imperialism even as Washington 
sought to extend influence over the Third World.81 The classification of the United
78 Ibid. , p. 11.
79 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,” p. 232.
80 I also drew on Doty’s work in making note of this subject positioning in the discussion above. See: 
Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction.”
81 Hence, and to extend this point a bit further, the concept of ‘American Empire’ is controversial 
because it contravenes the anti-imperial discourse of US foreign relations. See: Michael Cox, “The 
Empire’s Back in Town: or America’s Imperial Temptation Again,” Millennium 32, (no. 1,2003).
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States as anti-imperialist and the Third World as backward and powerless is thereby 
shown to have created possibilities for Washington to craft a managerial global 
identity as an alternative to formal global imperialism. Washington constituted its 
subsequent interventions in Third World politics within a lexicon of foreign policy 
that constructed the American subject as “an exemplary world citizen [and the] living 
model of sovereign identity, stability, freedom, democracy, and material progress.”82 
The extension of American power to the Third World could be contemplated and 
accepted on the grounds that post-colonial nations were presupposed to be 
‘“emerging peoples’...[n]ot yet fully developed, unreconciled, they are always 
subject to the dangers stemming from their own immaturity.”83 Doty’s account is 
particularly illustrative of the enabling functions of discourse by showing how the 
classification and positioning of subjects within US foreign policy discourse opened 
the possibility for particular interventions Third World politics that might otherwise 
not be contemplated.
Rather than selecting one analytical concept from this existing discursive 
practices literature, in the foregoing discussion I have shown that it is possible to 
draw several analytical tools from existing discursive practices analysis into an 
overarching conceptual framework. Within each of my case studies I examine the 
constitution of US cultural and informational diplomacy by drawing upon the 
concepts of alterity, narrative, frames, and predication surveyed in the foregoing 
discussion.84 In my account of the development of the Division of Cultural Relations 
and its successor agencies presented in chapter three I utilise these four concepts as a 
basis to determine what the prevailing modes of representation mobilised in the 
context of US cultural diplomacy were, and to enquire into the broader implications 
of these practices in the context of US foreign relations. The narration of deepening 
inter-American ties will be shown to be implicated in the establishment of a cultural 
diplomacy program 1936 and in the deployment of cultural relations in a wider global
8~ Doty, Imperial Encounters, p. 83. As 1 shall discuss shortly, Christina Klein’s work has also 
explored the US’s ‘narratives of anti-conquest’ in the post-war period.
Ibid., p. 134.
84 It bears noting that Jutta Weldes’ survey of explanatory approaches to the constitution of national 
interests also emphasises the different kinds of discursive practices that can be simultaneously in play 
at a particular historical moment, and thus provides some support for my strategy of interrogating 
several formats of discursive practice within each case study. Weldes, “Constructing National 
Interests,” pp. 281-2.
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context during the Second World War and its aftermath. Concepts of diplomatic 
reciprocity and non-govemmentalism were frames that situated the extension of 
Washington’s cultural influence into the Western Hemisphere in this early phase as 
mutually agreeable (and anti-imperialist, in keeping with prevailing conceptions of 
liberalism in US political culture), and subsequently predicated the extension of US 
cultural diplomacy to other modernising regions such as East Asia. The concept of 
American anti-propagandism was a frame mobilised in 1936-38 that legitimated the 
expansion of the cultural diplomacy programs during the Second World War and its 
aftermath. The construction of logics of alterity within cultural diplomacy policy 
texts was implicated in maintaining claims to American exceptionality that this 
subjectivity implied: the US alone had developed a liberal format for cultural 
diplomacy, while ‘others’ such as the European colonial powers and the totalitarian 
states invariably perpetrated distorted, subversive cultural messages.
In the context of informational diplomacy, as undertaken by the Voice of 
America (VOA) radio station surveyed in chapter four, the significance of framing 
and predication within informational policy texts provides an effective illustration of 
the enabling functions of discursive representation in foreign policy. Situating 
VOA’s work in relation to the prior debates criticising propaganda in the US was an 
acute quandary for VOA officials, particularly since they were determined to convey 
the principles American political culture as well as fulfilling a foreign policy purpose. 
As the forthcoming chapter will show, notions of journalistic practice and 
Washington’s commitment to the establishment of a liberal international 
informational order were, from the founding of the Voice and throughout the 1940s, 
frames that enabled information to be projected for the purpose of securing 
international influence even though prior political debates had repudiated the similar 
practices associated with ‘propaganda.’ Generally it was in the name of the American 
people and the journalistic practices upheld by the private American media that 
informational diplomacy policy was articulated by VOA officials. Hence, the 
functions of US informational diplomacy were framed in progressive and non­
aggrandising terms. Finally, chapter four highlights how narratives of global 
historical progress situating the US as the vanguard of the transition toward an 
economically and politically liberal global order also featured in the representation of 
US informational diplomacy. This narrative practice served as a basis to locate
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American foreign policy in general as an effort to install, and subsequently defend, 
the interests of all nations at the level of global order after 1945.
The course of Washington’s diplomacy within Unesco highlights how the 
representation of American identity and interests played out in a multilateral context. 
In my discussion of the Unesco case in chapter five the classification of other agents 
emerges as a prevalent tendency within the articulation US policy. In the mid-1940s, 
supporters of Washington’s involvement in the founding of the institution mobilised 
more long-standing narratives situating America as the locus of post-war global 
renewal and historical progress toward a liberal world order. The value of apolitical 
cultural interchange, the significance of non-governmental representation, and the 
democratic connotations of multilateralism were recalled within these narrative 
representations, and ultimately served to situate the United States as a vanguard of 
global progress and integration. As Cold War antagonisms deepened during the late 
1940s, Unesco was increasingly situated as an arena through which to pursue the 
vindication of America’s liberal political culture, and the politically and morally 
subversive intentions of the Communist and social democratic ‘other’ were 
increasingly prevalent within US diplomatic papers and policy proposals. Although 
the USSR was not a member of Unesco during this phase, the logic of alterity through 
which the propaganda struggle with the USSR had been represented in Washington 
licensed the increasingly overbearing way in which Washington engaged with Unesco 
on issues that had ideological bearing.
Reconceptualising Cultural and Informational Diplomacy: Theoretical
Contribution of This Study
In the course of adopting a conceptual framework informed by discursive 
practices analysis to engage with the practices of US cultural and informational 
diplomacy in the way illustrated in the foregoing section, my study speaks to the 
empirical and theoretical concerns of several existing strands of academic literature. 
Firstly, my study has implications for contemporary writing on American soft power 
and the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy- now generally referred to 
as ‘public diplomacy’- within the field of foreign policy studies. My study extends 
this literature by identifying the constitutive functions of cultural and informational 
diplomacy discourse during 1936-53. Generally, these diplomatic practices have
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been considered within studies of IR solely in terms of their ability to deliver to 
influence over foreign public opinion to governments. Furthermore, in setting out to 
elucidate the constitutive aspects of cultural and informational policy, my study also 
proffers a political and historical critique of the prevailing theoretical terms, notably 
the concept of ‘soft power,’ in which public diplomacy is currently conceptualised. I 
shall contend in the discussion below that the notion of soft power itself can be 
understood as being implicated in a self-reflexive discourse, and argue that soft power 
itself is less significant as a description of how to attain global influence than it is a 
reflection of ongoing patterns of American self-constitution and an emblem of the 
kinds of self-perceptions that historically nourished Washington’s engagement in 
Cold War antagonisms.
Secondly, I shall review the emergence of a contemporary research agenda 
within the field of Diplomatic History that surveys the practices of cultural and 
informational diplomacy. This research agenda has paid particular attention to the 
development of these diplomatic practices by the US and the USSR, articulating in 
the process a new historiography of the Cold War. Several important empirical 
research programs and lines of theoretical enquiry in relation to international cultural 
and intellectual practices have been opened during these debates. I also indicate how 
adopting a theoretical perspective informed by IR constructivism/discourse analysis 
helps to clarify some of the conceptual questions that this historical research agenda 
has identified, thereby opening the possibility for cross-fertilisation between the 
Diplomatic History and International Relations research agendas into culture, ideas 
and foreign policy. In the final part of this section, I shall return to the discursive 
practices approach to specify how extending discourse analysis to cultural and 
informational diplomacy can extend the substantive parameters of this IR literature.
Soft Power and the Contemporary Public Diplomacy Debates
The value of effective public diplomacy and other instruments of 
international persuasion has emerged as a key theme within US foreign policy debates 
in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. 
These events brought into stark relief the issue of how Washington might more 
effectively manage global public perceptions of America through cultural diplomacy, 
educational exchange, international information and public relations- practices
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collectively termed ‘public diplomacy’ within this contemporary literature. Joseph 
Nye’s early writing on soft power predated the 2001 attacks on the US, however 
Nye’s work has subsequently become central to the contemporary lexicon in which 
the impact of public perceptions on world politics is debated. This recent public 
diplomacy/soft power literature warrants consideration here firstly because my 
study’s empirical concerns overlap with the kinds of practices that are surveyed 
within this prominent current literature. Secondly, my study’s theoretical approach 
provides a way of critically reflecting on the underlying ontological and political 
assumptions of this current debate.85
Beginning with 1990’s book Bound to Lead, Nye’s writings on soft power 
presented a thesis on the key role that political and cultural attraction played in 
Washington’s ‘triumph’ over the Communism system, and should serve as a basis of 
Washington’s ongoing position of global leadership in a post-Cold War context. In 
this early work on soft power, Nye contended that, having represented the 
embodiment of democratic principles and successfully pursued their global 
vindication during the Cold War, the US possessed an ability to get other states “to 
want what it wants- [which] might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with 
the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.” This constitutes 
a form of international influence “associated with intangible power resources such as 
culture, ideology, and institutions,” through which “a state may achieve the outcomes 
it prefers in world politics because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a 
situation that produced such effects.”86 However, despite having articulated the 
geopolitical effects of soft power upon US foreign relations, this early work 
emphasised the non-governmental sources of American political attractiveness and 
cultural prestige: its media, entertainment industries and educational institutions, and 
the universalism of US ideals such as liberty and prosperity enshrined within 
America’s domestic political culture.
It was not until the more systematic unpacking of the force of persuasion 
and attraction in foreign policy undertaken within 2004’s Soft Power that Nye 
addressed the practices of international persuasion by governments in detail. Framed 
as an assessment of the implications of Washington’s “fraught international relations”
85 Significantly, few scholars within the constructivist or critical theory approaches to International 
Relations (with the exception of Janice Bially Mattem) have critically engaged with Nye’s conception 
of soft power. Mattem, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft.”
8fa Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, 80 (Fall, 1990), pp. 166-7.
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in the wake of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Soft Power asks how foreign policy 
itself can shape the relationships of cultural attraction and political emulation that 
structure the international system. In this context, Nye observes that governments can 
accrue soft power both by adopting the practices of cultural and informational 
diplomacy themselves, and by taking a broadly multilateral approach in their foreign 
policy. In a survey of the history of the Cold War, Nye notes how government- 
sponsored educational exchanges; scientific congresses; high cultural events such as 
theatre and musical tours; as well as the export of popular entertainment and even 
sporting competitions effectively won admiration for American values among a 
global public audience.87 He also observes that although the US was a relative 
‘latecomer’ in utilising official cultural and informational diplomacy in the 1930s, 
America’s universalist culture and the creeds of liberty and prosperity that America’s 
political culture celebrates had placed Washington in prime position to undertake 
public diplomacy on behalf of Western civilization during the Cold War.88 During 
the post-Cold War period, however, Nye finds that bureaucratic upheavals and 
inadequate funding have hampered Washington’s ability to mobilise its soft power. 
In the contemporary context, a more coherent, well-funded, attentive and culturally- 
sensitive US approach to international persuasion is advocated, so that the US can 
continue to draw on the influence that comes from global “attraction to [America’s] 
shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to those values.”89
As the foregoing points suggest, Nye’s survey of the adoption of cultural 
and informational diplomacy within US foreign policy is part of a broader argument 
about the basis of America’s Cold War ‘triumph’ and the subsequent 
recommendation that US public diplomacy be extended to undermine global anti- 
Americanism and terrorism. The historical survey of US cultural and informational 
diplomacy that Nye develops for this purpose is thus not sufficiently detailed to 
engage with the ways in which US policy-makers tended to represent the practices of 
international public persuasion, and were thereby implicated in the diffuse internal 
changes that led to the transformation of Washington’s foreign policy posture in 
1936-53.90 Furthermore, the premise behind the soft power concept is that a natural
87 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 
pp. 45-7.
88 Ibid., pp. 100-2.
89 Ibid., pp. 123-4.
90 Ibid., pp. 99-107.
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congruence exists between what the US’s domestic political culture symbolises and 
the political and cultural aspirations of significant numbers of non-Americans. 
Within this posited continuum between global aspirations and US politics and culture, 
American ‘attractiveness’ appears to be understood as a fact rather than as a political 
claim. By simply communicating America’s values more strenuously and 
consistently, this logic seems to suggest, the US can tap into a reserve of global 
public attraction that comes from America’s embodiment of ‘universal’ human 
aspirations.91
In developing his argument about the US’s inherent attributes for cultural 
and political leadership, Nye overlooks the point that when Washington began to 
pursue cultural and informational diplomacy on an ongoing basis from 1936 there 
were deep ambiguities within academic and policy opinion as to whether US political 
culture even permitted Washington to use cultural and informational diplomacy. As I 
noted in my introduction to this study, the embrace of global posture of hegemony 
and vindicationism by Washington during the Second World War period was 
undertaken by articulating precisely this kind of continuum between America’s 
domestic creeds and the nature of cultural and political aspirations abroad. Asserting 
this continuum became a source of self-legitimation for US cultural and informational 
diplomacy. Might Nye’s work be thought of in similar terms? One of the 
implications of adopting a discursive practices framework for my analysis is that it 
shows how America’s universal cultural and political ‘attractiveness’ has been a 
historically contingent and endogenous claim, and that Nye’s conception of US soft 
power appears to fall into a similar pattern.92 In fact, the concept of soft power
91 A related point is that Nye adopts the vocabulary of cultural and political universalism as a 
description of America’s global position, rather than a political claim, presupposing in the process that 
the aspirations of the world’s people are uniformly focused on emulating the US’s form of political, 
cultural and economic life. This claim, as the coming chapters will show, was also habitually made in 
the context of US foreign policy-making within the cultural and informational programs, and this study 
suggests that the underlying purposes and self-images that such claims advance must be subject to 
deeper reflection. Thus, in addition to presuming that public diplomacy is a basis for the ‘fulfilment’ 
of America’s domestic creeds, Nye’s assumes that America is a culturally and ideologically universal 
beacon. In my work, these are treated as political claims of the kind that Rodney Barker emphasises 
that are implicated in the construction of power relations, rather that as objective political ‘facts.’ See 
Barker, Legitimating Identities.
92 As such, the soft power thesis also denies the objects of American attraction, the global public, the 
ability to think beyond the United States’s example in articulating their cultural and political 
aspirations. In making this point I have drawn on Cox’s distinction between problem-solving and 
critical international theory. Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory,” in Approaches to World Order, ed. Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. 
Sinclair, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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achieves traction within US foreign policy commentary precisely because it is 
couched within the shared assumptions and lexicon through which Washington has 
cultivated a sense of itself as a hegemonic actor in world politics. However, to 
effectively analyse the representational practices that have constituted Washington as 
a cultural and informational agent in world politics necessitates that alternatives terms 
of theoretical engagement from the concept of soft power be found.
Similar political premises are evident in many other recent discussions of 
US public diplomacy, much of it written by former government officials. In 2002 
Christopher Ross, then serving as a special coordinator for public diplomacy within 
the Department of State, urged the ‘rebuilding’ of the US’s capacity to conduct public 
diplomacy and revive America’s cultural and political influence among populations 
that might otherwise be swayed by anti-Americanism.93 US informational diplomacy 
has been presented in these recent policy debates as a vital short- and medium-term 
tool for American counter-terrorism. Hence, former VOA director Sanford J. Ungar 
claimed in 2005 that radio broadcasting- “the country’s best instrument of public 
diplomacy-” could be of great significance in confronting current US foreign policy 
challenges.94 David Hoffman, head of the journalism advocacy organisation 
Intemews, emphasised in 2002 that in addition to its own informational diplomacy, 
the US should also work towards the liberalisation and improvement of journalistic 
practices globally:
freedom of speech and exchange of information are not just luxuries, 
they are the currency on which global commerce, politics, and 
culture increasingly depend.. .that, more than any number of 
advertisements about American values, is what will bring light to
93 Ross emphasises how “great numbers of people reject terror and hope for themselves, their families, 
and their societies that for which the United States is known: democratic governance, tolerance and 
freedom to prosper...the United States [must] engage them.” Christopher Ross, “Public Diplomacy 
Comes of Age,” The Washington Quarterly 25, (no. 2, 2002), p. 83. The same year, US diplomat 
Helena K. Finn charged that the US’s resources for cultural diplomacy were “utterly inadequate,” and 
that international persuasion (“one of the most potent weapons in the United States’ armoury”) had 
been neglected by Washington for too long. In this piece Finn was presenting her personal views. 
Helena K. Finn, “The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign Audiences,” Foreign Affairs 82, 
(no. 6, 1993), pp. 17, 20.
94 Sanford J. Ungar, “Pitch Imperfect: The Trouble at the Voice of America,” Foreign Affairs 84, (no. 
3, May/June 2005), pp. 7, 13. See also the various replies to Ungar’s essay: David S. Jackson, 
Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Richard Richter and Philomena Jurey, “His Master’s Voice? Is the Voice of 
America a Source of Responsible Journalism?,” Foreign Affairs 84, ( no. 4, July/August, 2005);
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the darkness from which terrorism has come.95
Hoffmann’s recommendations are especially interesting since the doctrine of freedom 
of information has been a long-standing feature of US informational diplomacy 
discourse, in the context of Washington efforts to promote international liberalism 
more broadly, as my forthcoming chapters will highlight.
Although they are part of a significant debate in the context of contemporary 
US foreign policy thinking, the work of Joseph Nye and the other current public 
diplomacy commentators as noted above are steeped in the prevailing political 
interests and assumptions of the US foreign policy.96 This is because none of these 
contemporary foreign policy pieces engage with the question of how the ideological 
foundations of America’s ‘public diplomacy’ have been endogenously constituted, 
and the implications of these representational practices for the kind of presumptions 
to universalism that premise their policy recommendations.97 As John M. Hobson 
contends, adopting an historicist methodology as this study does constitutes a
95 David Hoffmann, “Beyond Public Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 81, (no. 2, March/April 2002), p.
95. A call for more high-level interest in public diplomacy was made by Anthony J. Blinken, a
former US National Security Council member, who emphasised the universalism of America’s 
ideology when he noted that the international “critics of the United States have useful corrections but 
no alterative system of values and practices that offer as much progress and possibility as the US 
system does.” Anthony J. Blinken, “Winning the War of Ideas,” The Washington Quarterly 25, (no. 2, 
2002), pp. 111-13. Published extracts from the Council on Foreign Relations’ Independent Task Force 
on Public Diplomacy in 2002 similarly suggested that international persuasion was particularly central 
as a tool with which to undermine anti-American terrorism: Peter G. Peterson, “Public Diplomacy and 
the War on Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 81, (no. 5, September/October 2002). The failure of the US’s 
international persuasion has also been noted by Chris Patten, “Soft Power and the Rule of Law,” The 
Sydney Morning Herald, (April 17, 2003); Max Walsh, “Unilateral Damage,” The Bulletin, (October 5,
2005) . Other contributions, including Rosaleen Smyth’s 2001 survey of the global mass media 
environment and the ongoing relevance of informational diplomacy, have explored how the US’s 
informational diplomacy might be enhanced by new technologies and digital communications. 
Rosaleen Smyth, “Mapping US Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century,” Australian Journal o f 
International Affairs 55, (no. 3, 2001).
96 And having sketched the limitations of Nye’s concept in the context of my own research problem, 
his views are certainly a resonant and influential part of this contemporary debate calling for a reversal 
of the unilateralist tendencies of the current US administration.
97 A recent edited volume by Jan Melissen has added a theoretical dimension to the contemporary 
debate on public diplomacy. Brian Hocking’s contribution to this volume is particularly important in 
clarifying the kinds of inter-governmental relationships and complex policy networks in which 
contemporary public diplomacy is conducted. However, these accounts also fail to consider the 
existentially productive dimension of public diplomacy discourse. Brian Hocking, “Rethinking the 
‘New’ Public Diplomacy,” in The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. 
Jan Melissen, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Another angle on this problem has been 
illuminated by Julia Sweig, who has recently contended that by celebrating too boisterously and 
unreflectively America’s claim to cultural and political leadership within international politics in the 
context of the Cold War, US foreign policy-makers have actively undermined the US’s international 
credibility and appeal as a hegemonic power into the post-Cold War era. Julia Sweig, Friendly Fire: 
Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century, New York: Public Affairs Press,
2006) , Ch. 16.
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‘critical’ theoretical project, in that historical studies expose the origins of prevailing 
relations of dominance and subordination within the global order. Writing history 
provides “a means to rethink theories andproblematise the...present,” revealing how 
contemporary global relationships have “emerged not in accordance with ‘natural’ 
human impulses but rather through processes of power, identity/social exclusion, and 
norms.” In uncovering the constitutive functions that have been performed by the 
discursive representation of American cultural and informational diplomacy, my 
study ‘de-naturalises’ the discursive and ideological foundations of US public 
diplomacy."
In contrast to these contemporary public diplomacy commentaries, recent 
scholarship examining the diplomatic history of cultural and informational 
diplomacy, particularly in relation to the Cold War, offers more detail and conceptual 
depth into the constitutive functions and the kinds of identity-claims that policy­
makers articulate in the context of cultural and informational policy-making. The key 
objectives and contributions of this Diplomatic History research agenda are surveyed 
in the next section. My study takes several cues from this so-called ‘cultural turn’ 
within Diplomatic History research, and I follow a similar historical methodological, 
although in the section to follow I shall also indicate how the questions that guide my 
study differ from the kinds of questions that have been asked by this historical 
literature.
98 John M. Hobson, “What’s At Stake in ‘Bringing Historical Sociology Back into International 
Relations? Transcending ‘Chronofetishism’ and ‘Tempocentrism’ in International Relations,” in eds. 
Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, Historical Sociology o f International Relations, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 5-10.
99 This critical theoretical approach also informs the discursive practices approach, particular insofar as 
Raymond Duvall and Michael N. Barnett have surveyed it in their 2005 study of the typology of power 
in international relations. In this article the authors call for an extension of the discursive practices 
approach specifically within the context of US foreign policy studies, so that IR scholars might better 
understand the sources of discursive or ‘productive’ power that have attended the material structures of 
US hegemony/empire. “It is possible and desirable...to see the American empire as constituted by 
global social relations. Making this move requires that willingness to see the United States at the 
imperial centre, structurally constituted and discursively produced through a complex of imperial 
relations that are not themselves fully under the control of the US state as actor. To fully appreciate 
how power is embedded in empire, though, requires a willingness to see not only the different forms of 
power but also how they combine in different ways to create structured and enduring hierarchies of 
control and advantage.” Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” p. 66.
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Culture in Diplomatic History: The Propagation o f Ideology as Foreign Policy
Since the late 1970s an expanding research agenda within the study of 
foreign policy history has set out to examine the cultural, ideological and discursive 
determinants of diplomacy and foreign policy. One of the key features of this agenda 
has been its ability to situate these inter-subjective factors within the historiography 
of the Cold War. In the process of emphasising the diplomatic impacts of culture, 
ideology and information, this historical work, like the constructivist critique of neo­
utilitarianism that emerged during the 1990s in IR, has effectively moved beyond 
depictions of international politics as a domain populated by purely rational agents in 
pursuit of their material interests.100 In this observation the nature of states as agents 
within world politics was effectively recast during the early stages of this debate: as 
Akira Iriye has contended, states are in one way or another “held together both by 
public authority organising and enforcing law and order, and by significant symbols 
that impose meaning on experience.’,101 The key point of critical insight here was 
that governments pursue diplomacy through the prism of the prevailing cultural and 
ideological terms of their domestic authority.102 Iriye’s Across the Pacific developed 
this premise by charting the cultural determinants of Washington’s diplomatic 
relationship with East Asia. In this context he traced how US foreign policy in the 
first decades of the twentieth century was driven by a posture of “moral mission,” 
through which Washington saw itself as a “symbol of progress...imparting] its 
blessings to others.”103 These cultural prisms through which American foreign policy 
was conceived were especially powerful in the case of US foreign policy toward 
China, which was built upon “moral concern with the destiny of China...America 
was pictured as having built up good will in China; Free China, a phrase that began to 
be used in official documents, looked to the United States for support and
100 I hasten to add that this move has been much less controversial and largely driven by empirical 
concerns rather than by a turn to ontological critique, in the case of constructivism in IR. See Akira 
Iriye, “Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations.” Diplomatic History 3, 
(no. 2, 1979), p. 100. A more recent statement of this approach is made in Akira Iriye, C-ultural 
Internationalism and World Order, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 1-2.
101 Iriye, “Culture and Power,” pp. 116-7.
102 Much of this work was developed in relation to Great Power politics in the Asia Pacific. See, e.g.: 
Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History o f American-East Asian Relations, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967).
103 Iriye, Across the Pacific, pp. 205, 221. On Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘civilizing mission’ and the 
distinctive characteristics of US imperialist in the first decades of the twentieth century see Frank 
Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism, (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2001).
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Cooperation,” although this image proved ultimately “hollow, a product of the liberal 
American imagination.”104 In later work Iriye extended his assessment of the 
significance of international cultural interaction to diplomatic relationships, 
contending in 1997’s Cultural Internationalism and World Order that just as political 
interactions take place through the prism of cultural and ideological perceptions, so 
too do international cultural interactions serve as a conduit for the pursuit of 
international political interests, rivalries or, conversely, international 
rapprochement.105
Much subsequent research on cultural diplomacy and international 
information within the discipline of Diplomatic History was sparked by these 
pioneering reflections on the cultural and inter-subjective determinants of foreign 
policy. Frank Ninkovich’s history of the US State Department’s cultural diplomacy 
programs constituted a key early contribution to this research agenda. In 1981’s 
Diplomacy o f Ideas, Ninkovich surveyed the evolving scope and tone of US cultural 
diplomacy practices. He shows how the sentiment of ‘liberal ecumenism’ that had 
dominated the State Department’s programs in the 1930s and early 1940s gave way to 
cultural power politics and ideological confrontation by the late 1940s: a reflection of 
the broader shift toward a Cold War posture within US grand strategy.106 His account 
also implicitly recognises the legitimising function that references to America’s 
historical development within policy texts performed, as US policy-makers grappled 
with the implications of Washington’s involvement in global ideological antagonisms 
during the early stages of the Cold War.
As the rhetoric of the Cold War grew progressively more abstract- 
with frequent allusions to the conflict of systems, the antithesis 
between totalitarianism and democracy, and the struggle between 
slavery and freedom- contradictions evaporated...The world was 
changing rapidly and making new and difficult demands on the 
United States, [and] Americans could keep pace only by using 
the traditions available to them. It was inevitable as well as ironic 
that a cultural diplomacy that prided itself on its ecumenism and 
its rationality was prevented by the very expansiveness of its vision 
from becoming conscious of its parochial limitations. What passed
104 Iriye, Across the Pacific, p. 221.
105 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, ‘Conclusion.’ The overarching nature of culture as a prism 
through which international politics takes place is also emphasised in Ninkovich’s work, see 
Ninkovich, Diplomacy o f Ideas.
106 Ninkovich, Diplomacy o f Ideas, ‘Conclusion.’
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for universalism was only a projection of America’s self-image, 
and a distorted one at that.10
The constitutive and enabling functions of foreign policy discourse were also 
explored by Ninkovich in a 1977 article exploring the internal controversy sparked by 
a touring exhibition of avant-garde painting supported by the State Department’s 
visual art exchange program in 1947. In an illustration of how cultural and political 
issues came to be deeply entwined during the Cold War, Ninkovich traces how the 
Department of State’s art program prompted fierce debates about the ‘intellectual and 
structural underpinnings’ of post-war American grand strategy. The controversy over 
the modernist artworks provided an outlet for the expression of a nativist American 
aesthetic, which actually presaged the consolidation of the US’s Cold War ideological 
posture among domestic and official opinion:
The emphasis on universalism, the fear of radical subversion 
combined with a self-righteous insistence upon the pristine vitality 
of American cultural forms, and the view of art as an instrument 
of national power- all the themes which tended to clash in the art 
fiasco would begin to mature into a comprehensive cold war 
consensus that would eventually allow for the release of immense 
American energies throughout the world.108
In engaging with a range of empirical issues that reflect on US’s cultural and political 
perceptions of world politics,109 Ninkovich’s work represented an important addition 
to the first wave of scholarship into the connections between foreign policy and 
culture, media and ideology within the field of Diplomatic History.110
The second wave of research into culture and foreign policy within 
Diplomatic History has been encompassed considerable theoretical diversity and casts
Ibid., pp. 150, 183.
108 Frank Ninkovich, “The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy: Art and the State Department 1938-1947,” 
Diplomatic History 1, (no. 3, Summer 1977), p. 236.
109 In addition to these studies of the State Department’s cultural programs, the cultural, spiritual and 
‘civilizational’ elements of US foreign relations have also been traced in Ninkovich’s work on 
American philanthropic institutions and the modernisation of China through educational programs 
during the early twentieth century. Frank Ninkovich, “The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and 
Cultural Change,” The Journal o f American History 70, (no. 4, March 1984).
110 In addition to the work of Akira Iriye, standout works from this phase include: Emily S. Rosenberg, 
Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945, (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1982); Frank Costigliola, Awkward Domination: American Political, Economic and 
Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Michael H. 
Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
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a wider empirical net in terms of its subject matter. The historical insights presented 
by this second-wave literature have exposed some of the key issues that my study 
examines. These insights include how Washington’s post-war cultural diplomacy 
programs were responded to by European populations; how the Cold War developed 
within the realm of international cultural and intellectual interchange; and how 
discursive practices have informed the ways in which different states utilised the 
cultural and informational instruments of diplomacy. As Jessica C. E. Geinow-Hecht 
notes in an introduction to a recent collection that is emblematic of the diversity of 
the second ‘cultural turn’ in Diplomatic History, the focus of this literature is “the 
sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national 
boundaries...[and] the creation and communication of memory, ideology, emotions, 
life styles, scholarly and artistic works, and other symbols.” 111 Issues examined 
within this agenda include: the history of multilateral cultural cooperation, especially 
the connection between the inter-war cosmopolitan political movements and cultural 
internationalism; Soviet and British cultural diplomacy; non-government international 
philanthropic and educational interactions; and the projection of concepts of gender 
through official and non-government cultural diplomacy. 112 The constitutive 
influence of popular culture has been a strong theme cutting across the various 
geographical and temporal preoccupations of this recent research, 113 as has the
111 Jennifer C. E. Geinow-Hecht, “Introduction: On the Division of Knowledge and the Community of 
Thought: Culture and International History,” in Culture and International History, eds. Jessica C. E. 
Geinow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 6.
112 Thomas Allen Schwartz has written a book review that usefully surveys the ‘cultural turn’ in 
Diplomatic History: Thomas Allen Schwartz, “Explaining the Cultural Turn- or Detour?,” Diplomatic 
History 31, no. 1 (January 2007). Another interesting reflection on this turn is supplied in Ninkovich’s 
evocatively titled review: Frank Ninkovich, “Where Have All the Realists Gone?,” Diplomatic History 
26, (no. 1, Winter 2002). My discussion in chapter two also surveys much of the secondary literature 
on the history of cultural and informational diplomacy. On multilateral cultural diplomacy see: Iriye, 
Cultural Internationalism. In addition to Gould-Davies’s work on Soviet cultural diplomacy, the 
writings of former US diplomat Frederick C. Barghoorn during the 1950s and 1960s provide some 
interesting reflections on the ‘symbolic’ significance that cultural relations were understood to have by 
Soviet leaders. See, e.g.: Gould-Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy;” Frederick C. 
Bargoorn, “Soviet Cultural Diplomacy since Stalin,” Russian Review 17, (no. 1, January 1958). On 
gender see, e.g.: Emily S. Rosenberg, “Consuming Women: Images of Americanisation in the 
‘American Century,”’ Diplomatic History 23, (no. 3, Summer 1999); Belmonte, “A family Affair?” 
On philanthropy see, e.g.: Volker R. Berghahn, “Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the ‘American 
Century,” Diplomatic History 23, (no. 3, Summer, 1999). The role of symbolic diplomacy such as 
honours, summits and other rituals has also been explored in contemporary Diplomatic History 
writing, and represents a tangential approach to the study of diplomatic history as a cultural practice. 
See: Chan Lau Kit-ching, “Symbolism as Diplomacy: The United States and Britain’s China Policy 
During the First Year of the Pacific War,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 16, (no. 1, March 2005).
113 Film, art, music, popular literature and fashion have been regarded as “significant texts for 
diplomatic historians.” Helen Laville, “‘Our Country Endangered by Underwear:’ Fashion, 
Femininity, and the Seduction Narrative in Ninotchka and Silk Stockings," Diplomatic History 30, (no.
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examination of discursive practices in relation to the diplomacy of culture and 
information.114 Consequently, my work speaks to many of the theoretical and 
empirical concerns of this historical debate.
The centrality of cultural meanings and cultural diplomacy practices in 
generating Cold War rivalries has been developed in the work of Nigel Gould-Davies, 
Scott Lucas, Frances Stonor Saunders and James Vaughn. As I reflected above the 
insight into the constitutive role that cultural antagonism played in the context of the 
struggle presented in their work supplies ballast to the reading of the Cold War I 
develop here. Gould-Davies, for example, has summarised this underlying account of 
the Cold War as an ideological struggle in the following terms: “the Cold War was 
essentially a clash of belief systems in the absence of direct military hostilities, the 
transmission of ideas and values was a key method of conflict. The Tow politics’ of 
cultural relations were, in fact, high politics.”115 This conclusion is shared by Scott 
Lucas in his survey of the various informational and psychological warfare agencies 
through which the US waged its international crusade in the name of the overarching 
cause of ‘freedom.’116 In a detailed study of US Central Intelligence Agency’s 
activities during the early Cold War struggle, Stonor Saunders proffers a similar 
argument in suggesting that the early struggle between Washington and Moscow was 
founded on the shared premise that there were deep connections between cultural and 
intellectual vitality and geopolitical competition.117 James Vaughn has recently 
illustrated the benefits of a comparative perspective in the study of propaganda, 
charting the failure of British and US Cold War informational practices in the Arab 
Middle East during 1945-57. Vaughn’s work is of some interest in that he notes how
4, Summer 2006), p. 625. See also Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism; Rosenberg “Consuming 
Women.” A review of this gender literature is: David Healy, “Haiti, Marines, and Culture,” 
Diplomatic History 27, (no. 5, November 2003). On Art, in addition to Ninkovich, “The Currents of 
Cultural Diplomacy;” see: Jessica C. E. Geinow Hecht, “Art Is Democracy and Democracy Is Art: 
Culture, Propaganda and the Neue Zeitung in Germany, 1944-1947,” Diplomatic History 23, (no. 1, 
Winter 1999).
114 Rosenberg, “Consuming Women;” Laville, “Our Country Endangered by Underwear;” Klein, Cold 
War Orientalism. Belmonte develops the argument that there were potent narratives within US 
informational diplomacy in relation to gender: “While the information programs were an integral 
element of early Cold War diplomacy, they also represented a concerted effort to define American 
national identity. Through radio shows, films, and publications, US policymakers propagated a 
carefully constructed narrative of progress, freedom, and happiness. They not only ‘imagined’ an 
American ‘community’ but they also presented their vision to the world in hopes of persuading foreign 
peoples to reject communism and adopt democratic capitalism.” Laura A. Belmonte “A Family 
Affair?,” p. 80. Also see: Haddow, Pavilions o f Plenty.
115 Gould Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” p. 212.
116 Lucas, Freedom ’s War.
117 Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War, Ch. 2.
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the ideological and cultural identities of both Britain and the US were perceived 
during the Cold War as highly valuable objects over which the conflict itself had, to 
some extent, been staked. 118 In coming to these conclusions, the historiography of the 
cultural Cold War complements the argument made by this study, namely that 
cultural and informational diplomacy was a highly significant constitutive practice in 
the emergence of superpower rivalry.
I differ from this cultural historiography of the Cold War in my adoption of 
a conceptual framework drawing on constructivist IR, as such this work encompasses 
a theoretical dimension pertaining to the parameters of foreign policy analysis that is 
not explicitly addressed within the study of Diplomatic History. In the next section of 
this discussion I therefore revisit the discursive practices approach to show how my 
work extends the substantive insights and theoretical parameters of this existing work.
The Functions o f Cultural and Informational Diplomacy and the Extension o f 
Discursive Practices Analysis
A discussion of the conceptual and analytical frameworks of the discursive 
practices approach has been undertaken above, and so at this stage I shall briefly 
review how my work extends the discursive practices approach through its 
engagement US cultural and informational diplomacy. As I suggested above, much 
of the work within this approach examines processes of international estrangement 
and the production of (in)security. The work of Todorov, Shapiro, Doty and 
Campbell, as well as other scholars within the discursive practices approach such as 
Jutta Weldes and the early work of Lene Hansen, has collectively illuminated the 
discursive constitution of danger and insecurity in world politics with strong critical 
insight. 119 While this aspect of discursive practices in foreign policy is surveyed in
118 Vaughn, The Failure o f American and British Propaganda, pp. 4-5.
119 Todorov, The Conquest o f America; Shapiro, The Politics o f  Representation-, Doty, Imperial 
Encounters-, Cambpell, Writing Security. The underlying theoretical claim within this literature can be 
summarised as follows: “identities (both of self and others) and insecurities, rather than being given, 
emerge out of a process of representation through which individuals- whether state officials, leaders or 
members of nationalist movements, journal editors, or users of the Internet, for example- describe to 
themselves the world in which they live.” Jutta Weldes, et. al. “Introduction: Constructing Insecurity.” 
in Jutta Weldes, et. al. eds., Cultures o f Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production o f 
Danger, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 14; Jutta Weldes, “The Cultural 
Production of Crises: US Identity and Missiles in Cuba,” in eds. Jutta Weldes, et. al., Cultures o f 
Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production o f Danger, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999); Jennifer Milliken, “Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in
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this study- especially in relation to the way in which cultural and informational 
officials represented Axis and Soviet propaganda in terms of a threat to American 
security- much of what was attempted through US foreign policy in this period was 
also constructive, integrative and sought to affect deeper international 
interdependence. Washington’s vision of the post-war order as a source of cultural 
rehabilitation and political rapprochement- a vision in which Unesco was particularly 
emblematic- was also constituted by the policy discourses that I examine in this 
study. As such, the work of Christina Klein and a recent critique articulated by Lene 
Hansen, alongside that of historians who have connected US policy discourse to the 
process of post-war economic integration, is significant as a call to extend the 
discursive practices approach beyond security policy toward examining how 
representations enabled American to construct the post-war global order.120 This is 
not to suggest that the study of discourse and danger/crisis is not a productive line of 
enquiry, but to claim that it is possible to extend the substantive interests of the 
discursive practices approach beyond studying foreign policy as the articulation of 
international threats and disorder.
One of the most significant implications of the argument I develop in the 
chapters to follow is that I problematise David Campbell’s claim that America’s Cold 
War foreign policy was essentially bound up with the articulation of difference and 
denigration in relation to an internal ‘other.’ My study shares Campbell’s interest in 
uncovering the transformation of US interests and identity as enabled by US foreign 
policy discourse during the 1936-53 period. However, cultural and informational 
diplomacy give a slightly more nuanced view of how the concept of ideological 
warfare was regarded and eventually accepted as the guiding rationale of US foreign 
policy during the late 1940s.121 Although the Cold War symbolises the importance of
Korea,” in eds. Jutta Weldes, et. al., Cultures o f Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production o f 
Danger, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Pedersen, “In Search of Monsters to 
Destroy?;”H ansen, Security as Practice', Shared themes on the cultural contexts of security ‘threats,’ 
with less explicit focus on discourse as a methodology, are developed by Ole Wasver and Morten 
Kelstrup, “Europe and its Nations: Political and Cultural Security,” in eds. Ole Waever and Morten 
Kelstrup, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, (London: Pinter, 1993).
120 Klein, Cold War Orientalism', Hansen, “Clash of Cartoons?”; Haddow, Pavilions o f Plenty, 
Rosenberg, “Consuming Women.”
121 1 share this interest in how moral, ideological and narrative elements shaped the transformation of 
the United States as an international agent during the Second World War and early Cold War without 
necessarily sharing the implication of Campbell’s view of the primacy of the domestic threat in the 
discursive constitution of the Cold War. There is sufficient scope within the purposes of my 
discussion to delve into the causal implications of Campbell’s work on the Cold War. My own 
conclusions on how discourses about the Communist and Soviet threats shaped the US’s agency as a
79
the constitutive functions that cultural and informational discourse played in the 
transition to a hegemonic posture in US foreign relations, the ways in which cultural 
and informational diplomats regarded Cold War ideological antagonisms is not 
revealed as a straightforward process within this study. Rather, I also show how the 
Cold War propaganda struggle was subject to several different interpretations by US 
policy-makers in the late 1940s. Liberal sentiments were often voiced to counteract 
moves toward a posture of ideological warfare within the cultural and informational 
programs themselves, while at the same time supporters of a more strident approach 
couched their arguments in terms of the defence of the liberal democratic system. In 
other words, both Cold Warriors and those who sought a less antagonistic basis for 
engagement with the Soviet Union co-opted the same rhetoric of liberalism and 
American singularity to articulate their views. As such, my case study chapters will 
cast Washington’s assumption of the role of Cold War protagonist in a more nuanced, 
complex and contested way than Campbell’s implication that the Cold War was an 
ontological inevitability suggests.122
Conclusion
In the foregoing discussion I illustrated how, in response to my key research 
questions, my overarching argument develops along three lines. First, my 
overarching argument contends that from their earliest stages the US cultural and 
informational diplomacy programs hosted debates about the nature of US political 
culture and the parameters of American interests as a world power, and that these had 
a broad resonance in helping to enable the transition toward a hegemonic posture in 
US foreign relations. My study further argues that the mobilisation of discourses of 
liberalism and exceptionalism were two key ideas that structured the cultural and 
informational programs and shaped the kind of hegemonic global role Washington
cultural and informational diplomat will be made clear in the chapters to follow. Campbell, Writing 
Security.
122 Campbell is not alone in his implication that the Cold War was somehow ‘inevitable’ at the 
conclusion of the Second World War. In an ironic convergence of conclusions, structural realist 
explanations of the Cold War similarly locate the nature of the struggle as taking place through internal 
balancing due to the bipolar structure, and thus adopt a similar functionalism concerning the origins of 
the Cold War struggle as a historical phenomenon that Campbell’s account, arguably, also regresses 
into from its very different starting point. For a survey of structural realist accounts of bipolarity see: 
Patrick James, “Structural Realism and the Causes of War,” Mershon International Studies Review 39, 
(no. 2, October 1995). On bipolarity see Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, (Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Ch. 7.
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began to construct for itself during 1936-53. Finally, I noted above that in making 
this argument my work has implications for how IR scholars conceptualise power, 
agency, and the nature of foreign policy-making as a constitutive practice. After 
summarising the three key threads of my argument and the implications of this work, 
my discussion moved into a discussion of the conceptual framework and mode of 
enquiry that I draw from the discursive practices approach within constructivist IR. I 
reviewed discourse analysis in light of the analytical tools it supplies to engage with 
the linguistic processes that feature within foreign policy-making: including logics of 
alterity; narratives; frames; and the classificatory/positioning device of grammatical 
predication, indicating how I employ these tools within my three case studies. 
Finally, this chapter has indicated how my work differs from other current approaches 
to cultural and informational diplomacy in International Relations and Diplomatic 
History.
The historical component of my study begins in the forthcoming chapter, in 
which I survey the European inter-war historical context in which the practices of 
cultural and informational diplomacy and propaganda developed. I shall chart the 
development of these practices as diplomatic tools, and explore the intellectual and 
popular responses to cultural and informational diplomacy within Europe and the US 
during the inter-war period. In the next chapter I also examine the political context in 
which international persuasion was adopted by Washington as a diplomatic tool in 
1936, noting how the proliferation of American philanthropic activities and the 
extension of US foreign policy constituted the backdrop to the founding of a US 
cultural diplomacy program.
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CHAPTER TWO
PROPAGANDA CRITIQUE AND POST-LEAGUE INTERNATIONALISM: 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
In 1927’s Propaganda and the World War, American political scientist 
Harold Lasswell observed that the advent of ‘total war’ in 1914-18 heralded a profound 
change in the way that political power would subsequently be exercised. For Lasswell, 
the widespread use of psychological warfare during the conflict had signalled that 
propaganda’s emergence as one of the “most powerful instrumentalities of the modem 
world,” having “arisen to its present eminence in response to a complex of changed 
circumstances which have altered the nature of society.”1 Lasswell’s emergence during 
the 1920s as America’s most prominent theorist of mass communications, politics and 
modernity, particularly given the significance accorded to the question of propaganda’s 
relationship to democracy in Lasswell’s work, is emblematic of broader shifts within 
American and European politics that occurred during the inter-war period.2 
Communications, culture and public opinion had become one of the most pervasive and 
controversial topics of debate among academics, diplomats and government officials 
and within the popular media on both sides of the Atlantic. What generally 
underscored these debates were Laswell’s two key concerns: namely that the 
instruments of political power had undergone a key shift due to the advent of rapid 
mass communications technologies, and that in the wake of the First World War
1 Quote taken from the British edition under a different title: Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique 
in the World War, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co, 1938), p. 220. On Lasswell see also: 
Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 
1986), p. 99.
2 Lasswell does not seem to have been a wholehearted critic of propaganda. For example, in Propaganda 
Technique in the World War he is less critical of Woodrow Wilson’s Committee on Public Information 
than many other US propaganda critics of the period. In other writings Lasswell emphasised the 
centrality of symbolism and representation, and sought to contribute to the developing study of political 
psychology. See, e.g.: Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War; Harold D. Lasswell, “The 
Study and Practice of Propaganda,” in Propaganda and Promotional Activities, eds. Harold D. Lasswell, 
Ralph D. Casey and Bruce Lannes Smith, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935); Harold D. 
Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).
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governments had increasing incentive to use them in the context of the rise of populist 
ideological movements.
In this context, a particularly significant topic of debate in the inter-war period 
concerned propaganda’s impact upon the conditions of peace, war and effective 
diplomacy. In one of the most enduring contributions to these debates E. H. Carr had 
observed how “it did not take long for the belligerents of 1914-18 to realise that...it 
was a condition of success on the military and economic fronts that the ‘morale’ of 
one’s own side should be maintained, and that of the other side sapped and destroyed.”3 
Carr went on to articulate a conception of strategic influence in the international system 
that encompassed ‘power over opinion,’ as well as the more traditional military and 
economic resources that states could bring to bear in the pursuit of their national 
interests.
While many scholars of the inter-war period such as Carr had suggested that 
the most significant implication of propaganda was its function in international conflict, 
an increasing number also detected the potential for international progress and political 
integration through the use of mass communications as an instrument for fostering 
international understanding. This inter-war ‘cosmopolitan’ movement advocated 
enhanced government and non-government efforts to deepen understanding and 
solidarity between nations, and thereby establish a foundation for international peace. 
Within this movement a ‘cultural internationalist’ sphere of international cooperation 
emerged, which drew on nineteenth century precedents to international cultural 
diplomacy and encompassed a “variety of activities.. .to link countries and peoples 
through the exchange of ideas and persons, through scholarly cooperation, or through 
efforts at facilitating cross-national understanding.”4 Specific criticisms of this
movement also emerged, such as Oswald Spengler’s denunciation of cosmopolitanism 
as a quest for pan European ‘cultural fulfilment’ that symbolised the demagogical and 
poisonous tendencies of a civilisation in decline. Other critics of cultural
internationalism, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, sought to demonstrate that the historical
3 Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, 2nd edition, (New York: Harper & Row, 
1946), p. 136.
4 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997), p. 3.
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record did not support the proposition that cultural understanding would restrain the 
aggrandising tendencies of states.5
What is also significant about these propaganda debates of the inter-war 
period was the epochal character of the changes that the rise of propaganda and total 
war were thought to signify. As Akira Iriye has observed, “just as the coming of the 
[First World War] unleashed nationalistic emotions and submerged internationalist 
forces, its prolongation had the effect of once again forcing people to question the 
system of interstate relations founded on national sovereignties, identities, and 
interests.” 6 These foundational institutions of world politics were questioned in light of 
the view that the balance of power had failed as a regulatory mechanism within 
international politics and the notion that technological innovations in communication 
and transport had caused spatial and temporal integration in international relations. The 
Russian Revolution and the enshrining of principles such as democracy and self- 
determination within the Versailles settlement were also taken as evidence of profound 
changes to the international system, as both seemed to herald a new historical era in 
which mass politics dominated both the domestic and international agendas of states. 
Bestselling books in Europe of the inter-war period reflect the imagery of epochal 
shifts, with titles including the ‘Decline of the West,’ a ‘Twenty Years’ Crisis,’ and 
‘Great Illusions.’ Other titles interrogated ‘Power,’ ‘International Government,’ the 
rise of an ‘International Mind’ and the ‘Prospects for Democracy. ’7 In the United 
States, with the arguable exception of Reinhold Niebuhr’s work, propaganda and the 
advent of total war were regarded somewhat differently, through a self-reflexive and 
moral prism through which America’s exceptionalism and morality as a world power
5 See Jacinta O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 59-71; Niebuhr, Moral Man, Ch. 4.
6 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, pp. 54-5.
7 See e.g.: Oswald Spengler, The Decline o f the West: Form and Actuality, trans. Charles Francis 
Atkinson, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926); Carr, Twenty Years Crisis', Norman Angell, The 
Great Illusion, 2nd edition, (London: Heinemann, 1933)- the book’s first edition was issued in 1908, to be 
reprinted multiple times in the two decades after; Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis, 2nd 
edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960); Leonard Woolf, International Government, (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1916); ‘International Mind’ is a chapter title from John A. Hobson, Towards 
International Government, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915); Alfred Zimmern, The Prospects o f 
Democracy and Other Essays, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929).
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should be embodied by Washington’s refusal to use propaganda.* 8 Uniting the divergent 
trans-Atlantic perspectives on the moral implications of propaganda, however, was a 
basic consensus that the war had opened up foundational changes for the conduct of 
statecraft. New instruments of political power had emerged, and factors such as 
culture, social structure, nationalism, and public opinion had become part of the fabric 
of the international system.9
Three strands from the history of the inter-war period will be analysed in this 
chapter. The first is the emergence of propaganda and cultural diplomacy as tools of 
international statecraft. Washington’s adoption of cultural diplomacy and international 
information as instruments of foreign policy from 1936 occurred after a twenty-year 
period during which the deployment and refinement of these diplomatic techniques had 
been taking place in the crucible of European diplomacy. I shall outline some key 
elements of the history of propaganda and cultural diplomacy prior to 1918, and then 
turn to a more detailed account of the techniques and policies that were adopted in 
Europe in the wake of the First World War and the Russian Revolution. As I observed 
above, a key preoccupation within intellectual and popular debates in this period was 
the question of whether the diplomatic deployment of information and culture would 
turn out to be a source of deeper chaos or future stability in the international system. 
Consequently, the second strand of inter-war history that will be examined in this
x It is fair to say that Niebuhr has a more ‘European’ than ‘American’ outlook within his work on
international politics during this period. I thank Vibeke Tjalve for some useful discussions on the
‘European origins’ of Niebuhr’s thought. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study
in Ethics and Politics, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1932). See also Harold Lasswell,
Power and Persuasion, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1948). Sproule’s study of US reactions to
propaganda is perhaps the most comprehensive available and will be drawn on extensively in this
chapter. J Michael Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience o f Media and Mass
Persuasion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
9 Although many textbooks emphasise that the first ‘Great Debate’ of International Relations scholarship 
took place in the inter-war period, these accounts have tended to overlook the role of public opinion as an 
axis of debate between scholars in this period. Instead, the stories that International Relations tells about 
its ‘first debate’ focus on how the prospects for inter-state cooperation were rendered in political debates 
of this time. However, it is clear that the questions posed by new technologies, new ideologies and the 
rise of propaganda as an instrument of political power were one of the core theoretical questions for 
international commentators in this period. It is a shame that the accounts of this debate presented to 
students of International Relations overlook this aspect. This is one of several problematic implications 
of the image of a ‘First Debate’ between discrete ‘idealist’ and ‘realist’ positions. Other implications of 
this debate are surveyed in: Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran, “The Construction of an Edifice: The 
Story of a First Great Debate,” Review of International Studies 31, (no. 1, 2005).
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chapter is the intellectual history of propaganda studies. In this context, some of the 
key differences that emerged between the European and US responses to propaganda 
will be analysed. The development of an American public and international discourse 
on propaganda is a particularly important story to be addressed in this section, because 
it was in this public and academic context that the first renditions of the US’s objectives 
and approaches to official cultural and informational diplomacy were articulated.
The third strand of this chapter’s historical survey is an examination of US 
foreign relations during the inter-war period. American philanthropic and educational 
activities in the realm of international cultural and informational interchange will be 
examined within this discussion as an area in which internationalist and humanist 
activities flourished prior to Washington’s official involvement in cultural and 
informational activities, furnishing the government programs with expertise and 
channels of operation after 1936. I shall also examine the broader steps toward 
international engagement that were pursued through US foreign policy during the inter­
war period. Contrary to the retrospective image of an ‘isolationist’ Washington that the 
historiography of US foreign relations has perpetrated, I shall highlight in this section 
that there were some important forms of international engagement pursued by US 
foreign policy in the decades between the Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt presidencies. In this context I adopt the term ‘post-League internationalism’ 
to refer to Washington’s approach to foreign policy during the inter-war period. This 
term suggests a more nuanced account of America’s international role after the Senate’s 
rejection of the League of Nations Charter than the conventional isolationist image.10 
This is not to suggest that there were not significant instances of US disengagement 
from the international system during the inter-war period. Charles P. Kindleberger’s 
account of the spiralling economic chaos of the 1930s, for example, highlights several 
instances of inaction on the part of the US that deepened the crisis, and the US Senate’s
10 This term is taken from Tomoko Akami. Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and 
the Institute o f Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919-1945, (London: Routledge, 2002). Akira Iriye 
also uncovers the elements of internationalism that underscored US foreign relations during the inter-war 
period in reflecting on the ‘globalising’ of America after 1913. See: Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History 
o f American Foreign Policy, Volume Three: The Globalizing o f America 1913-1945, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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failure to ratify the League of Nations Charter is also well known.11 However, it is not 
acknowledged often enough that Washington also participated in a number of League 
initiatives, spearheaded multilateral arms control initiatives, and extended its diplomatic 
and economic reach deep into the Western Hemisphere and the Asia Pacific during this 
period. Most significantly, uncovering these strands of internationalism that were 
developing within US foreign policy between the world wars brings into focus the 
circumstances of Washington’s adoption of cultural and informational diplomacy 
practices.
In the discussion below I use key terms in the manner outlined in my 
introductory chapter. Here ‘propaganda’ refers to advocacy of a political doctrine 
through informational and symbolic means, while ‘informational diplomacy’ will refer 
to international persuasion through print, radio and film media. I shall trace how the 
terms ‘cultural diplomacy’ and ‘cultural internationalism’ were articulated in this 
period to describe cultural and educational interchange during the inter-war period, 
largely as a way to escape the pejorative connotations that ‘propaganda’ had acquired 
during the First World War. These terms were favoured in a diplomatic context by 
Britain in particular during this period, as a way to convey its ideological critique of the 
Axis and Communist practices. However, as I noted in my introduction, I am interested 
in the construction of pejorative terms such as ‘propaganda’ and liberal ones such as 
‘cultural/informational diplomacy’ that were mobilised during the inter-war period, and 
as such do not assume a natural distinction between them exists.
11 Kindleberger’s work is significant here as a history of failure of economic cooperation in the 1930s 
here, however I do not take up his explanation of this failure as a function of a multi-polar international 
structure. Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Penguin edition, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), Ch. 14. In the context of the League of Nations Charter 
ratification fiasco, it is often wrongly assumed that Senate Republicans were comprehensively and 
irretrievably hostile to the League project from the beginning. This was not the case, isolationist 
elements were scattered across both the Republican and Democrat parties and did not make up the 
majority of Lodge’s supporters in passing the Charter with reservations. The Lodge Reservations to the 
Charter were intended to coordinate US participation in the League with the provisions of the US 
Constitution, and as such actually reflected the Senate majority’s enthusiasm for a more active basis for 
US engagement in post-war international relations. Woodrow Wilson himself, the League’s most ardent 
supporter, should be seen to share responsibility for the disagreement that precluded US involvement in 
the League for his refusal to negotiate with the constitutionalist (not isolationist) position of Congress.
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The Emergence of Cultural and Informational Instruments in Diplomacy.
Although the inter-war period represented a crucial phase in the development 
of culture, information and education as tools of foreign policy, 12 these practices have 
considerably older origins. The leaders of Hellenic Athens, for instance, had extended 
Greek cultural achievements across the Athenian empire as a complement to its military 
and economic dominion. In one of the most frequently quoted passages of 
Thucydides’s History o f the Peloponnesian Wars the Athenian General Pericles thus 
declared that as an example of politics, law and aesthetics his city was “an education to 
Greece.” 13 Thucydides’s epic goes on to document Athens’ decline from this position 
of hegemonia- the possession of power that is broad, legitimate, containing a cultural 
component and embodying common interests- into one of arkhe, meaning ‘control’ or 
outright coercive domination. Thucydides’s work is emblematic of a broader tradition 
of classical political thought concerned with the exercise of international attraction, 
which distinguished the pursuit in politics of “enlightened from narrow self-interest, 
strategies of influence associated with each and their implications.” 14 Within this style 
of political thought, as Thucydides’s account reflects, the ability to sustain cultural and 
educational prestige was inextricably linked to the maintenance of domestic and 
international political legitimacy.
Cultural prestige and imperial power were also deeply connected in the 
context of the classical Roman Empire. As with Athens, Roman culture, education and 
ideals were promulgated in the context of Roman imperial ties, though they also
12 Although the focus of this study is not educational diplomacy, the development of educational 
diplomacy parallels the emergence of cultural and informational practices, and I see no reason to exclude 
it from the broader survey of international persuasion that I develop in this section.
13 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. R. Warner, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1954), pp. 145-7. As with the overlooked propaganda element in the conventional image of the ‘Great 
Debate’ that IR scholars have crafted for a pedagogical purposes, I would note that the resources of 
legitimacy and culture that the Athenian empire drew on and squandered during Thucydides’s epic are 
also overlooked in disciplinary accounts of the IR ‘Realism’ of Thucydides.
14 Richard Ned Lebow, “Power, Persuasion and Justice,” Millennium 33, (no. 3, 2005), p. 551. The 
presence of these themes within Thucydides’s account provide an interesting illustration of two broader 
concerns within this dissertation: namely the nature of hegemonic power and the way that culture and 
ideas have accompanied the exercise of hegemony, and the ways in which policy-makers (or in the case 
of Pericles, military leaders) narrated the exercise of Greek cultural influence abroad.
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percolated far beyond, and outlasted, the formal empire. The Ceaser dynasty was 
particularly innovative as cultural diplomats, as Jowett and O’Donnell argue:
[t]he Roman Empire was able to offer more than military 
protection- they provided both a moral philosophy and a 
cultural aesthetic that was adopted by the local peoples.
In this way the art and architecture of Rome was as much 
a symbol of imperial power as were the garrisons of armoured 
legions; and the cultural legacy remained much longer.15
As a consequence, some contemporary commentators have regarded the Roman empire 
as the exemplar of cultural hegemony as an international phenomenon, and thus the 
most appropriate benchmark against which to assess the extensiveness of US cultural 
dominance in the twenty-first century.16
The term ‘propaganda’ does not derive from classical political discourse, 
however, but rather is associated with Pope Gregory XV’s Sacra Congreatio de 
Propaganda Fide of 1622, a program of Catholic renewal and mass publicity launched 
in the context of the counter-reformation at the beginning of the Thirty Years War. 
What followed the Pope’s declaration was the earliest systematic and strategic use of 
mass propaganda in the context of war: the number of printed subversive leaflets that 
were distributed to troops by various parties to the conflict during the Thirty Years War 
(1618-1648) numbered in the thousands.17 Despite the connection that was established 
in the seventeenth century between propaganda and warfare, the term still referred in a 
neutral way to advocacy of truth or of a particular doctrine: it was not pejorative in
15 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, pp. 40-1.
16 Joseph Joffe, “Who’s Afraid of Mr. Big?” The National Interest 64, (Summer, 2001), p. 43. The 
comparison has been taken to its conclusion within Peter van Ham’s study of public diplomacy and pax 
Americana, where he illustrates the mixture of attraction and rebellion that US power gamers by citing 
the scene from the Monty Python film Life o f Brian where the Israelite revolutionaries ask ‘what have the 
Romans ever done for us?’ The answer is, ironically, such things as aqueducts, sanitation, medicine, 
education, and wine. Peter van Ham, “Power, Public Diplomacy, and the Pax Americana," in The New 
Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), pp. 53-55.
17 Significantly, the peace agreements that ended the conflict, signed in the city of Westphalia, dealt with 
foundational principles of the European international order. The possible links between the kinds of 
issues that were settled during this foundational peace settlement, with its extensive impacts international 
law and politics, and the extensive use of propaganda by both sides remain little understood, however.
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connotation at this stage.18 Propaganda acquired an association with manipulation and 
deception during the early twentieth century, largely as a consequence of the ways in 
which barrages of false and emotive information were deployed as propaganda by all 
sides during the First World War. In this post-1918 period ‘cultural diplomacy’ and 
‘cultural internationalism’ emerged as liberal categories of persuasive practice in an 
international context, while ‘propaganda’ was informational (and, for many 
commentators, nefarious) in character.
Precursors to Cultural Diplomacy, Propaganda in the Post-1648 Order
As far back as the seventeenth century cultural and educational propaganda 
techniques had been developed in a European context, but not as an official diplomatic 
activity. In 1689 a French-speaking college, one of the earliest examples of an 
international cultural institution, was founded in Prussia by exiled French Protestants. 
Several similar French institutions were founded shortly thereafter in Britain. In the 
decades that followed, the exiled French Huguenot communities in Holland and 
England also established French-language periodicals that came to be widely 
distributed across Western Europe, and contributed to the emergence of a trans­
national, French-speaking pan European ‘republic of letters.’19 In the course of the 
eighteenth century propaganda’s form, function and content were refined with its use as 
a diplomatic tool of the French monarchy. During the War of Spanish Succession 
(1701-1714) French diplomats distributed jurisprudential pamphlets which cited 
passages from eminent legal authorities such as Hugo Grotius that implicitly advanced 
French claims. Interestingly, French diplomats avoided putting these forward as their 
King’s personal claims, anticipating that the pamphlets “consisting as they do entirely
! 8 The roots of the term are Latin, propagare: to extend, enlarge or spread.
19 Joseph Klaits, Printed Propaganda Under Louis XIV: Absolute Monarchy and Public Opinion, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 20-1. On the expulsion of roughly 200,000 French 
Hugenots after the Edict of Fountainbleu of 1685. See: Heather Rae, State Identities and the 
Homogenisation o f Peoples, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 117-9. On French 
cultural expansion in the seventeenth century see: Walter R. Roberts and Terry L. Deibel, Culture and 
Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 1976), p. 17. See also Anthony Haigh, Cultural Diplomacy in Europe, (Strasborg: Council of 
Europe, 1974), pp. 28-30.
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of passages from disinterested authors, cannot be attacked without directly attacking 
authors...who carry weight in the public’s judgement.” 20 Joseph Klaits situates this 
innovation in the broader context of Louis IV’s ‘communications revolution,’ in which 
the use of symbols and information became integral components of the Sun King’s 
domestic and international statecraft.21
Increased rates of literacy in Europe had established the eighteenth century as 
an era saturated with mass political debate, much of it prompted by the work of 
cartoonists, pamphleteers including William Hogarth, James Gillary, and the French 
economic satirist Frederick Bastiat. As Mlada Bukovansky has argued, it is in this 
period that the “origins of the notion of public opinion as a political force” on an 
international scale can be observed.22 Bukovansky argues that the spread of discourses 
of political authority and legitimacy originating in post-Revolutionary France and 
America affected a profound transition in the practice of diplomacy:
underpinning the changes in the conduct of war and international 
politics that followed in the wake of the [French] Revolution was a 
new template of political legitimacy. Widespread emulation of the 
revolutionary French did not immediately ensue.. .but the template 
generated in the Revolution proved durable and compelling.
The liberal revolutions of the eighteenth century thus fundamentally altered “shared 
understandings of what was possible in politics,” ultimately contributing to the 
downfall of absolute monarchy as the source domestic political authority, and of 
dynastic marriage as the format of international alliances.23 Political revolution was
20 French ministerial consultant Ulrich Obrecht is quoted here. Klaits, Printed Propaganda Under Louis 
XIV, pp. 96-7.
21 “In the artwork of the absolutist state, French society was to be much more than a passive audience. 
Louis XIV’s government intended that the King’s subjects should participate in the ceremony of 
monarchy....Intendants, provincial governors, and other officials throughout France were mobilised to 
accomplish this purpose.” Ibid., pp. 11-12. A brief history of French cultural diplomacy as a national 
‘brand’ from Louis XIV onward is also supplied by Wally Olins, “Making a National Brand,” in The 
New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, ed. Jan Melissen, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005).
22 Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in 
International Political Culture, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 102. The earliest 
instance of propaganda on behalf of the United States occurred in this period, as reflected in Benjamin 
Franklin’s efforts from 1777 to appeal to sympathetic sectors of French and English public opinion.
23 Ibid., pp. 165, 186
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deeply implicated in the refinement of techniques for the coordinated use of 
propaganda, particularly in the case of the French revolutionary government’s effort to 
court sympathetic intellectuals across Europe. As with Louis IV’s legal advocacy, 
post-revolutionary French propaganda had a covert element: during the Napoleonic 
Wars it was revealed that a purportedly English newspaper called The Argus of London 
had actually been written by French government agents.24
During the nineteenth century, propaganda and cultural diplomacy techniques 
were extended and refined as a consequence of their deployment in the context of 
European colonial expansion. France was, once again, at the forefront of these 
innovations. Among the European powers it was France that placed most emphasis on 
cultural diplomacy, based on a vision of its colonial possessions as an extension of the 
French nation. The Alliance Frangaise was founded in 1883, partly with the rationale 
of consolidating colonial ties, and partly to stand self-reflexively as an official symbol 
of French cultural universalism and political prestige. As Tzvetan Todorov has 
reflected, French national identity had been articulated in increasingly universalist 
terms following the revolutionary period. Writing on French nationhood in 1844, Jules 
Michelet had thus observed: “What is holy in France, whatever it may be, is holy to all 
nations: it is adopted, blessed and mourned by the human race. For any man...his first 
country is his own, and his second is France.”25 By 1900 France had established a 
government office to monitor and support non-government international cultural 
initiatives, including the Alliance Frangaise. 26 French educational diplomacy, in the 
Middle East in particular, had become particularly extensive by the end of the 
nineteenth century, arising in part from the Catholic missionary tradition and in part 
from the government’s cultural format for colonial dominance. The trajectory of
24 Jowett and O’Donnell Propaganda and Persuasion, pp. 59-60.
2:1 Such discourses of universalism and exceptionality, as I shall demonstrate in the forthcoming chapters, 
have strong parallels within the discursive practices of US foreign policy-making during the period 
examined within this study. Many strikingly similar statements were made by US foreign policy-makers 
during the Second World War. Jules Michelet (1844) quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: 
Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought, trans. Catherine Porter, Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 211.
20 Roberts and Deibel, Culture and Information, p. 18.
27 The author also notes that these initiatives were largely tolerated within the pluralist Islamic societies 
in which they operated. John P. Spagnolo, “The Definition of a Style of Imperialism: The Internal
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German cultural expansion followed a similar path to French practices, and proliferated 
widely during the latter part of the nineteenth century.28
The rise of a pan European intellectual discourse on propaganda and mass 
politics in the twentieth century had also been foreshadowed by the very end of the 
nineteenth century. Several influential academic treatises had appeared considering the 
emergence of public opinion as a key force in European political life. A bestselling 
work by the French scholar Gustave Le Bon captured prevailing European intellectual 
sentiment at the turn of the century when it remarked that “[t]he entry of the popular 
classes into political life- that is to say, in reality, their progressive transformation into 
governing classes- is one of the most striking characteristics of our epoch of 
transition.”29
Twentieth Century Cultural and Informational Diplomacy
Geopolitical events during the first two decades of the twentieth century gave 
significant impetus to the development of new techniques and technologies for 
propaganda which comprise the backdrop to Washington’s adoption of cultural 
diplomacy in 1936 and international information in 1941. These European 
developments are worth surveying because European inter-war diplomacy constituted 
the framework in which cultural and informational diplomacy developed as foreign 
policy practices, and because European practices served as the context for public 
debates on the nature of propaganda in the US. Although France remained Europe’s 
key sponsor of international cultural relations after 1918, some of the most significant 
innovations in the mass distribution of international information occurred to the east: in 
Germany and Russia. In 1915, Germany used international broadcasting for mass 
persuasion purposes for the first time, using cable communications to transmit political
Politics of the French Educational Investment in Ottoman Beirut,” French Historical Studies 8, (no. 4, 
Autumn 1974).
28 Thirty-eight German-speaking international schools had been established between 1830 and 1870, and 
were, like the first French examples, a product of private initiative rather than government policy.
29 Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study o f the Popular Mind, (London: Ernest Benn, 1896), pp. 15-16. 
On Le Bon’s popularity in Europe during the early twentieth century see Volker Berghahn, “Philanthropy 
and Diplomacy in the ‘American Century,’” Diplomatic History 23, (no. 3, Summer 1999), pp. 395-6. 
See also: Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, p. 30.
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messages into enemy areas. However as Philo Wasbum points out, Lenin and other 
Bolshevik leaders had been discussing radio’s significance as possible tool of 
Communist revolution as early as 1910, since “Russia had need of a centralised, far- 
reaching system of mass communication. It was a nation of enormous 
proportions...made up overwhelmingly of illiterate peasants.”30 Consequently, “[o]n 
November 7, 1917, the first day of the Russian Revolution, the cruiser Aurora, in the 
harbour of St. Petersburg, broadcast messages to the ‘Citizens of Russia’ containing 
decrees written by Lenin.”31 Morse code cable communications were also extensively 
used in Russia during the immediate post-Revolutionary period, and by February 1918 
Lenin himself had addressed the Russian people via short-wave radio transmission. 
The Bolshevik government proceeded to sponsor research to improve radio 
broadcasting techniques in the aftermath of the revolution. By 1922 the Nizhni 
Novorod station was broadcasting within a radius of 2,000 miles due to innovations in 
signal capacity.
As the French revolutionary government had a century earlier, the USSR 
possessed a comprehensive and consistent ideology to propagate, which gave it a 
consistent and systematic message and a clear intended audience. One former US 
diplomat to the USSR highlights how this early Bolshevik propaganda was viewed in 
the West, noting how, from 1917, the Communists:
claimed leadership of the ‘national liberation’ movements in the non- 
European world and of the struggle of the Western proletariat.. .Soviet 
Russia has offered to the world, or even demanded that the world 
adopt, its version of mass culture.
The Bolshevik government articulated a policy of systematic international propaganda 
in 1927, and founded its first permanent international short- and medium-wave
30 Philo C. Wasbum, Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction 
o f Political Reality, (Westport: Praeger, 1992), p. 2. On the pre-revolutionary propaganda experience 
gained by the Bolsheviks, see Peter Kenez, The Birth o f the Propaganda State: Soviet methods o f Mass 
Mobilization 1917-1929, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 5-8.
31 Wasburn, Broadcasting Propaganda, p. 2.
’2 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
33 Frederick C. Barghoom, The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role o f  Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet 
Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 28. E. H. Carr also made point that the 
messianic approach of Soviet propaganda was the key to its success. See Carr, Twenty Years Crisis.
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international broadcasting station, Radio Moscow, in 1929. The station initially 
undertook ongoing broadcasting in German, French and English.34 The Bolsheviks 
were also innovative in the use of radio propaganda in a targeted way, pioneering the 
deployment of propaganda in crisis diplomacy by broadcasting on behalf of Soviet 
demands in 1926 for the return of territory from Romania, and then later conveying the 
USSR’s solidarity (in English) with striking coal miners in Britain.35 These broadcasts 
thus attracted some of the earliest attempts at radio signal jamming by the European 
powers. This was a tactic later used by the US during the Cold War.
The Soviet All-Union Society for Cultural Ties (VOKS) was created in 1925. 
Though it claimed to be independent from the Soviet government, the Society was 
funded by the state to manage the Soviet Union’s official cultural and educational 
exchanges. Building on existing Marxist sympathies in Western Europe, VOKS made 
considerable progress in promoting Bolshevik views among European intellectuals 
during the inter-war period. VOKS’s approach to cultural and educational exchange in 
this period was highly selective and politicised, however. For instance, the Society’s 
vice-president instructed the Czech Soviet Friendship society in 1931 that “[o]ur 
foreign societies would...be entirely wrong in limiting their work to disseminating 
neutral information.”36 Many intellectuals visited the USSR under its auspices during 
the inter-war period at Stalin’s personal invitation, including John Dewey, H. G. Wells 
and Bertrand Russell. Intourist, the official Soviet tourist agency established in 1929, 
oversaw these visits and developed strategies that would subsequently be used within 
Soviet cultural exchanges to control the impressions of official visitors, including 
surrounding them with cadres of ‘interpreters’ and confining them to group tours.37
A relatively significant number of visits and cultural activities between the 
USSR and the West took place prior to the Second World War. In his detailed study of
~'4 Gary D. Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VO A in International Politics, 
1956-64, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996), p. 7; Michael Nelson, War o f the Black Heavens: The Battles 
o f Western Broadcasting in the Cold War, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), p. 3.
For a more detailed than can be provided here, see: Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda, p. 
7, Ch. 1. See also: Wasburn, Broadcasting Propaganda, Ch. 1.
’6 Lous Nemzer, “The Soviet Friendship Societies,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 13, (no. 2, Summer 
1949), p. 274. 
j7 Ibid., p. 43.
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Soviet cultural diplomacy Frederick Barghoom does not supply figures, but notes that 
in the 1930s Western visitors to the USSR numbered in ‘the thousands’ and were 
‘unusually purposeful’ because they consisted largely of international ‘opinion 
leaders.’38 Many of the cultural and intellectual visits from the US to the USSR were 
sponsored by American philanthropic organisations, since no formal diplomatic ties 
existed between the two countries. Thus, despite Bolshevik concerns that Western 
contacts might introduce ‘alien’ ideas or hearten the ‘remnants of capitalism’ that 
remained in the USSR,39 when compared with the insular cultural policies of the early 
Cold War period, the 1920s and 1930s have been described as a time of ‘extensive’ 
Soviet openness to cultural diplomacy. In contrast to this estimate that ‘thousands’ of 
sponsored visitors went to the USSR during the 1930s, one study suggests that only 140 
delegations from all non-Communist states were invited to the USSR between 1945 
and 1952.40
The Crucible o f Europe: Inter- War Cultural and Informational Practices
The use of information and cultural interchange as instruments of foreign 
policy also expanded widely outside the USSR during the 1920s. As noted above, a 
formidable effort to extend French culture had been ongoing via private initiative, with 
government support, since the nineteenth century. There was significant enthusiasm in 
France, within both official and private spheres, for the large-scale emergency cultural 
interchange and information policies that had been put in place during the First World 
War to continue into peacetime. In 1920 one official in the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had reflected that continuing the wartime information programs could provide a 
new foundation for France’s influence in Europe, noting how: “Propaganda is nothing 
but intellectual and moral influence and yet it is the most immediate and most valuable 
means for seconding the efforts made by this country to establish and develop her
38 Ibid., pp. 32-5. Nigel Gould-Davies confirms this estimate, noting that ‘several thousand’ American 
tourists visited the USSR in the 1920s and early 1930s with a range of purposes in mind, some 
educational or culture and some, no doubt, purely for tourism. Nigel Gould Davies, “The Logic of Soviet 
Cultural Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 27, (no. 2, 2003), p. 186.
39 Barghoom, Soviet Cultural Offensive, p. 31.
40 Frederick C. Barghoom and Paul W. Freidrich, “Cultural Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy,” World 
Politics 8, (no. 3, April 1956), p. 326.
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material prosperity.”41 The emphasis on French cultural prestige was also strong 
throughout the inter-war period, reflected in the French government’s leading role in 
sponsoring the League of Nations International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation 
and the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, both of which were 
headquartered in Paris. French spending on cultural diplomacy increased steadily 
during the inter-war years, between 1933 and 1936 alone French funding for cultural 
and informational projects doubled.42 With France’s economic and military capacities 
decimated after 1945, bilateral relationships were emphasised as the preferred format 
for French cultural diplomacy, and lauded in characteristic terms as a basis to reassert 
France’s ‘traditional’ status as a world power and global cultural beacon.43
Building on nineteenth century private-sector initiatives, the first government 
programs for German cultural diplomacy were founded in 1900. Germany’s most well- 
known initiative during this period was the Goethe Institute, founded in 1932. A recent 
study by Wolf Lepenies has illustrated the assumptions that underpinned the projection 
of German culture after the First World War, noting the tendency in Germany to 
sublimate political claims into a celebration of German cultural achievement. 
Aesthetics had been a key feature of post-unification German political culture, and 
received strong emphasis as a salve for the national humiliation of the Versailles 
settlement. Many German intellectuals had enthusiastically supported the First World 
War effort, having signed a 1914 manifesto entitled An die Kulturwelt (‘To the 
Civilized World’) which amounted to a ‘moral declaration of war’ on behalf of German 
culture. Consequently the post-war conditions imposed on Germany were condemned 
as a slight on German culture itself: “[w]hen political and military defeat came in 1918, 
German historians were well prepared, as at the war’s outbreak four years earlier, to 
reject the claim that the Allies had fought a war against German militarism only...not 
against German culture.”44 The appeal of National Socialism in Germany is thus 
explained partly by the supplanting of democratic politics by aesthetic ritual, a process
41 M. Nobelmain (1920) quoted in Haigh, Cultural Diplomacy, pp. 28-30.
42 Wilma Fairbank, America’s Cultural Experiment in China 1942-1949, (Washington DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 4.
43 William R. Pendergast, “Unesco and French Cultural Relations,” International Organization, 30, (no. 
3, 1976).
44 Wolf Lepenies, The Seduction o f Culture in German History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006), pp. 17, 22.
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which appeared to reinstate Germany as ‘Kulturnation:’ the cultural apex of the West. 
Furthermore, Washington seemed aware in this period of the political undertones of 
German cultural diplomacy, and the extension of Nazi cultural exchange programs into 
Latin America provided one of the most important catalysts for the US to take up 
cultural diplomacy practices in the late 1930s.
The connection between totalitarianism and cultural diplomacy was reflected 
in Japanese policies in the inter-war period, although these were largely conducted 
within an East Asian regional context. From 1919, calls were repeatedly made in the 
Japanese Diet for official cultural exchanges with China, which prompted the founding 
of a Japanese government bureau to supervise cultural diplomacy in Asia. The role of 
this bureau was expanded in 1927 to encompass a program of official cultural contacts 
with Europe and the Americas.45 During the 1930s culture and information, or ‘thought 
war’ (shisösen)- came to occupy a key place in the context of official visions of 
Japan’s future empire in Asia.46 As one Japanese commentator had put it in 1939, the 
extension of culture and information was seen as a way of communicating to Asians 
that they could “totally put an end to the long period of dependence on and copying 
after the West” and highlight Japan’s ‘innate’ claim to a sphere of influence within 
Asia.47
As the 1920s gave way to the 1930s, short- and medium-wave radio became 
the most commonly utilised format for international information broadcasting. Short­
wave had benefited during the 1920s through technological innovations in signal 
capacity, spearheaded by two states with large territories: the USSR (as mentioned) and 
the US. In the US, however, it was private enterprise rather than the state that had 
spearheaded technical innovations.48 The authoritarian regimes in Germany and Italy 
used short-wave extensively for their international broadcasting during the early 1930s.
45 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, p. 74. International persuasion initiatives outside Asia in this period 
included the opening of a pro-Japanese publicity bureau in New York City.
46 Barak Kushner, The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2006), p. 15.
47 Ude Hisashi (1939), quoted in Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941- 
1945, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 5.
48 Short-wave’s prominence also increased as receiver sets and adaptors became cheaper, particularly 
after 1932. Holly Cowan Shulman, The Voice o f Victory: The Development o f American propaganda 
and the Voice o f America, 1920-1942, (PhD Dissertation: University of Maryland, 1984), p. 26.
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As the pre-war chief of German international broadcasting Eugen Hadamowski had 
observed, radio was “the strongest weapon of the spirit- that opens hearts and does not 
stop at the borders of cities and does not turn back before closed doors...that is able to 
force peoples under the spell of one powerful spirit.”49 While German short-wave 
infrastructure had initially been established in 1929 for the purpose of communicating 
with colonial outposts, during the early 1930s much of the German radio infrastructure 
was redirected toward the German-speaking regions of Europe accompanied by the 
distribution of pre-tuned radio receiver sets.50 It was reported in the US that by 1939 
70% of German households owned a wireless set- the highest percentage in the world- 
while many offices, factories and restaurants had also been fitted with receivers.51 The 
Nazi approach to international information to non-German speaking areas has been 
characterised as ‘pragmatic’ in tone, however, since it was connected the search for 
export markets and lacked the innovativeness and broader message of Soviet 
propaganda. Yet the commercial purposes of German broadcasts to Latin America 
did have the effect, perhaps unintended, of sparking concerns about Axis economic 
expansion in the United States and leading Washington toward adopting official 
cultural diplomacy as a response.
Beyond Germany, the newly sovereign Vatican City adopted a short-wave 
international propaganda policy in February 1931. Italy commenced short-wave 
broadcasting from 1935, with a strong international component undertaken in the hope 
of undermining British interests in Africa and the Middle East.53 Japan founded its 
official short-wave broadcasting program in the mid-1930s. In September 1935 the 
Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie beamed appeals (that were not heeded) for American 
military support against the Italian invasion using a one-kilowatt transmitter.54 Both
49 Eugen Hadamowski quoted in Nelson, War of the Black Heavens, p. 4. A comprehensive study of how 
Nazi Germany’s propaganda infrastructure was built with a comparison with British policies is: Michael 
Balfour, Propaganda in War: 1939-1945, (London: Routledge, 1979). See also: Aristotle A. Kallis, 
Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
50 “Radio as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” (no author, undated); Records Relating to the International 
Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; 
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD, p. 3.
51 Ibid., p. 14.
?2 Wasburn, Broadcasting Propaganda, pp. 15-6.
53 Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy, p. 7.
54 Shulman, Voice o f Victory, p. 29.
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sides in the Spanish Civil War also made use of radio broadcasting in the hope of 
courting international public opinion.55 The need to communicate with expatriates in 
colonial outposts led to the development of government short-wave infrastructure in 
Western Europe: the Dutch commenced routine broadcasting to its colonies in 1927; 
the French and Belgians followed suit in 1931; while the British Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (BBC) Empire Service was founded in 1932.
‘Traditional Self-Effacement? ’ The Development o f Cultural and Informational 
Diplomacy in Britain
As we shall shortly see was the case in the United States there was a certain 
British reticence among the public towards the idea of official propaganda in the 1930s, 
which makes it an interesting case within the historical context of US cultural and 
informational diplomacy. British international information:
developed.. .in a rather haphazard manner without any central plan 
for the creation of a comprehensive British propaganda organisation.
There [had] been very little systematic consideration of the nature of 
this instrument in the ways it might best be utilized to advance British 
foreign policy objectives.56
As far back as the 1920s, during which time Whitehall had maintained only a skeleton 
international information program, British policy-makers had declared some reluctance 
to publicise government aims as an official policy. As one Foreign Office official had 
reflected in 1922, “the word ‘propaganda’ is a misnomer and the aim which has been 
put before us is rather that of correcting misapprehensions.. .as a result of the 
aggressive propaganda of other nations.”57 A second memorandum of 1930 had 
similarly observed the problem posed for Britain was that despite the efforts of the 
European cultural internationalists to craft new, non-coercive forms of international
55 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
56John B. Black, Organising the Propaganda Instrument: The British Experience, (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1975), p. xi.
?7 P. A. Koppell (1922) quoted in Phillip M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: 
Selling Democracy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 72.
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public persuasion, the fact remained that the “boundary between cultural and 
tendentious propaganda is, in practice, very indefinite” and this left British policy­
makers with a moral and political dilemma.58
The 1932 founding of the BBC Empire Service constituted an addition to the 
BBC domestic services (established by Royal Charter in 1927). It was established 
along the lines of the domestic Charter of the BBC, and was thus a government-funded 
but editorially independent corporation for distributing news and features to British 
subjects in British colonies. In 1938 the BBC Empire Service’s range was extended 
beyond the Empire to Middle Eastern and Mediterranean regions that were being 
subject to Fascist Italian propaganda, and it was with this crucial decision that the 
British reticence toward the projection of British culture and information as a tool of 
foreign policy began to diminish.59 Plans were subsequently drawn up for the 
establishment of a Ministry of Information in case Britain should require psychological 
warfare services in the event of a future European conflict. Phillip M. Taylor thus notes 
that, as reflected in the unanimous support by the House of Commons for a resolution 
in favour of the dissemination of British information abroad,
the depth of prejudice and suspicion about propaganda was 
decidedly less deep-rooted in the late 1930s than it had been 
at the end of the First World War.. .This was largely because 
the evidence and the kind of arguments that had prompted 
the creation of the British Council in 1934 continued to gather 
force and wide currency during the remaining five years of 
peace.. .The issue was kept alive not only by the intensification 
of anti-British propaganda, and the steps taken by the government 
to counter it, but also by questions and debates in the House 
of Commons, regular debate in the Press, numerous articles 
published in learned journals, and the appearance of several 
influential books.60
Given this sense of reticence, the Empire Service broadcasts remained distinct in style
from the Axis broadcasts; the BBC sought to be ‘peaceful,’ it declined to take a
58 BBC memo of 1930 quoted in Shulman, Voice o f Victory, p. 27.
59 J. M. Lee, “British Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War: 1946-61,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 9, (no. 1, 
March 1998), p. 117.
60 Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 81.
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stridently ideological line on international issues and broadcast exclusively in English 
until 1938. American policy-makers drew heavily on these sentiments in articulating 
their vision of the tone and rationale for US international short-wave broadcasting.
However, there was a sense of pragmatism alongside the British efforts to 
maintain a ‘peaceful’ approach to propaganda; as Philo Wasbum notes, of all the Great 
Powers it was the declining imperial power Britain that had most to benefit from 
propaganda. In Wasbum’s view, the Empire Service was intended:
to do more than contradict the claims of adversaries.. .They were 
attempting to perpetuate the appearance of power in the eyes of 
foreign observers at a time when radio transmissions from hostile 
states were beginning to expose, by a variety of means, the harsh 
realities of British decline.61
Furthermore, and as Nicholas Cull has extensively charted, as the British propaganda 
services were extended during the late 1930s, one of their principal efforts was a 
campaign against America’s position of neutrality in the European struggle against the 
Axis before 1941.62
Cultural diplomacy was also adopted by Whitehall as a tool to consolidate 
British ties with the colonies. It developed rather slowly, however, which the diplomat 
and commentator Harold Nicholson attributed to traditional British sense of self- 
effacement: “if foreigners failed to appreciate, or even to notice, our gifts of invention 
and or our splendid adaptability, then there was nothing that we could do to mitigate 
their obtuseness.” The cultural diplomacy advocate Rex Leeper similarly quipped: 
“as for taking positive steps to explain our aims and achievements, that we regard as 
undignified and unnecessary.”64 The British Council for Relations with Other Peoples 
was established in 1934 as a consequence of recommendations from the British
61 Wasbum, Broadcasting Propaganda, p. 11. On the issue of British decline and the failure to use 
cultural and informational diplomacy see also Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 65.
62 Nicholas Cull, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American ‘Neutrality’ in 
World War II, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
63 Harold Nicholson quoted in Frances Donaldson, The British Council: The First Fifty Years, (London: 
Johnathan Cape, 1984), p. 11.
64 Rex Leeper quoted in ibid., pp. 11-2. See also: John M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The 
Manipulation o f British Public Opinion 1880-1960, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 
10. See also: Lee, “British Cultural Diplomacy.”
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Overseas Trade Committee that cultural diplomacy could support the UK’s economic 
interests and a vigorous lobbying effort led by Leeper. The Council was partly to serve 
as a semi-official institution to attract international visitors to the UK, improve the 
image of British firms in Latin America and Europe, and supervise educational and 
cultural activities.65 Its first director, Lord William Tyrrell, summarised the Council’s 
role in the following terms:
We have much to learn from others, but we have also much to 
teach them. If we do not do the teaching ourselves, we shall be 
misunderstood and misinterpreted. If you will regard us as a body 
able and willing to do this educational work abroad, may I ask you 
also to regard us as a people who are assisting practically in our 
national defence. Modem defence consists not only in arms but in 
removing misunderstanding.66
The foregoing survey of the development of propaganda and cultural diplomacy has 
highlighted the importance of technology in the development of international 
persuasion as a diplomatic practice. From the emergence and distribution of the 
printing press across Europe to the achievement of better short-wave signals in Russia, 
and even as reflected in the use of aircraft by German and French forces for the 
distribution of pamphlets during the First World War, there has been a close 
relationship between the evolving means of communication and use mass advocacy as a 
diplomatic tool. Two external factors also spurred the development of propaganda and 
cultural diplomacy in Europe: ideological expansionism and colonial conquest. The 
relative absence of these two factors, and the strength of the private sector in American 
media and cultural life, appears to have largely distanced the US from the pressures of a 
propaganda-saturated European context during the inter-war period and fostered public 
debates condemning European diplomatic practices as undemocratic and war­
mongering.
65 Lee, “British Cultural Diplomacy,” p. 117.
06 Lord William Tyrrell (1936) quoted in Taylor, British Propaganda, p. 77.
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Closely paralleling the technological and political developments outlined in 
the foregoing discussion were academic and popular debates that sought to determine 
how the adoption of informational and cultural propaganda had altered the nature of the 
global order and the exercise of domestic political authority. In fact, cultural diplomacy 
emerged during the inter-war period as a distinct category of practice that was seized 
upon within official US policy-making after 1936 as a consequence of these intellectual 
debates, as European cosmopolitans sought to theorise and put into practice less 
manipulative and unilateral approaches to the projection of national ideas and 
influence. In the next section I shall examine in more detail the intellectual 
developments that were stimulated by the rise of propaganda and cultural diplomacy, 
including the emergence of academic International Relations in Europe as a discrete 
discipline of study and the beginnings of behavioralism in US political science.
Propaganda and Inter-war Intellectual Debates
Cosmopolitanism and Cultural Internationalism
How was the evolution of cultural and informational diplomacy as a means of 
exercising international influence comprehended during intellectual debates of the 
inter-war period? As Jo-Anne Pemberton has recently observed, by the end of the First 
World War European scholars saw their time as an era of ‘historic discontinuity,’ as 
reflected in ‘crisis literature’ such as Oswald Spengler’s bestselling Decline o f the West 
of 1918. Interestingly, images of crisis and discontinuity also framed the so-called 
‘idealist’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ internationalist movement, which advocated global renewal 
and the construction of a new world order based on international communications and 
cross-cultural understanding as a response to the crisis of total war in 1914-18.67 As I 
foreshadowed above, both sides of the European decline/renewal debate in inter-war 
scholarship shared the premise that the First World War’s unprecedented 
destructiveness and the rapid pace of technological change were a portent of imminent,
67 Jo-Anne Pemberton, “New Worlds for Old: The League of Nations in the Age of Electricity,” Review 
of International Studies, 28 (no. 2, 2002), pp. 311-2. On Spengler, particularly his concept of the 
dwindling spiritual resources of the West, see: O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West, pp. 71-6.
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epochal change.68 Very few contributions to intellectual debates of this period sought 
to claim that the First World War had little historical significance or signified 
continuity with the historical dynamics of the past.
As Pemberton suggests, cosmopolitan visions of world order constituted an 
attempt “to generate excitement about possible tomorrows” and to quell widespread 
public anxieties about the communications technologies that had been deployed for 
propaganda purposes during the war. In this context the cosmopolitans sought to 
demonstrate that it was possible to “deliberately produce a harmony of interests” by 
advocating the “rearranging intellectual and political priorities.”69 The technological 
and political forces that had been unleashed by the war were depicted as “amenable to 
telic control given the application of the correct knowledge as well as rational 
appreciation of the need for concerted action.”70 In articulating this conception of 
political progress, many of the inter-war cosmopolitan writers suggested that 
international communications could foster an ‘international community,’ a concept 
drawn from nineteenth century legal debates (especially during the Hague Conferences) 
and the application of evolutionary philosophy to international affairs. L. T. 
Hobhouse’s Democracy and Reaction, written in 1904, was one of the most important 
precursors to inter-war British cosmopolitanism in his account of the evolution of a 
liberal international community.71 Hobhouse had inspired cosmopolitan scholars in 
their effort to problematise the “arbitrary divide between national and international 
politics” by suggesting how a civilised human conscience could serve as a safeguard 
against the narrow interests of sovereign states.72 Communications technology came 
into play here, envisaged as a practical mechanism for achieving this type of 
international progress.
68 Pemberton, “New Worlds for Old.”
69 Ibid., pp. 312, 335.
70 Ibid., p. 317. See also, Peter Wilson, “Introduction”, in eds. David Long and Peter Wilson, Thinkers of 
the Twenty Years Crisis: Inter War Idealism Reassessed, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 4.
71 L. T. Hobhouse, Democracy and Reaction, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904), see esp. Ch. 5-6. See 
also Casper Sylvest, “Continuity and change in British liberal internationalism, c. 1900-1930,” Review of 
International Studies 31, (no. 2, 2005).
72 Sylvest, “Continuity and Change,” pp. 270-3. On the internationalist movement in the US at the turn 
of the twentieth century see William T. R. Fox, “Interwar International Relations Research: The 
American Experience,” World Politics 2, (no. 1, October 1949).
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The political significance mass persuasion and the idea of an international 
public sphere of opinion and cultural understanding was built into the lexicon of inter­
war International Relations as a consequence of the collectivist philosophy 
underpinning of the League of Nations. The League of Nations International 
Committee for Intellectual Cooperation and the International Institute for Intellectual 
Cooperation, established in 1922 and 1926 respectively, sought to foster an alternative 
basis for international diplomacy than power politics for precisely this reason. 
Participants in these initiatives had insisted that Europe had been united by the 
suffering of war, while:
the submergence of internationalism, in particular the cultural 
internationalism that had seemed to have emerged so promising 
before the war, under excessive nationalism had been the most 
deplorable aspect of the conflict. Educated elites themselves had 
been guilty of this development, as they had embraced power 
politics and called on the masses to reject the cultural influences 
of enemy nations. Deeply embarrassed and ashamed of their 
wartime behaviour, many erstwhile internationalists, as well as 
new converts, now vowed to dedicate themselves to resuscitating 
and expanding that movement as the only hope for a sane world 
order.7
The aspirations embodied by the cosmopolitan internationalist movement were 
humanist and progressive, yet also “unquestionably elitist” in subscribing to the view 
that “intellectuals of all nations had a responsibility to teach the masses how not to be 
caught up in a chauvinistic frenzy but instead to become even more aware of their 
shared destiny.”74 We shall see in the coming chapters that the articulation of US 
cultural diplomacy after 1945 played up the democratic elements of its own cultural 
forms, drawing contrast with these elitist elements of the inter-war basis of cultural 
internationalism that had ultimately failed to prevent a second European war.
73 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, p. 56.
74 Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History o f American Foreign Policy, Volume Three: The Globalizing o f 
America 1913-1945, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 107-8. US Comment on the 
League Institute during the period that the US government was carving out its own programs for cultural 
and informational exchange also picked up on this issue of ‘elitism.’ See: “US Now Planning to Educate 
Europe, Official Reveals,” New York Times, April 8, 1943.
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Despite this elite focus, the cultural internationalists of the inter-war period 
emphasised the revolutionary potential of their activities. Mary Parker Follett 
characterised cosmopolitanism in The New State as an epochal shift in world politics: 
whereas “the old fashioned hero went out to conquer his enemy; the modem hero goes 
out to disarm his enemy through...mutual understanding.” Hence, the pacification of 
international relations would be anchored within a:
group culture which shall be broader than the culture of one 
nation alone. There must be a world-ideal.. .in which the ideals 
and civilization of every nation can find a place. ..Iam told that 
this is mysticism. It is the most practical idea I have found.75
Similarly rousing language was adopted by Frank Heath, secretary of the British 
delegation to the League Committee, who suggested that to affect progress in world 
politics “the realm to be conquered is the Kingdom of Knowledge and Ideas.”76 Sir 
Alfred Zimmern, often referred to as the ‘unofficial spokesman’ of inter-war British 
cultural diplomacy, contended in 1928 that with the rise of radio communications 
technologies the pace at which political ideas could be transmitted and adopted had 
increased rapidly. “Political ideas no longer grow in stillness: they burst in upon us 
from near or far,” such that policymakers “have not even yet understood that the life of 
the world has entered upon a new phase in which the older...modes of calculation are 
of no avail.” Zimmern was quite specific about how international communications 
and cultural diplomacy would remake international relations, remarking in 1929 that 
world politics was being subject to a process “of knitting together intellectual relations, 
not emotional relations, of developing acquaintanceship and mutual knowledge.” 
Elsewhere he noted the need to ‘obliterate difference’ between nations, emphasising the
75 Mary Parker Follett, The New State: Group Organization the Solution o f Popular Government, (New 
York: Longmans, Green & Co, 1920), pp. 345-6. See also Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, pp. 58-60.
76 Frank Heath (1929) quoted in Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, p. 61.
77 Alfred Zimmern, Learning and Leadership: A Study o f the Needs and Possibilities o f International 
Intellectual Cooperation, (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), pp. 24, 323-5, 333. See also Iriye, 
Cultural Internationalism, p. 64. I do not wish to suggest that Zimmern sits wholly within the ‘idealist’ 
or ‘cosmopolitan’ camp, in fact he reflects the diversity of supporters of the League Committee. 
Zimmern disagreed with his contemporaries on some key points, colonialism in particular. A nuanced 
account of Zimmern’s thought on world politics is provided by Jeanne Morefield, Covenants Without 
Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit o f the Empire, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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psychological closeness that flows from travel, trade and communication in forging 
‘organic’ trans-national connections and thus rendering war unthinkable.78 Zimmem’s 
fellow British delegate to the League of Nations Committee Gilbert Murray similarly 
observed that:
The world has not yet sounded or measured the immense power of 
mere publicity.. .1 mean the knowledge that your actions are to be known 
and discussed, and particularly that you will have to answer questions 
about them face to face with your questioner. Publicity is the only new 
weapon which the League possesses, but if properly used it may well 
prove to be about the most powerful weapon that exists in human affairs.79
The inter-war advocates of international cultural and informational 
interchange stressed the links between improved international communication and the 
refinement of human rationality. Normal Angell, perhaps the most famous 
cosmopolitan thinker of the period, had argued in The Foundations o f  International 
Polity (1914) that although economic interdependence would constitute the key 
mechanism for lasting peace, an integral part of this process involved exposing the 
essentially artificial nature of national differences via trans-national communication and 
interaction. Angell observed that “all those factors of improved communication which 
have intensified our material interdependence have to a still greater degree intensified 
our moral and intellectual interdependence,” and thus contained within them the 
promise of a more peaceful international system.80 In response to his ‘defeatist’ 
interlocutors, Angell charged that “the guarantee of the moral values of a free 
society...have been systematically belittled by certain modem writers who have 
laboriously used reason to prove that reason cannot be trusted; and have maintained 
campaigns against liberty and liberalism.” A similar charge was levelled by Leonard 
Woolf against the critics of the League of Nations. He argued in The War For Peace
78 Alfred Zimmern, quoted in Julie Reeves, Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and 
Tourists. (Abington: Routledge, 2004), pp. 45-6.
79 Gilbert Murray (1922) quoted in Robert W. McElroy, Morality in International Relations: The Role o f 
Ethics in International Affairs, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 11.
80 Norman Angell, Foundations o f International Polity, (London: Heinemann, 1914), pp. xxii-vii & 33.
81 Norman Angell’s Why Freedom Matters, quoted in Peter Wilson, “Carr and his Early Critics: 
Responses to The Twenty Years Crisis, 1939-46,” in EH Carr: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Michael Cox. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), p. 167.
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that “one must hesitate to accept sweeping statements about interests, conflicts of 
interests, and power being such immutable social or political ‘realities’ that they 
inevitably determine the structure of society.” 82 As Robert McElroy has subsequently 
reflected, in lauding international communication and cultural engagement as a basis to 
pacify world politics, the inter-war liberal internationalists including Angell and Woolf:
advanced a view of human nature that stressed rationality and community, 
rather than conflict and the drive for power.. .World War I and the 
democratisation of the West had created a radically new situation for 
international relations in which morally based precepts of state action 
could be effectively enforced by international public opinion and the 
community of nations. The politics of nations was for the internationalists 
a malleable thing that was capable of being patterned, albeit imperfectly, 
according to an effective moral order.83
For these cosmopolitan scholars “normative analysis.. .did not imply ‘bleeding heart’ 
idealism, but rather practical policy relevance. Academic specialists in international 
relations and law addressed the world of states as it was with a view to changing things 
for the better.” Many of the conferences on fostering international progress that were 
held under the auspices of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation thus 
applied their beliefs to pressing policy questions such as international economic 
governance.84
As intellectual and policy discourse, therefore, the inter-war cosmopolitan 
vision for world politics mobilised some powerful ideals and descriptions of the 
international system. Their imagery pitted efforts toward post-war renewal against the 
suffering of total war that was the inherent risk in adopting the balance of power as the 
regulative principle of world order. The cosmopolitans contrasted the ‘humanistic’ 
intellectual bonds sought by cultural internationalism against the forces of war and 
nationalism; and situated images of their own activism against the passive, repetitive 
and morally irresponsible balance of power system.
82 Leonard Woolf quoted in ibid., p. 177.
83 McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy, pp. 12-3.
84 David Long, “Conclusion: Inter-War Idealism, Liberal Internationalism, and Contemporary 
International Theory,” in Thinkers o f the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed, eds. 
David Long and Peter Wilson. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 306-7.
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Power over Opinion and ‘Realist’ Critics
As the foregoing discussion has indicated, a vibrant discourse spelling out the 
connections between international communications, public opinion and political 
progress had developed within the cosmopolitan movement of the 1920s and early 
1930s. We shall see in later chapters that the doctrine of cultural internationalism 
advocated by the cosmopolitans was deeply undermined but not completely 
extinguished by the Second World War. Cultural internationalism re-emerged as the 
rationale for enhanced bilateral cultural ties and in proposals that cultural 
multilateralism be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation in 
the post-1945 period. US policy-makers drew extensively on the vocabulary of 
historical progress that these prior attempts at international cultural cooperation had 
mobilised. Nonetheless, looming concerns about another military crisis in European 
politics gave the international ‘realists,’ who had sought to refute the cosmopolitan 
image of imminent global renewal, an increasingly large audience as the 1930s 
progressed. Rather than celebrating the progressive possibilities that mass 
communications provided, these critics argued that mass communications and populism 
had further entrenched the practice of power politics. E. H. Carr’s Twenty Years ’ Crisis 
remains one of the most widely read contributions to these debates, and it developed 
precisely this argument. In pointing out the shortcomings of the Versailles settlement 
and the League of Nations, Carr contended that the nascent ‘international community’ 
was an illusion. Carr thus included among his catalogue of Western Europe’s 
diplomatic failures at the end of the First World War the false hope among policy­
makers that international information (and implicitly cultural initiatives) would bring 
peace and stability.
As with the cosmopolitan doctrines of international reform that I surveyed 
above, Carr’s account rests on the premise that new communications technologies were 
an important symbol of change in global politics. In this context Carr made two salient 
observations: the tendency toward capitalist monopolies in the areas of mass 
communications and media enterprise, and the frequent use of the mass media by
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governments to actively enflame nationalist passions during the 1920s and 1930s. As a 
consequence of these two developments, Carr noted that governments were already 
“vitally dependent on the opinion of large masses of more or less politically conscious 
people,” and how even private media enterprises follow the prevailing political 
interests, finding it “convenient to accept voluntary collaboration with the state as an 
alternative to formal control by it.”85 With such instruments of mass persuasion 
working on behalf of the state, “freedom of thought is being fundamentally modified by 
the development of.. .new and extremely powerful instruments of power over opinion,” 
such that “the issue is no longer whether men shall be politically free to express their 
opinions, but whether freedom of opinion has, for large masses of people, any meaning 
but subjection to the influence of innumerable forms of propaganda directed by vested 
interests.”86
Carr’s account of modem types of power drew on Bertrand Russell’s Power 
(1938), an extended analysis of the sociological and ideological underpinnings of 
political authority. Russell’s account posed a conundmm between 
modemity/democracy and the accumulation of state power, reflecting on the 
significance of belief, opinion and communication as a source of authority for the 
modem state.
Like energy, power has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, 
civil authority, influence on opinion. No one of these can be regarded 
as subordinate to any other, and there is no one form from which the 
others are derivative.. .the power of a community depends not only 
upon its numbers and its economic resources and its technological 
capacity, but also upon its beliefs. A .. .creed, held by all the members 
of a community, often greatly increases its power.
Carr had a similar interest in disaggregating state power in its modem form, citing the 
military, economy, and favourable public opinion as key capabilities that states can 
deploy both domestic and international statecraft. This was evident in the cases of 
Italy, Germany and the USSR, with the USSR in particular having made use of its
85 Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, pp. 134-5.
80 Ibid., pp. 134-5.
87 Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis, 2nd edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), 
pp. 9, 99.
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“universal gospel” to court favourable public opinion in international contexts.88 But 
one of the most controversial of Carr’s claims was that democratic governments 
manipulated mass communications in a similar way to these totalitarian regimes.89 
Here he charged that:
[democracies purport to follow mass opinion; totalitarian states 
set a standard and enforce conformity to it.. .In practice, the 
contrast is less clear cut.. .Democracies, or the groups which 
control them, are not altogether innocent of the arts of 
moulding and directing mass opinion.90
In positing this continuum of propaganda behaviour across both totalitarian and 
democratic regimes, Carr thus dismissed the cosmopolitan thesis that detected the 
promise of renewal in the harnessing of mass communication for diplomatic purposes.
Carr also contended that a key ‘fallacy’ of cosmopolitan writing was the fact, 
symbolised by the rise of Axis power, that the collective principles of the League of 
Nations “meant different, and indeed contradictory, things to different people.. .Opinion 
in favour of the League.. .was confined to those countries where the League was felt to 
be serving ends of national policy.” 91 The League’s decline:
had far more than a local significance, and gives us a clue to the 
whole problem of the place of what are now known as ‘ideologies’
88 Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, p. 138. See also Edward Hallett Carr, Propaganda in International Politics, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 6; Russell, Power, Ch. 9-10.
89 Carr, Propaganda.
90 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 133-4. Carr’s tone here is one of moral ambivalence, and it has some 
similarities with the tone adopted by Russell when he observes that the main beneficiary of the rise of 
new forms of power in modern society was not a particular type of ideological regime or economic class, 
but rather the institution of the state itself. Russell, Power, pp. 135-6. Russell’s account also developed 
a strident critique of the democracies: “Systematic propaganda, on a large scale, is at present, in 
democratic countries, divided between the Churches, business, advertisers, political parties, the 
plutocracy, and the State. In the main, all these forces work on the same side, with the exception of 
political parties in opposition, and even they, if they have any hope of office, are unlikely to oppose the 
fundamentals of State propaganda.” Russell, Power, p. 97.
91 Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 140. The ‘illusory’ nature of international consensus on universal 
principles, whether originating with the League of Nations or with the promulgation of ideologies such as 
Communism and Fascism, is complicated somewhat by Carr’s insistence that there are internationally 
powerful ideas, on the basis which we can suggest that ‘international morality’ also exists. As Peter 
Wilson’s discussion of Carr’s critics indicates, these and other contradictions have been debated and Carr 
did not, perhaps, ever resolve them effectively. See Peter Wilson, “Carr and his Early Critics: Responses 
to The Twenty Years Crisis, 1939-46,” in EH Carr: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Michael Cox, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2000).
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... For if it be true that power over opinion cannot be disassociated 
from other forms of power, then it appears to follow that, if power 
cannot be internationalised, there can be no such thing in 
politics as international opinion, and international propaganda is 
as much a contradiction in terms as an international army.92
It bears noting that Marxist scholars, particularly those of with the Frankfurt School in 
Germany and the work of Antonio Gramsci in Italy, had posed a similar a challenge to 
the cosmopolitans’ reception of mass communications and culture as a liberating force 
in world politics.93 Carr’s critique also had certain parallels with American 
liberal/rationalist critiques of propaganda and its role in international conflicts in this 
period. Emerging perspectives about communications and political behaviour noted the 
concentration of power and the distortion of human rationality that propaganda 
induced. US historical scholars were also deeply sceptical of the veracity of the 
supposed links between international communications and lasting peace that the 
cosmopolitans had emphasised. As I shall elaborate in the next section, together these 
perspectives constituted a potent American anti-propaganda discourse during the inter­
war period.
92 CaiT, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 138.
93 Inspired by the work of Lenin, who first explored the question of how to wage the battle of ideas 
against the false consciousness of the workers in What Is To Be Done?, Marxists in Germany and Italy 
reflected on the role of opinion in capitalist societies during the 1920s. Antonio Gramsci, writing in the 
1920s as a prisoner of Mussolini, argued that ideologies be understood as “real historical facts” and 
should confronted as such in revolutionary struggles, because ideology had proved increasingly central to 
the modem state as the mechanism by which ruling elites intellectually subordinated the workers. 
Gramsci’s account of the social formation of ‘hegemony’ constituted a detailed account of the 
connections between intellectuals, public opinion, and the structures of power in the capitalist state. 
German Marxists from the Frankfurt School identified their revolutionary struggle as a form of 
ideologiekritik, noting that “radical criticism of society and criticism of dominant ideology are 
inseparable.” These accounts of power were detailed and complex in their analysis of the state and 
propaganda, and their depths are beyond the scope of my main discussion. Nonetheless, as a reflection 
of the European intellectual milieu of the inter-war period, Marxist research had, along with the cultural 
internationalist movement, taken on the interest in the power of ideas. What characterised Marxist 
accounts, including Carr and Russell’s, was their scepticism of claims that ‘democratic’ societies differed 
from totalitarian ones in relation to the character of their propaganda. See: Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, What 
Is To Be Done? Burning Questions on Our Movement, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947), Ch. 5; 
Antonio Gramsci, Selected Writings 1916-1935, ed. David Forgacs, (Lawrence & Wishart: London, 
1988), pp. 196-7; On ideologiekritik see: Raymond Guess, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas & 
The Frankfurt School, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 26. The Frankfurt School’s 
engagement with mass culture as a ‘culture industry’ is associated with the work of Theodor Adorno, 
particularly during the late 1940s. For Adorno’s summary of this work see: Theodor W. Adorno, “The 
Culture Industry Reconsidered,” in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, eds. Stephen Eric Bronner 
and Douglas MacKay Kellna, (New York: Routledge, 1989).
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Democracy and the American Propaganda Critics
What were the main elements of the US intellectual response to propaganda in 
the inter-war period? In addition to acknowledging the significance of ‘total war’ as a 
new phenomenon in world politics, there was a tendency within US studies of 
propaganda during the inter-war period to link criticism of their own government’s use 
of public information to the question of propaganda’s validity per se. Revelations that 
false information about the war that had been promulgated within the US had proved 
deeply unsettling to the American public after 1918. A key factor in this scandal was 
the British censorship of information about the war through its monopoly of the 
transatlantic cable and the knowing distribution of false information in the US by 
British diplomats. The activities of the Woodrow Wilson administration were a further 
source of concern. Public opinion had remained somewhat divided on US involvement 
in the war even in 1917. This led Wilson to broaden the functions of his newly 
established Committee on Public Information (CPI) from censorship (instituted prior to 
the US’s entry into the war as a combatant), towards the proactive task of promoting 
the official view of the conflict to both domestic and international audiences. The 
Committee became known as the Creel Committee, named after George Creel, the 
high-profile journalist who had been engaged by Wilson to direct it.
As J. Michael Sproule reflects in his comprehensive study of US propaganda 
debates during this period:
Under Creel’s ministration, Wilson’s war pervasively enveloped 
American citizens at every venue in their personal lives. For those 
travelling to work, there were trolley posters illustrating all manner 
of ways that the ordinary citizen could personally help win the war... 
Displayed in locales urban and rural, posters supplied some of the 
most evocative and best remembered propagandas of the war in 
accordance with the belief of Division-chief Dana Gibson.. .that 
wartime art needed to ‘appeal to the heart.’94
94 Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, p. 10.
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The Committee’s activities also included distributing information to public institutions 
and schools, including the National School Service Bulletin supplied to teachers for the 
purpose of ‘citizenship’ instruction. In universities across the US, courses on the 
causes of the war and the defects of German culture were offered, and the Committee 
drafted a number of well-known American scholars into promoting the war effort. 
These academic efforts were supervised by a National Board for Historical Service, 
under the leadership of the Columbia University social scientist James T. Shotwell.95 
Hollywood was drafted into the effort to make films to promote the war as a crusade for 
democracy that demanded America’s wholehearted effort. Public speakers known as 
the ‘Four Minute Men’ were also sent to film screenings in order to use the intermission 
for short ‘patriotic orations,’ in a style “owing more to American ‘boosterism’ and its 
‘bandwagon syndrome’ than to psychological enlightenment.”96 As Robert Endicott 
Osgood subsequently observed, the CPI-authored information tended to liken 
America’s role in the European conflict to a ‘holy war.’97
Internationally, the CPI’s activities included the distribution of printed 
material in support of disruptive separatist movements in Germany and the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, agitating in Spain for its entry into the conflict on the side of the 
Allies, and gamering support for US war aims in Russia and Latin America.98 Above 
all, the CPI sought to secure favourable international opinion on Wilson’s post-war 
settlement plan. As one account of the Committee written during the 1940s suggested 
“the object [of the CPI’s international campaign] was almost entirely political- to win 
the support, over the heads of the government if need be, for the Wilsonian program of 
peace and reconstruction.” These international activities included lecture tours, 
photograph displays and the circulation of printed information and films. They were 
subsequently regarded as so successful that “by the time of the Armistice the name of 
Woodrow Wilson, and a general idea that he was a friend of peace, liberty and
95 Ibid., p. 10.
)6 Alfred E. Cornebise, War As Advertised: The Four Minute Men and America’s Crusade, 1917-1918, 
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984), pp. ix-x.
97 Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America ’s Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation 
o f the Twentieth Century, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 277-8.
98 J. R. Mock and C. Larson, Words that Won the War: The Story o f the Committee on Public Information 
1917-1919, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 301, 321.
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democracy, were nearly as familiar in some of the remote places of the earth as they 
were in New York, St. Louis or San Francisco.”99
The CPI’s activities incorporated a cultural element: the more than two 
hundred lectures delivered across Europe by prominent Americans, for example, were 
intended to emphasise America’s moral ‘greatness’ and to offset ‘Hollywood’ images 
of American culture as a vacuous celebration of material abundance.100 Although the 
term ‘propaganda’ was used freely in internal correspondence to describe Committee 
activities, public statements issued by the Committee had a tendency to represent the 
CPI as a celebration of democracy.101 Hence the Committee’s final report claimed:
We dealt in the positive, and our emphasis was ever on expression, 
not suppression.. .We did not call it ‘propaganda’, for that word, in 
German hands, had come to be associated with lies and corruptions.
Our work was educational and informative only, for we had such 
confidence in our case as to feel that only fair presentation of its 
facts was needed.102
The material examined in the next chapters reflects how similar terms were adopted by 
US policy-makers in casting the State Department’s cultural and informational 
activities as ‘positive’ rather than self-serving, on the grounds that the US’s 
‘authorship’ established a distinction between acceptable ‘information’ programs and 
manipulative ‘propaganda.’ Yet in key respects the need to convincingly do so had 
been made more acute in light of the CPI’s precedent.
In the two years following the CPI’s dissolution in 1918 some particularly 
influential members of the American journalistic and scholarly professions began to 
voice concerns about the Creel Committee’s final report and the practices of the 
Committee in general. Some members of the Committee’s international section, 
including director of the Foreign Press Bureau Ernest Pool, had urged that the 
Committee’s efforts, particularly its international advocacy, should continue into
99 Ibid., pp. 235-7.
100 United States Committee on Public Information, The Creel Report: Complete Report o f the Chairman 
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116
peacetime. However, feelings of betrayal and suspicion among the US public had 
developed in the wake of emotional and fervent tone of the Committee’s domestic 
activities, precluding the adoption of Pool’s proposal. As Alan Winkler notes, these 
post-war sentiments hardened into a pervasive scepticism toward propaganda within the 
United States:
103
Creel accomplished his task too well. As his agency sought to arouse 
America, it stirred up hatred of all things German.. .The CPI did spark 
support for the war, but it also helped stir up the hysteria that led 
unthinking Americans to rename sauerkraut ‘liberty cabbage’ and 
hamburger ‘Salisbury steak’. At the same time, it generated unrealistic 
hopes for a better world. When Wilson’s hopes for peace and 
reconciliation were eroded at the peace conference at Versailles and in 
the subsequent debate over ratification at home, Americans were left 
with the sharp contrast between unfulfilled dreams and the realities of 
world politics. And so in the following decades the Creel Committee 
was remembered in a bitter way.. .propaganda itself was viewed as too 
boisterous, too exuberant for a world that had hardly been made safe 
for democracy
The style of the Committee’s work would later be approvingly cited, along with British 
propaganda, in Adolf Hitler’s assessment in Mein Kampf that the democracies had 
found a “psychologically correct” method of public persuasion and had deployed it 
with “unheard-of-skill.”105
The initial public condemnation of the Committee’s work in the immediate 
aftermath of the war sparked an academic debate on propaganda and democratic 
politics during the 1920s. A key early contribution was Walter Lippmann’s Public 
Opinion (1922), followed by Harold Lasswell’s Propaganda and the World War 
(written as a PhD dissertation at the University of Chicago, and eventually published in 
1927), both of which reflected on deleterious impacts of mass persuasion and official
103 Mock and Larson, Words that Won the War, p. 331.
104 My own emphasis. Alan M. Winkler, The Politics o f Propaganda: The Office o f War Information 
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media controls within democracies.106 As early as 1919 Lippmann had advocated the 
establishment of a centralised government bureau to monitor the accuracy of the US 
news media to ensure that public information could be kept free of the taint of 
propaganda. US journalist Will Irwin had warned his readers that same year that the 
war signified how the world had entered its ‘Age of Lies.’ One of the most common 
concerns expressed about the CPI’s work in these contexts was its emotionalism: the 
propaganda critics of this period, deeply troubled by the blurring of information and 
psychological manipulation that the Committee had accomplished, seized on the 
concepts of journalistic and educational freedom as a way to insulate American 
democracy from subversion by propaganda.
A key factor in the popular interest in US debates on the rise of propaganda in 
international relations was the extent to which the advertising and public relations 
industries expanded within the United States during this period. Sproule characterises 
the inter-war period as America’s era of ‘Big Communication,’ with the US public 
increasingly saturated with the products of the mass media. The number of radio 
receivers in use within the US had risen dramatically, from 60,000 in 1920 to 3 million 
in 1924.107 American scholars, many of them at the Universities of Chicago, Yale and 
Columbia, consequently turned their analytical focus to the implications of mass media 
and the significance of strategically deployed language or symbolism in both political 
and commercial contexts. Lasswell’s analytical methods were at the forefront of this 
developing research agenda assessing “infiltration of self-serving ideology into 
news... [which] diffused the idea of propaganda as democracy’s enemy.” As Sproule 
notes, ‘propaganda analysis,’ a term that referred to research seeking to demonstrate the 
illicit nature of propaganda, had become “a prominent strain in American social 
thought” by the 1920s. The impacts of the media were also examined in the ‘social 
influence’ studies of Raymond Dodge and the writings of Everett Dean Martin, both of 
whom singled out the ‘emotional logic’ of propaganda as the basis for its degenerative 
impact on democracy.108
106 Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, pp. 18-9. 
101 Ibid., p. 33.
108 Ibid., pp. 20-1.
118
Many of these early efforts within the US academy to understand propaganda 
were shaped by an emerging ‘behaviouralist’ approach for the scientific analysis of 
mass politics. By the 1930s, however, the tone of much American writing on 
propaganda had shifted in emphasis as a consequence of the darkening political 
situation in Europe. Across Europe academic and popular debates were reflecting a 
sense of despair about the connection between media, culture and political power. As 
Iriye notes:
The decade was characterised by forces that were the precise 
opposite of cultural internationalism: exclusionary nationalism, 
racism, aggression... Moreover, culture, instead of moderating 
national military power, was frequently combined with it, thereby 
losing its autonomy and its international character.109
The quandary this provoked for US commentators was what an American intellectual 
and policy response to these troubling European developments should be, with many 
concluding that at the very least the scourge of propaganda that had spread to Western 
Europe could be prevented from taking root in the United States. What thus developed 
during this phase of American propaganda scholarship was a moral critique of 
propaganda and cultural diplomacy, framed in historical rather than behaviouralist 
terms, and exemplified by the writings of 0. W. Reigel, Reinhold Niebuhr and Nicholas 
Spykman.
Reigel had contended in 1934 that the source of Europe’s peril- aggressive 
nationalism- had arisen as a consequence of communications technologies of public 
‘enslavement’ and the regimentation of the human mind. His title, Mobilising for 
Chaos, reflects the contention that propaganda as practised by both the fascist and 
democratic European powers was a particularly dangerous manifestation of modernity 
in world politics. Reigel’s book thus concludes with the warning that although “the 
United States has so far resisted the tendencies which have...produced an intellectual 
medievalism in certain European countries,” the survival of American democracy was
109 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, p. 91.
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vitally dependent on freedom of opinion and information.110 US author Frederick 
Lumley similarly warned of a ‘propaganda menace’ in a 1933 book of the same title, in 
which he examined a spectrum of communication processes and noted how vested 
interests were routinely conveyed through news, culture, religion and education. 
Walter Millis’ bestselling Road to War, published in 1935, illustrated to Americans 
how propaganda had been the catalyst of the First World War, highlighting a litany of 
immoral tactics on the part of the British in their effort to secure American involvement 
in the conflict.* 111
A key figure in this phase of American debate on the moral and historical 
implications of propaganda and the possibility of international reform through 
international communications was Reinhold Niebuhr. In 1932’s Moral Man and 
International Society Niebuhr articulated a critique of cultural internationalism with a 
similar premise to Carr’s, questioning the cosmopolitan logic that a peaceful 
international community could be secured by the development of an international 
public sphere. As Niebuhr observed:
While rapid means of communication have increased the breadth 
of knowledge about world affairs among citizens of various nations, 
and the general advance of education has ostensibly provided the 
capacity to think rationally and justly upon the inevitable conflicts 
of interest between nations, there is nevertheless little hope of 
arriving at a perceptible increase of international morality through 
the growth of intelligence and the perfection of the means of 
communication.112
In a commentary on cultural diplomacy written a decade later, Niebuhr cites the 
historical animosity of France and Germany, neighbouring societies with extensive 
knowledge of each other, as an illustration of this logic. While international 
interchange and understanding might bring about international community in the long 
term, Niebuhr noted that this could not occur without other extensive international 
reforms. In his post-1945 writing on cultural relations, Niebuhr shifted somewhat from
110 O. W. Reigel, Mobilising for Chaos: The Story o f the New Propaganda, (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1934), pp. 17, 211-4.
111 Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy, pp. 45-6, 50.
112 Niebuhr, Moral Man, p. 85.
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this position and conceded that there was some possibility that the international system 
could be reformed through cultural exchange. He nonetheless cautioned that the ‘social 
tissue’ required for world government would develop slowly and “immediate and direct 
relevance” for cultural diplomacy should not be claimed.113 Cultural interchange could 
turn out to be especially hollow, according to Niebuhr (and here he was plainly 
addressing American cultural diplomacy advocates), when it was vulnerable to 
domination by a lone and potentially overbearing power.114
Yale University’s Nicholas John Spykman was another prominent sceptic of 
the efficacy of cultural internationalism and international communication. As a theorist 
of power politics who argued that military power was the ultimate determinant of 
influence within the international system, Spykman acknowledged the increasing 
salience of psychological warfare as a tool of international statecraft, however. He took 
up these ideas after Washington had adopted cultural and informational techniques, 
suggesting in 1942 that war:
cannot be won except with the whole-hearted cooperation of both 
soldiers and civilians.. .The state has become vulnerable to new 
weapons. Psychological and ideological warfare have been added 
to the technique of economic strangulation, political manoeuvre, 
and military assault. Propaganda and counter-propaganda have 
been added to the arms with which the will to fight is 
undermined or strengthened.115
In dismissing cultural internationalism as a ‘fashion’ and disparaging the ‘missionary’ 
enthusiasm with which government and private cultural relations initiatives were 
conducted in Latin America , Spykman argued that the:
political results of [the US’s]...cultural campaign have been nil...
Fear and distrust of the United States have become considerably 
less in recent years, but the change is not due to a better 
understanding of our culture but to the basic shift in our attitude
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toward Latin America symbolised by the Good Neighbour Policy.116
Like Niebuhr, Spykman condemned the logic of cultural internationalism due to its 
mistaken “assumption that people who are fundamentally different will necessarily 
begin to like each other as they become better acquainted its erroneous and disproved in 
everyday life.” Despite the swarms of American travellers who have visited Europe, he 
notes that the American public remained convinced throughout the 1920s that 
disengagement was an appropriate diplomatic strategy toward Europe. On the other 
hand, Spykman observed that Americans had been “much more favourably disposed 
toward the Chinese, whose country almost no one had visited and whose civilization 
practically nobody understood.”117
Julie Reeves’ recent account of the history o f cultural studies during this 
period highlights another intellectual shift that was taking place and had bearing on 
American perceptions of world politics. The development of anthropological studies 
within the US was taking place during the 1930s and 1940s, as reflected in the writings 
of Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, with the latter’s Patterns o f Culture published in 
1934 constituted the “symbolic milestone” in this development. The previously 
dominant ‘humanist’ discourse had situated culture as:
‘the best of everything’ and the ‘pursuit of perfection.’ The aim 
now was to pursue that perfection on an international scale and 
to spread the benefits o f ‘sweetness and light’ globally by exchanging 
the ‘best of everything’.. .If people became more cultured, then they 
would change their habits and behaviour; this would mean that they 
would become more civilized, which would, if all went to plan, affect 
the nature of international relations. In the short run, it could prevent 
war, and in the long run, it could lead to a whole new world order.118
During the 1930s and 1940s, however, what supplanted this discourse of high cultural 
interchange was an ‘anthropological’ view, situating culture as an organic source of 
division between national communities. Hence by the late 1940s, the ideological
Ub Ibid., p. 236.
U1 Ibid., p.255.
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tensions between the US and USSR were reinforced by prevailing conceptions of 
culture as
less something to be exchanged, least of all to foster mutual 
understanding, and more of a weapon in the battle to win hearts 
and minds. Moreover this battle was not entirely concerned with 
promoting a state’s best side, the primary purpose was to win the 
competition between two, very different, ‘ways of life.’119
Thus during the same decade as more instrumentalist informational techniques were 
gaining a measure of acceptance as diplomacy instruments within US political science, 
the dominant academic discourse on culture was correspondingly moving toward a
1 90divisive, anthropological framework.
As support for US intervention in the Second World War after 1939 gathered 
momentum, many of the American progressive propaganda critics reoriented their work 
and began to consider how to enhance official information as a mechanism for civilian 
morale building. The rapid decline of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 
established in 1937, which had been intended to sponsor research on how to combat 
propaganda, symbolised this shift away from anti-propaganda studies.121 In its place, a 
spate of new psychological and sociological studies emphasised the connection 
between public morale and national efficiency, and an academic Committee for 
National Morale was founded July 1940 to examine national mobilisation and public
119 Reeves, Culture and International Relations, p. 93.
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opinion in wartime. As Sproule observes, although the propaganda critics had 
dominated US inter-war scholarly debates, the challenge of sustaining this refutation of 
propaganda in the context of world events had led, by the late 1930s, to a “wide- 
ranging, unsettled, and characteristically American colloquy on the meaning of 
propaganda for democracy.” This range of perspectives on culture, communications 
and world politics constituted a fertile basis from which US policy-makers articulated 
America’s cultural and informational strategy in world politics, as the coming chapters 
will show. Furthermore, the impetus behind calls for an official program of cultural 
diplomacy drew on the fact that US philanthropic programs had proliferated in Latin 
America, China and to a lesser extent in Europe. Many of these initiatives were 
intended to foster democratic principles and economic development through education, 
cultural interchange and technical assistance, and thus they shaped the terms upon 
which supporters of an official cultural program articulated their positions. I shall 
discuss these discourses of American philanthropic influence shortly in the following 
section, which considers the third strand of inter-war history to be examined here. In 
the discussion below I shall thus summarise the American non-government sector’s 
engagement with cultural diplomacy and philanthropy prior to 1936, and then highlight 
the broader aspects of internationalism in US foreign policy upon which the US’s 
cultural and informational diplomacy programs were built.
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Inter-war America: Anti-Propagandism, Philanthropy, and Post-League
Internationalism
Despite public and academic criticism of government propaganda, since the 
early twentieth century American philanthropic, evangelical and educational 
institutions had maintained a strong cultural and educational presence abroad, and these 
activities proliferated during the inter-war period. As the Division of Cultural 
Relations’ Waldo Leland had observed in 1943, these non-government activities were 
crucial in the US public’s eventual acceptance of an official cultural diplomacy policy, 
having established the idea that an American cultural presence must be maintained 
abroad in the public psyche for several decades.124 American sponsored scientific 
exchanges were some of the earliest examples US philanthropic activity, having been a 
key policy of the Smithsonian Institution after 1848. In 1890 the American Association 
of University Women awarded its first scholarship to send an American to study 
overseas. An important forerunner to the Fulbright Program emerged in this period, 
in the form of the Belgian Educational Foundation, established at the behest of 
President Herbert Hoover in 1920 to spend surplus currency from Washington’s 
Belgian relief program during the First World War on a series of bilateral educational 
exchanges. The American Library Association had also sponsored English-language 
libraries overseas, many of them in Latin America, from the early 1920s. These 
libraries, along with the US cultural centres that had been established by US expatriates 
throughout Latin America, were later absorbed into the official cultural relations 
program and counted as one of its early areas of success.
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The number of American international philanthropic institutions had 
proliferated significantly from the first decade of the twentieth century: there were five 
US grant-making foundations at the turn of the century, 30 by 1914, and nearly 200 in 
1930. The key areas of focus for American philanthropic programs were Europe, 
Latin America and China, with emphasis shifting toward the latter two during the 
1930s. The Institute of International Education (HE), which subsequently worked 
closely with the US government educational exchange programs, played a key role in 
promoting Latin American educational exchanges during the 1930s. In addition to 
establishing summer schools for American college students in Rio de Janeiro (1929) 
and Lima (1932), the IIE presided over an expanding educational fellowships program 
that brought Latin Americans to the US, initially offering 148 positions to Latin 
Americans in 1926, expanding to 375 by 1938. Liping Bu notes that while the 
recipients of IIE fellowships represented a small proportion of the overall foreign 
student population in the US,
the significance of these fellowships should not be ignored. The 
fellowships were established for the purpose of enabling ‘bright, 
capable, and typical students to study abroad who because of economic 
restriction would otherwise be unable to do so.’ Fellowship students, 
upon returning to their homelands, were expected to become leaders in 
their communities and to influence public opinion in favour of 
international understanding. Candidates were instructed that 
fellowships were created as a valuable instrument for international 
understanding and only incidentally for the personal advantage of the 
fellows.129
The American Council of Learned Societies had been established in 1919, and also 
worked towards fostering international educational interchanges with Europe and Latin 
America.
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As Frank Costigliola has observed, large numbers of American tourists, as 
well as artists, writers, and scholars visited Europe in the wake of the First World War, 
taking advantage of affordable travel and favourable currency exchange rates.130 This 
interchange of persons also deepened the cultural and intellectual ties between 
Americans and Europeans, and comprised an additional basis for the American public’s 
gradual acceptance during the 1930s that an official cultural diplomacy program was 
warranted. Given the extensive opportunities and resources that were thus available for 
international interchange in this period, Richard Arndt has recently described the 1930s 
as:
a historical high in American private internationalism, despite the 
onrush of economic disaster and totalitarianism. As though to 
protest Congress’s rejection of the League, the US intellectual world 
struck out on its own. Cultural internationalism had come to life, 
even if the news had not reached America’s legislators.131
In China, the American Oriental Society played a prominent role in promoting
commercial contacts and educational activities with the US, and the Rockefeller
Foundation’s China initiatives contributed significantly to medical, scientific and
technical education there from early in the twentieth century. After 1920, the
Foundation broadened into sponsorship of cultural exchange and social scientific
education. Foundation reports from 1909 and 1914 stated that these elements of the
program had been intended for “striking at the roots of superstition” to eliminate
“radically false views of life;” to thus “develop the scientific spirit, high moral ideas”
1
and provide “training in new conceptions of political and social organisation.” 
Rockefeller’s Humanities Division, established in 1934, articulated “an explicit interest 
in promoting international understanding through cultural means.” Its directors were:
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convinced that the humanities, like the sciences, were internationalist 
in thrust and that they could advance the same progressive cultural 
mission.. .[A]n interchange of cultural values, in addition to 
reducing international tensions caused by misunderstanding, would 
result in ‘the discovery of common origins for differentiated national 
ideas.’133
Similar progressive visions of world history had also been taken up within the 
American pacifist movement, which consisted of various student, Trades Union, 
Church and women’s groups, reaching its zenith with the formation of the National 
Peace Conference in 1933.134
Philanthropy and the Basis of Official Cultural Diplomacy
When the US government moved into the realm of international cultural and 
educational relations, it drew on experts with philanthropic experience, many of whom 
had long been advocates of a US government framework or clearing house to support 
private projects. For example, Dr Samuel Guy Inman, who was selected by Cordell 
Hull to negotiate several multilateral cultural exchange conventions at the Pan 
American Conference of 1936, had been a longstanding advocate and practitioner of 
educational relations with Latin America in the interests of more effective political 
relationships. Inman is recorded as suggesting that Washington take note of the extent 
to which French success in the geopolitical realm was as much a product of the ‘power 
of cultural attraction’ as it was of its high diplomacy. Philanthropic support for 
research on international cooperation had also been an important function of 
philanthropic foundations that contributed significantly to the early US government 
programs. The Rockefeller Foundation, for instance, had sponsored a committee at 
Columbia University under James T. Shotwell, who later sat on the General Advisory
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Committee for the Division of Cultural Relations, to study intellectual cooperation and 
its impact on world politics. 136
The private and philanthropic origins of US cultural diplomacy had a 
significant impact on the discourses that were subsequently articulated in the context of 
the State Department’s cultural programs. International philanthropic activities 
emanating from the US embodied the conviction, which Andrew Carnegie did much to 
publicise in his Gospel o f Wealth, that the application of business methods to 
humanitarian programs and foreign policy would bring the most effective results. 137 In 
his historical study of US philanthropic foundations Edward Berman has suggested that 
the concepts of ‘development’ and ‘governance’ that arose from the corporate 
philosophy comprised an ideological template that shaped Washington’s policies for 
international economic development in subsequent decades. 138 Frank Ninkovich has 
similarly identified a technocratic rationale within the philanthropic activities of this 
period consisting of
an emerging pragmatist perspective that had as one of its central tenets...
a belief that enquiry itself could stabilise and sustain a culture,...
determines the mental attitude of people.. .and carries with it the shaping
1 TQof a civilization.
Ninkovich also notes that in addition to the technocratic notions of ‘cultural 
modernisation,’ a teleological liberal discourse had informed philanthropic ideals in the 
inter-war period. In his study of the Rockefeller’s activities in China during the first
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decades he notes that the Foundation’s programs reflected a “transparently historicist 
faith in the inevitably triumph of the liberal World Spirit.”140 As we shall observe in 
the next chapter, these notions deriving from philanthropic activities of technocracy, 
modernisation and American pragmatism, as well as elements of liberal teleology, were 
also incorporated into the lexicon through which official cultural diplomacy was 
represented by US officials after 1936. The official programs also co-opted 
philanthropic principles in emphasising that Washington’s cultural diplomacy was 
politically disinterested: policy-makers seized on the idea that even with government 
funding, cultural diplomacy’s “purposes can be served in some detachment from 
national political purposes.”141
Post-League Internationalism: the Ideological Origins o f Official Cultural Diplomacy 
and International Information
As I stated above, in addition to the adoption of cultural and educational 
diplomacy practices by philanthropic and private institutions, an important precondition 
to the adoption of official cultural diplomacy and international information programs 
were the deepening international ties Washington pursued through its foreign policy 
during the inter-war period. In this context, Tomoko Akami’s recent account of the 
American Institute of Pacific Relations and inter-war US foreign policy research is 
particularly illuminating. Akami distinguishes between the templates of ‘Wilsonian 
Internationalism’ and Republican ‘post-League Internationalism,’ contending that after 
the decline of Wilsonism, internationalist sentiments did continue to shape US foreign 
policy. As Akami observes:
If there was a distinguishing feature of Republican internationalism 
in the 1920s, it was its enthusiastic pursuit of an American order in 
certain regions. Isolationism meant isolation from European politics.
The Monroe Doctrine defined and protected the US sphere of interest- 
the American continent, Asia and the Pacific- and the United States
m  Ibid., p. 818.
141 Frances X. Sutton, American Foundations and US Public Diplomacy, (Ford Foundation: New York, 
1968), p. 3.
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was actively involved in these regions.
Within this US sphere of interest, as Henry Cabot Lodge had indicated in 1919, 
“Americanisation was the basis of world peace....The Pacific region, Asia included, 
was clearly the extended frontier where the United States could pursue its manifest 
destiny.”142
In what has since been regarded as a manifesto of this inter-war Republican 
internationalism, Elihu Root claimed in a 1922 article in Foreign Affairs that despite its 
failure to join the League of Nations, the US nonetheless understood and intended to 
uphold its “rights and obligations incidental] to the membership of the community of 
nations.”143 Within this legalist sensibility, the education of global public opinion on 
questions of international order and law would be indispensable in establishing a new 
‘popular diplomacy’ between states. Root was also a prominent supporter of the 
philanthropic and educational programs emanating from the US at this time such as the 
Institute of International Education, and served as a trustee of the Carnegie Corporation 
and president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.144 Many of the 
foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the inter-war administrations took up Root’s 
rhetoric of international ‘community,’ the march of democracy and the rule of law. 
During the 1920s and 1930s activities that “complemented the League and became a 
significant part of the machinery of the post-League order,” highlighting the fact that 
Republican politicians were attempting to link “the popular dream of world peace to 
a.. .partisan vision of an ongoing world of law and economic cooperation free from 
political precommitment.”145
Akami characterises post-League Internationalism as a posture of independent 
engagement in international initiatives, while Frank Ninkovich offers a slightly
142 Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, pp. 34-5.
143 Here, I am characterising the internationalism of the Republican party, not the ‘neo-republican’ theory 
of international order that recent scholarship in IR has propagated. Elihu Root, “A Requisite for the 
Success of Popular Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 1, (no. 1, 1922), p. 8. On the neo-republican or ‘neo­
constitutionalist’ account of international order see, e.g.: G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, 
Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding o f Order after Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001).
144 Bu, Making the World Like US, p. 53.
145 Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific, p. 33. See also Charles DeBenedetti (1978) quoted in Akami, 
Internationalizing the Pacific, p. 34.
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different term: ‘cooperative anti-imperialism,’ to describe the kinds of international ties 
the US pursued during the inter-war era, particularly in the Asia Pacific. Ninkovich 
emphasises the heritage of the early twentieth century’s progressive era within the 
Republican internationalism of the inter-war period, particularly in relation to notions 
of great power cooperation, international law and arbitration, and the pursuit of 
economic ties.146 The Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921-22 and the Nine 
Power Treaty over China of 1922 were key examples of progressive foreign policy 
principles that were put into practice during the inter-war period. The Coolidge 
administration took up the progressive legacy with the co-sponsoring of one of the most 
far-reaching treaties of the period: The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War 
(Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris) of 1928. This treaty was significant also for its 
outlawing of propaganda containing ‘incitements to war,’ a principle later cited as a 
legal precedent with which to prosecute the Nazi leadership during the Nuremberg 
trials.147 Dollar Diplomacy, Open Door economic policies, and the Monroe Doctrine 
(somewhat augmented into a rhetoric of Pan Americanism) were principles derived 
from the progressive era that were upheld under the terms of Republican post-League 
Internationalism. Douglas Little’s analysis of antibolshevism as a ‘fundamental tenet’ 
of US foreign policy thinking in the inter-war period also finds a more internationalist 
posture in US foreign relations during this phase than retrospective concepts of US 
isolationism generally suggest. Little shows how Woodrow Wilson’s policy of non­
recognition toward the Soviet Union was carried on by successive Republican 
administrations as a key platform of US foreign policy, and as such from the late 1920s 
onward anti-Communism provided a rationale for Washington’s military intervention in 
Nicaragua in 1926.148
146 Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism, pp. 221-2.
147 Preston, Hope and Folly, p. 26.
148 The sending of American marines to Nicaragua was justified by Secretary of State Kellogg by the fact 
that “the Bolshevist leaders...set up as one of their fundamental tasks the destruction of what they term 
American imperialism.” Secretary of State Henry Stimson later stated that the economic and political 
strife in the Caribbean as a consequence of the Great Depression was attributable to “Communists and 
the riff raff.” US relations with Greece and Spain were also shaped by an interest in undermining the 
extension of Soviet influence. Douglas Little, “Antibolshevism and American Foreign Policy, 1919- 
1939: The Diplomacy of Self-Delusion,” American Quarterly 35, (no. 4, Autumn 1983), pp. 380-2.
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In the economic sphere, John Lewis Gaddis notes that in addition to the legal 
progressivism of the inter-war period, the extension of American economic power into 
Europe and elsewhere indicates that a more active form of foreign policy was pursued 
by the inter-war Republican presidents than the isolationist image in much American 
historiography suggests:
The effects of American participation in World War I came to lie 
primarily in the emergence of the United States as Europe’s chief 
creditor and source of investment capital.. .the critical role Americans 
played in the rehabilitation and stabilisation of Europe during the 1920s 
.. .now seems comparable in importance to their better known activities 
there after 1945.149
Akira Iriye adds that internationalist principles shaped US foreign relations in the inter­
war period. Though it was applied in a somewhat ad hoc fashion, a commitment to re­
establishing ‘order and stability’ in US foreign policy discourse was matched by an 
extensive economic commitment to the Asia Pacific. Even with the Japanese 
occupation, US capital investments in China had hit a sum of $40 million by 1941.150
The Asia Pacific comprised geographical focal points for the progressive, 
integrationist imaginary of post-League Internationalism during the inter-war period. 
In the Pacific context, the Institute of Pacific Relations proposed an:
American [led] regional order [that] was not a simple assertion of 
hegemony, but a multilateral framework of cooperation of the powers 
under the leadership of the United States.. .The Pacific Community 
carried all the excitement and anxiety of a dawning new era.151
Although Washington did not undertake many practical measures to halt the Japanese 
conquest of China after 1931, its moral condemnation of Japanese policy and appeal to 
the League of Nations to formulate a multilateral response highlight an internationalist
149 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End o f the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, 
Provocations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 6, 11.
150 Iriye, Power and Culture, p. 17.
151 Akami, Internationalising the Pacific, pp. 44-5.
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sentiment- the paucity of action notwithstanding- in US foreign policy thinking during 
this period.152
A Pan American sensibility had also developed within Washington and among 
the US people during the 1920s and 1930s. President Herbert Hoover made the 
symbolic gesture of designating April 14 as Pan American Day in the US, and by 1930 
more than 20 conventions and treaties for fostering closer ties between the American
1 r o  u t m
republics were proposed and ratified by Washington. As I shall highlight in the next 
chapter, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt placed Western Hemispheric 
relations high on its foreign policy agenda, with the Good Neighbour Policy as the 
administration’s first foreign affairs declaration.154 It is also significant to note that 
despite the domestic upheavals of the period, the US public’s enthusiasm for 
progressive internationalism was based on:
the proposition that the best way to reaffirm American self-definition 
was not to eject alien elements or to eschew foreign contact, but to 
stand for a new vision of the world in which American values and ways 
of life would spread to other lands. American civilization would be 
reinforced through its dissemination to the rest of the world.. .not to 
remain comfortable with its own traditions but to try to universalise them.155
152 Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History o f American-East Asian Relations, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), pp. 178-80.
153 Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings, pp. 18-25. On Washington’s innovative economic policy 
toward Latin America during the inter-war period and the extent to which this informed the post-war 
Bretton Woods institutions see: Eric Helleiner, “Reinterpreting Bretton Woods: International 
Development and the Neglected Origins of Embedded Liberalism,” Development and Change 37, (no. 5, 
2006).
154 In fact, Roosevelt lauded the Good Neighbour Policy in his inaugural address. The interventionist 
basis of the Good Neighbour Policy is emphasised by Mark T. Berger: “Although Pan Americanism after 
1933 was relatively benevolent in contrast to German and Japanese expansion in this period, or the 
situation in the British and French empires, the Pan American system served primarily as a means by 
which the US could maintain its hegemony in the western hemisphere. Despite the stated anti­
interventionism of the Good Neighbour Policy, the US, operating within a structure of Pan American 
cooperation, was even more interventionist than previously. But US ‘intervention’ was carried out by 
ambassadors, foreign service officers, economic and military advisers backed up by economic assistance 
and private capital, instead of the Marines and gunboats of the past.” Berger, Under Northern Eyes, p. 
50.
155 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism, pp. 81-2.
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The foregoing points indicate that to characterise US official and public opinion as 
entirely isolationist in the inter-war period is misleading. As we shall see in the chapter 
to follow, despite public fears of propaganda, the officials of the first American cultural 
programs understood that there was some public support for apolitical forms of cultural 
and educational interchange between the US and other nations if a way of addressing 
concerns about the immoral implications of ‘propaganda’ could be found.
American visions for the development of orderly and prosperous communities 
of interest within the Asia Pacific and the Western Hemisphere during the inter-war 
period were especially significant because it was also to these regions that the bulk of 
US philanthropic cultural and educational projects had been directed. Hence it was to 
these regions, and not to Europe, that the official cultural diplomacy programs initially 
directed their efforts. These official cultural programs were consequently represented 
as a conduit between these pre-existing spheres of US interaction with Latin America 
and Asia.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have outlined the most significant historical developments 
associated with the rise of propaganda and cultural diplomacy after the First World 
War. The academic and popular responses to the emergence of propaganda in Europe 
and the US during the inter-war period have also been surveyed, as were the strands of 
internationalism within US foreign relations during the inter-war period. Inter-war era 
American conceptions of propaganda, cultural philanthropy and international progress 
encompassed a diverse set of propositions as to whether, and if so how, the US might 
construct official programs of cultural and informational diplomacy. This ‘colloquy’ of 
opinion concerning propaganda and international cultural relations in inter-war 
America provided a varied and flexible lexicon in which the framing of the US’s 
official cultural diplomacy programs took place after 1936, as I shall illustrate in the 
coming chapters. By actually building on critiques of propaganda as an undemocratic 
practice, and simultaneously drawing on the philanthropic discourses that cast
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international cultural initiative as a mechanism for the spread of democracy and order, 
US cultural diplomacy could be represented by policy-makers as a singular category 
cultural influence that simultaneously repudiated and went beyond ‘propaganda.’ 
Rather than grasping the nettle of propaganda as a necessary measure in times of war, 
as the British essentially did in this period, US policy-makers overwhelmingly tended 
in the early phases of the program to represent their work as an apolitical, universalist, 
but also persuasive cultural program that was not to be termed ‘propaganda.’156 It is 
this effort to frame American practice as distinctive, unique and embodying reciprocal 
interests that is the subject of the chapter to follow, in which I shall examine discourses 
of American identity and influence that were mobilised in the making of US cultural 
diplomacy policy after 1936.
156 On British propaganda, see: Carr, Propaganda. See also: Ralph Block, “Propaganda and the Free 
Society,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 12, (no. 4, Winter 1948), p. 677.
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CHAPTER THREE
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY:
FROM GOOD NEIGHBOUR PRINCIPLES TO THE MORAL BASIS OF
WORLD ORDER1
The State Department’s Division of Cultural Relations was established in 
1938 and, with several name changes, it remained Washington’s main organ for 
cultural diplomacy during 1938-53. As such, it presided over programs for the 
exchange of persons, established American cultural institutions abroad including the 
United States Information Service centres (USIS), and circulated material on American 
society and culture. The program also encompassed educational activities, intellectual 
projects, and the distribution of publications and films. By surveying the policy 
directives, debates and public statements that accompanied the formulation of US 
cultural diplomacy, as I have contended in foregoing chapters, I will examine in this 
chapter how conceptions of American identity were articulated during the process of 
foreign policy-making. Identity was a feature of cultural foreign policy-making in two 
related senses: firstly, in the way in which cultural diplomats established symbols of 
‘America’ to be projected to audiences abroad, and secondly, as a discourse that 
defined the range of available options that were envisaged by policy-makers. In the 
latter case, I am interested in the discursive frameworks through which policy-makers 
fixed shared ideas about the subjects, objects and issues that US cultural diplomacy 
pertained to. As such I shall address the key questions of this study, which ask how the 
discursive representation of US cultural diplomacy developed and how these 
representations were implicated in Washington’s transition toward a posture of global 
hegemony. In particular, I trace how and why the promotion of US culture came to be 
understood as a necessary feature of American foreign relations, particularly in relation
1 On the ‘moral basis’ for world order see B. Harvie Branscomb, Chair of the US Advisory 
Commission on Educational Exchange, (1948) quoted in Henry Kellerman, Cultural Relations as an 
Instrument o f US Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program Between the United States 
and Germany 1945-1954, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 7.
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to the ‘vindication’ of America political ideals within a global context, at successive 
stages of US foreign relations during 1936-53.
What were the key components of US cultural diplomacy discourse during 
1936-53, and how did they enable the adoption and ongoing use of cultural diplomacy 
by Washington? Furthermore, how were they implicated in Washington’s transition 
toward seeing itself as a hegemonic power? As I shall highlight in the discussion 
below, American cultural diplomacy was initially framed as a reciprocal activity. By 
seeking to gradually mould the opinions of foreign educational and cultural elites 
through international interchange, the rationale that was stated at the founding of the 
cultural diplomacy programs was to foster mutual understanding between Americans 
and their neighbours. We shall see below how reciprocity was often articulated as the 
basic format of US cultural diplomacy in order to assuage ongoing concerns in 
Washington and publicly about propaganda’s illegitimacy in the context of US political 
culture. Similarly, bilateralism was articulated as the basic format of the cultural 
program in this early phase, partly as a symbolic expression of the Division’s (and by 
implication the American people’s) aspiration for genuine, meaningful dialogue with 
other societies according to America’s liberal principles.1 2
Within the discourses of US foreign policy-making, distinguishing ‘cultural 
diplomacy’ from ‘propaganda’ was not a matter simply of announcing a categorical 
distinction at the founding of the Division or in the announcement of new initiatives. 
Rather, what emerges from the archives of cultural policy-making is an ongoing 
representational process that situated Washington’s style of cultural diplomacy in 
exceptional terms. This representational practice most often took the form of discursive 
‘framing’ within US cultural policy directives and statements. ‘Framing,’ in my usage, 
is a process of articulating figurative premises and categories according to which 
narrower policy imperatives are to be conceptualised. These cultural policy ‘frames’ 
were thus treated as ‘background’ assumptions about the character of American identity 
and agency and were thus subject to agreement in a way that the particular cultural
1 See Richard Arndt, The First Resort o f Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth
Century, (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005).
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policy imperatives or initiatives themselves under discussion in policy-making contexts 
were not. Upholding Washington’s deep commitment to anti-propagandism was one 
of the most significant framing principles of US cultural diplomacy. In fact, as we shall 
see below, the repudiation of propaganda was a key condition of possibility for the US 
cultural diplomacy program. By affirming the exceptionality of America’s cultural 
practices, the exceptionalist ‘self that American political discourse had traditionally 
articulated could be vindicated by the format of US foreign policy. The repudiation of 
propaganda in foreign policy discourse was a symbolic tool that assisted in marshalling 
broader governmental and public support for the programs of US international 
persuasion, rendering an American cultural relations program thinkable despite the fact 
that propaganda had been deemed ‘un-American’ by the inter-war propaganda critics. 
In this way, US cultural policy-making also implicitly upheld shared social 
understandings about the acquisitive character of European propaganda and the 
distinctiveness of the ‘New World’ style of diplomacy crafted by Washington.
We shall also see below how grammars of predication and alterity were also 
utilised to great effect within these discourses of US cultural diplomacy. Locating the 
State Department’s cultural diplomacy practices as anti-propagandistic drew on the idea 
that the United States was a singular nation in its historical commitment to liberalism, 
and that this could find expression in the format of its foreign policy. The concept of 
‘authorship’ was used frequently in US cultural diplomacy discourse to connect the 
bounded nature of power in US domestic political culture to its conduct of foreign 
policy. In this way, even if particular policies resembled ‘propaganda’ the US, by 
virtue of its domestic identity, repudiated propaganda itself as a practice. The cultural 
diplomacy program was presupposed by a set of ideas about the US ‘self that 
connected America’s domestic virtues to the pursuit of global virtues and a moral world 
order.3 4 Logics of integration and opposition, through which Washington’s role as a 
hegemonic power was constructed relationally, also featured within the discursive 
practices of US cultural diplomacy. Implicit in notions of American authorship within
3 I noted in chapter one that I differ slightly from other scholars, such as Michael Barnett, who have 
used the term ‘framing’ in the context of foreign policy analysis.
4 An early statement of the cultural programs as part of a moral order was made in the following 
address: Sumner Welles, “Address by Sumner Welles at the Consultative Meeting of the American 
Republics, September 30, 1939,” Department of State Bulletin 1382, (September 30, 1939), p. 302.
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cultural policy debates was a set of presuppositions about how the American ‘self was 
situated in relation to international ‘others.’ In the case of US cultural diplomacy to 
Europe or the USSR, the other could be rendered in oppositional terms, as separate, 
threatening or otherwise antithetical to the US. However, US cultural diplomats often 
also articulated a pluralist identity for the US that approached the international other as 
a constituency for its ideas and influence: as subjects that needed to be bound more 
closely to America’s vision of the global order. This was particularly the case within 
US cultural initiatives to Third World, as I discuss in this chapter with particular 
reference to China.* 5
My discussion in this chapter covers several stages of the US cultural 
diplomacy program. I begin with the inter-American origins of the US cultural 
diplomacy program, highlighting the representations of diplomatic interdependence, 
reciprocity and openness mobilised by US officials during its early phase. Washington 
first adopted an international legal framework for official cultural diplomacy and 
educational exchanges through multilateral Pan American treaty provisions that it had 
proposed in 1936, and ratified shortly after. Fears of Axis influence in the Western 
Hemisphere, particularly concerns that Germany was using purportedly ‘apolitical’ 
cultural activities as a vehicle for economic imperialism, served as a catalyst for 
Washington’s 1936 proposal of a Pan American treaty for cultural interchange. As the 
Division of Cultural Relations’ first director had reflected, the founding of US cultural 
diplomacy in 1938 was essentially a defensive response to “the misrepresentation of 
American life...[that] was going on in South America,” rather than a fully-fledged 
effort to assert US power.6 As a consequence of these regionalist origins, the
For an extended discussion of predication: in my usage I follow Roxanne Doty and Jennifer
Milliken, see chapter one. On logics of opposition/integration see chapter one also, particularly my
discussion of Christina Klein, Iver Neumann, Lene Hansen and Tzvetan Todorov.
6 Ben Cherrington quoted in Frank Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas: US Foreign Policy and 
Cultural Relations, 1938-1950, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 32. See also 
Ben Cherrington quoted in J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings o f US Cultural 
Diplomacy 1936-1948, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 112-3.
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development of US cultural diplomacy and its approach to inter-American relations 
were deeply entwined until the mid-1940s.* 7
As Cordell Hull phrased it, the origins of US cultural diplomacy rested with 
the realisation that political ties must be “bulwarked by an appreciation...of the 
spiritual and intellectual values in this country, as well as by an understanding by the 
American people of the cultural achievements of their southern neighbours.”8 In 
addition to the articulation of cultural diplomacy as a defensive measure in an inter- 
American context, the founding statements of the official US cultural diplomacy 
program contained within them seeds of a broader vision of US-sponsored international 
economic, military and social interdependence. As the international affairs scholar 
Harley Notter had observed in a 1939, Washington:
recognised [the] interrelatedness of societal national factors and societal 
international factors...The ideas, the ideals, and the manners of the 
different nations have become better known to all nations. The 
commerce of ideas and ideologies along the ether waves and the 
skywaves of travel have become matters of as direct governmental 
concern as commerce in merchandise.9
US cultural diplomacy was extended beyond Latin America first to the Near 
East, then to China where there had been a strong tradition of US philanthropic 
activities, and shortly after that to Europe. In charting the extension of the cultural 
diplomacy program, I note how the anti-propaganda frame and discourses of alterity 
(both oppositional and integrative) established a new conception of self that US policy­
makers were increasingly casting as Washington’s preferred post-war global role. But
Key advocates of cultural diplomacy in the US at this time came from an inter-American context.
These include Samuel Guy Inman (Latin Americanist and unofficial advisor to Cordell Hull on
cultural issues); Sumner Welles (former ambassador to Cuba and Assistant Secretary of State); and
Steven Duggan (of the Institute of International Education). The inter-American origins of US
cultural diplomacy are plainly suggested by the title of Espinosa’s, Inter-American Beginnings o f US
Cultural Diplomacy.
8 Cordell Hull quoted in Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings o f US Cultural Diplomacy, p. 111.
9 Harley Notter, “Cultural Relations with the Other American Republics: Address before the 
American Political Science Association on December 29, 1939,” p. 3.; Miscellaneous Subject Files, 
1939-1950 (Subj. 1939-50); Records of Harley Notter (HN); General Records of the Department of 
State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, 
College Park, MD (NARA, CP).
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in the immediate post-war period Congress downscaled many of the State Department’s 
wartime initiatives, and the cultural program’s administrative arrangements were 
consequently unsettled in the years immediately after the war. Despite these 
bureaucratic pressures, I note how the cultural programs took on new functions in order 
to consolidate the Allied victory and enact their conception of America’s global cultural 
and political vindication during 1944-45. The broadening of US cultural diplomacy 
functions in the immediate post-war period was made possible by some particularly 
evocative depictions of American culture and the possibilities for bringing about 
stability and progress promised by its export. In the 1944-45 period US cultural 
diplomacy was articulated according to a logic of inclusion/pluralism, which scripted 
US foreign policy as a basis to bind the international system to the multilateral 
institutions and liberal internationalist principles during the post-war settlement. 
Narrative practices also came to the fore within the representation of US cultural 
diplomacy during this phase, with policy-makers tending to situate the position of 
international dominance Washington occupied after the war as a way to fulfil 
America’s longstanding adherence to democratic politics and a liberal culture.
There were ironies and ambiguities associated with the representation of 
American cultural diplomacy and hegemony in the post-war context, however. Cultural 
diplomacy practices were situated within a wide and complex set of ideas about US 
foreign policy and the global order, and such there were often several threads and even 
contradictory representations mobilised simultaneously.10 As Washington’s 
responsibilities as a victorious power expanded to include post-war reconstruction and 
reorientation in Axis areas during 1946, a more instrumental and unidirectional kind of 
cultural diplomacy had to be crafted by the Division. Maintaining the credibility of US 
policy through expressions of anti-propagandism and the repudiation of power politics 
was a particularly significant function of cultural diplomacy discourse in the late 1940s, 
and I show that much was at stake in this because the sentiment was increasingly belied 
by the policies adopted. Deepening mistrust between the US and USSR from 1946-47 
onwards had shaped cultural diplomacy debates into defending Washington’s
10 On the diffuse causual impacts of discourse see, e.g.: Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 
“Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, (no. 1, Winter 2005).
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commitment to democratic openness while simultaneously and forcefully rebutting 
Soviet propaganda claims.
In 1948 the cultural programs were placed on a firmer legislative footing with 
the passage of Smith Mundt Bill, yet I will show below that this did not dampen 
debates within the Division on the implications of ideological warfare for America’s 
longstanding political principles. In my survey of the post-1948 context I explore the 
struggle on the part of many cultural policy-makers to sustain their expressions of 
liberalism and the commitment to anti-propagandism against contending visions of 
cultural diplomacy as a Cold War instrument, particularly given the Cold War 
sentiments of Assistant Secretaries of State William Benton and George V. Allen. 
Another significant implication of the shift toward an increasingly instrumental 
understanding of cultural diplomacy in this period was a new discourse about what 
American culture itself signified in an international context. Whereas in the inter- 
American context, and during the war, US officials had emphasised America’s 
‘popular’ culture as the cultural expression of democratic principles, as antagonisms 
with the USSR developed US officials sought to project America’s ‘high’ cultural and 
intellectual achievements to Europe and the USSR. The emergence of the Cold War, as 
a struggle that was in an overarching sense a ‘cultural’ contest, reveals in a particularly 
clear way how the articulation of America’s cultural identity enabled American 
emergence as a protagonist in the Cold War.
Inter-American Origins of the Cultural Diplomacy Program
The founding of a US government program for cultural relations with the 
Latin American republics in 1936 was articulated as a response to two key 
developments. Over the short term, concerns that Axis information and cultural 
activities were undermining the US’s reputation in the Western Hemisphere had 
catalysed high-level support for efforts to improve America’s regional image. Over the 
longer term, deepening cultural, social and intellectual ties between North and South 
America, and the success of Franklin Roosevelt’s integrationist Good Neighbour Policy 
toward the region, had rendered the idea of a formalised, official cultural program
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increasingly acceptable in the policy and public spheres.11 With episodic setbacks such 
as Bolivia and Paraguay’s Chaco War of 1932-35, the two decades that had followed 
the First World War had witnessed deepening economic and political ties across the 
Western Hemisphere, and State Department officials took this as a testament to the 
relevance of cultural diplomacy as a diplomatic instrument.
Precedents for many of the cultural diplomacy activities taken up by the 
Department of State after 1936 had also been set during the First World War, within the 
Creel Committee’s ambitious program to publicise Woodrow Wilson’s war aims in the 
Western Hemisphere. The Committee’s activities, which included the provision of free 
English language tuition, the establishment of public libraries and the distribution of 
printed materials and films, were countenanced in part because they had escaped some 
of the condemnation that Wilson’s domestic propaganda had attracted after 1919.12 
These diplomatic forerunners to a permanent US international persuasion program were 
possible because these precedents had been considered ‘educational’ rather than
• • i  1‘propagandist^’ in character. As J. Manuel Espinosa notes in his definitive memoir 
of founding of the Division of Cultural Relations, the US public also increasingly 
perceived itself as part of a regional cultural convergence in the inter-war period.14
11 As Robert Dallek notes, it is important to recall the formative influences of two earlier presidents: 
cousin Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson- the latter appointing Roosevelt as Secretary of the 
Navy- on Franklin Roosevelt’s internationalism. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American 
Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
12 One of the most significant components of the Committee on Public Information’s international 
cultural diplomacy was the opening of the Benjamin Franklin library for US publications and 
English language study in Mexico City, which was administered by the government for seven and a 
half months and in that time received 106,000 visitors. With the CPI’s dissolution at the end of the 
war, official support for the US libraries and other initiatives weakened, but the Benjamin Franklin 
Library was kept open through private funding, and was reintegrated into the government cultural 
diplomacy after 1938 like many other cultural centres and English language programs in Latin 
America. Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings o f US Cultural Diplomacy, p. 18.
13 The Herbert Hoover presidency subsequently founded several political and educational initiatives 
to improve inter-American relations. Hoover declared his support for the study of Latin American 
languages within the United States, and strongly supported the exchange of films- because they 
represented a ‘universal language’ for cross-cultural understanding. Hoover was also a pioneer in 
establishing American educational exchange programs, proposing that currency from surplus war 
materials left in Belgium be used to send students and professors to the United States. This funding 
structure based on surplus currency was later adopted by J. William Fulbright in the 1946 Surplus 
Property Act which established his eponymous educational exchange program. Ibid., pp. 18-22.
14 On tourism and US public sentiment, see: ibid., p. 47. See also: Waldo Leland, “International 
Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present Problems,” University of Denver Social 
Science Foundation Papers, 1943; Box 2, File 28; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU 
Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville. Leland
326
Inter-American conferences for both official and non-government purposes proliferated 
markedly during the inter-war period. Notable among these was the (non-government) 
Inter-American Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, established in 1930 with the 
objective of advising the Pan American Union on regional cultural and intellectual 
relations. Private initiatives to foster inter-American cultural diplomacy and 
intellectual exchanges were relatively well developed by the late 1930s, and embodied 
the voluntarism and philanthropic spirit of American philanthropy.15
The establishment of an official program for cultural diplomacy in 1936 built 
on the political precedents set under Wilson and Hoover as well as public sentiment and 
existing networks established through philanthropic and private activities. This 
heritage was emphasised by the staff of the Division of Cultural Relations after 1938 as 
they sought to co-opt philanthropic expertise into the government activities.16 In stating 
their connection to the philanthropic sphere, US officials often characterised the official 
cultural diplomacy program as a ‘clearing house’ for private initiatives to convey the 
open, reciprocal ‘American’ spirit that the US cultural diplomacy programs sought to 
embody. A key short-term political factor in the founding of the Division was reflected 
in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inaugural address of 1933, in which he articulated his 
administration’s intention to be a ‘good neighbour’ within the Western Hemisphere. 
Some significant gestures in US-Latin American relations followed, including the 
abrogation of the US-authored Platt Amendment to Cuba’s constitution, and the 
proposal of a multilateral military non-intervention pact at the 1933 Pan American
notes the increasing involvement of the US public and intellectuals in international cultural and 
intellectual relations. These deepening connections were also symbolised by the proliferation of trade 
showcases within the US such as the Pacifico Mercado, and by fact that proposals for an inter- 
American highway were debated by Congress during the 1930s.
15 On the ways in which increasing internationalist sentiments developed from the perspective of US 
diplomats, see Edward Trueblood, “Recent Developments in the Field of Inter-American Cultural 
Relations: Cooperation Between Government and Private Interests,” Foreign Service Journal 18, (no. 
1, January 1941), p. 6.
16 Rosenberg notes that the scale of private and philanthropic actions declined in the 1930s as a 
consequence of the depression, and puts forward the argument that government involvement in 
cultural diplomacy was begun in order to fill this vacuum. Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the 
American Dream: Atnerican Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945, (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1982), pp. 202-3.
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Conference. There has been a fairly extensive historical debate on the lasting impacts 
the Good Neighbour Policy. However, during the 1930s the policy established a new 
conception of America’s identity as a politically and economically dominant, but 
benign, regional power.18 Washington’s fears about the extension of Axis economic 
and political influence into the Western Hemisphere were, in part, understood as a 
transgression of this dominant regional position that the Roosevelt administration had 
articulated during the mid-1930s.
Among the eleven conventions for peace, solidarity, disarmament and trade 
signed at the Buenos Aires Pan American Conference of 1936 were five pertaining to 
cultural and educational relations. Their provisions were modest in themselves: only 
two students and one professor would travel under the Convention’s auspices from the 
US to each of the Latin American republics, and vice versa, per year. However, the 
language of the convention was evocative and far-reaching, and it established the terms 
of the more generalised discourse of reciprocity, openness and liberalism that was 
articulated for the cultural diplomacy program beyond Latin America in the early 
1940s.19 The preamble to the agreements had stated:
17
the purpose for which the Conference was called would be advanced 
by greater mutual knowledge and understanding of the people and
17 The Platt amendment was a deeply resented principle arising from US colonial control of Cuba 
which had given the US the right to unilateral military intervention.
18 Historiographies of the Good Neighbour Policy have disputed the rosy image that US historians 
have traditionally upheld. Many Latin American historians have characterised the policy somewhat 
differently, the ‘dependency ’ of analysis has situated the Good Neighbour Policy as an attempt to 
extend the penetration of American capital in South America. Max Paul Friedman has provided a 
different critique of the Good Neighbour Policy in Latin America, pointing out the covert counter­
espionage policies that the US pursued in Latin America during the 1930s and 1940s. The 
persecution of innocent German and Italian civilians by the FBI in Latin America was a largely 
overlooked feature of US foreign policy during the inter-war period. However, accepting 
Friedman’s judgment of the ‘evanescence’ of the Good Neighbour Policy does not prevent us 
examining the discursive practices engaged in by US policy-makers at the time. In fact, the 
discursive practices that cast the Good Neighbour Policy as an egalitarian and democratic basis for 
hemispheric relations can be thought of as even more significant as a self-reflexive practice if we 
accept that they obscured a hypocritical state of affairs in US-Latin American relations. Max Paul 
Friedman, “There Goes the Neighbourhood: Blacklisting Germans in Latin America and the 
Evanescence of the Good Neighbour Policy,” Diplomatic History 27, (no. 4, September 2003).
19 Miguel Espinosa’s official memoir of the cultural program makes this point, noting the inter- 
American agreements of 1936 were deliberately expansive in their language, explicitly intended as a 
rhetorical basis that “made possible a broad interpretation of future inter-American people-to-people 
exchange and communication.” Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings o f VS Cultural Diplomacy,
p. 1.
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institutions of the countries represented and a more consistent educational 
solidarity on the American continent, and that such results would be 
appreciably promoted by an exchange of professors, teachers and students 
among the American countries, as well as by the encouragement of a 
closer relationship between unofficial organisations which exert an 
influence on the formation of public opinion.20
In both American policy statements and internal documents from the Buenos Aires 
conference the notion of international public opinion as the basis of US regional 
leadership was a key frame. US initiatives would embody the “common denominator 
of public opinion,” and gave “form to a unified public opinion” within the 
Hemisphere.21 Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles emphasised how US 
leadership in the region would be “conducive to a healthy international trade...[of] the 
culture and civilization of other people.” Cordell Hull who, more than any other 
figure, came to symbolise the extension of America’s New Deal era social and 
economic progress into US foreign policy, claimed that the American delegation had 
brought with it to Argentina:
a strict political and moral doctrine for the nascent [inter-] American 
democracy... the basis of peace lies in the development of a 
public opinion- for which freedom is indispensable- that will 
totally repudiate the acts and utterances of statesmen propagating 
doctrines of militarism.23
Reflecting several years later on the nature of US foreign policy in the Western 
Hemisphere during this period, former Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle asserted 
that the United States’ vision of regional order:
differs materially from many theories of international organisation.
20 “Draft Inter-American Convention for the Promotion of Cultural Relations,” (1936); Reel 33; 
Microfilm Personal Papers of Cordell Hull, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
21 Adolf Berle, “Speech of A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State. Foreign Policy Association- 
Boston, Massachusetts, January 21, 1939,” p. 8; Speeches, Box 142; Papers of Adolf Berle; Franklin 
D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.
22 Sumner Welles (1935) quoted in Mark T. Berger, Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies 
and US Hegemony in the Americas, 1898-1990, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995),
p. 51.
23 “Highly Important Speech of Mr Cordell Hull,” Noticias Graficas (Buenos Aires), 24 December, 
1936; Reel 33, Papers of Cordell Hull; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.
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It contemplates the complete equality and sovereignty of every member 
of the community. It likewise assumes that each member of the 
community maintains its liberty of action. But it takes for granted that 
the bonds of understanding shall be so strong that on tasks of great 
common interest the group will act together. So, it was hoped, the 
Western world would achieve peace, a steady settlement of international 
problems by reason and justice instead of by force, and a continuous 
cooperation for defence against any powers outside the hemisphere.24
Although the treaties signed at Buenos Aires covered a range of issues, including 
disarmament, collective security and trade, the cultural and educational exchange 
agreements were held up as a symbol of the progressive and emancipatory possibilities 
promised by the extension of American power during the late 1930s.25
The vision of regional order that the US delegation articulated during the 
Buenos Aires Conference also reflects the emergence of liberalism and liberal 
internationalism as key categories within US political discourse. As Ronald Rotunda 
has observed, after 1932 Franklin Roosevelt co-opted in his electoral campaign a 
moniker that had hitherto been relatively obscure: ‘liberal.’ Rotunda notes that “[t]he 
symbol ‘liberal’ is especially important for the New Deal because, as it emerged, it 
seemed to represent something new” even as it repackaged long-standing principles of 
US political culture into a pro-New Deal partisan position.26 The US delegation’s 
program at the Buenos Aires Conference, particularly as symbolised by Cordell Hull’s 
proposed agreements to ‘liberalise’ trade, made a similar rhetorical move to cast the 
Roosevelt administration as singular and innovative in its foreign policy. In this
24 Berle, “Speech of A. A. Bede Jr.,” pp. 2-3.
25 Ninkovich notes the significance of reciprocity as one of the key approaches in the cultural 
diplomacy program during this early phase, see Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, Ch. 1.
26 Here, Roosevelt was particularly keen to distance himself from the economically conservative 
traditions of his own Democratic party. Ronald Rotunda, The Politics o f Language: Liberalism as 
Word and Symbol, Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986), pp. 16, 57. An interesting piece that 
can be read in conjunction with Rotunda’s book is Alonzo Hamby’s analysis of how, in the years 
immediately after Franklin Roosevelt’s death, symbols and myths were fashioned around the 
persona of Roosevelt himself to provide a rallying point for liberals (again, liberalism is meant here 
in a domestic partisan sense). Alonzo L. Hamby, “The Liberals, Truman and FDR as Symbol and 
Myth,” The Journal of American History 56, (no. 4, March 1970).
27 In the introductory chapter of his study, Robert Haddow has traces the (considerable) influence of 
ideas about enterprise and industry, through figures such as Henry Luce and Nelson Rockefeller, in 
relation to the foreign policies that Washington adopted during the 1940s. Robert Haddow, 
Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s, (Washington DC: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).
330
context it is significant that cultural diplomacy was adopted at a time in which new 
partisan categories were being articulated for domestic politics and foreign policy.
It was not until mid-1938 that permanent administrative arrangements to 
implement the Buenos Aires agreements were finalised. On July 27, 1938 the Division 
of Cultural Relations was established by State Department Order. The Division was to 
be headed by Ben Mark Cherrington, former director of the Foundation for the 
Advancement of Social Science at the University of Denver.28 In his letter inviting 
Cherrington to fill the post, Secretary of State Cordell Hull located the Division’s 
connection to US foreign relations in terms of “the importance of an understanding of 
the habits of thought and mode of life of other countries” which could facilitate “cordial 
and fruitful international relations.”29 In founding the Division, Hull sought to distance 
the Roosevelt administration from the aspersions of ‘propaganda,’ claiming that 
‘cultural diplomacy’ was a more appropriate term to apply to the policies of a 
progressive democracy such as America. Hull could therefore assert: “we are clear 
about one matter: we do not wish to follow the examples of the totalitarian States. 
Whatever we do must conform to the procedures and standards long established in our 
American democracy.”
Cherrington later reflected that US cultural diplomacy had come about “when 
Hitler and Mussolini’s exploitation of education and culture as an instrument of 
national power policies was at its height,” and consequently the Division was 
determined to be “an organisation that would be a true representation of our American
28 An interesting indication of the prevailing sentiments of surrounding the cultural diplomacy 
program was the selection of a director. Samuel Guy Inman, who had attended the Pan American 
Conference in Buenos Aires as a negotiator for the US and was one of the most prominent Latin 
Americanists in the US at the time, was led to believe he would head the Division when the 
proposals were first discussed. Despite his friendship with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Inman 
was judged by other State Department officials to be unsuitable for the job in light of his background 
in Christian missionary activities. Cherrington, who had run the Foundation for the Advancement of 
the Social Sciences at the University of Denver, and had supervised several studies of international 
education, proved an acceptable ‘secular’ and more social scientific alternative, although he only 
served in the post of Director for two years. On Inman’s activities see Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of 
Ideas, Ch 1.
29 Cordell Hull quoted in Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy, p. 329.
30 Hull quoted in Arndt, First Resort of Kings, p. 67.
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tradition of intellectual freedom and educational integrity.”31 Waldo Leland, as head of 
the American Council of Learned Societies and an advisor to the Division since its 
inception, similarly defined the program’s approach in this early period as concerned 
with the “advancement of the cultural (and intellectual) life of the participating peoples 
by the sharing of knowledge and experience,...the promotion of understanding and 
spiritual solidarity among peoples and the improvement of the conditions life.”32 This 
point was also made by George Messersmith, who succeeded Hull as Secretary of State. 
He observed that with the Division’s activities “we are not trying to make...counter­
propaganda. We are interested in the broad basic problem of developing the really 
friendly relations between this country and our neighbours.”33
The repudiation of propaganda in US cultural diplomacy discourse was 
complemented by the mobilisation of logics of international integration and cultural 
pluralism within cultural diplomacy policy debates.34 Again, these representational 
practices were implicated in situating the US and the Latin American region as 
undergoing a process of convergence and cultural amalgamation, articulating a 
historical basis for the legal and institutional frameworks of regional order that the US 
sought to institute.35 These representations situated America in the narratives of 
historical progress, as can be observed, for example, in early statements made by the 
political scientist Harley Notter, soon to join the Department of State in its post-war 
policy planning division. Notter had situated the US’s sponsorship of political and 
cultural cooperation in the Western Hemisphere in 1939 as:
part of the epic of greater America which we share with the other
31 Ben Cherrington “Cultural Relations in the Department of State,” Attachment to letter from Jesse 
MacKnight to Howland Sargeant and William T. Stone, (January 19, 1948), p. 1; Records Relating 
to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953 (IIA. 1938-53); General Records of the 
Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, 
College Park MD (NARA).
32 Waldo Leland, “International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present 
Problems,” University of Denver Social Science Foundation Papers, 1943, p. 23; Box 2, File 28; 
Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts 
Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.
33 Messersmith quoted in Arndt, First Resort o f Kings, p. 60.
34 As highlighted in chapter one, I draw on the notion of integrative logic within Klien, Cold War 
Orientalism.
35 On the range of broader treaties and agreements that US sought to institute at the 1933 and 1936 
Pan American conferences see Esponosa, Inter-American Beginnings.
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nations of this hemisphere. The present-day life of our country is 
also only to be understood, not by an examination of it alone, but 
by an examination of all the great movements and progress among 
the American republics.. .The trend is in the direction of a cultural 
amalgam.
Notter became one of the most prominent advocates of cultural diplomacy in the 
context of the administration’s liberal internationalist principles for the post-war global 
order. Notter envisaged that cultural bonds would complete the global “liberal 
revolution” that had begun the nineteenth century. To do so, these post-war planners 
claimed that “the United States would have to become the mainstay of a new order that 
merged the political, economic, and cultural aspects of life into a comprehensive 
unity.” 36 By no means were these sweeping depictions of historical change and 
regional convergence confined to the early cultural diplomacy program, however: they 
would be taken up in a much broader way after the Second World War as Washington 
articulated its plans for a liberal, institutional global order. The cultural programs to 
Latin America constituted a forum for the articulation of new conceptions of 
international interdependence and the New World as a source of liberal principles, 
especially in relation to the question of how America’s singular status as an anti­
imperial power could be reconciled with the pursuit of international cultural and 
political influence.
In its first months of operation, the Division of Cultural Relations held a series 
of meetings in Washington to bring together educators, artists, philanthropists and 
policy-makers to determine how to establish a program of US-Latin American cultural 
relations. A smaller General Advisory Committee was also constituted at this time to 
serve as an ongoing policy forum for the cultural diplomacy program. The staff of the
36 Harley Notter, “Cultural Relations with the Other American Republics,” p. 5; Subj 1939-50; HN;
RG 59; NARA; Frank Ninkovich, “The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy: Art and the State 
Department, 1938-1947,” Diplomatic History 1, (no. 3, Summer 1977), p. 220. Notter was, 
interestingly, a scholar of Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism. See, e.g.: Harley Notter, The 
Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1937).
37 A reflection of the modesty of the Division’s first program is that participants from across the 
country who attended the advisory conferences held in 1938 were not recompensed for their travel or 
accommodation to Washington while attending the conferences.
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General Advisory Committee included leading figures in the field of international 
education such as Waldo Leland, as well as international relations scholars such as 
James T. Shotwell and the Reverend Edmund A. Walsh. The Departmental Order 
constituting the Division had simply stated its role as “encouraging and strengthening 
cultural relations and intellectual cooperation between the United States and other 
countries.” Consequently, there was much to be resolved in terms of how the 
Division was to embody America’s identity and Washington’s foreign policy objectives 
within its approach to cultural diplomacy.39
The cultural policy program initially built on the existing US philanthropic 
frameworks of interaction with Latin America. Between 1937 and 1939 at least seven 
new American cultural centres had been established in Latin American capital cities, 
and the Division’s work in its first months included a survey of these centres in 
preparation for extending government funding to existing institutions and establishing 
new ones.40 By 1946 the Division was operating 47 American cultural centres across 
the world. At this stage the Division’s work also encompassed funding of radio 
broadcasting to Latin America, a point later overlooked when the Division’s staff
38 Division of Cultural Relations, “Progress Report of the Division of Cultural Relations,” 1940, p. 3; 
Box 2, File 5; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & 
Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.
39 The search for a policy role was left open also because Congress did not play a role in determining 
the Division of Cultural Relations’ policy mandate during this period. Although it hadn’t formally 
mandated the US cultural diplomacy program, Congress expressed support for the Division in 1939 
in the form of House Resolution 5835. This did not provide funding: the Division’s funds ($27,920 
for the first year, and $75,000 for 1939-40) fell within executive appropriations. It was only after 
1941 that the Division was funded through the Congressional appropriations process. US House of 
Representatives, House Resolution HR 5835 Authorising President to render closer and more 
effective relationship between American Republics, April 26, 1939; (Y4 F76/1 :In2/5); Washington 
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1939, p. 307. On funding, see also: Chronological Outline o f  
the Organisation and Ranking Officers o f CU 1938-1945, (no author, undated) p. 39; Box 2, File 2; 
Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts 
Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville. Other secondary sources have cited different figures 
on the Division’s budgets, depending on how they have calculated the figure. See, e.g.: Amdt, First 
Resort o f Kings, p. 60.
40 Trueblood, (First name unrecorded), “Recommendations for Strengthening United States Cultural 
Institutes in South America 1940,” Attachment to Letter from Charles A. Thomson to Ben M. 
Cherrington, November 30, 1940, p. 1; Box 5 ff 40; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special 
Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.
334
sought to distance their own ‘cultural diplomacy’ projects from the State Department’s 
more instrumental wartime ‘information’ initiatives such as the Voice of America.41
The Division had been in operation less than a year before it faced a major 
quandary in terms of how to uphold reciprocity and anti-propagandism as guiding 
principles within its policy program. With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, US 
cultural diplomats were compelled to reflect on their work in pragmatic as well as 
morally progressive terms. Although the US was not directly involved in the fighting, 
the international emergency itself and the ideological threat that Axis military 
expansion signified challenged the prevailing apolitical self-reflexive representations of 
American cultural diplomacy. While still defining their work as a manifestation of 
America’s inherent international progressivism and morality, the Division’s staff also 
undertook to locate cultural diplomacy activities in the context of challenges to 
“national security [which] made it imperative that the United States counter the 
aggressive propaganda activities of Germany with a more vigorous program of its 
own.”42
Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, who would soon enter the State 
Department as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, emphasised in 1940 that 
cultural diplomacy provided a vital opportunity to convey America’s condemnation of 
Axis expansionism. He argued that by virtue of its ideals, America was implicitly 
engaged in the ideological struggle between democracy and totalitarianism: “cultural 
relations are not irrelevancies. They are everything...[For the democracies] cultural 
defeat is a defeat on the one front on which defeat cannot be accepted.”43 In 
recognition of America’s moral obligation to condemn totalitarianism, MacLeish 
arranged a series of anti-fascist symposia at the Library of Congress. These brought 
together US and European intellectuals to assess the cultural implications of the war. 
MacLeish also appointed the celebrated German emigre novelist Thomas Mann as a
41 On the schisms between the cultural diplomacy and information programs, see: Ninkovich, The 
Diplomacy o f Ideas, pp. 120-2.
42 Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings o f US Cultural Diplomacy, p. 139.
4j Archibald MacLeish quoted in Arndt, First Resort o f Kings, p. 98.
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Consultant on international cultural relations and the war to the Library of Congress.44 
Significant here is that Washington’s global obligations were framed in ideological 
terms despite its stated neutrality. In using his official position to call the symposia and 
engage consultants at the Library of Congress, MacLeish was an early entrepreneur of 
the position, which would soon achieve much wider resonance, that an international 
ideological ‘threat’ in itself could not be left unanswered by America.
The United States joined the Allied war effort after the December 7, 1941 
attack on the US Navy at Pearl Harbour by Japan. The war delivered a substantially 
larger funding appropriation for the Division, which extended to sending the first 
posting of US cultural attaches abroad, to several Latin American embassies. The US 
film exchange program sponsored by the Division was also expanded, and a total of 
550 motion pictures were eventually distributed to Latin America by the US 
government between 1939 and 1942. The film exchange policy provoked debates as to 
whether the Division ought to distribute controversial films in the name of democratic 
openness or should seek to cultivate a more selective image of America. One former 
US diplomat, John M. Begg, recalled that a film version of John Steinbeck’s Grapes of 
Wrath was of particular concern in Washington due to the film’s critique of depression- 
era American capitalism.45 In response to questions as to the film’s suitability for 
official distribution, the US embassy in Chile advised in favour of the piece, despite a 
June 1940 advisory that films “marred by the inclusion of objectionable details” such as 
overt bias toward special interests or negative images of the US should be excluded 
from the cultural diplomacy program.46 The embassy had reported how showing 
American poverty in an honest way have given the Chilean audiences a basis for
44 Thomas Mann had been written several pieces in 1940 on the connection between culture and 
politics from a humanist perspective. Wolf Lepeneis, The Seduction o f Culture in German History, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 60.
45 John M. Begg, “Oral History Interview,” July 11, 1975; Harry S. Truman Library Oral History 
Project; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division. See also “Memorandum,” Herbert Edwards to 
Lloyd A. Lehrbas, (June 28, 1948); Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 
1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and 
Records Administration, College Park MD.
46 See Begg, “Oral History Interview.” See also: Division of Cultural Relations, “Progress Report of 
the Division of Cultural Relations,” 1940, p. 73; Box 2, File 5; Records of the Division of Cultural 
Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at 
Fayetteville.
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identifying with Americans, and that this openness and honesty had supplied credibility 
to the US programs. Soon after, the Division of Cultural Relations adopted a different 
approach to defining the limits of American ‘openness’ in its film program, and began 
routinely advising the studios through State Department officials posted to Hollywood 
on how to make films better suited to official purposes.
America’s creed of individual liberty was frequently stated as a key point of 
emphasis within the US cultural programs directed to the Western Hemisphere. 
Official program statements framed cultural diplomacy as a co-optive practice in the 
context of a shared regional identity, suggesting that it should emphasise how “we of 
the Americas share in common a fundamental belief of the most far-reaching 
importance. We believe in the value of the individual human being whatever his race 
or creed or economic status may be .” 47 By celebrating the liberties of the New World, 
US policy-makers also implicitly constituted American republicanism and 
independence as a factor that distinguished US policy from the imperialistic practices 
that had underscored the cultural diplomacy practised in conjunction with formal 
imperialism by the European powers.
More challenging to sustain as the US began to reframe its cultural diplomacy 
for wartime purposes than its credentials as the rightful regional power within the New 
World, however, was the distinction that was articulated between US ‘cultural 
diplomacy’ and immoral ‘propaganda.’ These framing issues became a particular 
preoccupation in policy statements authored by figures such as Leland, Cherrington and 
Shotwell, given their intellectual backgrounds and longstanding interests on 
international cultural relations. As scholars, they had grappled with some foundational 
philosophical questions associated with the nature propaganda, culture and education in 
response to the inter-war propaganda debates. Cherrington, for instance, sought to 
maintain the Division’s apolitical mandate even as figures such as MacLeish provided 
eloquent arguments in favour of the idea that Washington must articulate to the world a 
firmer defence o f democracy against the global propaganda onslaught of Nazi 
Germany. Having insisted that the cultural activities were to be “definitely educational
47 Shaw, “Text of Radio Address by Assistant Secretary of Shaw,” Department o f State Bulletin 
1662, (November 8, 1941), p. 370.
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in character,” so that the Division could not be seen to function in any identifiable way 
as a “diplomatic arm or a propaganda agency,” Cherrington emphasised the temporary 
nature of wartime ideological antagonisms and the somewhat selective approach within 
the Division’s programs that the antagonism demanded.48 His successor as director, 
Charles Thomson, had challenged this point in a foundational debate with Cherrington 
during the early 1940s by arguing that propaganda could be ‘instructive’ or 
‘destructive’ depending on the intent and nature of its author. By approaching the 
targeted audience as equals rather than inferiors, urging them to “simply...think as 
[America] thinks” rather than adopting manipulative or forceful rhetoric, Thomson 
framed the Division’s work as being able to encompass some more strident or 
instrumental elements because US intentions were fundamentally benign: what was 
important was that its intentions were not to be a propagandist, even if some policy 
strategies adopted resembled the practice.49 Thomson’s view essentially prevailed in 
operational terms after this debate, and the Division increasingly used cultural 
diplomacy as an instrument of US national interests during the war. However, 
Cherrington’s liberal representation of cultural diplomacy as a mode of international 
interchange retained a clear symbolic purchase within US cultural diplomacy debates, 
and the reciprocity, openness and anti-propagandism he articulated remained resonant 
ideas within the discourses of US policy-making after 1936.
Though Cherrington remained a committed advocate of a humanist, apolitical 
format for long-term international cultural engagement, the outspoken General 
Advisory Committee member, Waldo Leland, and the head of the Division’s research 
section, Ralph Turner, both engaged more readily with the Charles Thomson’s position 
that the US should conduct its cultural diplomacy in an instrumental manner during the 
war. Leland, writing in 1943, situated ‘propaganda’ as an acceptable term for 
American foreign policy, but in a qualified sense. He classified the cultural program 
objectives in the following terms:
The war effort calls for active propaganda at the intellectual level,
the development of moral solidarity among the United Nations, and
48 Cherrington quoted in Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, p. 31.
49 Thomson quoted in ibid., pp. 40 & 60.
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the assurance of good will towards the United States. Hence much 
that is done in the name of cultural relations has objectives that are not 
primarily cultural. This situation is likely to be prolonged well into the 
post-war period when activities aimed at restoring areas that have been 
devastated by war and at relieving their peoples will have almost as 
large a place in the attention of the national Government as the activities 
of the war have at present... it is important to try to distinguish between 
activities that have purely cultural and intellectual objectives and those 
that, though cultural in form, are designed to influence the course of the 
war and to assist the work of post-war restoration.50
Meanwhile Turner argued that the cultural diplomacy program should “support 
concretely the foreign policy of the United States” and foster “an international situation 
under which American democracy can be secure and develop.”51 These depictions not 
only sought to ensure that the significance of culture as a diplomatic tool would be 
acknowledged in Washington, but also foreshadowed the emergence of a wider 
rendition of America’s national interests in a post-war context. As Assistant Secretary 
of State Adolf Berle had put it in 1939, cultural diplomacy was inherently a more 
politicised practice than simply cultural interchange. For Berle, cultural diplomacy also 
conveyed national power and could legitimately be used by Washington to transform 
international relations. The cultural program must thus, in Berle’s terms, embrace its 
potential as a function of US foreign policy that could establish a “materially 
different.. .moral conception” of world order.52
‘Enlightened and Far-Sighted Leadership:’ Extending Cultural Diplomacy to the 
Near East and China
In early 1941 the scope of the Division’s work widened from Latin America 
to include China and the Near East, and with this development its staff rose from eight 
in late 1939 to seventy-six by 1943. In 1941 the suggestion that the US undertake a
50 Waldo Leland, “International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present 
Problems,” University of Denver Social Science Foundation Papers, 1943, pp. 26-7; Box 2, File 28; 
Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts 
Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.
51 Ralph Turner (1942) cited in Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, p. 67.
Berle, “Speech of A. A. Berle Jr.,” pp. 1, 8.
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program of cultural diplomacy in Europe had been raised, only to be dismissed by the 
State Department’s Division of European Affairs on the grounds that extensive private 
cultural and intellectual ties already spanned the Atlantic. The Near Eastern cultural 
relations program drew on earlier requests by the Arab regions for information and 
educational assistance from the United States during the 1930s, and hence had 
considerable early success. The program placed a particular emphasis on subsidising 
American schools and universities in the region, in the hope that Washington could 
demonstrate its anti-colonialist sentiments by association with these independent 
institutions, and that by improving living standards and technical sophistication the US
C' )
would become synonymous in the Arab mind with modernity and progress. As Frank 
Ninkovich has noted, these discourses of American modernisation, “idealism and anti­
imperialism” that were propagated by the American Near Eastern program caused some 
friction between the US and the existing colonial powers in the region. “By drawing an 
explicit contrast between European imperialism and disinterested American policy, the 
United States was priming itself, if not for a political competition, then for a cultural 
contest on informal terms.”54
In 1944 one American diplomat posted to Turkey had similarly characterised 
the Washington’s interest in the Middle East as having a ‘secular-missionary’ 
orientation. The cultural diplomacy program was warranted because Washington 
needed “to have this small but strategically located country not only friendly to us but 
also able to think things through in patterns similar to our own in politics, economics, 
social welfare, and the many other phases of our culture.”55 This statement embodied 
the modernising imperative that became a key theme in the articulation of US cultural 
diplomacy programs toward the Third World after the Second World War.56 It
53 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, pp. 51-2.
54 Ibid., pp. 53-5. See also: Division of Cultural Relations, “Memorandum Respecting Inter- 
American Cultural Relations,” (undated), p. 10; Box 5, ff 43; Personal Papers of Ben M. 
Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.
35 Donald E. Webster quoted in Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, p. 53.
36 I adopt the term ‘modernising imperative’ in order to draw a parallel between the kinds of 
principles of US influence in the Third World that had been articulated in policy-making discourses, 
and the ‘modernisation’ discourse that developed within US academic discourses in the post-war 
period. It was a discourse of political influence, poverty alleviation and social reform in the 
underdeveloped world, which became the dominant paradigm of US policy studies of the Third 
World: “North American academic interest in, and the very idea of, the Third World expanded
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reflected an underlying and soon-to-be prevalent view of American cultural diplomacy 
as a force for modernisation, democratisation and technocratic administration in 
relation to the Third World. This narrative of modernisation and technical assistance, 
as a basis to spread democracy, built on and extended representations that had initially 
been mobilised in an inter-American context.
A US cultural program was established in China following the extension of 
American lend-lease economic aid to the Nationalist government in June 1941, and as a 
consequence of the increasingly dire warnings from ‘China hands’ such as Pearl Buck 
and Willys R. Peck that considerable US assistance was required to keep China in the 
war. As the first director of the Division’s program in China Stuart E. Grummon had 
claimed, the US had a longstanding interest in China’s political development and 
should develop more explicitly politicised activities in China than those that had been 
used in the inter-American context. Grummon even advocated that informational 
functions be taken up within the context of US cultural diplomacy:
If it was deemed important before the outbreak o f hostilities with Japan 
to develop a radio program directed to the Chinese people to encourage 
them in their resistance against Japan and to emphasize certain phases of 
American life which might contribute to strengthening their morale, the
CO
need is now clearly greater.
With a US broadcasting program already in place, radio was ruled out of the Division’s 
range of activities. However, printed material and films were extensively distributed as 
part of the Division’s activities in China, alongside less directly politicised activities 
such as the conservation of cultural artefacts and educational exchanges.
The development of the Division’s China program warrants a sustained look 
within my discussion both for the precedent it set in articulating the terms of
dramatically after 1945. The imperatives of the Cold War meshed with a long-standing missionary 
paternalism which continued to perceive the people of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania as 
being in need of guidance, education and reform.” Berger, Under Northern Eyes, p. 14.
57 Peck’s views are particularly significant because he succeeded Stuart Grummon as the second 
head of the Division of Cultural Relation’s China section. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, p. 
10.
58 Grummon, (1942) quoted in ibid., p. 14.
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Washington’s post-war cultural diplomacy with the Third World, and because China 
looms large as a key priority for the Division of Cultural Relations during the Second 
World War. The Division’s policies toward China exposed many of the operational 
quandaries that American cultural diplomats and foreign policy officials subsequently 
faced in dealing with the Third World after the war, and proved a testing ground for 
how officials would articulate an effective response to these quandaries. The China 
program thus brought the export of democracy to the fore as a key objective of US 
cultural diplomacy:
The items of the program approved are almost exclusively designed to 
convey as early as possible to wide sections o f the Chinese public, 
including Government and university circles, the merchant class, and the 
people of village and country, the real interest taken by the United States 
in China’s present plight; its desire to be of every possible assistance; its 
own parallel defence program and war effort; and some idea of those 
American institutions and emergency undertakings which might be of 
assistance to the Chinese in stimulating their own progress along 
democratic lines, as well as presenting another, and a more constructive, 
picture to counter the very extensive and highly organised Axis 
propaganda, principally Japanese and German, which has long been 
disseminated throughout the Far East in Japanese, Mandarin, Chinese 
dialects, and English, French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, 
Siamese, Mongolian, Arabic, and other languages.59
In emphasising the promotion of democracy as the central purpose of American cultural 
diplomacy the Division’s staff had to resolve a sharp contradiction between what was 
stated to be America’s traditional anti-propagandism and the strategic purposes that had 
necessitated this intervention in Chinese domestic politics in the first place. This 
tension was especially acute within policy debates concerning the extent to which the 
US cultural programs would be received in China and elsewhere as a symbol of 
unconditional US support for the Nationalist government. Although the Nationalist 
regime was the internationally-recognised government o f China, the Division’s cultural 
diplomacy programs were an arena in which concerns about the prospects for
Hadey Notter, “The Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations: A Report to The 
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second 
Session, January 1942,” p. 14; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA.
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democracy in Asia could be voiced by US diplomats and officials. The State 
Department’s China Desk cautioned the Division not to press the democratic point, 
urging it to bear in mind ‘Chinese sensibilities’ and avoid distributing material with 
‘democratic’ themes that could be interpreted as tacit critique of the Kuomintang 
regime for the duration of the war.60
The Division responded to this moral quandary, as Ninkovich points out, by 
articulating a technocratic vision of American cultural diplomacy as a basis for the 
political and cultural modernisation of China: “cultural lend-lease.. .became the 
program’s dominant policy concept.” America’s idealism was somewhat “muted,” and 
it was hoped modernising or technocratic influences would be “of the most immediate 
benefit to China” and might well be sufficient to stimulate democratic change in the 
future.6' Framing US policy in these modernising terms effectively deferred the moral 
problem associated with extending the US cultural assistance to China. Cultural 
modernisation was a forward-looking discourse that contained the promise of future 
democratisation within it without compelling US cultural diplomats to confront the 
authoritarianism of the Chungking regime directly. Democratic transformation would 
necessarily follow from American cultural assistance, but it was no longer a 
precondition for extending it, as had been the case within depictions of the inter- 
American cultural diplomacy program as building on the shared democratic sensibility 
and republicanism of the Western Hemisphere.62
As Wilma Fairbank subsequently observed, the State Department’s cultural 
diplomacy program in China failed to achieve this social and political transformation 
through cultural/technical relations. There was a wide “gap between the strenuous 
efforts and good intentions of the China program administrators in Washington and the
60 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, pp. 56-7.
61 Ibid., p. 56. See also: Harley Notter, “Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations A 
Report to The Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, 
Second Session, January 1942,” p. 14; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA.
62 On China as a topic of debate in the General Advisory Committee after 1941, see “Compilation of 
Policy Statements on the Cultural Relations Program, Approved by the General Advisory 
Committee,” (June 15, 1944); Box 5 ff 38; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special 
Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver. See also Cherrington’s statements in: 
Division of Cultural Relations, “Memorandum Respecting Inter-American Cultural Relations,” 
(undated), p. 10; Box 5, ff 43; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, 
Penrose Library; University of Denver.
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circumstances, material, psychological and, above all, political, of the recipients in Free 
China.” 63 Logistical troubles, local corruption and Chinese factional disputes 
undermined the US cultural program during the war and in its aftermath. Many 
American cultural diplomats were concerned that Washington had entered into too 
close an association with the Nationalist regime, thereby jeopardising America’s 
democratic credibility in the pursuit of cultural diplomacy for strategic purposes. One 
dispatch from China thus reported that:
any American working.. .[in cultural relations] is to some degree a 
press agent for the Kuomintang and the Chinese government. No 
matter how careful he may be, and I have tried to be careful, he is 
part of a fabric of deceit. Certain facts about China- facts of no military 
significance- he must not write.. .Any American working for the Ministry 
is part of an organisation which would not permit anyone to send to 
America a sanely written and wholly accurate article about of the Fascist 
tendencies of the Chinese government, which are little known in America, 
the country from which China is so anxious to obtain help.64
The State Department’s John K. Fairbank, stationed in China during the war, echoed 
the point that the modernising ideal behind US cultural diplomacy in China had 
deferred crucial political and moral questions to both America and China’s detriment:
ideas are as important as techniques. American technical assistance 
may hasten the industrialisation of China, as it did of Japan, without 
necessarily bringing China and the United States closer in thought and 
feeling. It is worth remembering that the last generation in the West 
was highly gratified at the ‘westernisation’ of Japan, although to us it is 
now clear that this ‘westernization’ was but a means serving Japanese ends. 
We do not fear China’s aims, but we should not delude ourselves by 
assuming that railroads and factories will make China into a second United 
States. International understanding is not to be achieved by the export of 
goods and services alone.65
63 Fairbank, America ’s Cultural Experiment in China, pp. vii, 24.
64 Floyd Taylor quoted in ibid., p. 70.
65 Fairbank’s call for an end to the mythologising of China in US policy discourse was particularly 
prescient in light of the statements of Ballantyne and others cited below. John K. Fairbank and T. L. 
Yuan, “Sino-American Intellectual Relations,” (December 31, 1942), p. 1; Records Relating to the 
China, Burma, and India Theatres, 1942-5; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 
208; National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, College Park, MD.
344
In this context, Fairbank argued that democracy-promotion ought to be at the forefront 
of US cultural diplomacy policy, rather than being regarded in somewhat vague terms 
as an outcome of US technical and economic assistance. To underline the importance 
of democracy-promotion even during wartime, Fairbank cautioned that “China is in the 
American world and if the United States is to play its part properly in this new world it 
must understand the other actors.”66 With the considerable obstacles to China’s 
democratisation present, however, these warnings did not lead to successful policy 
outcomes for the Division either during or after the war.
Other officials within the China program were more certain that democratic 
modernisation could eventually occur through US cultural and educational assistance to 
China, and they drew on a framework of alterity to great effect in this context. A 1942 
public address by US Foreign Service officer Joseph W. Ballantyne, for instance, 
described effective cultural relations with China and East Asia as:
our greatest hope of rebuilding a new world on progressive lines out of 
the sorry plight in which we now find ourselves in enlightened and 
far-sighted leadership, which can only be provided by men of broad and 
liberal culture.. .our contributions can be large along spiritual and 
intellectual lines- especially in the field of political ideologies.67
Ballantyne’s piece appeared in both the Department o f State Bulletin and the Foreign 
Service Journal, indicating that it had some resonance as a statement of Washington’s 
intentions for long term political reforms in East Asia. Ballantyne’s analysis adopted 
the premise that a cultural harmony underpinned a congruence of regional interest 
between the US and China. China’s ‘ancient’ culture was situated as a contrast to the 
‘warlike’ foundations of Japan’s culture, in suggesting what the lynchpin of 
Washington’s vision for a post-war Asian order should be, Ballantyne noted that 
Washington could rely on the “essentially democratic character of Chinese national 
institutions and the historically peaceful character of Chinese national policies.”68 In a
66 Ibid., p. 1.
67 Joseph Ballantyne, “Cultural Factors in the Far Eastern Situation,” Department o f State Bulletin 
1740, (May 9, 1942), pp. 397, 402.
68 Joseph Ballantyne, “Cultural Factors in the Far Eastern Situation” Foreign Service Journal 19, (no. 
7, July 1942), pp. 364-7.
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similar vein, a 1944 policy paper from the Division remarked on China’s peaceful and 
democratic trajectory, noting that “China has become our neighbour and every further 
advance in science will draw her still closer.”69 Data on US cultural diplomacy 
spending in 1946 shows that these aspirations were backed in operational terms: China 
was the largest component of the US cultural relations program that year, costing 
$797,107.70 A form of alterity was also present within these representations: though 
they were at different stages in history, the United States and China shared ‘democratic’ 
cultural foundations, rendering cultural diplomacy and political cooperation between 
the two acceptable, in contrast to Japan’s ‘warlike’ identity.71 The extension of US 
cultural, economic and diplomatic assistance to the Nationalist regime was thus, the 
concerns of Fairbank and others notwithstanding, represented as simply speeding up 
China’s democratic development. The realisation in 1949 that this modernising 
imperative constituted misplaced faith appeared to find an outlet in the strenuous way 
which Washington subsequently sought to diplomatically isolate the Chinese 
Communist regime.72
There are several significant implications that can be drawn from the 
foregoing discussion of Washington’s cultural engagement with the Near East and 
China. Discourses of international interdependence and American modernity, building 
on discourses first mobilised in the context of inter-American relations, functioned to 
enable the extension of US power into the Near East and China. Key propositions were
69 Haldore Hansen, “America’s Need for Understanding China.” Department o f State Bulletin 2220, 
(November 26, 1944), p. 626.
70 Curiously, the second largest allocation of US funding was to Brazil, which for 1946-47 was 
allocated $449,267. It remains unclear whether these figures were drawn just from the Division of 
Cultural Relations program or whether they included sundry expenditures of the Foreign Service 
covering types of activities that might be classified as cultural relations. Foreign Office of the 
United Kingdom, to William Benton, “Comparative Expenditures and Personnel by Country- 
Europe,” Appendix A; Foreign Office of the United Kingdom to William Benton, (November 7, 
1946); IIA, 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
71 This also suggests that the post-war reversal of China and Japan in the US’s thinking on the post­
war order in Asia was partly due to a shift in how cultural alterity was envisaged within US foreign 
policy discourse, with Communism becoming the category upon which conceptions of the other 
were determined.
72 Denial of membership to Communist China in Unesco is an example that will be surveyed in this 
study. The US delegation to China did not gain a reputation for fair-mindedness when it sought to 
block Red Chinese membership at the same time as supporting fascist Spain’s entry into the 
institution.
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extracted from the Good Neighbour Policy and reconstituted as a broader narrative of 
America’s progressive anti-conquest of the Third World.73 Depictions of America’s 
modernising impact on China were also articulated in order to resolve the contradiction 
between Washington’s democratic principles and the extension of its assistance to a 
plainly authoritarian ally. As the material cited above attests, however, it was not 
predominantly public concerns that created these debates about the extent of the 
Chungking regime’s authoritarianism. Rather, it was largely for self-reflexive purposes 
that these modernising representations and logics of alterity were mobilised in the 
context of US cultural diplomacy to China. The constitution of Washington’s role as 
the exemplar of democracy and modernity in this period also set a powerful precedent 
for the framing Washington’s cultural and political engagement with other colonised or 
underdeveloped regions in subsequent years.
Planning for Post-War Influence: Developing Narratives of US Hegemony
How did this image of US cultural diplomacy as a basis for modernisation and 
understanding develop in policy statements beyond the China program? To what extent 
did the modernising imperative of American cultural diplomacy shape US foreign 
policy at a general level? The Division of Cultural Relations hosted debates about the 
cultural programs and Washington’s broader role in the post-war order, especially the 
European post-war order, that were multifaceted and complex. In many respects, the 
modernising narratives articulated in the context of Third World regions such as China 
and the Near East were transposed onto a European context after the war, particularly 
when US officials articulated their role in Europe as democracy-promotion through 
cultural reconstruction and rehabilitation. At a broader level, during the closing stages 
of the war and in its early aftermath narratives of historical progress informed how 
cultural diplomats characterised US plans to institute a just, stable and open post-war 
order. Here, exceptionalist sentiments informed the ways in which US cultural officials 
characterised Washington’s global role. The US was scripted as both universal, in its
731 adopt this term from the work of Christina Klein. Klein, Cold War Orientalism.
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ability to formulate a just peace upon universal principles, and singular in its possession 
of the power that was required to institute it.
A further warranting argument that was often articulated in favour of the 
projection of US cultural diplomacy was that the people of Europe needed instruction in 
America’s traditions of ‘freedom.’ These incorporated freedom of speech and political 
association, but importantly also ‘free markets,’ and the latter came to predominate 
when the State Department sought to propagate its message in opposition to Western 
European socialist movements. Finally, the notion that America had historical ties to 
Europe played out in a complex way during the planning and implementation of the 
post-1945 settlement. On the one hand, American cultural traditions were represented 
as the democratic fulfilment of European traditions and therefore a universal solution to 
the problem of international disorder and war. On the other, Europe’s difference from 
America was played up as American cultural officials reflected on the ethnic and 
ideological antagonisms that had caused repeated bloodshed on the European continent, 
and presented American cultural traditions as a way to reform European politics. In 
this section, I shall explore how American cultural diplomats articulated the relevance 
of their work in relation to US foreign policy in the post-war order, much of which 
dates back to the early phases of US involvement in the Second World War itself.
The Division’s second director Charles Thomson spelled out a tripartite 
rationale for a US cultural program of global scope in 1942:
1, Cultural relations provide our own people with a realistic 
appreciation and comprehension of other peoples, and in 
consequence provide likewise a more solid democratic 
basis for our international policy. 2, Cultural relations develop 
in the minds of other peoples not necessarily a more friendly, 
but beyond question a more fair and accurate idea of us. 3,
Finally, the cultural program makes for more mutually helpful 
relations with other countries by developing the habit of planning 
and working together.74
74 Chades Thomson, “Address Delivered by Mr Charles A. Thomson, Chief Division of Cultural 
Relations, Department of State, at the Pan American Day Exercises of the University of Texas, 
Austin, Texas, on April 14, 1942,” p. 7; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA.
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However, the cultural diplomacy program’s supporters also found it necessary to 
acknowledge the program’s strategic significance in relation to the war effort, and in 
this context issues of ‘power politics’ shaped the articulation of US cultural 
diplomacy’s rationale as post-war planning began. The Division had in this vein noted 
to a Congressional appropriations hearing in 1942 that “books, as well as bullets, can 
serve in the defence of the Americas.”75 From 1942 onwards the General Advisory 
Committee had largely taken up Thomson’s concept of US practices as ‘instructive 
propaganda’ as opposed to Cherrington’s commitment to a scrupulously apolitical 
posture. The work of the Committee increasingly framed US cultural relations as an 
‘instrumentality’ in the struggle against Nazism: a term used frequently by James T. 
Shotwell.76 After leaving the Division and in his capacity as an ongoing member of the 
General Advisory Committee, Cherrington continued to oppose this pragmatic view of 
cultural diplomacy that was developing in this period, partly as a way of coming to 
terms with the future place cultural diplomacy within US foreign policy. Cherrington 
insisted that at the very least, the question of whether cultural relations were ‘national’ 
or ‘international’ in character needed further debate before an instrumental posture 
could be adopted. Concerns therefore remained, as international education advocate 
Lawrence Duggan put it, whether “any implication of a tie-in between cultural 
interchange and foreign policy would invalidate the effect of the cultural activities.”78
The Division’s staff did not wholly depart from the reciprocal, anti- 
propagandistic premise of US cultural diplomacy of the 1930s, however. Indeed, one 
of the most important functions of discursive practice in the context of US cultural 
diplomacy was to resolve the contradictions that emerged with the extension of 
American power during the war by representing particular practices in multiple ways to
75 Harley Notter, “Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations,” p. 10; Subj. 1939-50; 
HN; RG 59; NARA.
76 Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings o f US Cultural Diplomacy, p. 194. The program was 
described as “one of the basic instrumentalities for modifying international relations and attitudes, 
and for maintaining a better stabilized world order...Our leadership in international action in the 
cultural field will be as decisively necessary as in the political and economic fields.” Ibid., p. 195.
77 As noted above, Cherrington remained on the General Advisory Committee after he left the post 
of Director of the Division of Cultural Relations. Ibid., p. 196.
78 Lawrence Duggan quoted in ibid., p. 197.
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different audiences. US foreign policy officials outside the cultural programs often 
queried the reluctance of cultural diplomacy officials to stridently condemn the 
ideological threat and the misrepresentation of America perpetrated by the Nazi regime. 
Harley Notter had debated these key issues in policy correspondence of early 1943, in 
which his interlocutor queried: “why is it so important to avoid causing resentment on 
matters of education and culture...should policies on these matters differ essentially 
from those on economic and political matters, which in some cases will be enforced 
whether they cause resentment or not?”79 Notter’s answer was that cultural
diplomacy’s purpose was to convey a more lasting message about America than an 
expedient wartime approach required. The Division should remain a civilian program 
and hence “avoid the natural tendency during war to expand disproportionately a 
program of cultural relations. This inevitably would create an abnormal situation that 
would lead to an undesirable reaction at the termination of the war.” US cultural 
diplomacy would remain “divorced from such propaganda activities as the government 
might find necessary during the war...long range objectives [must remain]...the 
preoccupation of the Division.” Waldo Leland similarly advocated circumscribing of 
the Division’s functions so that it would remain a symbol of America’s singular 
commitment to reciprocity and openness:
there is grave risk of doing violence.. .if a government decides what 
is good for the people of another country and then proceeds to dish it 
out to them in the name of a program of cultural relations. Suspicion 
and misunderstanding are sure to result.. .The principle of mutual 
acceptability also implies that a government does not use a program of 
cultural relations as a tool to further or to implement its political social 
or economic policies.
79 B. Fosdick (reviser, author unrecorded), “Statement of Policy on Participation in Educational and 
Cultural Reconstruction by the Department of State,” (January 25, 1944); Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 
59; NARA.
80 Division of Cultural Relations, “Progress Report of the Division of Cultural Relations, Department 
of State,” 1940, p. 14; Box 2; File 5; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); 
Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.
81 Waldo Leland, “International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present 
Problems,” University of Denver Social Science Foundation Papers, 1943, pp. 27-8; Box 2, File 28; 
Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts 
Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.
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In recent work Richard Arndt has argued that from this early period onward 
US cultural diplomacy officials depicted their work as an expression of the ‘culturalist 
constituency’ within the United States rather than an instrument for the pursuit of 
narrow national interests.82 This culturalist impulse, as captured in the concept of 
mutual acceptability, was a key principle in framing US cultural diplomacy as an 
exceptional category of practice even at the height of the Second World War. In a letter 
of February, 1943, State Department Latin America specialist Sumner Welles reflected 
on the quandaries that war posed to the practices of cultural diplomacy when he queried 
how Washington might pursue mutual understanding and simultaneously prosecute the 
war:
Should a true cultural relations program be used to implement 
the foreign policy of any one country; or should it provide a 
vehicle for the interchange of ideas and the deepening of 
understanding in order to aid people in the determination of 
their destiny?83
As Ninkovich contends, the challenge for American cultural diplomats in this period 
was “whether in the pursuit of security or in the service of ideals.. .[wartime] 
developments foreclosed a return to more detached uses of cultural relations” during 
peacetime.84 The policy debates in this phase reflected this uncertainty of purpose as to 
how actively or instrumentally Washington ought to pursue cultural and ideological 
influence, and the policy debates of the period show how central the effort to find an 
appropriate lexicon of cultural diplomacy was in resolving the tension.
With these attempts by American cultural diplomats to reconcile the 
implications of US involvement in the Second World War in relation to Washington’s 
traditional reluctance to pursue propaganda, there developed a broad consensus that, at
82 Arndt, First Resort o f  Kings, p. 180.
83 Sumner Welles to Charles A. Thomson , with Enclosure: “Memorandum Concerning a Long- 
Range Program of Cultural Relations for the United States, Sep 15, 1941,” (February 22, 1943); Box 
5 ff 43; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; 
University of Denver.
84 My emphasis added. In claiming that the cultural diplomacy program was conducted in the name 
of the American cultural elite not Washington these kinds of discourses implicitly conveyed the 
US’s repudiation of power politics. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, p. 35.
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the very least, the geographical scope of US cultural diplomacy would need to be global 
in the post-war period. Ben Cherrington noted that the necessity for a global US 
cultural program was a function of global inter-dependence and the importance of 
presenting the US as a cultural and political template of modernity. Once again, 
however, he distanced US cultural diplomacy from Washington and its strategic 
interests. Reflecting on the modest origins of the program and the ‘culturalist 
constituency’ for which the US cultural diplomacy program spoke:
it is neither possible or desirable following the conflict to confine 
to the western hemisphere the government’s cultural relations activities.
In our integrated world, it would be futile to attempt permanently to 
maintain cultural enlightenment in the western hemisphere while the rest 
of the world was in the grip of cultural decadence. Evidence is lacking 
that the men of science, letters and the arts in the Americas would consider 
such a policy.8'^
The assumption that the promotion of American culture and ideas, with impetus coming 
from American civil society rather than from the government, would be warranted in 
the wake of the conflict for the purposes of cultural regeneration therefore went some 
way toward assuaging internal concerns that US cultural diplomacy had become too 
instrumental in tone.
In this vein, the pluralism of US society and its tradition of civic, as opposed 
to ethnic, culture was discursively situated as a counterweight to the philosophies of 
national aggrandisement and collectivism that had been propagated by the Axis powers. 
To confront Nazi propaganda claims that America’s immigrant society lacked spiritual 
unity, the Division’s cultural programs often utilised foreign-bom American citizens as 
spokespeople for America. As early as 1940, US foreign policy-makers had claimed
85 Division of Cultural Relations, “Memorandum Concerning a Long Range Program of Cultural 
Relations for the United States, September 15, 1941,” p. 1; Box 5 ff 43-2; Personal Papers of Ben M. 
Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.
86 General Advisory Committee on Cultural Relations, “Compilation of Policy Statements on the 
Cultural Relations Program, Approved by the General Advisory Committee,” (June 15, 1944), p. 3; 
Box 5 ff 38; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; 
University of Denver. On the Nazi claims, see: Aristotle A. Kallis, Nazi Propaganda and the 
Second World War, (Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 75-6. In a rather absurd twist, the 
‘entertainment’ segments of Nazi international propaganda broadcasts incorporated American-style 
swing and jazz music due to their popularity in Europe. There was some debate about this since
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that American pluralism could also be mobilised as an instructive principle for the 
modernisation of the Third World. One Divisional official had argued that US cultural 
diplomacy was needed because America “had no ‘official culture’ to sell any of our 
neighbours. The idea of an official culture is repugnant to us.” 87 It bears noting, 
however, that a rather selective vision of American pluralism was employed in this 
context. It was a stated policy platform within the Division that US cultural diplomacy 
would downplay the realities of racial segregation within the US.88 Christina Klein has 
also noted how representations of America’s social pluralism shaped its relations with 
the colonised world:
Washington defended democracy during the war as a universal 
political philosophy applicable to all peoples regardless of race, 
and by doing so it helped move into the mainstream the idea of 
America as a harmonious nation made up of people from diverse 
ethnic, racial, national, and religious backgrounds... The United 
States thus became the only Western nation that sought to legitimate 
its world-ordering ambitions by championing the idea {if not always 
the practice) of racial equality.89
For US policy-makers, cultural diplomacy could also communicate the tenets of US 
political culture by striving to incorporate pre-existing private initiatives as an 
expression of America’s tradition of voluntarism and the cultivation of civic virtue. In 
emphasising pluralism and civic virtue in cultural diplomacy discourse, US officials 
sought to locate Washington’s new foreign policy demands and practices as expressions 
of longstanding tenets of US political culture.
some quarters of the Nazi hierarchy branded the popularity of jazz in Germany during the 1930s as a 
Semitic plot to bring about the ‘musical race defilement’ of Germany, and issued a policy banning 
jazz- ‘musical decadence’- from the domestic airwaves in 1933. See: Horst J. P. Bergmeier and 
Reiner E. Lotz, Hitler’s Airwaves: The Inside Story o f Nazi Radio Broadcasting and Propaganda 
Swing, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), Ch. 5.
87 Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings o f US Cultural Diplomacy, p 148.
88 See Harold B. Hoskins, “Memorandum: Mobilizing 38,000,000 Foreign-Born Citizens for 
Effective Psychological Warfare,” (January 7, 1942), p. 2; Box 6 ff 1; Personal Papers of Ben M. 
Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.
89 My emphasis added Klein, Cold War Orientalism, p. 11. Michael Hunt’s study has made the 
opposite point, however, and highlights how notions of racial inequality constituted the US’s foreign 
policy approaches at various historical moments. See: Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign 
Policy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
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As the Allied military situation in Europe improved from halting successes 
during 1942-43 to a full-scale rollback of Axis forces in 1944, US cultural diplomats 
began to draw up more specific plans for a post-war cultural program that would 
function to ensure that the overall settlement would find public acceptance in Europe 
and elsewhere. As had been articulated within the China program after 1941, from 
1944 planning for the post-war cultural program framed the objectives of US cultural 
diplomacy to war-ravaged European areas in forward-looking, transformational terms. 
Both the staff of the Division of Cultural Relations and post-war planners within the 
State Department envisaged a close relationship between political/ideological 
reorientation, economic reconstruction, and US-led cultural rehabilitation. In this 
context, cultural influence was understood to be one of Washington’s most important 
resources in consolidating a legitimate and durable post-war settlement. It was a 
testament to just how broad the State Department’s vision for reformulating the post­
war world order had become. As Cherrington informed the Division’s General 
Advisory Committee in 1944:
Political and economic arrangements of international life must be 
undergirded by a world public opinion friendly to their successful 
operation and cultural relations may be the means of attaining such 
public opinion.. .Three obvious principles should guide any program 
of international cultural relations: 1) the cultural relations activities 
should be reciprocal and no slightest suggestion of imposing one people’s 
culture upon another. 2) international exchange in culture should never be 
exploited as an instrument of national policy ‘designed to serve some 
irrelevant purpose of state.’ 3) wherever possible the exchange of cultural 
interests should involve the direct participation of the people and 
institutions concerned with those interests in their respective countries- 
the program should stem from the authentic centers of culture.90
This statement reflects an ongoing tendency within policy memoranda concerning the 
post-war settlement to frame US cultural diplomacy was a distinct category of practice 
in relation to the propaganda of other states, and that the post-war settlement that
90 Howland Sargeant, to Barrows and Charles Thomson, “Notes on ‘America’s Future Cultural 
Relations’ by Ben Mark Cherrington from the “Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 1944,” Enclosure in Howland Sargeant to Barrows and Charles Thomson, (January 
29, 1948), p. 1; IIA 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
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Washington was to put in place would be singular in its rationality and generousness. 
In this context, Cherrington represented American national interests as distinct from 
those of the imperialist European powers in its embodiment of a reciprocal, open 
approach. In this rendition, the US sought long-term international stability, economic 
prosperity and democratic change, but not imperial dominion or self-aggrandisement.
One of the most acute issues in foreign policy discourse that emerged as 
policy-makers articulated US cultural priorities at the end of the war was the rise of 
anti-colonialist movements, particularly in Asia. Anxious to define the US “not only as 
a nonempire, but as an antiempire,”91 the cultural programs attempted to convey to the 
greatest extent possible the egalitarianism of America’s civic culture and its historical 
and political critique of European civilisation. As I noted above, the cultural diplomacy 
programs mobilised an image of America’s racial pluralism and harmony to gamer 
support from international audiences, and few US diplomats seemed willing to reflect 
on the domestic reality of racial segregation within the American South during the 
1940s in articulating this policy strategy. Cultural diplomacy officials mobilised a 
conception of world politics in which relations of influence and inter-dependence 
between “East and West [could now] be understood.. .outside the coercive ties of 
empire.”92
In relation to India, for example, cultural diplomacy had been utilised by 
Washington to express symbolic support for the Indian independence movement, 
angering the British colonial administration in the process. A 1943 US Army report 
circulated to US diplomatic posts in India narrated the anti-imperial approach through 
which the US traditionally exercised its power in Third World areas:
The British are.. .embarrassed by our attitude on the colonial question.
Obvious American disinclination to engage in colonial expansion, the
American record in championing Asiatic states threatened by aggression
and repeated American pronouncements extolling the virtues of liberty
91 On the distinctive and paradoxical ways in which the US understood its own colonial past as well as 
that of its European counterparts see Paul Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and 
Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910,” The Journal of American History 
88, (no. 4, March, 2002), p. 1316. See also Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism.
92 Klein, Cold War Orientalism, pp. 11-2.
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and self-determination have in the past given the United States a good 
reputation in Asia.93
In promoting Indian political independence, Washington not only caused British 
distemper but had also risked a potentially disastrous disruption of its military supply 
lines into East Asia should an Indian civil war erupt. In this context, the publicity 
propagated by US cultural diplomats in India was contrary to US strategic interests, and 
yet it was undertaken because it constituted America’s identity as a liberal power and 
served to spell out Washington’s more long-term intentions for the global order. In a 
similar process to that through which policy-makers rationalised their politically 
compromised dealings with the Chinese nationalists, cultural diplomacy discourse 
provided an outlet for US concerns about the moral compromise that had been made in 
undertaking military cooperation with the British Empire in Asia.94
I have noted in the foregoing section several elements of the representation of 
US cultural diplomacy during the course of the Second World War. A modernising, 
technocratic vocabulary of cultural diplomacy was established as US policy-makers 
began to contemplate the extensiveness of the tasks of Third World reform: post-war 
reconstruction; and construction of a lasting peace. Although cultural relations were 
now being associated with the practical and rather instrumental requirements of 
securing the post-war settlement, the Division’s officials continued to frame their work 
as a manifestation of reciprocal purposes and long-range moral and political objectives. 
They did so by characterising their policies in the language of the liberal inter-war
93 John Davies, “Anglo-American Cooperation in East Asia,” (November 15, 1943), p. 4; 
Confidential Files, 1943; Records of the New Delhi Mission, India; Records of the Foreign Service 
Posts of the Department of State; Record Group 84; National Archives and Records Administration 
of the USA, College Park, MD.
94 At the same time as Washington promoted its own vision for India’s independent future to 
Indians, in London US diplomats had argued that the activities in India were purely cultural and 
apolitical in nature and should not be contradicted by British publicity. As official correspondence 
to the Foreign Secretary Earl Halifax commented, British attempts to publicise its position on India 
within US had provoked indignation. “Unfortunately, for practical purposes, ‘propaganda’ ... is 
what the Americans believe it to be, and they have made it abundantly clear (for many years) that 
objective publicity to counter what we regard as their misconceptions is, to them, the most 
obnoxious kind of propaganda.” File Notes, regarding Letter Leo Amery, to Viscount Halifax, (no 
author), (June 7, 1940); FO 371/2454; Public Record Office of the United Kingdom, Kew. 
Emphasis in original.
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critique of propaganda, and by pointing to the ongoing involvement of private 
American initiative as evidence of this liberal posture. These cultural discourses 
depicted Washington as a non-coercive, progressive, far-sighted and modernising 
power in the Third World, and thereby licensed the Division to make an obvious 
statement on Indian political affairs over the heads of the British imperial authorities. I 
have also traced in the discussion above the emerging significance of cultural 
diplomacy as a basis for the US to articulate ‘narratives of anticonquest’ that 
legitimated the extension of American power into post-colonial areas. In the next 
section I explore how these narratives and other representational practices shaped the 
development of American cultural diplomacy in the aftermath of the Second World 
War.
The Challenge of Post-War Cultural Diplomacy: Courting Propaganda
In Washington it was felt at the end of the Second World War that a durable 
post-war settlement depended on the marshalling of the forces of international 
understanding and cultural rehabilitation in the interests of peace. As Secretary of State 
Edward Settinius had asserted:
the United States is in ‘for keeps’ this time. Our interests are deeply 
involved in the peace and well-being of Europe, as they are in the peace 
and well-being of Asia and we shall support our interests.. .not in any 
sense for domination or advantage but in the spirit of.. .peace and security.95
In an address made shortly after assuming office on April 12, 1945, President Harry 
Truman similarly declared an American commitment to international understanding as 
the basis for a lasting peace:
Ignorance and its handmaidens, prejudice, intolerance, suspicion of 
our fellow men, breed dictators. And they breed wars. Civilization 
cannot survive an atomic war.. .And so we must look to education in
95 Edward Settinius. “Mobilisation for Peace and Reconstruction through the United Nations 
Organisation: London, October 19, 1945” Department o f State Bulletin 2399, (October 14, 1945), p. 
560.
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the long run to wipe out that ignorance which threatens catastrophe.
Intelligent men do not hate other men just because their religion 
may be different, because their habits and language may be different, 
or because their national origin or color may be different. It is up to 
education to bring about that deeper international understanding which 
is so vital to world peace.96
Both confidential and public policy statements on cultural diplomacy in this 
period rendered America’s objectives as broadly conceived internationalist interests 
rather than narrower national priorities. And there were some wider reasons why these 
kinds of representations in US cultural diplomacy were resonant during the post-war 
phase. In June that year Washington had taken a leading role at the founding 
conference of the United Nations Organisation in San Francisco. President Roosevelt 
had been the key instigator of the UN proposals in the lead-up to the conference, having 
ensured British and Russian support for the idea at the Yalta Conference in February, 
and having hosted the Dumbarton Oaks UN planning meetings, as well as sponsoring 
the Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference from mid-1944. These broader 
developments encouraged cultural diplomats in their depiction of American national 
interests as singularly global in their character, and the language they mobilised that 
America had a cultural claim to exercise global leadership in turn reinforced the 
transition toward the embedding of American power within the global order. However, 
despite this general embrace of embedded internationalism in US foreign policy, and 
given the costs these new initiatives had imposed on the US, Congressional funding for 
cultural diplomacy was slashed in 1945-46, and a series of disruptive bureaucratic 
reorganisations ensued.97
In 1944 the functions of the Division of Cultural Relations had been 
transferred to a new Science, Education, and Art Division under a newly created Office
QO
of Public Information. By early 1945 an Assistant Secretary of State for Public and 
Cultural Relations position was created. It was first occupied by Archibald MacLeish, 
then subsequently by William Benton after 1945, George V. Allen from 1948, and
96 Harry Truman, “Fordham Address,” New York Herald Tribune May 12, 1946.
97 On these disruptions see, e.g.: Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, Ch. 5.
98 Later that year the Science, Education, and Art Division was subdivided into internal geographical 
divisions, and its name was changed to the Division of Cultural Cooperation.
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Edward Barrett from 1950. The Division of Cultural Cooperation (as it had become 
known during the war) was abolished in 1946, and integrated into an overarching 
Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, which itself was replaced the 
next year by an Office of Information and Educational Exchange. The legislative basis 
for the State Department’s cultural diplomacy program was also left uncertain in this 
period, and ongoing efforts from 1939 to introduce bills in Congress for a permanent 
cultural diplomacy program beyond the provisions of the 1936 Pan American treaties 
were unsuccessful." Although these unsettled bureaucratic arrangements hampered 
Washington’s cultural diplomacy operations, they also prompted numerous 
restatements of the cultural diplomacy program’s basic premises and approach. There 
is thus ample evidence during this phase from which we can assess how US policy­
makers discursively located the functions of cultural diplomacy in the context of the 
post-war settlement and how they represented US foreign relations in general.
As Henry Kellerman’s memoir of the American occupation of Germany 
observes, America’s cultural and educational approach in consolidating the Allied 
victory, was a:
case without precedent. For the first time in modem history a victor 
used the vast range of his cultural resources and the potential of his 
citizens in a common and contributing effort to assist the vanquished 
in rebuilding his national institutions and his relations with the entire 
world. Indeed, the reeducation or reorientation program must have 
appeared as a wholly inconsistent and unorthodox undertaking to a 
people who remembered the reparations of the ‘dictate of Versailles’ 
and could therefore rightfully expect far more severe retribution.100
During the Allied occupation German educational and cultural institutions were 
overhauled, and as early as 1946 the long-term goals of this policy were defined as 
ensuring “the development of educational methods, institutions, programs and materials 
designed to further the creation of democratic attitudes and practices through
99 See Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of VS Cultural Diplomacy, pp. 226-7.
100 Kellerman, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy, pp. 10-1.
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education.” 101 However there were tensions between this politically instrumental role 
that cultural diplomacy was to play in reorienting formerly belligerent societies and the 
presupposition of US anti-propagandism that cultural officials had traditionally sought 
to uphold. The modernising imperative behind US cultural diplomacy in relation to 
China and India had been one thing, but the outright occupation of Axis areas presented 
a more acute rhetorical challenge. The principle of reciprocity was contradicted by the 
very nature of the occupation functions, and in this context “the conflict between 
[cultural diplomacy] purists and pragmatists was never fully resolved” in relation to the 
post-war occupations.
Political considerations continued to motivate and often to shape 
policies governing the US exchange program. Fundamentally 
humanitarian and avowedly ‘nonpolitical,’ the educational 
and cultural relations program sponsored by the Department of 
State was established because international communication and 
understanding through cooperative person-to-person relations were 
considered to be a necessary aspect of foreign relations.
Mutual understanding through this means was considered to be an 
important part of the larger foreign policy goal of international peace. 
Thus the exchange program was from the beginning a part of the 
international political scene. 102
One British memorandum on cultural relations from this period had defined 
‘propaganda’ as the total identification of a national culture with the objectives and 
purposes of a particular regime or political ideology. 103 As Kellerman’s reflections 
highlight, when the US sought to rehabilitate occupied areas and eliminate residues of 
Nazi sentiment America’s post-war cultural diplomats sought to justify why their work 
had moved rather closer to this kind of activity. The tension between connecting
101 Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum #1779 quoted in ibid., p. 21.
102 Ibid., pp. 8-9. On the shift from post-war ‘democratic re-education’ to anti-communism within 
US cultural diplomacy, and on the perceived intersection among State Department officials between 
economic aid and political consciousness (for example, Marshall Plan funds supplied for German 
home-ownership so that the German people would develop a greater appreciation for capitalist 
norms of private property rather than turning to socialism), see: Rebecca Boehling, “The Role of 
Culture in American Relations with Europe: The Case of the United States’s Occupation of 
Germany,” Diplomatic History 23, (no. 1, Winter 1999).
103 “The British Council and the Maintenance of British Influence Abroad,” (no author), p. 9; 
General Correspondence on Cultural Propagnada 1919-1938, FO 431/4; Public Record Office of the 
United Kingdom, Kew.
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America’s liberal commitment to freedoms to the exercise of power (and the 
circumscribing of Europe’s freedom to choose its own political future in the process) 
was an underlying paradox within the narrative of post-war European reform that 
cultural diplomats articulated in this period. It was not, and indeed could not, be fully 
resolved in this period.
In his history of post-war Austria Reinhold Wagonleitner similarly notes that 
a fundamental dilemma arose between the political values of US cultural diplomacy 
and the pragmatic requirements of occupation. Specifically, US cultural diplomats 
faced a particularly acute tension between narratives that stressed the open, pluralistic 
tone of America’s democracy, and the need to circumscribe free speech for the sake of 
forestalling socialism on the European continent at the operational level. 104 In addition 
to promoting democracy through cultural diplomacy, the principles of free trade and 
free markets had been elevated as key principles to convey as part of the Department of 
State’s broader conception of how to bring about material and ideological progress in 
Europe.
On the one hand, US planners were thoroughly convinced that the 
‘liberal’ capitalistic system of the United States could, as it were, be 
equated with the culmination of all previous human forms of organization, 
superseding all other social systems not only materially but morally as 
well. On the other hand, the need of the conquered people to change their 
culture was equally based upon the unshakable, optimistic faith in 
progress, assuming that long-range political reforms and the establishment 
of Western democracy can be achieved only by an open, pluralistic, 
liberal education. 105
Richard Pells also notes in a detailed study of US-European relations that Washington’s 
cultural and intellectual engagement with Europe was particularly strident when it came 
to making the point that capitalism was crucial to Europe’s future political and social 
stability, as if the moral dilemmas of circumscribing political freedoms could be 
sublimated by Washington’s sponsorship of free enterprise. Discourses of enterprise
104 Reinhold Wagonleitner, Coca-Colanisation and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the 
United States in Austria after the Second World War, trans. Diana M. Wolf, (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1994).
105 My emphasis added. Wagonlietner, Coca-Colanisation, p. 67.
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and free markets were entering the realm of cultural diplomacy discourse to the extent 
that:
when officials in Washington tried to ‘reeducate’ the Germans, or 
offered Europeans the Marshall Plan, or helped Hollywood reclaim its 
European markets, or defended the ideals of free trade in the face of 
Europe’s cultural protectionism, they were acting on a set of assumptions 
rooted in America’s Puritan and Jeffersonian past, and in its more 
entrepreneurial present. If- with assistance from America- people elsewhere 
were given the same democratic freedoms and the same economic skills, if 
they modernised along American lines, if they purchased American 
consumer goods and learned English well enough to enjoy America’s 
mass culture, then they would surely turn into ‘Americans’ themselves. 106
In situating economic freedom as a key principle for post-war reforms in 
Europe, cultural diplomacy officials greeted the rise of social democratic movements in 
Europe with incomprehension and, in some cases, condemnation. The linkage between 
capitalism and freedom that the discourses of post-war cultural reconstruction 
encompassed thus became the basis of one of the key tenets of Washington’s role in the 
Cold War struggle. As one US diplomat has reflected:
It seems, in retrospect, it’s going to very difficult to explain to our 
children that we had a problem when we were in the process of giving 
the Europeans the wherewithal to start their economies up, and we 
were making these enormous sacrifices and having this extremely 
forward-looking economic policy, and yet we had to argue with the 
Europeans and explain it. 107
Although reciprocity had been in a key framing and operational principle of the early 
phase of US cultural diplomacy, when it came to the economic reconstruction 
reciprocity and openness had limits. As Pells reflected, the American cultural policies 
were not wholly successful, and the propagation of American capitalist ideology in 
Germany can be regarded as “a case study of how a country that was determined to 
defend its national traditions and local customs in the face of enormous outside
106 Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American 
Culture Since World War II, (Basic Books: New York, 1997), pp. xiii-xiv.
107 Harold Kaplan, “Oral History Interview, October 19, 1990,” p. 16; Foreign Affairs Oral History 
Collection; Georgetown University Lauinger Library Special Collections.
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pressure.” The German people demonstrated how it was possible to “adapt to, modify, 
and resist the political and cultural policies of the United States.” This mixture of 
acquiescence and defiance, according to Pells, would shape Western European 
responses to American power for decades to come.108
In addition to economic ideology, international interdependence was a key 
theme that featured as Washington’s cultural role in the post-war order was narrated, 
both in endogenous policy contexts and to international audiences. An undated 
memorandum from the Division of Cultural Relations written during the Second World 
War had set out these assumptions in unequivocal terms:
In the interdependent world of today the activities of every nation 
vitally affect the peoples of other nations. It is recognised that other 
peoples are concerned mainly with the impact of the United States 
on their particular interests and territories. They feel that the United 
States affects them in at least three important respects: 1) By the 
contribution of the United States to the maintenance of peace; 2) By the 
impact of American foreign policy and of non-Govemmental United 
States activities on their areas; 3) By the ways in which American 
practices, beliefs, and activities are relevant to the needs of their areas.109
The deepening of international interdependence was narrated by US policy-makers as a 
function of imminent technological and economic change that required harnessing by 
the exercise of US power and the establishment of international institutions. As the
108 Pells, Not Like Us, p. 42. Nico Wilterdink has argued that while European populations often 
appeared to incorporate US cultural products and practices into their lives, there was also a degree of 
hesitancy and self-censorship in how they resisted US cultural dominance. US cultural officials and 
many historians since have thus misunderstood the extent to which US culture dominated and was 
incorporated into European society in the early post-war period. Rather, this was a matter of short­
term European acquiescence to US cultural programs, stemming from their gratitude for the US for the 
war effort. See: Nico Wilterdink, “The Netherlands Between the Greater Powers: Expressions of 
Resistance to Perceived or Feared Cultural Domination,” in Within the US Orbit: Small National 
Cultures Vis-ä-vis the United States, ed. Rob Kroes, (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1991). Rob 
Kroes has also surveyed in numerous elements of cultural reistance to US power. See, e.g.: Rob 
Kroes, If You’ve Seen One You’ve Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture, (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1996); Rob Kroes, “American Empire and Cultural Imperialism: A View 
from the Receiving End,” Diplomatic History 23, (no. 3, Summer 1999), pp. 463-77. William 
Hitchcock’s France Restored also makes a valuable contribution. In it he surveys France’s use of 
cultural diplomacy and multilateral influence to recover their lost prestige and capabilities in the post- 
1945 world order. William Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for 
Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
109 “Objectives and Principles of the International Information and Cultural Program,” (no author), 
(July 11, 1946), p. 1; IIA 1938-1953; RG 59; NARA.
363
Division of Cultural Relations’ Haldore Hanson had argued in 1944, the war had 
signified the ‘shrinking’ of the world, revealing processes that “may change the nature 
of international relations of our generation more completely than any other generation.” 
With the advent of more rapid communications and travel, Americans “will be 
informed about our neighbours...they in turn will be in a position to learn about us. 
The attitudes of the people of one nation toward the people of another are likely to exert 
an ever-increasing influence upon foreign policy.”110
The principle of diplomatic reciprocity was brought into these discourses of 
international interdependence and the necessity of strengthening the Washington’s 
global influence to manage it. The representation of Washington’s hegemonic global 
role in this phase highlights how the more longstanding commonplaces of US cultural 
diplomacy discourse- as a vehicle for the international expression of a liberal political 
culture- could be refashioned to suit the much broader parameters of American foreign 
policy in the post-war period. This was emphasised in January, 1945, in 
correspondence on cultural diplomacy and the Foreign Service received by Assistant 
Secretary of State Edward Barrett.
The role of the information officer particularly must be reciprocal.
He will have far more effective if he constantly stresses that he is 
interested in the exchange of information between the United States 
and other nations. A good article on French music placed in an 
American journal may have far more effect that half a dozen articles 
on American music in French periodicals. I think the people of any 
nation are probably less interested in the United States than they are 
interested in what the United States thinks of them. While we are not 
primarily concerned with feeding this latter interest, our outposts have 
demonstrated again and again that it can be used most effectively in 
the placing of our particular message.* 111
Although the familiar terms of discourse in cultural diplomacy policy-making had been 
maintained in these kinds of statements, the Division faced ongoing dilemmas about
110 Haldore Hansen, “America’s Need for Understanding in China,” pp. 624-5.
111 Emphasis in original. H. H. Amason to Edward W. Barrett, (January 29, 1945), p. 3; 
Chronological File 1944-45; Records of Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public 
Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General Records of the Department of State, Record 
Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.
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how to approach cultural engagement with post-war Europe, particularly in the light of 
the post-war successes across the Continent of Soviet propaganda. Frank Ninkovich 
characterises the 1945-47 period as a phase during which debates among cultural 
diplomacy officials between ‘pragmatists’ and ‘idealists’ emerged, and discursive 
practices were central to how proponents of each view sought to shape policy 
decisions. Advocates of the traditional ‘idealistic’ approach to US cultural 
diplomacy emphasised that the cultural programs could navigate the issues of post-war 
European reconstruction and confronting the USSR by maintaining the principles of 
reciprocity and anti-propagandism. A public address by the Division’s Charles J. Child 
on engaging with the Soviet public was able in these terms to express the conviction 
that “people can speak more directly to each other through the medium of the arts,” and 
with a strong program of Soviet-American exchanges “we can gradually build a trade in 
ideas which will leave lend-lease far behind in value given and received.”113
However, by the late 1940s a wartime posture had returned to the cultural 
diplomacy program, and ‘pragmatism’ gained increasing purchase as an inducement to 
extending the cultural diplomacy programs and other US diplomatic tools into areas 
where they might forestall the advance of Communism. By late 1947, the Soviet 
cultural program was being routinely characterised as having “an energy and 
resourcefulness which showed that Stalin’s regime, for all its monolithic intractability, 
could avail itself of an imaginative vigour unmatched by western governments.”114 
With the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill through Congress in January 1948- a 
response to wider concerns about Soviet propaganda- American cultural diplomacy had 
a legislative basis for the first time, and the discourses of US cultural diplomacy took 
on a more combative tone, though this shift was not without its own sources of 
ambiguity and paradox.115 In the next section I examine how the discursive practices of
112 Frank Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, p. 126
113 Charles J. Child, “Cultural Cooperation with the Soviet Union,” Department o f State Bulletin 
2430, (November 18, 1945), pp. 815-6.
114 Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World o f Arts and Letters, 
(New York: The New Press, 1999), p. 17.
115 The Smith Mundt Bill (Public Law 402) passed Congress in January 1948. The Bill’s formal title 
was The United States Informational and Educational Exchange Act, 1948, however it is more often 
referred to as the Smith Mundt Bill. It provided the first comprehensive legislation for information 
and cultural activities. The immediate impact of the Bill was felt most within the international 
information program, and a more comprehsive discussion of the Bill is provided in the next chapter.
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US cultural diplomacy were shaped by these early Cold War concerns, and specifically 
how representations of threats within the international order enabled the adoption of a 
more instrumental and politicised program of US cultural engagement.
Cultural Diplomacy and the Cultural Cold War
During 1945-46 US diplomats increasingly feared that cultural diplomacy had 
been adopted by the USSR as a vehicle for propaganda and subversion rather than for 
‘peaceful’ objectives such as the deepening of international understanding and the 
consolidation of the post-war order.116 Not only was cultural diplomacy now a routine 
and accepted component of US foreign relations, international tensions had rendered 
cultural subversion and covert psychological warfare more acceptable to the Truman 
administration for the purposes of ideological combat. A 1945 report to the head of the 
American Office of Strategic Services foreshadowed the adoption of covert cultural 
operations, locating Soviet cultural diplomacy as an instrument of international combat 
in an era of mass participation in geopolitics:
our enemies will be even freer...to propagandise, subvert, sabotage 
and exert.. .pressures upon us, and we ourselves shall be more willing 
to bear these affronts and ourselves to indulge in such methods- 
in our eagerness to avoid at all costs the tragedy of open war.
By February, 1946, George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ from the Moscow embassy had 
warned of the depth of Soviet antipathy toward the United States, predicting that “lip 
service will...be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between 
peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken the
116 As Walter Hixon notes, the Soviet cultural diplomacy program had been restarted as a 
consequence of Stalin’s resentment toward the West over war strategy issues. Hixon also suggests 
that the USSR extended its cultural programs due to the expectation that the US and Britain sought 
to infiltrate the USSR through their technical assistance and cultural diplomacy programs. It is 
important to thus note that this move toward suspicion of the other’s cultural motives appear to be 
mutual. Walter Hixon, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-61, (New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 7.
117 Gregory Bateson (1945), quoted in Frances Stonor Saunders, Cultural Cold War, p. 17.
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security position of Soviet peoples.”118 With the President’s proclamation of the 
‘Truman Doctrine’ for economic aid to Greece and Turkey in March, 1947, a 
significant new departure in American grand strategy was heralded. A wide-ranging 
strategy of economic and political assistance was adopted to forestall the extension of 
Communism within Europe.119 The implementation of the Truman Doctrine also 
incorporated cultural functions, and situated the significance of cultural diplomacy in 
US foreign policy as an instrument of reorientation and reconstruction, not 
‘understanding’ or ‘reciprocity.’ In extending US assistance to the Greek and Turkish 
education systems, the State Department envisaged cultural diplomacy as a mechanism 
to consolidate the ‘democratic’ factions within these states.120 These developments 
signalled new understandings of cultural diplomacy, as having a more central place in 
US grand strategy and national security policy.
The State Department’s cultural diplomacy program was increasingly being 
envisaged as an instrument with which to undermine Soviet influence. Washington’s 
superior openness to cultural interchange was represented as its key advantage in the 
context of these debates as a basis to expose the increasingly dogmatic and unilateralist 
format of the Soviet programs. As one State Department memorandum on bilateral 
cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union of November, 1946 had noted, in its cultural 
diplomacy programs: “the United States has an opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviet 
Union its earnest desire for friendship in a way not otherwise possible and in a manner 
which will not interfere with our diplomatic position.” But in the event of a Soviet 
snub, advantage could be gained by making the world aware “that we had done the best 
to be friendly and was [sz'c.] spumed...the Department cannot lose by making such an 
offer.” These kinds of policy strategies indicate how the internationalist paradigm of 
cultural interchange was being alloyed with a contending view of cultural diplomacy as 
an instrument of the Cold War conflict.
118 Kennan quoted in Nigel Gould Davies,“The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” Diplomatic 
History 27, (no. 2, April 2003), p. 198.
119 Harry Truman, “Truman Doctrine” in The Truman Administration: A Documentary History, eds. 
Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 251-6.
120 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, p. 134.
121 Fred Warner Neal, to William T. Stone, “Exchange of Persons with Russia,” (September 26, 
1946), p. 1; IIA 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
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In 1947 US spending on cultural diplomacy increased for the first time since 
the post-war cutbacks. Funds for the cultural diplomacy programs in Germany alone 
that year reached a peak of $6,040,064. However, US spending on cultural and 
informational diplomacy combined was still comparatively low at a sum of 
$30,123,086, having not yet surpassed the United Kingdom’s combined budget of 
$42,588,452 according to British figures.122 More significant, however, is that it was 
on the grounds of ‘defence’ rather than ‘international understanding’ that the US 
funding increases passed Congress. In the course of 1947 the rationale for extending 
US cultural diplomacy practices shifted away from the construction of a liberal political 
and economic order in Europe toward the defence of the continent against Communist 
subversion. Throughout 1947 the State Department received numerous direly-worded 
memoranda from US diplomats stationed in Europe claiming that America had been 
subject to a barrage of Soviet verbal attacks in all manner of cultural and intellectual 
frameworks. A report from the Moscow embassy in July, 1947 had warned of 
Washington’s dwindling ability to influence the ideological debate Europe. By this 
time the USSR had launched a cultural initiative known as the ‘Peace Offensive,’ and 
in this context the Embassy had reported that:
[ujnbelievable as it may seem, the Soviets appear to be steadily 
convincing the mass of the people of many lands that in the USSR 
lies the great white hope of the future, while the US constitutes the 
dark terror.. .It is unfortunate that almost at the inception of an 
international cultural program by the US government developments 
should take place which make it necessary to consider introducing 
into that program an element of contest. Yet the developments are 
taking place and we have a responsibility of squarely facing up to 
the issue, something which it seems we have not yet done.
In addition to the growing realisation that cultural diplomacy had been turned into an 
instrument of Soviet hegemony, particularly within the US intelligence agencies, the
122 On US spending to Germany, see: Kellerman, Cultural Relations as an Instrument o f US Foreign 
Policy, p. 9. On comparative figures see: Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, to William Benton, 
“Comparative Expenditures and Personnel by Country- Europe,” Appendix A, (November 7, 1946); 
IIA, 1938-53; RG 59; NARA. See also: Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, p. 132.
123 Mose Harvey, Moscow Embassy, to William T. Stone and staff, (July 3, 1947), p. 1; IIA 1938-53; 
RG 59; NARA.
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State Department’s geographical bureaus- especially the Western and Eastern Europe 
Divisions- became increasingly interested in cultural foreign policy instruments from 
1946-47. After two years of occupation in Germany, the Department of Defence also 
took more interest in cultural diplomacy and international educational policies as vital 
determinants of the ideological trajectory of Europe.124
This broader instrumentalist view of cultural diplomacy across Washington 
encouraged the return of ideological struggle (initially articulated against the Axis) as a 
key rationale for US cultural diplomacy within policy discourses of the Division of 
Cultural Relations during 1947.12:1 The tenure of William Benton as Assistant Secretary 
of State for Public Affairs was a particularly important factor in hastening the rise of 
Cold War antagonism as the prevailing frame for US cultural diplomacy. As a strong 
advocate for informational operations with a commitment to finding better 
measurements for the impact of cultural and informational programs, Benton’s role as 
Assistant Secretary has been characterised as imbibing a sense of ‘international 
salesmanship’ into the diplomacy of American culture and information.126 One 
memorandum of April, 1947 had optimistically suggested that Washington could 
integrate its liberal traditions and the new instrumentalism that circumstances 
demanded, asking: “must we abandon our efforts to inform the peoples of the world 
about the US, and turn to thrust and counter-thrust against Communist doctrine and 
propaganda?...We do not need to abandon one objective in order to work toward the 
other.” The statement captures the dilemma of the period, but it did not halt the shift 
toward a combative, instrumental tone within the cultural diplomacy program. 
Although the language of liberalism remained pervasive within cultural policy debates,
124 On the role of Defence in cultural and educational reconstruction programs see Kellerman, 
Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy. Europe was very much the focus of the 
cultural diplomacy debates in this period. US interests in Asia, Latin America, and other regions 
were somewhat neglected, particularly as far as the envisaging of culture as an instrument of 
ideological struggle was concerned. In particular, the ideological struggle in China was absent from 
these discussions of US cultural diplomacy policy.
125 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, p. 118. See also Arndt, First Resort of Kings, Ch. 8. For an 
account of the parallels between anti-Fascist and anti-Communist discourse in US foreign policy see: 
Les K. Alder and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930’s-1950’s,” American Historical Review 75, 
(no. 4, 1970).
126 Ibid., p. 120.
127 W. R. Tyler, to William T. Stone, “Notes on the OIC Program,” (April 22, 1947), p. 2; IIA 1938- 
53; RG 59; NARA.
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liberalism had been somewhat reformulated in this context. In line with extant 
understandings of Washington’s exceptional global responsibilities in the post-war era, 
US cultural diplomacy took on a sense of liberal absolutism, more akin to a global 
liberal crusade to actively undermine the enemies of liberalism than a reciprocal, free 
and open approach to cultural interchange. As Ninkovich observes, international 
tensions led the US cultural diplomacy program to be ‘ideologised.’128
A significant milestone in American Cold War cultural diplomacy was the 
passage of the Information and Educational Exchange Act, better known after its 
Congressional sponsors as the Smith Mundt Bill, through the US House of 
Representatives in January, 1948. Several of the non-government US institutions that 
had remained advocates of cultural internationalism during the war, such as the Institute 
for International Education and the American Library Association, had publicly 
supported the Bill on the basis of its pledge to provide more funding to cultural and 
educational activities. However, the Smith Mundt Bill was fundamentally pragmatic 
and ideological rather than internationalist and reciprocal when it came to articulating 
the purpose and approach for the official cultural diplomacy operations. References 
to the ‘emergency importance’ and ‘tremendous utility’ of government-sponsored 
cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges and international information repeatedly 
emerged within Congressional debates on the Bill. By deeming that the broad outlines 
of cultural diplomacy policy would be set by the Assistant Secretary’s office, Smith 
Mundt presaged a more a more consolidated and politicised approach to US cultural 
diplomacy.130 Still committed to his liberal rendition of cultural relations as distinct 
from propaganda, Ben Cherrington warned during the Bill’s final passage that 
Congress’s provisions were not yet ‘in line with American traditions.’131
128 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas, p. 132.
129 Ibid., p. 131.
130 As a consequence of the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill, the cultural diplomacy program was 
also fragmented. The cultural centres and libraries were given to a separate Division of Libraries 
and Institutes, and the cultural programs were placed in another separate division within the State 
Department. The reorganisation is discussed in more depth in Gilbert Crandall, “Winning Friends 
South of the Border,” Foreign Service Journal 27, (no. 9, September, 1950).
131 Ninkovich, Diplomacy of Ideas, pp. 129-33.
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After 1948, the framing of American cultural diplomacy policy situated the
broader objectives of cultural relations as ‘positive action’ on behalf of US interests in
the context of an international ‘contest’ of wills. Washington’s obligation to intervene
globally on behalf of political and economic freedom was increasingly narrated in the
context of US cultural programs in Europe. As one advisory report on the Smith Mundt
Bill had warned, with the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe tightening: “more and more
people are barred from understanding America’s intentions and experiencing our
freedoms. We can no longer afford to observe passively the rapidly shrinking area of
freedom throughout the world.”132 As Gary Kraske suggests, the concept of ideological
warfare that the official cultural programs had adopted to wage the Second World War
became the Division’s routine approach after 1948: “Cultural activities, like economic
and military matters, were viewed as tools to use for realising strategic objectives...the
distinction between unilateral propaganda and reciprocal co-operation became 
1
blurred.” The tensions that accompanied this shift are evident in the fact that the 
General Advisory Committee continued to advocate a traditional apolitical and 
reciprocal format for cultural diplomacy. In its September 1948 report the Committee 
reflected an ongoing propensity to render the cultural diplomacy program in idealistic 
terms. As the Committee had put it, the cultural programs must retain their focus on 
fostering “cultural exchange- not cultural penetration.” The Committee also reported 
that:
it is a basic fact that such a program of [cultural and educational] 
exchange is the natural expression of the democratic principles on 
which and for which we stand. The cultural achievements of the 
civilized world have been brought about by such cooperation... 
We shall continue, in cooperation with other peoples, to build the
132 William C. Johnstone, “Cooperative Exchange Programs Under the Smith-Mundt Act,” 
Department o f State Bulletin 3365, (December 12, 1948), p. 739. The Smith Mundt Bill was an 
important milestone in the US cultural and informational programs. It provided the first formal 
legislative sanction of the programs, and from then on the achievements of the cultural and 
informational program would be subject to scrutiny in the context of the Congressional 
appropriations process.
133 Gary Kraske, Missionaries o f the Book: The American Library Profession and the Origins of 
United States Cultural Diplomacy, (Westport: Greenwood, 1985), p. 259.
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good life which flows across national boundary lines.134
Overwhelmingly, Europe was the focus of the renewed and increasingly 
instrumental US cultural diplomacy effort after 1948. An American cultural program to 
China had been maintained into the post-war period, however, and policy-makers 
continued to emphasise educational and technical exchanges in the interests of Chinese 
modernisation. One of the earliest bilateral Fulbright educational exchange agreements 
was also signed with China in October, 1947. However, none of these initiatives had 
the scope to bring about the kind of long-term political changes it was hoped would 
occur. Although US diplomats had warned Washington that China was at the 
“political-cross roads,” the State Department was ill-equipped to prevent Communist 
advances during China’s civil war. The official and non-government cultural 
diplomacy institutions proclaimed their ongoing interest in cultural exchanges with 
China after the Communists seized control of the Chinese mainland in 1949, however 
Ninkovich characterises the State Department’s post-1949 cultural diplomacy efforts as 
drastically reduced and only ‘ameliorative’ in their aims.136
The nature of American culture itself and what it symbolised internationally 
was also rearticulated as a consequence of Soviet propaganda advances and the 
instrumental paradigm for cultural diplomacy that the Smith Mundt Bill had formalised. 
The non-elitist, ‘civic culture’ that had earlier been lauded as the basis of America’s 
cultural appeal in Latin America and China gave way to an emphasis on American high 
culture and intellectual prestige in the late 1940s. This was tied to the demands of 
waging ideological warfare specifically within the European context. Left-wing 
European intellectuals had become a target audience for the cultural diplomacy 
program as they were envisaged as key protagonists in the ideological struggle against
134 Report of the chair of the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange (1948) quoted in 
Kellerman, Cultural Relations as an Instrument o f US Foreign Policy, p. 7.
135 W. Bradley Connors (1947) quoted in Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, p. 143. See also, 
Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, pp. 142-4.
136 Ibid., p. 144.
137 At this stage, the US retained some cultural diplomacy ties with the Eastern bloc. Several of the 
United States Information Service posts in Eastern Europe were closed in 1948-49 at the insistence 
of their host governments, but many, including America House in Moscow, remained open. 
Consequently, my discussion of the Division’s ‘European’ policy refers to both Western and Eastern 
Europe.
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the Soviet Union, and various government agencies, including the newly-founded US 
Central Intelligence Agency, began a concerted effort to engage them. 138 American 
artistic and musical works were also utilised to convey American ideological prestige in 
a European context. 139 The changing definition of culture mobilised here is indicative 
of the terms of Washington’s new Cold War relationship with Europe, and perhaps of 
several different and conflicting ways in which America was now to be positioned in 
relation to European political traditions. The articulation of American cultural 
diplomacy prior to and during the war had narrated American culture as an expression 
of its significance as the ‘New World’ and the spirit of modernity that America’s 
historical position had garnered. America was situated as apart from Europe within this 
representational framework: there was an implicit logic of alterity at play, which set the 
US up in contra-distinction from Europe’s pathological nationalism, elitism and cultural 
homogeneity, intended to appeal to the aspirations of colonial peoples.
However, as the US became more deeply embroiled in the cultural struggle 
against Soviet power in Continental Europe, policy debates within the Division began 
to view America’s achievements in high culture and their cognisance with European 
aesthetics as a key resource in the Cold War struggle. Dispelling the “presupposition of 
American cultural retardation” thought to shared by European intellectuals thus became 
a component of the anti-Communist struggle. ’^ 0 Cultural policy directives increasingly 
took note of the way that intellectuals enjoyed “unusual respect and influence in 
Europe” and how intellectual prestige was one of the Soviet Union’s most potent 
weapons in its efforts to gamer support among them. For the Soviets:
intellectuals are mobilised in part to sustain the myth that all 
intellectuals worthy of the name acknowledge the superiority 
of Marxist logic and view with sympathy the elaboration of the 
‘Great Socialist Experiment’...Outstanding leaders in the realm
138 Frances Stonor Saunders provides an excellent survey of the CIA’s attempt to woo European 
intellectuals after 1948. Stonor Saunders, Cultural Cold War.
lj9 In this context several scholars have noted the promotion of avant-garde painting and music, some 
of it quite controversial. See, e.g.: Frank Ninkovich, “The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy: Art and 
the State Department 1938-1947,” Diplomatic History 1, (no. 3, Summer 1977). On avant-garde and 
classical music see also Stonor Saunders, Cultural Cold War.
140 W. G. Headrick (OMGUS Information Control Division, 1946) quoted in Stonor Saunders, 
Cultural Cold War, p. 20.
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of the arts and sciences are also exploited. 141
The notion of Soviet ‘exploitation’ reflected the prevailing constructions of the Soviet 
adversary as immoral, totalising, and highly instrumental in its use of culture and 
academia as a diplomatic instrument, prompting US policy-makers to consider how 
they might compete with the USSR on these terms. This constituted a move toward 
embracing the shared cultural traditions between Europe and America, as a foundation 
upon which Washington could build a better appreciation of freedom and a posture of 
influence among European cultural practitioners.
Richard Pells has reflected in some depth on these efforts by the US to 
promote its intellectual and high cultural achievements to the European intelligentsia 
during the late 1940s. He contends that US policy-makers, and State Department 
officials in particular, had difficulty understanding the sources o f social democratic and 
pro-Marxist sentiment among the intellectuals of Western Europe, and failed to 
effectively engage them during the post-war period.
It was the intelligentsia of Western Europe, more than any other 
group, whose refusal to distinguish between the United States 
and the Soviet Union most mystified and exasperated American 
policymakers. Edward Barrett, the assistant secretary of state 
for public affairs who was in charge of the campaign of truth, 
acknowledged Washington’s bewilderment: “We are stunned to find 
ourselves.. .persistently criticised by the intellectual elite of other 
nations. We are baffled when we find affluent, well-educated non- 
Communists in France or Sweden.. .groping publicly for a middle 
course.’ US officials felt that, of all people, Europe’s intellectuals 
should realise how much their own survival was at stake in the 
conflict between freedom and totalitarianism, between America’s 
reverence for civil liberties and the Stalinist repression of dissent.142
141 Public Information Committee, “The Soviet ‘Peace’ Offensive,” (December 1, 1949), p. 6; Policy 
Papers and Meetings, 1947-50 (PPM. 1947-50); General Subject Files 1947-50 (Subj. 1947-50); 
Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1947-1950 (ASPA 1947-50); General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park MD (NARA).
142 Pells, Not Like Us, p. 68.
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Yet as Pells further indicates, the development of a more instrumentalist approach to 
cultural diplomacy in the context of US grand strategy during the late 1940s had 
diminished the Division’s ability to engage in reciprocal and open cultural interchange.
Although a new effort to promote America’s ‘high’ culture prevailed as the 
US sought to engage European context after 1948, conveying America’s fundamental 
respect for individual initiative was still frequently highlighted as US cultural diplomats 
articulated the principles of American culture to the European public. Whereas a 
discourse of individual liberty had been a basis for attracting elite and public sentiment 
in the colonised world prior to 1948, US liberalism was also co-opted as a tool of 
ideological warfare in Europe after 1948. In this vein, in 1949 the State Department 
Public Information Committee guidelines suggested that, in counteracting left-wing 
critiques of the US in Europe: “Greater emphasis should be given the vertical mobility 
which characterises the fluid social structure of the US. It is useful in this connection to 
point to the proportion of worker-farmer children enrolled in American universities 
today.”143
Assistant Secretary of State George Allen, who replaced Benton in 1948, drew 
in a statement of that year on the underlying sentiment of American exceptionalism that 
underscored prevailing representations of US culture, including the idea of America’s 
singular social mobility. He characterised US policies as traditionally open and honest; 
Americans were “not obliged to present ourselves to the world as models of 
perfection,” hence:
[t]he primary advantage we have over the propaganda efforts of 
totalitarian states today is the fact that.. .[t]he United States has so 
many virtues to overcome the shortcomings that we need not fear 
the effect of our being thoroughly known abroad... We have the 
enormous advantage.. .that we are willing to admit our imperfections.144
143 Public Information Committee, “The Soviet ‘Peace’ Offensive,” (December 1, 1949); PPM 1947- 
50; Subj. 1947-50; ASPA 1947-50; RG 59; NARA.
144 George V. Allen, quoted in Lloyd Leheras, “Information Please, International,” The American 
Foreign Service Journal 25, (no. 9, 1948), p. 10.
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Such a statement belied the increasingly selective format that US cultural diplomacy 
initiatives were adopting in the post Smith Mundt phase. While State Department 
officials were also quick to condemn the USSR for rejecting US cultural and scientific 
exchange proposals in the late 1940s, by 1950 Washington was placing its own 
obstacles in the way of Soviet travel to the US with the first of two McCarran Acts, 
which restricted the number Soviet-bloc visitors allowed into to the United States.145 
Allen’s statement also belied the selective approach symbolised by instructions issued 
in 1948 to US government-run libraries throughout the world advising them to stock 
more explicitly anti-Communist literature, much of which had been directly 
commissioned by the US government. In a particularly embarrassing incident for the 
State Department in Germany, after being unsure of how to dispose of literature that 
was no longer allowed in the USIS library, the purged titles from the American library 
were destroyed in a bonfire outside the US Embassy.
However, anti-propagandism, reciprocity and openness remained key frames 
within both public and internal statements on Washington’s approach to cultural 
diplomacy. One policy statement on the library and book exchange program noted that 
despite the pressures of Soviet propaganda, liberalism and free speech remained the 
philosophical inspiration for the program.146 The US libraries abroad were thus a ‘vital 
responsibility’ because:
Leadership cannot assert itself through power alone. American 
leadership is meaningless if it isn’t built upon respect for our moral 
purposes in the world. This has been recognised by the American 
people from our earliest beginnings as an independent nation. Our 
Declaration of Independence speaks of a ‘decent respect’ for the 
‘opinions of mankind’. Everything of a major nature we have done in 
our history has taken into account such a ‘decent respect’ for the 
opinions of others. We are concerned about the opinions of others 
because a free nation has the obligation in the conduct of its foreign 
affairs to justify its actions before the world community.147
On the State Department’s condemnation of Soviet travel restrictions see: Department of State 
Press Release, “Efforts to Establish Cultural-Scientific Exchange Blocked by the USSR,” 
Department o f State Bulletin 3479, (April 3, 1949), P. 403. The McCarran Act (1950) is formally 
known as the Internal Security Act, and sometimes as the Subversive Activities Control Act.
146 Department of State, Report on the Book and Library Program, July 1953, Unpublished Report. 
Lauinger Library: Georgetown University.
147 Ibid., p. 64
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The ongoing relevance of America’s founding principles in the framing of America’s 
approach to cultural relations was also highlighted in an editorial in the Foreign Sendee 
Journal in 1951, which noted:
Periodically, for ourselves, we need a rediscovery of America, a new 
turning to the political foundations of our country, its religious forces, 
its literature, art and educational institutions.. .As this rediscovery of 
our own resources takes place the world will know it. For the world is 
hungrier for ideals than for gadgets. Let us therefore, in the midst of 
our planning.. .for the free world, reserve a special place for ideals.
These we need and these the world needs.148
These statements drew on longstanding themes within the discursive representation of 
US cultural diplomacy by situating the Washington’s global role as a manifestation of 
apolitical, reciprocal impulses. Yet behind this celebration of free speech a more 
narrow conception of cultural diplomacy, as an instrument of ideological warfare, was 
being adopted within Washington. Hence, articulating America’s tradition of free 
speech in this way seems part of the ‘irony’ of Washington’s Cold War posture that 
Reinhold Niebuhr identified, and also an indication that this ‘irony’ was a source of 
symbolic power within the US cultural diplomacy programs.149 Celebrating America’s 
commitment to liberalism was the grounds upon which engagement in ideological 
warfare was seen to be necessary after 1948, even though the tenets of liberalism would 
seem to contradict the kind of selective policies the Division was developed.
Conclusion
With the reorganisation of American informational diplomacy by President 
Dwight Eisenhower in 1953, the apolitical cultural internationalism that the staff of the 
Division of Cultural Relations had articulated during its existence as an autonomous 
Division was submerged within a broader self-regarding and instrumentalist approach
148 “Aims and Ideals: Editorial,” The American Foreign Service Journal 28, (no. 8, 1951), p. 26.
149 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony o f American History, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952), p.
133.
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to ideological warfare in Washington. With the National Security Council more 
heavily involved in shaping the objectives and approach of US cultural diplomacy, 
fewer opportunities existed after the 1953 reorganisation for a diversity of opinion and 
debate among policy-makers.
The pre-1953 period represents a phase in which the contradictions and 
challenges in framing a conceptual and discursive basis of American cultural diplomacy 
remained fluid and subject to contending perspectives. The discursive constitution of 
American cultural diplomacy was formative in the context of Washington’s identity as 
a hegemonic power because cultural and ideological issues were deeply bound up with 
the struggle against the Axis and the USSR undertaken in this period. The notion 
America had singular capabilities as a practitioner of cultural diplomacy, due to its 
political heritage, civic culture and reciprocal approach, served as a foundation for 
narratives that subsequently situated American culture as a global template of 
modernity and democracy. This narrative of liberal politics and civic cultural traditions 
had symbolic significance as a frame that depicted American national interests as non­
aggrandising or internationalist in character, a premise that was deeply resonant in 
policy debates concerning post-war US foreign policy. The modernising, technocratic 
logic that informed US cultural diplomacy within Third World contexts highlights the 
function of discourse in opening new avenues for foreign policy. Washington’s 
engagement with authoritarian regimes was made possible by the discourses of cultural 
modernisation in China, with democracy scripted as the outcome, but not the 
prerequisite, of American cultural and technical assistance. In all cases, while I have 
focused on the construction of Washington’s global role in terms of cultural diplomacy, 
many aspects of America’s broader foreign policy posture and entanglements were tied 
in with the representations of the US self and the international others Washington that 
sought to engage.
In a key sense, the cultural narratives that framed US cultural diplomacy 
objectives mobilised a vocabulary of American singularity and global vindication that 
resonated across the spectrum of US foreign policy discourse in the 1945-46 period and 
shaped the America’s global role more broadly. In the terms of this discourse the US 
could stand apart from aggrandising practices and promote democratic change in the
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post-war order on the grounds of its domestic cultural attributes and political virtues. 
This post-war exceptionalism also fed into the re-emergence of conditions of 
ideological struggle after 1947-48, and in key respects the paradox between liberalism 
and power was a generative tension that encouraged Washington’s deepening 
involvement in world affairs. The liberalising functions that policy-makers ascribed to 
cultural diplomacy helped to constituted the USSR, in a relation of alterity, as an 
inherent threat to the United States from 1947. Although some policy-makers 
expressed concerns that America’s identity was being compromised by the use of 
culture as an instrument of ideological struggle in the early Cold War, America’s 
singular ability to resolve these tensions also figured in the construction of the USSR’s 
of alterity and encouraged the adoption of a Cold War posture of cultural combat in this 
period.
I shall return to these observations about the broader characteristics of 
discursive practice and the formation of US cultural diplomacy policy in the concluding 
chapter of this study. In it I shall survey the discourses connecting American identity 
for its foreign relations and international influence across the three areas of policy 
examined here. In the forthcoming chapter, I turn to the discursive practices associated 
with the formation of US information policy during 1942-53. Similar patterns of 
representation to those which were undertaken in relation to cultural diplomacy can be 
detected, as policy-makers grappled with the ‘propagandists’ implications of unilateral 
information broadcasting by the Voice of America radio station, and in how the 
transition to a Cold War posture in US informational diplomacy was affected through 
the articulation of logics of alterity in relation to the USSR.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MOBILISING INFORMATION:
THE VOICE OF AMERICA AS A ‘JOURNALIST’ AND A ‘DIPLOMAT’ 1
The Voice of America (VOA) made its first international radio broadcast, a 
German news bulletin, on February 24, 1942. The feature was broadcast from studios 
located in New York City that had been hastily assembled in the 79 days since Japan’s 
surprise attack on the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbour. VOA’s mandate was initially a 
modest one, spanning three general objectives: to gamer public support for the Allied 
war effort among both neutral and allied populations; to undertake psychological 
warfare in Axis and occupied areas; and to convey general and unbiased news about the 
US and the war effort to both. Although the Executive Order establishing VOA had 
specified that the station would be given general policy direction by the Department of 
State, Voice staff in New York retained significant independence in determining the 
editorial and programming style of the station at its founding and into the early post­
war years. Consequently, the staff of the Voice tended to characterise their work in 
terms of VOA’s third objective- supplying unbiased news and information- during the
1 I would like to remind the reader at this point of some caveats issues the historical sources used in this 
chapter. I have drawn extensively on the archival records of the Office of War Information (OWI) and 
its successor agencies in researching this chapter. As the overarching authority with the responsibility 
for setting the Voice’s policy, the OWI’s records contain a large amount of evidence reflecting the 
discursive practices associated with US broadcasting policy. I would also remind the reader that here I 
almost always use the term ‘informational diplomacy’ to refer to the Voice of America alone, although in 
more general contexts one might use this term to cover such practices as international broadcasting, 
printed media, and film distribution collectively.
I have included evidence in the form of directives for general US information policy- covering the 
Voice as well as other components of the US information programs such as print and film- as well as 
directives that were specific to the Voice. Both general and specific directives are, I believe, important 
indications of the discursive practices of US informational diplomacy. The reader is referred to the 
introductory chapter to note that this chapter does not cover Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
Finally, the terms used here to cover the dual paradigms of VOA’s functions are ‘journalistic’ and 
‘diplomatic’ discourses. The ‘journalistic’ paradigm of US information programs was a term coined in 
Shawn J. Parry-Giles’s account of Eisenhower-era US informational diplomacy, and highlights the ways 
in which US informational diplomacy was represented as taking an apolitical, supplementary media role. 
I use the ‘diplomatic’ paradigm to encompass the more pragmatic, instrumental vision of the function of 
cultural diplomacy that many quarters in Washington held during the Second World War. See, Shawn J. 
Parry-Giles, The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955, (Westport: Praeger, 
2002) .
198
war and in its immediate aftermath. They represented VOA as far broader in scope 
than simply waging the military and ideological struggle of the Second World War, 
despite the fact that it was the circumstances of war that had enabled informational 
diplomacy to be contemplated as a feature of US foreign policy in the first place. 
Rather, from the outset the Voice constituted its role as having the wider objective of 
establishing a liberal information order and spreading democracy internationally, 
mobilising in the process a conception of America’s place in the world that was 
singular and embedded, and thus clearly distinct from what it had been the war.
In the case of VOA, with its unidirectional diplomatic format, the issue of 
how to clearly distinguish US information policy from ‘propaganda’ was particularly 
acute. Hence, the way in which policy-makers represented America’s information 
programs played a particularly important function in rendering information activities a 
possible and desirable component of US foreign policy. VOA’s stated function as 
seeking to both inform and persuade its audience placed policy-makers in something of 
a quandary: how could the underlying ideas about Washington’s liberal, rationalist 
credentials be embodied as an informational practice? On occasion the term 
‘propaganda’ was used in public or confidential contexts to describe the Voice’s work, 
but almost always in a qualified sense, with terms such as ‘true propaganda’ or ‘white 
propaganda’ coming into usage. Assistant Secretary of State Ed Barrett went so far as 
to suggest that Washington’s approach to international information was so 
fundamentally distinctive that it constituted an entirely new category of diplomatic 
practice, in which advocacy on behalf of US interests could be contemplated but “the 
old concocted type of horror stories were out of bounds.” Elsewhere Barrett stated that 
American information work could be called propaganda, but only ‘in the best sense of 
the word.’ ‘European’ power politics and the purely instrumental deployment of 
information was held up in contrast to Washington’s empancipatory and anti­
imperialist approach to international information in this period. Elmer Davis, who
2 Edward W. Barrett, “Oral History Interview July 9, 1974,” Harry S. Truman Presidential Library Oral 
History Project, Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, p. 5.
3 Edward W. Barrett, “Mobilization of American Strength for World Security,” Department o f State 
Bulletin 4012, (November 6, 1950), p. 735.
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made several interesting public addresses on the question of propaganda and US policy, 
echoed the ‘authorship’ idea mobilised in the context of US cultural diplomacy to argue 
that what was distinctive about the US programs was its intention.
It may be said that [State Department programs] must be propaganda 
in intention, otherwise why should the State Department conduct it?
... the intention is to see that foreign countries get a complete picture 
of what is going on in America.. .1 believe that in the long run that the 
total picture will create a good impression of the United States 
however bad things may look momentarily.4
In this context, an implicit narrative of America’s advancement along the path of 
modernisation was promulgated, which played up America’s historical break from 
Europe in casting the New World as an agent of global democratic renewal, global 
stability and economic liberalisation.5
In articulating the Voice’s broadcasting style as a unique kind of diplomatic 
activity- an ‘information’ effort not a ‘propaganda’ operation- US officials mobilised 
several elements of the inter-war anti-propaganda critique to articulate their new 
conception of American informational diplomacy. Grammars of predication classified 
US informational practices as seeking to affirm the American people’s repudiation of 
propaganda. This practice of predication was a key process in enabling Washington to 
undertake informational diplomacy. Informational policy-makers frequently located 
their work (in terms similar to the idea of an American culturalist constituency in the 
cultural diplomacy programs) as the voice of the American people amplified onto the 
world stage, downplaying in both internal and public statements VOA’s function as an 
instrument of Washington. Most significantly, the paradox between the foreign policy 
function and liberal principles that VO A encompassed was resolved through a dual 
discursive representation of the Voice. VOA was articulated as both a ‘journalistic’ 
institution that reported the truth and publicised American society and culture, as well 
as a ‘diplomat’ in simultaneously seeking to influence international outcomes and co-
4 Elmer Davis, “Address of Elmer Davis to the Chicago Rotary Club, 26 February, 1940,” p. 9; Box 4; 
Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, p. 9.
5 The logic of opposition is illustrated in the following piece: Alexander Rapoport, “The Russian 
Broadcasts of the Voice of America,” Russian Review 16, (no. 3, July, 1957), p. 3.
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opt global political attitudes.6 These descriptors created ambiguities and contradictions 
in VOA policy debates, particularly during the Second World War, and sustaining them 
required an ongoing rhetorical effort. Two quotes illustrate the contrasting 
vocabularies of the Voice’s composite role, the first rendering the Voice’s work in 
‘journalistic’ terms, the second emphasising ‘diplomatic’ contribution informational 
diplomacy could make to US foreign relations.
We must make the truth known to the peoples of the world. 
Truth in the world today is a political force.. .we will make 
plain the essential bond of common beliefs, and common 
interests that underlie differences in national customs and 
circumstances.7
While the American Government did not originate this new 
practice of appealing directly with foreign peoples, I do not 
regard the development as disadvantageous to us. Quite the 
contrary. I believe we can play the game as well as the next 
man, and much better than any totalitarian government can 
play it.8
In a post-war context these contradictory representations of the Voice worked more in 
the Voice’s favour, because sustaining representations of the station as both a 
journalistic and diplomatic institution gave the discourses of US informational 
diplomacy an elasticity and resonance in the articulation of a post-war informational 
program that either, in isolation, would not have provided. While the ‘diplomacy’ 
descriptor suggested that the projection of information was still warranted, the 
paradigm o f ‘international information/joumalism’ located the information functions as 
an expression of America’s liberal political culture. At different times, or to different 
audiences, either of the two characterisations of VOA’s role could thus be emphasised.
The journalistic paradigm was a particularly crucial in enabling the
6 I draw in this section on Shawn Parry-Giles’s discussion of the ‘journalistic paradigm’ of the US 
information programs. This was a theme in interviews I conducted with former VOA officials Walter 
Roberts, Alan Heil Jr., and Barry Zorthian. See Parry-Giles, The Rhetorical Presidency.
7 Dean Acheson, “Support for an Expanded Information and Education Program,” Department of State 
Bulletin 3913, (July 17, 1950), pp. 100-1.
8 George V. Allen, “Telling Our Side of the Story,” Department o f State Bulletin 3413, (January 13, 
1949), p. 142.
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information programs to be established in that it informed how VOA’s work was 
presented to an American public still wary of propaganda. This journalistic discourse 
signified that the Voice spoke not for the narrow interests of the US government but 
rather conveyed the broad and morally superior impulses of the US people. Yet 
according to its charter the Voice was as a mouthpiece for the US government in a way, 
for example, that its British equivalent, the BBC, was not. As Alan Winkler defines the 
Voice’s approach, the rationale for the station was a ‘strategy of truth:’ i.e. the 
journalistic techniques were qualified by the point that the Voice was nonetheless a 
foreign policy organ.9 To Congress and the Department of State, sceptical of VOA’s 
usefulness until the late 1940s, the diplomatic functions of the Voice were often 
asserted so that the station’s work could be viewed as worthy of ongoing funding and 
support when necessary, particularly in the context of the debates leading up to the 
1948 Smith Mundt Bill.10 The composite representation of the Voice was grounded in, 
and in turn reinforced, an underlying sentiment of American exceptionality after the 
war. In the terms of this discourse, the US could afford to be truthful and democratic in 
its attempts to persuade and attract international audiences. Actively pursuing 
informational influence was therefore not purely a self-interested act on Washington’s 
part but rather a process of international enlightenment.
From 1947, the articulation of US informational diplomacy shaped the new 
demands that had arisen with Washington’s emergence as a protagonist in the Cold 
War. When confronted with evidence of Soviet propaganda gains informational 
officials contended that a renewed informational program had, as during the Second 
World War crisis, become a matter of national security rather than a mechanism for 
international progress. Yet by continuing to insist that the information programs still
9 Alan Winkler, The Politics o f Propaganda: the Office o f War Information 1942-1945, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1978), p. 13.
10 There were particular difficulties for the Voice’s image in Congress, as the discussion below will 
highlight. See David F. Krugler, The Voice o f America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000). As Alan Heil explains, diplomatic traditionalists among 
the US foreign service and within the State Department had also been sceptical of the Voice, and 
discourses emphasising the diplomatic influence that international information could deliver were partly 
directed to these audiences. See Alan Heil, Voice o f America: A History, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), Ch. 2.
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inherently rejected the propaganda techniques, US information policy discourse 
maintained continuity between the demands of the emerging Cold War struggle and 
tenets of American liberalism. When these could be resolved, these contradictory 
propositions had a strong resonance in legitimating Washington’s conception of 
America itself as a Cold War protagonist. However, as the policy debates charted in 
this chapter show, while some information advocates reformulated America’s 
information effort into a posture of liberal absolutism,11 not all informational officials 
could accommodate the more selective style of US Cold War informational practices 
within the tenets of American political culture. Ambiguities and tensions were also 
present within the discursive representation of VO A and its place in US foreign 
relations in this period: US informational diplomacy was thus frequently a contested 
process in the years before 1953.
My account of the development of VO A in this chapter will proceed in the 
following stages. I first examine the founding of the Voice, and discuss how 
representational practices enabled the adoption of radio broadcasting in US foreign 
policy by actually incorporating into VOA’s policy lexicon the concepts of anti- 
propagandism that had featured in academic and public debates during the inter-war 
period. In surveying the Voice’s wartime activities I shall elucidate the key 
representations that shaped the (occasionally heated) debates over the nature of US 
information policy between the staff of the Voice in New York and their overseers in 
the Office of War Information in Washington. Emphasising VOA’s reluctance to 
engage in the manipulation of information functioned to situate America in broad terms 
as an agent of international openness and progress in a way that differed profoundly 
from the expansionist Axis powers.
I then turn to the 1944-46 period, which was marked by an effort to reframe 
the role of the Voice for post-war purposes. On the one hand, the compromises that 
had been demanded of the Voice when it transmitted psychological warfare broadcasts 
in conjunction with US military operations ended in 1945 and the journalistic functions
11 I draw on Louis Hartz in my conception of Cold War liberal absolutism. Louis Hartz, The Liberal 
Tradition in America: An Interpretation o f American Political Thought Since the Revolution, (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1955), pp. 58-9.
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of the station could be more freely expressed and embodied in this phase. The war had 
demonstrated how powerful propaganda could be as an instrument of war, opening 
space for supporters of an ongoing US information program to represent VOA as an 
essential tool for Washington to counter the subversive impacts of international 
propaganda in future. As had been contended in the pages of the Department of State 
Bulletin in 1945:
one can no longer rely simply on the understanding and knowledge of 
the politician and of the statesman for the formation of our foreign policy.
In the modem world the peoples as well as the governments participate 
in the formation and development of foreign policies.12
As we saw with the cultural diplomacy programs, however, funding cuts and unsettled 
bureaucratic arrangements undermined the Voice operations after 1945, since 
informational diplomacy had few supporters in Congress.
In addition to articulating the premise that radio had become an essential tool 
of international influence that must be seized by Washington, in the post-1945 phase 
the Voice’s functions were also framed in positive (as opposed to ‘zero-sum’) terms by 
international information advocates, as a source of substantive political progress that 
was as essential part of Washington's plans for the post-1945 peace settlement. 
International information was situated here as way to hold American up to the world’s 
public (particularly the decolonising regions) as a template for the spread of democracy,
ITself-determination, pluralism and liberal economics to underscore a new global order.
In this sense, the representation of international information fed into Washington’s 
embrace of a posture of post-war global restructuring and leadership. ‘Freedom of 
information’ was a doctrine of international communications articulated as a basis to 
promote Washington’s political goals during the post-war settlement. As the 
information programs’ Joseph Grew argued:
12 Dorothy Fosdick, “International Understanding: A Foundation for Peace,” Department o f State 
Bulletin 2346, (February 25, 1945), p. 296.
13 Dean Acheson quoted in W. Phillips Davidson, “Voices of America,” in Public Opinion and Foreign 
Policy, ed. Lester Markel, (Council on Foreign Relations Publications. New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1949), p. 157.
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International communications should and will expand beyond all 
recognition in the years to come, and it will be our responsibility as 
a people to see that this expansion will be a force for good and not a 
force for unmitigated evil as it would have been in the hands of our 
Nazi or Japanese enemies.14
The impact of the Smith Mundt Bill on informational and cultural exchange in 
1948, and the wider move toward global ideological struggle and liberal absolutism as 
the rationale of US informational diplomacy will then be examined. Here, I reflect on 
the contending ways in which US policy-makers viewed the early Cold War struggle. 
The increasingly instrumental language of VOA policy directives, particularly at the 
start of the Truman Administration’s Cold War information initiative known as the 
Campaign of Truth, will in this context be surveyed. I shall show how, despite strong 
dissenting voices within the information programs, the articulation of US informational 
diplomacy eventually helped to constitute Washington’s identity as a Cold War 
protagonist during the early 1950s.
Origins of the Voice and Early Developments
Although the US government did not adopt a policy of official international 
information broadcasting during the 1920s and 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt had made use 
of radio, his ‘fireside chats,’ for domestic information purposes from his 1933 
inauguration onwards. Radio infrastructure was well-developed during the inter-war 
period in the United States due to private enterprise, and international short-wave 
broadcasting had even been attempted from 1929 by both NBC and CBS via their own 
dedicated international frequencies. Advertising revenues proved too low for these 
operations to be considered viable as an ongoing project for either company, however, 
and as a consequence American international radio infrastructure was relatively 
underdeveloped until the early 1940s.15 Some philanthropic interest in international
14 Joseph Grew, “Freedom of Information,” Department o f State Bulletin 2346, (June 17), p. 1098.
15 It was on the basis of this prior neglect of international broadcasting operations that the prominent US 
information advocate Robert Sherwood had urged that government broadcasting be undertaken by a new 
and wholly government-run radio operation rather than by the corporations being engaged by the 
government to undertake this work. Robert E. Sherwood, letter to William J. Donovan, (July 12, 1941),
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short-wave broadcasting had been tentatively shown prior to 1942, but this was on a 
small scale compared with the international educational, developmental and cultural 
activities that had been pursued by the major US foundations and was built on by the 
State Department after 1936. One former information official has estimated that only 
seven philanthropic international short-wave broadcasters were in operation at the time 
of VOA’s establishment, all of which were requisitioned by the government operation 
in 1942 along with the dedicated short-wave frequencies owned by NBC and CBS.16 
VOA therefore had far smaller non-government precedents to draw on at the start of the 
1940s in both operational and rhetorical terms than the bilateral cultural diplomacy 
programs.
By the late 1930s, many of the American academics and commentators who 
had been staunch critics of propaganda in the 1920s revised their views in light of the 
spectacle of Nazi propaganda successes, and began to consider how an official US 
information program might be perfected for the purposes of mass mobilisation and 
public morale-building in the event of US involvement in another general war. The 
Pulitzer prize-winning playwright Robert E. Sherwood went to some effort in this 
context to cast an official informational policy as an acceptable policy strategy in 
Washington, as did Leo S. Rowe, director of the Pan American Union, who had long 
been a prominent supporter of the idea of an official information program to promote 
US interests in Latin America.17 There was even some Congressional support for the 
idea of a US informational diplomacy program: three bills to establish a US 
government short-wave broadcasting program had unsuccessfully been presented to the 
House by Congressman Emmanuel Celler from 1937. The US government Office of 
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs run by Nelson Rockefeller had also begun to
p. 2; bMS Am 1947 (1101) Robert E. Sherwood Personal Papers. By permission of the Houghton 
Library, Harvard University.
16 Former IBM vice-president Walter S. Lemon funded one such philanthropic operation: a station 
located in Boston called WRUL. One staff member who had volunteered with this station and went on to 
work for the Voice noted internationalist sentiments and journalistic values that these small-scale 
philanthropic broadcasters had adopted, which were carried on by the Voice. William R. Tyler, “Oral 
History Interview December 1, 1987,” Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. Georgetown University 
Lauinger Library Special Collections, pp. 5-9.
17 Shulman, The Voice o f America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945, (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 38-9. Rowe had been former chief of the Latin America Division at the 
Department of State, and had urged that the US government adopt an official radio operation since the 
1920s.
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channel funding into philanthropic short-wave broadcasting to Latin America from 
mid-1941, delivering programs with a mixture of advertising, language-instruction and 
entertainment. An undated memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller’s Office had 
informed the President that its information work was intended:
to encourage the fair presentation of news which will indicate to Latin 
Americans that there are many things in their life and culture which we 
respect and admire. It does this in the belief that the irritation in these 
countries towards us has grown out of a lack of appreciation on our part 
of their achievements and culture, and that admiration thereof will 
stimulate greater good will.18
The US Navy also possessed short-wave frequencies which it had used for ad hoc 
broadcasting to Latin America in the 1930s, which it leased to the Voice in 1942.
These assorted broadcasting activities were not well-known by the American 
public or even in Washington and they lacked coherent objectives.19 Despite the fact 
that many of the American ‘interventionists’ within and outside government during the 
late 1930s had argued that the US must confront Axis military expansion with an 
information program, a taboo against overt government propaganda still remained at 
the political and public levels. It was not until the founding of the Voice that a clearly 
defined rationale for US international radio broadcasting with a clearly identifiable 
agency and approach developed. With the establishment of the Voice an effort to 
discursively construct America’s role as an international information agent in terms that
18 Nelson Rockefeller, Program o f the Communications Division, undated; Box 5; President’s Official 
Files 1933-1945; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park NY, p. 2.
19 Arndt’s assessment of Rockefeller’s work is particularly scathing, and few accounts of the radio 
programs even bother to mention these early efforts in Latin America. Richard Arndt, The First Resort of 
Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 
2005).
20 The work of the Coordinator’s Office was also a significant development in the context of a US 
information policy because the Office argued that an effective information program had to encompass all 
forms of media such as print, radio and film, with the Office sending an advisor to Hollywood in order to 
ensure that US films could be more useful abroad. Rockefeller’s office observed in this context that 
“unconscious practices...have made motion pictures a source of trouble to our public relations in these 
countries. This trouble has arisen from practices of two kinds: first, the production of films containing 
characters or incidents offensive to [Latin American] people; second, the showing of films reflecting 
unfavourably on our own life, such as Mr Smith Goes to Washington.” Nelson A. Rockefeller, Program 
o f the Communications Division, p. 6; Box 5; President’s Official Files 1933-1945; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park NY.
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were congruent with American political culture as well as international circumstances 
was first undertaken.
After two decades of considering an official US propaganda program 
unnecessary to US foreign policy, in 1936 the Department of State set out to survey the 
ad hoc elements of official information distribution that had been taking place under 
and beyond its auspices, presumably with a view to determining how feasibly these 
might be consolidated into a sharper informational instrument for US foreign policy.21 
Franklin Roosevelt made no equivocal statements in support of an official US 
international propaganda policy in this pre-war phase, however he did appoint a special 
committee in 1940 to study allied war propaganda and determine the role of 
international information in the Axis’s early victories in Europe.22 Under the 
Committee’s auspices one of Roosevelt’s political advisors, William Donovan, 
travelled to the UK to study British fifth-column work as a prototype for a US 
psychological warfare/intemational information program in the event that the US joined 
the war.23
Early in 1941 the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OIC) was 
established within the Department of State under Donovan’s directorship. OIC was 
intended to serve as a propaganda monitoring division but lacked the mandate to 
conduct a comprehensive international information program.24 Robert Sherwood was
21 Claude G. Bower, “Rebel press Attack on the United States at Lima: Confidential Report for Secretary 
and Under-Secretary, December 7, 1938;” Box 76; President’s Secretary’s File 1933-1945; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.
22 Although Wallace Carroll reports that Roosevelt shared the public’s concerns that propaganda was an 
‘un-American’ practice, I would suggest that this overlooks three well-known aspects of Roosevelt’s 
leadership style and political views. Firstly, Franklin Roosevelt did not seem overly troubled with the 
consolidation of government power or the ‘imperial’ presidency as he pursued the expansion of the 
powers of the Executive office, and sought (unsuccessfully) to stack the Supreme Court after it blocked 
elements of the New Deal legislation. Secondly, Roosevelt was a skilled politician who shared his ‘real’ 
views with very few people, and it is difficult to say with any certainty what he thought of an American 
propaganda policy. Finally, Roosevelt was an interventionist and in this period sought to assist the Allies 
in any way possible. It thus seems unlikely that he would have had any political scruples concerning the 
use of international information given his ardent interventionism. See: Wallace Carroll, Persuade or 
Perish, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), p. 23.
2j Donovan also forged connections with British intelligence officials during his visit, paving the way for 
extensive cooperation between the Allies in the areas of covert operations and psychological warfare as 
well as propaganda during the war. Shulman, Voice o f America, p. 14.
24 The Office was established by presidential directive, not Executive Order, and as such Congress had 
no oversight role whatsoever in relation to the US information operations in this pre-OWI phase.
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installed as the head of one of OIC’s divisions; the US Foreign Information Service 
(FIS), in mid-1941. At the same time as these new offices were established in 
Washington, a government short-wave operation located in San Francisco had also 
begun to broadcast ‘official’ US perspectives to Asia, but as was the case with the Latin 
American broadcasts of this period the San Francisco operation had no clear policy 
direction, no apparent State Department sanction, and an ad hoc broadcasting schedule. 
These activities of these various offices collectively constituted the beginnings of US 
official informational diplomacy, but they were hampered by vague delineations of 
policy responsibility and a lack of clear political sanction. OIC did not even report 
directly to the White House. Nonetheless, Donovan and Sherwood both had the 
confidence of Franklin Roosevelt and consequently a strong informal conduit existed 
between the Presidency and these early information functions.
In the two years prior to the Pearl Harbour attack, some quarters of US 
government had begun to assess whether Washington could speak out on behalf of 
democracy in a time of ideological struggle, partly as a consequence of the 
interventionist lobby. Presidential advisor Harry Hopkins, for example, appeared to 
support the suggestion that the US should develop morale-boosting information 
features to broadcast to the British and European nations fighting Nazism in this period. 
One 1941 memorandum retained within Hopkins’s political files emphasised that a 
stable post-war order would be contingent on Washington’s willingness to export its 
ideology:
We must immediately set about the business of developing and 
educating an American leadership which will grip the imagination 
of mankind.. .[This is a] whole new phase in which the struggle for 
democracy- a positive phase, from which will emerge the concept 
of a new industrial democracy upon which the American people 
can found their faith. The President, who represents democracy to
9 Sall the world.. .is the man to launch this new future.
A gradual shift toward self-representations that depicted a much more engaged, 
ideological and transformational global role for Washington was steadily gathering
2:1 Russell W. Davenport to Harry Hopkins, (June 16, 1941), Attachment: “Memorandum,” p. 3; Box 324; 
Papers of Harry L. Hopkins Papers; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.
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pace prior to Pearl Harbour. Sherwood had written to Donovan in mid-1941 to argue 
that in a time of ideological struggle in Europe the US government urgently required its 
own media outlet:
consisting of [presenters and researchers] who are good linguists 
and are able to follow all foreign broadcasts in all languages, news 
men, psychologists, first-rate writers, artists, actors, musicians,
[who must] carry on a twenty-four hour a day program. There is no 
way in which our right to do this can be challenged for the Axis is 
waging a radio war against us and has done so for years.26
In this piece Sherwood characterised the Axis radio broadcasts to Latin America since 
the 1930s as amounting to ‘war’ against the US, charging that Washington should adopt 
a ‘positive program’ as a legitimate response to this encroachment on its sphere of 
influence. On the question of how Washington should construct an official American 
information program, Sherwood contended that some propaganda techniques could be 
legitimately incorporated into a US program given the emergency of Nazi 
expansionism. He thereby noted the necessity of “a definite policy...a specific 
objective” and that the US program “must stick to the same thing in a thousand 
different forms of expression.”z7
Sherwood’s public writing also developed this theme. He emphasised in a 
1940 play entitled There Shall be No Night that America already led the world by 
example in the struggle against totalitarianism.28 Sherwood had also publicly stated
26 Robert E. Sherwood, letter to William J. Donovan, (July 12, 1941); bMS Am 1947 (1101) Robert E. 
Sherwood Personal Papers. By permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University, p. 2.
27 Ibid., p. 2.
28 Whereas Sherwood’s previous plays had been explicitly anti-Fascist, There Shall Be No Night tells the 
story of the Finnish resistance against the Soviet invasion in 1939-40, and develops the theme of 
equivalence between Communist and Fascist authoritarianism. The subtext of the play’s closing scenes 
is the role of America as a beacon of democracy to occupied lands. As a character in the closing scenes 
of the play declaims: “I have often read the words which Pericles spoke over the bodies of the dead, in 
the dark hour when the light of Athenian democracy was being extinguished by the Spartans. He told the 
mourning people that he could not give them any of the old words which tell how fair and noble it is to 
die in battle. These empty words were old, even then, twenty-four centuries ago. But he urged them to 
find revival in the memory of the commonwealth which they together had achieved; and he promised 
them that the story o f their commonwealth would ever die, but would live on, far away, woven into the 
fabric o f other men 's lives. I believe that these words can be said now of our own dead, and our own 
commonwealth. I have always believed in the mystic truth of the resurrection. The great leaders of the 
mind and the spirit- Socrates, Christ, Lincoln- were all done to death that the full measure of their
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that: “The Nazis have established the world’s most thorough despotism, trampling over 
the decayed body of liberty to achieve authority; we still strive to perfect the world’s 
finest democracy,” and that decisive intervention against Nazism in word (and deed) 
was therefore incumbent upon the United States.29 Alan Winkler has characterised the 
staff that were recruited to found VO A as having been drawn from the sector of the US 
media and intellectual community exemplified by Sherwood, who, as “liberal and 
articulate interventionists,... had a vision of their nation’s responsibility in the war.” In 
advocating a response to fascist ideology that propagated American liberal political 
culture internationally, the interventionist lobby had already “determined the basic 
[ideological] directions the information program would take.” 30 Narratives of global 
modernisation and technological integration were situated as inexorable forces that had 
pulled the US into this struggle. Hence, there was frequent reference in policy 
announcements and debates to the fact that new radio technology had enabled Germany 
to spread propaganda within the Western Hemisphere. These representations 
subsequently enabled US informational advocates to situate the VO A as a defensive 
response to these new technical realities rather than an endogenous expression of the 
drive to domination or conquest.
Accompanying these early representations of the Axis propaganda threat was 
also a developing conception that the US could craft an ‘information’ program that 
embodied the tenets of US political culture, distinct in tone and objectives from the 
‘propaganda’ of the European states. References to a truthful or democratic approach 
and empancipatory impacts had been made by the interventionists, though at the same 
time it must be noted that Sherwood had also seemed to embrace some traditional 
propaganda techniques as a basis for a US information program. Radio broadcasts are,
o 1
by definition, unidirectional and hence essentially unilateral diplomatic practices. 
Therefore unlike the cultural diplomacy programs the information advocates could not 
begin with a clear conception of what an American ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’
contribution to human experience might never be lost.” My emphasis added, Robert E. Sherwood, There 
Shall Be No Night, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1941), pp. 175-6.
29 Robert Sherwood (1939-40) quoted in Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda, pp. 16-7.
30 Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda., p. 8.
31 Some efforts were made to incorporate written listener feedback into radio segments and 
incorporate a diversity of voices from within the US, but the fact remains that the Voice was 
essentially a unidirectional process of communication.
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information program, as distinct from the propaganda of others, might look like. How 
was information to be made into an effective instrument of US foreign policy, while at 
same time remaining attentive to, and indeed palpably embodying, a liberal political 
culture? In the next section I shall survey how VOA’s staff responded to this quandary 
associated with establishing the tone and approach of the American international 
information program.
Pearl Harbour: Discourses of American War Information
After the Pearl Harbour attack and the US entry into the Second World War, 
the White House was given the requisite emergency legislative powers sufficient to 
formalise and extend the existing ad hoc US information operations. Roosevelt 
immediately expanded OIC and FIS into a worldwide US information and 
psychological warfare program, instructing Sherwood to find staff and establish 
production studios for an official, multilingual short-wave broadcasting operation as 
quickly as possible. The operation was to be located in New York in order to draw on 
the expertise of the major US media corporations located there. By early 1942 the 
range of functions Roosevelt had granted OIC was found to be too narrow, and the 
Office was disbanded in 1942 to be replaced with an Office of War Information (OWI). 
FIS was integrated into the new office as OWI’s international branch. As a reflection 
of his special interest in fifth-column work (and given his pattern of frequent 
disagreements with Sherwood during 1941) William Donovan was placed in charge of 
US psychological warfare operations as head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 
precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency, within the Department of Defence.
The OWI’s top echelons had been given responsibility for setting and 
harmonising policy across the censorship, international and domestic information 
programs all covered by the Office. Despite this demarcation of responsibility, 
however, disputes between Sherwood, Donovan, and the newly appointed head of OWI 
Elmer Davis over how to harmonise the tone and functions of the international
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information program became a significant operational problem for the Voice.32 OWI 
also had a difficult relationship with the Department of State: the Office was ostensibly 
separate from State, reporting directly to the White House, but conflicts between the 
two developed because the Office had been given wide-ranging powers that often 
overlapped those of the State Department.33 These broader disputes over the direction 
of VOA policy were exacerbated by the basic ambiguities and tensions in the Voice’s 
rationale and approach. From its inception VOA officials were forced to operate within 
contradictory journalistic and diplomatic paradigms. Davis and other State Department 
officials in Washington frequently urged the Voice to utilise any means possible to 
secure diplomatic results, while Sherwood and the New York staff imposed journalistic 
strictures on their own work as a way to ensure the Voice’s credibility among 
international audiences and remain cognisant with American political culture. Hence, 
effectively representing VOA to its international and domestic constituencies and well 
as to its overseers in Washington was a key challenge for the New York staff in this 
early phase.
The Voice’s first broadcast was directed to Europe, in German, in February 
1942. In what has since been regarded as the founding public declaration of the 
Voice’s journalistic ideals, the broadcast began with an assurance to its audience that 
“[t]he news may be good for us. The news may be bad. But we shall tell you the 
truth.”34 The renowned radio producer John Houseman produced this first broadcast 
and emerged as a key figure in encouraging the journalistic paradigm within the 
Voice’s early programming. Houseman had most famously collaborated with Orson 
Welles on War of the Worlds, and had been approached by Sherwood soon after Pearl
32 Davis tended to concentrate his efforts on the domestic functions of the Office of War Information, but 
nonetheless did not have a good working relationship with Sherwood. The hostility between Donovan 
and Sherwood, both of whom had strong views on how the international information programs should be 
operated, became particularly problematic during the 1940s. Donovan, as an advocate of psychological 
warfare without scruples, was one of the key figures engaged involved in the information policy debates 
in Washington. His approach particularly rankled with Sherwood, who wished to preserve the 
journalistic integrity of the Voice as an embodiment of American democracy. See, e.g.: Holly Cowan 
Shulman, The Voice o f Victory: The Development o f American Propaganda and the Voice o f America, 
1920-1942. PhD Dissertation, (University of Maryland, 1984), Ch. 8.
33 See: Ibid., pp. 140-1.
34 Voice of America, “Introduction to VOA,” http://www.voanews.com/english/About/introduction-to- 
voa.cfm (accessed November 2, 2006).
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Harbour to help set up the Voice studios and supervise the building of its radio studio 
infrastructure. As chief of the VO A Radio Program Bureau Houseman was an 
outspoken proponent of the ‘truthful’ rendition of the Voice’s work. He reflected 
subsequently that in early 1942 “we had little choice,” the news for the Allies was 
“almost all bad” and the US had no choice but to avoid dishonesty or “weaselling.” But 
in this way VOA had also established a “reputation for honesty that we hoped would 
pay off on that distant but inevitable day when we would start reporting our own 
invasions and victories.” Elsewhere, Houseman described the approach of the early 
Voice operations as having had “absolutely no direction from anyone as to what we 
should broadcast other than the truth.”35
Alongside his conviction that a truthful approach would best serve America’s 
interests and most effectively convey the essence of America’s political culture to 
international audiences, Houseman brought to the Voice expertise in radio drama and 
encouraged his staff to find ways to incorporate dramatic techniques in VOA features. 
As Alan Heil notes, a key difference between the Voice and other Western international 
broadcasters such as the BBC in this period was VOA’s adoption of this dramatisation 
style. Even factual programs such as America Calling Europe used dialogues, sound 
effects, and music to present American perspectives and boost Allied morale.36 As one 
British observer noted, the Voice’s resemblance to radio serials and advertising created 
a tone that was “hammy.. .rather like selling.. .toothpaste, urgently.”37 Interestingly, the 
question of whether the Voice’s adoption of dramatic techniques could be thought of as 
a propagandistic strategy; whether it was appropriate to enhance the emotional purchase
35 John Houseman quoted in Heil, Voice o f America, pp. 35-7. Due to the time-pressures of news 
production, translation and operating around European time-zones, VOA scripts were rarely sent to 
Washington for approval.
,6 Heil, Voice o f America, pp. 37-8. Shulman reinforces the distinctiveness of VOA’s dramatic style, 
citing John Houseman’s recollections about the philosophical differences between his (and the Voice’s) 
dramatic approach and the pre-war work of some of the more stringent journalists at the Voice: “For 
them...the news was an essential and inviolable thing...[but] to me it was the raw material from which it 
was my job to fashion shows.” Houseman (1979) quoted in Shulman, Voice o f Victory, p. 301. In 
Shulman’s own terms, John Houseman brought ‘show business’ to the Voice. Shulman, Voice o f 
Victory, pp. 301, 312-3.
37 Shulman, Voice o f Victory, p. 336. Other official British views of the Voice’s function were more 
positive, however, with one official from the Ministry of Information reflecting that the exuberant and 
dramatic qualities of the VOA’s broadcasting was important for “keeping alive and stimulating the 
democratic view of life and of stating as powerfully as possible the achievements and purposes of 
democratic nations.” Unnamed official quoted in Shulman, Voice o f America, p. 43. VOA officials, on 
the other hand, often charged the BBC with being too heavily censored.
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of US broadcasts through dramatic techniques, does not appear to have been a point of 
debate among Voice officials in this period despite their wish to avoid ‘manipulative’ 
practices. Like Houseman, Robert Sherwood’s tendency was simply to state that the 
Voice’s wartime role affirmed the spirit of American democracy and was thus 
historically resonant on a global scale despite the specific techniques adopted. In 
policy directives and public statements Sherwood frequently expressed the conviction 
that the Voice had developed a unique style in international persuasion that embodied 
America’s democratic qualities: “the truth, coming from America, with unmistakable 
American sincerity, is by far the best form of propaganda.” By framing the VOA’s 
work in this way, the representation US informational practices by the New York staff 
sought to show how it was necessary for Washington’s wider foreign policy objectives 
that America be seen as standing apart from the illiberal, coercive practices of the 
totalitarian powers as it extended its influence into the international system.
In addition to news, the Voice broadcast informative features, music and 
serials on themes relating to both the war and American politics and society in general, 
and efforts were made in many programs to tailor broadcasts to particular sectors of the 
VOA audience. In one 1942 broadcast, for example, the women of France were 
addressed by francophone American women to support the French Resistance, who 
noted that their own husbands and sons were “out there fighting for freedom, same as 
your boys” and that “the American people are putting their whole soul into the job of 
winning the battle for freedom.”39 US labour leaders informed the left-leaning workers 
of Europe that the economics of war had set in motion a “process of levelling, a gradual 
evaporation of privilege, an extension of social and economic security, and an 
advancement of democracy” in US society.40 Dramatisations of key episodes in Latin 
American history were beamed south via the Voice in a radio serial portraying the 
Western Hemisphere as a ‘New World of Peace,’ narrating the successes of the Good
38 Robert Sherwood quoted in Winkler, The Politics o f Propaganda, p. 76.
39 Voice of America, “French Women;” Recording; Sonic Catalogue Reference: LWO 5554 GR 13 8A4; 
Library of Congress Recorded Sound Archive.
40 Voice of America, “Labour Voices from America;” Recording, Sonic Catalogue Reference: LWO 
5833 GR 34 13B3; Library of Congress Recorded Sound Archive.
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Neighbour Policy as a basis for Washington’s objectives for the post-war global 
order.41
Archibald MacLeish, whose role as Assistant Secretary of State for Public 
Affairs led him to comment frequently on the information programs, refashioned the 
terms of the inter-war propaganda critique in repeating Sherwood’s view that the 
journalistic tone of the Voice connected America’s democratic global aspirations to its 
informational practices.
The government of a democracy, by virtue of its existence as a 
democratic government, has a very different function in relation to 
the making of opinion. It is the government’s function to see to it 
that the people have the facts before them- the facts on which 
opinions can be formed.42
As the policy liaison between VOA in New York and the OWI in Washington, James 
Warburg represented US informational diplomacy as part of an epic ideological 
struggle between “those who want freedom for mankind and those who want freedom 
for themselves at the expense of others.” America’s wartime broadcasting policy was 
thereby framed in emancipatory terms, intended to inform the world that Washington’s 
plans for the post-war global order would prove to be “so permeated by justice that the 
majority of men will not be moved by violence.” 43
Holly Cowan Shulman’s account of the early years of the Voice emphasises 
that this founding group of officials, including Warburg, Houseman and Sherwood,
41 Voice of America, “This New World of Peace,” vols. 1 and 2; Recording, Sonic Catalogue Reference: 
LWO 5554 GR18 17A2-A3; Library of Congress Recorded Sound Archive.
42 Archibald McLeash public address (1942), quoted in Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda, pp. 13-4.
4’ Warburg (1941) quoted in Shulman, Voice of America, p. 22. James Warburg was another key 
information official at the Voice who strongly affirmed the journalistic discourses of VOA policy. He 
served in this period as Chief of Policy Planning for the Voice, a position that required him to act as a 
conduit between policy decision-making in Washington (as a member of the Overseas Planning and 
Intelligence Board) and the broadcasting operation in New York. Warburg had been a prominent New 
York banker during the 1930s, an outspoken interventionist after 1939 (he was a member of both the 
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and Fight for Freedom) and had joined Donovan’s 
OIC shortly before the Pearl Harbour attack. Warburg’s phrase that the State Department sought ‘order 
so permeated by justice that the majority of men will not be moved to violence’ was subsequently used 
by the Department of State in official publicity for the US’s war aims. James P. Warburg, Peace In Our 
Time? (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), p. 48. In 1944’s Foreign Policy Begins at Home 
Warburg urged that that US people think carefully about the opportunity for global reform that the war 
presented, so that effective institutions for global peace and reform be put in place. James P. Warburg, 
Foreign Policy Begins at Home, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1944).
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none of them career policy-makers, first mobilised the journalistic tenets that enabled 
Voice officials to situate their work as a symbol of American liberalism in subsequent 
years. As Alan Winkler has reflected, in the early phase the New York staff of the 
Voice “had no doubt about what they wanted to avoid. Fighting against fascism, they 
were insistent that their efforts bear as little resemblance as possible to those of the 
fascists.” The overwhelming sentiment was that “the United States, even in the context 
of a total war, could not afford...deception, which would only lend credence to the 
Axis charge that American ideals were hypocritical and hollow.”44 In this context, the 
New York staff at the Voice were particularly scrupulous to avoid the ‘atrocity’ stories 
that had been deployed for manipulative purposes during the First World War within 
British and US propaganda.45 The propagandistic implications of the Voice’s work 
were eased in this period by affirming the strictures of the Voice’s journalism and by 
framing this journalistic paradigm in turn as an expression of the tenets of American 
liberalism in an informational context. In the process, informational diplomats 
discursively constituted America’s global role as an exceptional, liberal power within 
the global order.
As the war progressed it became clear that OWI, which had been made 
responsible for setting the Voice’s policy direction and general editorial direction, had a 
decidedly more strategic or ‘diplomatic’ interpretation of the Voice’s role than the New 
York staff. OWI’s founding directive, Executive Order 9182, had defined the 
information programs as having a factual and informative basis but also encompassing 
advocacy in the context of US foreign policy. The Office was instructed to:
[fjormulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture, 
and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the 
development of an informed and intelligent understanding.. .of the 
status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, 
and aims o f the Government46
44 Winkler, The Politics o f Propaganda, pp. 19, 76.
4!> Shulman, Voice o f Victory, p. 351.
46 My emphasis added. “The Office of War Information;” Executive Order #9182, (June 13, 1942); 
Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953 (IIA. 1938-53); General Records
217
This rendition of the US informational functions encompassed some of the fundamental 
contradictions I noted above. Although it affirmed the significance of truth and a 
journalistic approach as a source of global progress, it also tied the rationale of the 
Voice to foreign policy objectives and hence to a ‘diplomatic’ understanding of the 
purpose of US international information. OWI director Elmer Davis, for instance, 
routinely cast the Voice’s role in quite selective and pragmatic terms:
OWI told foreign peoples the truth, but it did not tell them the truth for 
their entertainment or edification, it told them the truth to advance the 
interests of the United States; which meant that the selection of and 
emphasis of news sent to a particular country at a particular time was 
often determined by the need to support specific military or political 
objectives.47
The diplomatic function of informational diplomacy was also emphasised at a higher 
level: a 1942 memorandum to Franklin Roosevelt noted that, in waging the ideological 
struggle, the US information program must take a selective approach to informational 
practice, and should be guided exclusively by psychological warfare objectives. In this 
rendition the Voice would provide “interpretive news stories covering matter not 
covered, or not covered in full, through regular news channels.” In correspondence 
from one US diplomat in Britain to Sherwood ‘interpretation’ was situated as an 
essential component of an official program. There was:
an intense curiosity about America all over the British Isles. It 
will be either fed creatively or wisely by us, resulting in an 
understanding of the real America, or it will be fed haphazardly, 
resulting in misunderstanding and frustration., .the job of giving 
information cannot be distinguished from interpretation, and thus
of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, 
College Park MD (NARA).
47 “OWI Report to the President 1942-5,” p. 92; Box 4; Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress 
Manuscripts Division.
48 Unattributed, “An American Press Service Jan 11, 1942,” attachment to letter from George Fielding 
Elliot to William Donovan, (February 2, 1942), p. 5; Box 128; President’s Secretary’s File, 1933-1945; 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.
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from propaganda.49
Correspondence from the Secretary of State to the president within the first six months 
of the Voice’s founding similarly noted the “intimate relationship between the means of 
communication and the execution of American foreign policies,” and the importance of 
ensuring that the US government would maintain a system of “world-wide 
communication under such degree of Government control as to ensure that it will be 
operated in the national interest” in the post-war period.50
Although it is evident from the foregoing material that the Washington staff 
tended to mobilise a more instrumental understanding of VOA’s functions than those 
within the New York operation, the synthesis of both positions after 1945 served to 
produce a discourse of American identity that was able to accommodate liberalism and 
the pursuit of international influence, and which helped to constitute the new ways in 
which US policy-makers were articulating America’s position within the global order. 
During the war, however, this tension between Washington and New York proved 
difficult to manage and often hampered VOA’s operations, as the next section 
demonstrates.
Journalist, Diplomat or Psychological Warrior? VOA and the War Effort in 
Europe
Throughout 1942 the Voice’s operations had expanded rapidly. French, 
Italian, and English language desks had been added in the days shortly after the Voice’s 
first German broadcast in February. By April, VOA had started broadcasting 24 hours 
a day. In the same month VOA’s outpost in San Francisco was reporting a strong 
signal in Asia, and was planning to expand staff on the West Coast from 96 to 150.51
49 Herbert Agar to Robert Sherwood, (November 30, 1942), p. 1; Outpost Records 1942-6; Records of 
the Historian; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208; National Archives and 
Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA).
50 Cordell Hull, to the President, “Memorandum,” (June 29, 1942), p. 1; Box 71; President’s Secretary’s 
File; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.
51 Halifax, “From Washington to Foreign Office,” (April 17, 1942); FO 317/31779; Public Record Office 
of the United Kingdom, Kew. An analysis of how ineffective (from the US perspective) American
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By June, the Voice had 23 short- and medium-wave radio transmitters and was 
broadcasting in 27 languages. As one US official involved in wartime broadcasting 
noted, programmers at the Voice hoped to contribute to “morale building...making the 
people over there feel that victory would come in the end, that the United States was on 
the side of victory, as we had always been.”52 With this expansion of VOA operations, 
particularly into the European theatre of military operations, there came further 
challenges for VOA officials in terms of how to sustain their journalistic broadcasting 
practices and the liberal self-representations of the Voice operations that were connoted 
by the journalistic paradigm. Tensions about just how pragmatic and selective the 
information operations could legitimately be, and over how much Washington should 
compromise its political ideals to achieve desired military outcomes, were played out in 
these wartime policy disputes. The functions of discursive practice in relation to 
foreign policy-making are thus particularly apparent in this wartime phase of VOA’s 
operations. The liberal, self-critical journalistic paradigm that VOA officials had 
articulated in the founding phase led them to broadcast material that contravened the 
wishes of their superiors in Washington over the content of programming. Hence, the 
underlying issue that was contested during these disputes between New York and 
Washington was how easily American traditions of free debate could be maintained 
during the exigencies of warfare itself, and in light of the fact that the war itself was 
seen to have broader significance as a defence of democracy from the scourge of 
totalitarianism.
In early November VOA faced one its most significant wartime policy 
dilemmas when it was directed to undertake tactical broadcasting in North Africa as a 
psychological warfare component of the roll-back of Axis forces. During the Allied 
invasion of North Africa, codenamed Operation Torch and led by General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, VOA was instructed to broadcast into enemy areas and persuade the 
people of the region and the occupying Vichy forces that the invasion was the first step 
in the Allied liberation of Europe. Explicit directives for Voice broadcasts in the
propaganda was in Asia, due to the compromises made with British hegemony, can be found in Winker, 
The Politics o f Propaganda, pp. 82-3.
52 Tyler, “Oral History,” pp. 15-6.
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context of the Operation were issued from the Departments of War and State, and they 
significantly curtailed the journalistic freedom of the station. OSS head William 
Donovan was placed in charge of Voice programming in the context of Operation 
Torch, and he instructed the Voice to intersperse news, stories on Hollywood celebrities 
and American popular music with statements about America’s ultimate victory to have 
maximum persuasive effect with French troops.53
This psychological warfare operation proved to be a major concern for the 
New York staff, who felt the station’s integrity as a journalistic institution was being 
compromised. Of particular concern were instructions that Voice broadcasting must 
persuade the Vichy French forces and their Commander Francis Darlan to join the 
Allies. Darlan eventually did so, and was rewarded with an appointment as the Allied 
High Commissioner of North Africa.54 This became a watershed issue for the Voice 
news staff since many of the staff of the French desk were emigres that had fled the 
Vichy regime, and felt the US had compromised its most fundamental ideals by 
courting and rewarding Darlan. The French desk directly contradicted Donovan’s 
orders by running editorials to France overtly criticising Darlan and condemning the 
Vichy government for their fascist collaboration. The administration’s dealings with 
the Vichy commander were declared in these broadcasts to be ‘unsettling’ and 
‘ambiguous.’55 The psychological warfare demands imposed on the Voice during 
Operation Torch brought to the fore underlying ambiguities of VOA’s role that had 
been present since 1941. The episode led to criticisms of the Voice in Washington and 
further disputes with New York over VOA’s broadcasting approach.
The most controversial episode in VOA’s wartime broadcasting occurred in 
July, 1943. During the Allied invasion of Italy, VOA had broadcast an opinion feature 
in English branding Italy’s King Emmanuel III, who had been installed by US forces as
53 The theory here also was that if enemy troops were discovered listening to US broadcasts they could 
argue that the program was ‘music’ rather than political. “Memorandum: Operation Torch,” William 
Donovan to Franklin D. Roosevelt, (January 24, 1942); Box 128; President’s Secretary’s File 1933-1945; 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.
54 David Stafford, Roosevelt and Churchill: Men o f Secrets, (London: Abacus, 1999), pp. 192-4.
55 Winkler, The Politics o f Propaganda, p. 88. On the internal controversies associated with the US’s 
ongoing recognition of Vichy France see also Wallace Carroll, Persuade or Perish, p. 13. Shulman’s 
book on the French Desk at VOA has a detailed discussion of Operation Torch and VOA perspectives on 
Darlan and Vichy France. Shulman, Voice o f America.
221
the interim head of state, a ‘moronic little king.’ The editorial also described the US 
occupation of Italy as “a political minuet and not the revolution we have been waiting 
for.”56 The ensuing dispute between New York and Washington led to a reassertion of 
the OWI’s authority over US information policy-setting, and Elmer Davis demanded 
the resignation of James Warburg, as well as control desk chief Edd Johnson and the 
head of the radio news and features division Joseph Barnes. John Houseman had 
departed of his own accord shortly before the scandal, and Robert Sherwood was 
demoted and sent to London as an OWI liaison officer. Edward Barrett succeeded 
Sherwood as director of the Voice, and sought to impose a more instrumental rendition 
of the international information functions on Washington’s behalf. The journalistic 
paradigm propounded by founding figures as Sherwood, Barnes and Warburg had 
proved costly to the Voice, yet there remained an obvious determination within the 
New York operation to articulate policy in such a way as to repudiate a propagandistic 
or instrumental approach.
What is most striking about VOA’s insubordination during the Darlan and 
Emmanuel episodes is the contrast it presents with how the staff within the US 
informational diplomacy program saw themselves during the early Cold War. Whereas 
even at the height of the Second World War it was considered appropriate to criticise 
America’s allies on democratic grounds, later in this chapter we shall see how the Cold 
War posture of the US information programs became considerably more instrumental 
or ‘diplomatic’ on the question of whether it was legitimate for America to court 
authoritarian regimes than in the 1941-45 phase. Under Cold War conditions American 
liberalism would not be expressed through this kind of self-criticism, but rather by 
condemnation of Soviet totalitarianism and strident advocacy on behalf of America’s 
ideological system.
56 Voice broadcast quoted in Winkler, The Politics o f  Propaganda, pp. 94-5.
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Narratives o f Anti-Conquest and Anti-Propagandism in the Projection of War 
Information
Given Washington’s wide military responsibilities and the consequent 
expansion of America’s sphere of political involvement in world politics during the 
war, Voice broadcasting was also undertaken in Asia and the Middle East. In the 
context of these efforts, and linked to the journalistic paradigm situating VOA 
operations as an exemplar of democratic openness to debate, information officials 
represented their objectives as communicating America’s moral support and traditions 
of free speech in the interests of post-war democratisation and self-determination in 
colonised areas. The representation of VOA’s functions in information policy 
discourse fed into a broader shift in which Washington came to see a key pillar of its 
post-war role as fostering Third World modernisation and political independence. 
Narratives about America’s own path of democratic development and Washington’s 
anti-colonial foreign policy traditions implicitly fed into the characterisation of the 
practices and functions of US informational diplomacy. Hence, by conveying 
information, analysis and features on US society that could instruct the peoples of the 
Third World in how free societies operate, the US information programs constituted 
America as an exemplar of democratic politics and an anti-imperialist that would 
empower Third World peoples to seek to independently determine their own political 
futures. The policy debates surrounding the American information programs in China, 
for example, situated the modernisation and the democratic empowerment of the 
Chinese people as contingent on its adoption of Washington’s vision of the post-war 
global order. OWI policy guidelines from 1944 thus emphasised that the US policy 
should take the ‘broadest possible’ perspective on US national interests in Asia, and 
therefore set in motion a “long term process of bringing the Chinese people into the 
world community, so that they will be capable of keeping their own house in order and 
of making their independent contribution to the life of other nations.”57
57 Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, “Guidance for OWI Informational Work in 
Unoccupied China, Oct 24, 1944,” p. 2; Chronological File, 1944-45 (CF. 1944-5); Records of Archibald 
MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945 (MacLeish
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America’s own success as a republic of the New World that had risen to the 
status of world power would be an instructive example for China: US broadcasts would 
“show that our military success derives from a productive potential which is based on 
our political and social institutions.” 58 For China to adopt the role of a regional power 
in the way that the US had in the Western Hemisphere, information officers were 
instructed that:
To strengthen China internally, we must first of all try to convey 
to the Chinese a realisation of all the advantages to be derived 
from, and the techniques to be used for, the political organization 
of a country on a truly democratic basis. For this purpose we 
must present a picture of the workings of a genuine democracy 
elsewhere. We should also make plain the hope of the American 
people that China will develop toward real democracy in the 
political sense without interruption.. ..we must also show that a 
nation’s prestige and influence in the international sphere are closely 
dependent upon the degree to which it has succeeded, internally, in 
creating a healthy national economy and a governmental 
administration that enjoys the respect and confidence of its citizens.59
US information policy toward China was therefore framed by representations of 
America’s own democratic politics and its significance as a beacon of political 
development, as well as, implicitly, America’s distinction from an imperialistic 
Europe.60 US information policy debates represented the source of America’s strength 
as its commitment to individual freedom and America’s ability, following from this, to 
realise global common interests through its foreign policy. Not only was the 
embedding of American power in the Third World permitted by this discourse, it was 
also scripted as being warranted in the interests of global justice and prosperity.
1944-5); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and 
Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA).
58 “Memorandum,” George Taylor to Laughlin Currie, (May 7, 1943), p.3; Records Relating to the 
China, Burma and India Theatre, 1942-5; Records of the Historian; Records of the Office of the War 
Information, Record Group 208; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.
59 Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, “Guidance for OWI Informational Work in 
Unoccupied China, Oct 24, 1944,” pp. 2- 3; CF. 1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; NARA.
6 This was often emphasised in US dealings with Britain in relation to the post-war order in Asia. 
Stanley Hombeck, “Report of Mr Hornbeck on His Recent Trip to London on Postwar Problems in the 
Far East,” (October 28, 1943), pp. 3, 6; 791-13, Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State 
Department Records o f Harley A Hotter, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).
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Several memoranda on US information policy in the Third World also stressed the 
importance of affirming that the American search for economic ties did not amount to a 
search for commercial advantage or economic imperialism, once again casting 
Washington as a new, progressive and anti-imperial force in world politics.61
In the 1944-45 period policy directives and decisions surrounding the work of 
the Voice began to locate information broadcasting in relation to the requirements of 
the imminent post-war phase. In reflecting on post-war informational objectives, VO A 
officials continued to represent their work in terms of the distinction between the 
‘propaganda’ pursued by other international actors and the singular approach to 
information that was being crafted by the US. This discourse factored into the wider 
imagery in VO A policy documents of the integrative and liberal/progressive basis for 
American hegemony in the post-war global order. As one memorandum on post-VE 
day broadcasting policy cautioned:
We cannot say that.. .operations in Europe are to be exclusively 
either ‘information’ or ‘propaganda’. Our primary task is to 
present the United States itself and the United States Government’s 
war and peace policies as convincingly as possible in order to win 
respect for this country and support for its policies and aims. In the 
best sense of the word, we are primarily active propagandists for 
the United States.. ..In our radio, news and other media, we should 
not resort to evangelical persuasion. As before, we report, we quote, 
and we comment in a dignified, objective way. In general, we depend 
upon selection and emphasis for our propaganda effect in these media.62
Rather than embracing any means possible to promote a post-war settlement favourable 
to the US, American information officials represented the Voice’s challenge in the post­
war period as to continue to embody the truthfulness and openness that were hallmarks 
of American political culture. Archibald MacLeish had urged the Senate Foreign
61 Information Policy Committee, “US Information Policy in French Morocco,” (February 10, 1944), p. 
1; 1379-29, Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records o f Harley A. Hotter, 
(Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).
62 R. Edgar Moore, (probable author), Overseas Operations Branch of the Office of War Information, 
“Memorandum on Post-VE Propaganda,” (May 14, 1945), p. 3; CF 1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; 
NARA.
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Relations Committee in December 1944 that public opinion should be a key 
consideration in designing and implementing American plans for the post-war 
settlement, noting the:
basic change in the relation of peoples to each other which the modem 
development of the art and technique of communications had brought about... 
It would not be too much to say that the foreign relations of a modem state 
are conducted quite as much through the instruments of public international 
communication as through diplomatic representatives and missions.
In an undated draft statement on international information written during the war, 
Harley Notter had also claimed that given its vast economic and military resources, the 
US would be in a position to affect major global changes if it took seriously the 
emergence of public opinion as a key factor in world politics, and pursued the 
comprehensive international information strategy that was warranted by this shift.
With the victory of the United Nations, the United States will have to 
play an increasingly important part in world affairs. The likelihood is 
that the United States will emerge as a more vigorous entity than any 
other.. .Doubtless, new ideologies will develop.. .there will be a 
continuing struggle of democracy against totalitarianism.. .It is 
inconceivable that the international voice of the United States should 
be silent or remain weak in the post-war world that will be struggling 
competitively both in commerce and in ideologies.64
The Voice’s role in the post-war order was thus discursively represented as a function 
of America’s historical claim to global leadership. Washington was narrated as having 
in a new position emerging out of historical transformations that, axiomatically, obliged 
America to impart the lessons of its political development to the rest of the world. In 
this context a synthesis between the journalistic and diplomatic functions of the Voice
63 Archibald MacLeish, “Statement of Archibald MacLeish on his Appointment as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Public Affairs Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” (December 12, 1944); CF 
1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; NARA.
64 David Samoff, “International Broadcasting After the War,” attachment to “Subcommittee of the 
Division of Cultural Relations Report on Sarnoff Proposals,” (June 3, 1943), pp. 1-3; Miscellaneous 
Subject Files 1939-1950; Records of Harley Notter; General Records of the Department of State, Record 
Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.
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had begun to develop, in accordance with the hegemonic structure of pax Americana 
that was being planned in Washington in the closing stages of the war.
‘Threats to Our Virtue:’ Propaganda, Information and the Post-War Order
1945: The Voice ’s Positive Role
The significance of the Voice and the nature of its contribution to the Allied 
victory became a key topic of debate among the Voice’s New York staff and US 
information advocates in the aftermath of the war. This debate occurred as a result of 
funding cuts from 1945 that had forced US information officials to identify aspects of 
the VO A program to be discontinued, downscaled or delegated to the private 
corporations engaged by Washington to produce 40% of the post-war ‘VOA’ 
programming. In addition to these cuts and outsourcing arrangements, the Voice 
operations were downscaled as a consequence of the military taking over the running of 
the information programs in occupied areas such as Germany, Austria and Japan.65 The 
military were increasingly acknowledging the validity of informational and cultural 
activities as diplomatic instruments in this period, although this awakening had not yet 
extended to Congress, which remained highly sceptical of the Voice and its relevance 
to American foreign policy. The Voice was a costly operation among a set of 
informational and cultural functions that Congress had little time for, and cuts to State 
Department funding hit VOA particularly hard. The year 1945 had seen the Office of 
War Information with its highest ever appropriation of $54 million. This was 
downscaled to $40 million within a year, and cut even further after that. The Voice 
bore the largest share of the cutbacks. Several of the Voice’s foreign language services 
had to be discontinued completely in this period.
On August 31, 1945, even before Japan’s official surrender, the OWI and the 
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs were both abolished and their 
functions were transferred to an Interim International Information Service within the
65 See, e.g.: Henry Kellerman, Cultural Relations as an Instrument o f US Foreign Policy: The 
Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954, (Washington DC: 
US Government Printing Office, 1978).
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Department of State.66 On January 1, 1946 an Office of Information and Cultural 
Affairs was established, and given responsibility for setting informational policy. 
These funding cuts and the reorganisation forced many of the Voice’s staff back to 
private industry careers in journalism and radio production. Those who stayed, 
however, continued to articulate a journalistic approach for US informational 
diplomacy. They represented the Allied victory in VO A broadcasts, and in internal 
debates connected the journalistic practices that they had undertaken during the war, as 
a symbol of the creeds of democracy and justice that America most embodied of all the 
victorious powers.
When it came to representing the Voice’s objectives and approach in the 
immediate post-war context, Washington’s proposals for a post-war order built on the 
global embedding of liberal norms provided a better fit with the ‘journalistic’ discourse 
of the Voice than the combative approach that OWI had articulated during the war. 
This congruence between the role that VOA officials had claimed for themselves 
during the war and the order-building, integrative thrust of US foreign policy in general 
seemed to indicate that the New York operations and Washington were now in 
harmony, or working ‘positively,’ for the same international objectives.67 This 
congruence had not always been apparent during the war, particularly during the Darlan 
and King Emmanuel controversies. The State Department’s effort to establish a 
regionalist, multilateral and economically liberal global system, as well as its effort to 
bring about to political, educational and cultural rehabilitation in war-tom areas, served 
to affirm the liberal, progressive conception of American foreign relations that the staff 
of the Voice had claimed was the basis of their criticisms of US strategic policy during
/L O
the war. The democratic principles that underpinned Washington’s post-war plans
66 Edward W. Barrett, Truth is Our Weapon, (New York: Funk and Wagnels, 1953), p. 51.
67 The notion of a ‘positive’ phase is drawn from the following article in the Department o f State 
Bulletin: Henry Villard, “The Positive Approach to an Enduring Peace,” Department o f State Bulletin 
2256 (January 28, 1945).
6S Reform of the conditions of economic autarchy were emphasised in broadcasts to former Fascist 
occupied areas in the closing stages of the war. See, e.g.: Unattributed, “Propaganda For Italy” 
(undated); 791-18, p. 3; Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of 
Harley A. Notter, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987). The democratic kinds of 
information and cultural influence that the US must use in post-war occupations was noted in the 
following memorandum: L. W. Fuller, “Germany: Occupation Period: The Propaganda Ministry and the
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seemed to indicate to Voice officials, who during the war had felt removed from 
Washington’s concerns, that with the end of the war their democratic aspirations could 
find full expression.
Within this ‘positive’ rendition of the role of informational policy vis-ä-vis US 
grand strategy Voice officials situated ‘freedom of information’ as a pillar of America’s 
domestic information culture that could be applied internationally to facilitate 
Washington’s global liberalising objectives. The narrative elements that this discourse 
plotted how America’s belief in the free exchange of ideas had led the American people 
to reject propaganda during the inter-war decades. As a principle of US foreign policy 
in the coming era, this narrative suggested that freedom of information would serve to 
embed the traditions of American democracy and free debate within the international 
order. Archibald MacLeish, for instance, had represented freedom of information in the 
following terms:
We believe in the greatest possible freedom of.. .[international] 
communication. Freedom of communication, freedom of exchange 
of ideas, is basic to our whole political doctrine. But at the same 
time we cannot help but realise that complete freedom of 
international communication, particularly when that communication 
is instantaneous and has all the emotional urgency of immediate 
and first-known things, can be dangerous also. We have seen 
skilful and dishonest demagogues pervert the instrument of 
international communication to their own purposes without the 
knowledge of their victims.. .We should be less than intelligent 
and certainly less than realistic if we did not take account of 
these things in deciding how we propose to live in the world we 
shall have to live in.69
In expressing these sentiments, MacLeish sought to link the practices of the 
Voice to the liberal traditions of American political culture, and thereby scripted the 
relevance of these domestic principles to the international order. However, there was a 
caveat to the principle of freedom of information, as articulated by MacLeish, that 
reflected the position of global leadership and influence that the US was assuming.
Chamber of Culture,” (March 1, 1944); 1520-H-132, Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State 
Department Records o f  Harley A Notter, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).
69 Archibald MacLeish, “Popular Relations and the Peace,” Department o f  State Bulletin 2247, (January 
14, 1945), p. 50.
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Liberal informational principles would be enshrined within the global order, but in the 
early phases of the post-war order the US would also oversee and institutionally 
regulate the informational practices of other states. Dorothy Fosdick similarly noted in 
the Department o f State Bulletin that the international order had become a ‘democratic’ 
structure, but that Washington’s role in the regulation of international information into 
post-war order should nonetheless remain an active one.
.. .[0]ne can no longer rely simply on the understanding and knowledge 
of the politician and of the statesman for the formation of our foreign 
policy. In the modem world the peoples as well as the governments 
participate in the formation and development of foreign policies 
...If ill-tempered and irresponsible talk prevails, constructive efforts 
are imperilled. If men doubt each other’s purposes and misunderstand 
each other’s intentions, the hands of their governments in trying to 
organise the world for peace are seriously weakened.70
The inherently democratic and distinctive celebration of free information and individual 
autonomy within US political culture would thus distinguish the practices of pax 
Americana from the kinds of instruments through which totalitarian regimes had sought 
international dominance before the outbreak of the war. Partnership between the US 
government and America’s media corporations would provide a further impetus to 
embed the free exchange of information into the post-war era. The post-war moment 
had provided “supreme opportunity and responsibility [to] the communications 
industries to give such a truthful picture of America that the outside world will never 
again doubt our power and our devotion to the ideals in which we believe.”
In sum, post-war American discourses of international freedom of information 
had several dimensions. On the one hand, the principle was conveyed as an expression 
of the continuities between American domestic political culture and the constitutive 
principles of the planned post-war order: this was a self-reflexive discourse that 
connected America’s domestic creeds to its intentions as an international agent. In a 
related sense, freedom of information was articulated as an indispensable tool for the 
general pacification of world politics, by eliminating international public mistrust and
70 Fosdick, “International Understanding,” p. 296.
71 Joseph S. Grew, “Freedom of Information.” Department o f State Bulletin 2346, (June 17, 1945), p. 
1098.
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undermining propaganda as a tool of war and totalitarianism. But at a deeper and 
largely implicit level, the discourse of freedom of international information that US 
informational diplomats articulated was also tied to ideas about Washington’s ongoing 
position of leadership and entitlement to regulate the global order. Freedom of 
information was to this extent a circumscribed concept, designed to facilitate the spread 
of pro-Western information and consolidate the post-war order on Washington’s terms, 
as the forthcoming chapter’s discussion on Unesco will also illustrate.
By representing the Voice as a mechanism for the internationalisation of US 
political culture, supporters of US informational diplomacy presupposed that the 
deployment of America’s cultural and ideological resources, not only to advocate but 
also show by example the benefits of a democratic political system, was an essential 
accompaniment to the projection of material influence by Washington. As one 
information programming report from early 1945 put it, the Voice had been called upon 
by the peoples of the world to “impart, explain, and illustrate the working of the 
inherently democratic temper of the American people as it simultaneously expresses 
itself and reinforces its strength in the many-sided activities of free American 
citizens.” This point also appealed to the staff of the Voice in New York, who had in 
any case traditionally seen themselves as speaking for the American people rather than 
the government as such. With the global democratic discourse that accompanied the 
building of a new global order in 1945-46, the journalistic and diplomatic discourses of 
the Voice both easily applied and thereby synthesised.
In articulating the Voice’s ‘positive’ role in the post-war order, the open and 
transparent characteristics of the information program as a journalistic practice were 
also seen as a basis for the spread of America’s democratic norms internationally:
because we are convinced that America stands up well under 
examination and that knowledge of this nation fosters respect 
for it and confidence in it. We try to present a really balanced 
picture of America. To present the case for democracy not by 
argument but by example. The US believes that democracy is
72 Management Planning Office, Office of War Information, “Program Guide for France,” (April 1, 
1945), pp. 1.2.2-1.2.3; CF. 1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; NARA.
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the best form of government yet devised and that the country which 
adopts a democratic form of government is far less likely than any 
other to plunge the world into war. However, we do not help the cause 
of democracy by bluntly telling non-democratic countries that their 
forms of government are inferior. We should illustrate how democracy 
works here and let our audiences reach their own conclusions.73
Information policy was thus also depicted as a mechanism to ensure that the post-war 
settlement would not be regarded as the punitive exercise that Versailles had been. As 
with the US cultural diplomacy, the ‘internationalist’ character of America’s national 
interests framed assertions that Washington had developed an exceptional format for 
conducting international informational diplomacy in such a way as to promote, not 
undermine, democracy and free debate.
However, at the same time as informational diplomacy was being depicted as 
essential to consolidating the post-war settlement and a ‘positive’ congruence between 
the journalistic functions of VOA and US grand strategy could be asserted, the Voice 
was confronting a strong Congressional determination to cut foreign policy spending.74 
This created an awkward challenge for the Voice’s advocates: while attempting to 
assert the significance of the Voice’s positive role in relation to the international 
context of the post-war period, VOA officials also had to confront the issue that the 
instrumental or ‘diplomatic’ functions of international information were not seen to be 
sufficiently compelling by Congress to sustain a full-scale operation.75 Whereas the 
war had supplied the justification for the Voice’s establishment in the first place, the 
circumstances of war were represented by the Voice’s supporters as having been a 
temporary constraint on the purely journalistic function that its staff wished to pursue, 
yet it was this lack of ‘diplomatic’ credentials that Congress pointed to as evidence of 
VOA’s irrelevance to US foreign relations. Without the rise of Soviet hegemony in 
Europe in 1946-48 and the key US decisions to forestall Communism in Greece,
73 R. Edgar Moore, (probable author), Overseas Operations Branch of the Office of War Information, 
“Memorandum on Post-VE Propaganda,” (May 14, 1945), p. 2; CF 1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; 
NARA.
74 Krugler, Voice o f America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles.
75 On the Congressional critics of the information programs in this period see: ibid., Ch. 2.
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Turkey and the Western zone of Germany it is unclear whether the Voice could have 
continued to function on any significant scale.
The two most significant elements in the recovery of VOA’s stature within 
Washington after 1945’s funding cuts were the energetic advocacy for informational 
diplomacy undertaken by Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, and the 
establishment of a legislative basis for US informational and cultural diplomacy with 
the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill (Public Law 402) in 1948. Both came about as a 
result of general unease that was developing in Washington about Soviet expansionism. 
In presenting their views, both Benton and the supporters of the Smith Mundt Bill 
revived the rhetoric of global ideological struggle that had been mobilised in the 
Voice’s founding phase during the Second World War, arguing that the US had been 
thrust into an increasingly volatile and precarious political position vis-ä-vis Europe. 
These images of international volatility and threat that were mobilised as advocates of 
VO A sought to emphasise the salience of their work fed into more generalised 
principles in US foreign policy thinking in which America came to be situated as the 
key defender of democracy and guarantor of stability in Europe. In this sense, 
representation of VOA’s work in the late 1940s helped to constitute and enable the 
assumption of a Cold War posture of liberal absolutism in US informational diplomacy, 
and helped to constitute the ideological foundations of the Cold War struggle for a 
wider audience in Washington.
International Information and Cold War Advocacy: Benton, the Smith Mundt 
Bill, and the Return to a Diplomatic Role
The information programs gained an effective advocate in Washington with 
the appointment in late 1945 of the former advertising executive, businessman and 
president of the University of Chicago William Benton to the position of Assistant 
Secretary of State for Public Affairs. After the OWI was dismantled it was largely 
Benton’s vision of an ongoing American peacetime information operation and his 
considerable powers of persuasion that effectively resituated the Voice as an essential 
component in any US response to the extension of Soviet influence in post-war Europe.
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One of Benton’s most effective themes in arguing for an ongoing information operation 
was that US power was being undermined by a sophisticated, extensive and highly- 
resourced Soviet publicity onslaught. To an appropriations hearing in May, 1946, he 
predicated the functions of America’s international information program in the 
language of international security and national survival:
The course ahead for the United States in coming years will be at 
best a difficult one. We are determined not only to avert another 
war, but to build a living, abundant peace for ourselves and our 
wives and children. Let us not neglect any essential part of the 
structure we are erecting. The State Department information...
1  f \program is an essential part of the structure.
As Alan Heil notes, Benton became a key figure in the Voice’s post-war recovery by 
seizing on the ‘geopolitical tides’ of late 1946 in how he articulated US national 
interests, and by consistently noting the contributions that the Voice would make in 
pursuit of them. However, the imagery of Soviet threat that pervaded Benton’s efforts 
to revive US informational diplomacy had important implications for the changing tone 
and role of VO A in US foreign policy. Increasingly, the Voice was cast less and less as 
an exemplar of democratic politics in the discourses of US informational diplomacy, 
and was instead situated as a spearhead for US strategic interests. Drawing on concerns 
about the ongoing Soviet military occupation in Eastern Europe, the failure of the 
Allies to reach consensus over the future of Poland at the Potsdam Conference, and 
Winston Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech in October, Benton framed the challenge of 
US foreign relations in this period as overcoming ideological impasse in Europe, which 
had partly come about as a consequence of Congress’s reluctance to fund the 
information programs in 1945.
Hardly a day passes without some important decision or action being 
taken by Americans here or in London, Paris, Tokyo, Nanking or 
elsewhere- and each individual action poses a problem in world 
information. [We must explain] our actions and attitude toward
76 William Benton, “Statement to the US Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing 8 May, 1946;” 
State Department Appropriation Bill, 1947; Y4 Ap6/2:st2/947; (Washington, DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 1947).
234
Spain, the Balkan countries, Germany, Palestine, Japan, China,
Russia, Indonesia, Siam, Iceland, and a host of other countries, not 
only in terms of current decisions but in terms of the reasons for them, 
the goals we are trying to achieve, and their background in our history 
and development.. .the eyes of the people of the world are upon our 
internal as well as our international activities. The starving millions of 
the world wonder about the United States- how we live, what we do, 
where we are going. A strike in coal mines, an increase in living costs, 
a tornado in Kansas, a decrease in locomotive production, the colour of 
the bread we eat- all have a direct impact on the economic and living 
conditions of other peoples.77
In this vein, Benton urged for the renewal of America’s global ideological promise as a 
way to diffuse the sources of potential Communist subversion within a fracturing 
European geopolitical order.
Similar rhetoric depicting post-war Europe as a terrain of ongoing ideological 
struggle was also adopted by the Truman administration’s key foreign policy 
spokespeople such as Secretary of State George Marshall and Under Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson. Both increasingly attributed the problems of post-war governance in 
Europe to the “irreconcilable ideologies” of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. 
A key working paper prepared for the President on the need for economic aid in Europe 
had noted that in conjunction with material assistance, US interests demanded an 
equally strong effort to transmit public information and explain the “conflict between 
free and totalitarian or imposed forms of government.” 78 George Marshall had also 
noted in that year the danger of undermining the goodwill America had gained in the 
post-war settlement:
Our actions do not always speak for themselves unless the people 
of other countries have some understanding of the peaceful intention 
of our people. An understanding of our motives and our institutions 
can come only from a knowledge of the political principles which our 
history and traditions have evolved, and of daily life in the United States.79
77 Ibid., p. 24.
78 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Information (1947) quoted in John Lewis 
Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War, 1941-1947, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972), pp. 349-50.
79 George Marshall quoted in Davidson, “Voices of America,” p. 157.
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This renewed emphasis on the informational instrument in Washington presented a 
profound dilemma for VO A officials. On the one hand they wished to retain their 
journalistic ethics as an expression of America’s liberal political culture and democratic 
system, but on the other hand these international circumstances appeared to call for a 
more strident and selective form of advocacy within their broadcasts. Like the earlier 
efforts to represent US ‘information’ programs as a distinctive form of practice 
compared with the ‘propaganda’ of other states, Marshall’s statement reflected how US 
foreign policy-makers were seeking to resolve this dilemma by framing Washington’s 
motives for engaging with international public opinion in a new, exceptional way as the 
leader of the free world. A more strenuous form of advocacy on America’s behalf was 
enabled in this post-war phase by the articulation of America’s posture of foreign 
relations as seeking the democratisation and enlightenment of the world’s people, 
which supplied moral license to the projection of international influence, rather than 
narrow or self-aggrandising domination. However, a persistent tension seemed to 
remain between this enlightening, progressive and long-term function of US 
informational diplomacy and the idea that there were more immediate security 
requirements that could also be fulfilled by VOA in the post-war context.
The idea that effective publicity could pay security dividends was also made 
frequently in public statements on the information programs. The director of the Office 
of International Information and Cultural Affairs, William T. Stone, had addressed an 
Ohio public forum on US foreign policy in early 1946, arguing that “the public interest 
requires that international radio be adequately financed. As a means of expressing 
America, its culture and its ideals, short-wave radio will pay incalculable dividends to 
the American taxpayer.”80 The importance of maintaining support within world public 
opinion was defined in similar terms by the President: in early 1946 Harry Truman 
contended that “the nature of present day foreign relations makes it essential for the 
United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the
80 William T. Stone, “International Broadcasting- A National Responsibility,” Department of State 
Bulletin 2526, (May 12, 1946), p. 906.
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conduct of our foreign affairs.” 81 Truman’s support for an information program in 
1946 signalled that the Voice was being situated as an important instrument of US 
foreign policy at the rhetorical level, but both the Department State (under the 
indifferent tenure of Secretary of State James Byrnes) and Congress failed in the 
immediate post-war period to supply the Voice with practical support, additional 
funding or clear policy direction. Furthermore, with such contradictory threads of 
justification and debate in play during this post-war phase it is clear that VOA’s 
supporters had yet to find a coherent way for justifying their position informational 
diplomacy had an essential role to play in American foreign policy.
Constituting the Cold War Circumstance, 1947: The Soviet Propaganda Threat
1947 saw a significant shift in how VOA presented its broadcasts, and in the 
ways in which US diplomats characterised America’s global role and the international 
order. A more instrumental format and rationale for US broadcasts was adopted as 
concerns about the Soviet propaganda threat became more pressing, although 
traditional discourses of American openness and journalistic values of free debate and 
openness were still often stated as constitutive principles of America’s global role 
within these discourses. As I shall show in the discussion below, this juxtaposed 
imagery within US informational discourse enabled a more instrumental and selective 
broadcasting approach to be adopted, on the grounds that Washington’s most vital 
international obligation was now to mount a defence of the free world in the context of 
the Cold War struggle. This was illustrated in February 1947, when a Russian language 
service was added to VOA’s broadcasting for the first time. The service was instructed 
to provide an honest dialogue about the US and its policies, but directives for the 
Russian broadcasts encompassed a clear element of advocacy for US policies: “Special 
attention will be given to important statements and speeches by high United States 
officials explaining American aims and policies.”82
81 Harry Truman quoted in Heil, Voice o f America, p. 46. 
S2 Heil, Voice o f America, pp. 46-7.
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As a consequence of Benton’s efforts to generalise a geo-strategic rationale 
for the US broadcasting programs during early 1947, the State Department’s public 
affairs division undertook a review of the Voice’s operations and assumptions. To 
William T. Stone a policy study completed that April reported that VOA’s objectives 
remained too “inconclusive and theoretical” to effectively confront Communist 
propaganda, and noted that the overall information program was “inadequate in 
proportion as the exigencies of the international situation present an increasing 
challenge to us.” The way in which this report went on to describe the problem of 
Communist influence evoked the paradox of the Voice’s wartime role, framing the 
challenges of international persuasion in terms of the virtues and values of the United 
States.
[A]s anti-American propaganda has increased in volume and intensity the 
threat of psychological warfare has reared its ugly head like a threat to 
our virtue. We fear increasingly the loss o f the ethical basis, or the 
idealistic inspiration of our work. We are tom between the desire to 
restrict ourselves to the presentation of a ‘full and fair picture’ of our 
land and our people, and the realisation that to engage in this task alone is 
not enough, in the face of the intense and systematic campaign against our 
policies and our motives which are today turning the minds of men against
83us, while masquerading under the banners of freedom and democracy.
The report went on to address the dilemmas of how to craft an appropriate tone for 
American information policy abroad:
There need be no forced choice between ‘a full and fair picture’ and 
‘psychological warfare.’ At the risk of being called Jesuitical, may I plead 
for the selection of the means necessary for achieving the desired end? 
These means should not be more distasteful, or ethically deplorable, than 
the accepted necessity of having recourse to war in order to ensure national 
survival.84
This review candidly represented the information programs as a strategic tool to be 
calibrated with the general objectives of US foreign policy, rather than an apolitical and
83 My own emphasis added. W. R. Tyler, “Notes on the OIC Program,” to William T. Stone, (April 22, 
1947), pp. 1-2; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
84 Ibid., p. 2.
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humanistic reflection of US society. Its engagement with the question of national 
survival and the sense of urgency in relation to the anti-Communist struggle in 1947 
articulated a decidedly more instrumentalist account of the purpose of US informational 
diplomacy.
Deepening tension between the US and the Soviet Union over the slow 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and the US decision to extend economic aid to 
Greece and Turkey had led to strident attacks on the US in the Soviet state media.85 
The Truman administration’s policies in this period had consolidated around a hard-line 
approach to Soviet expansion, which created some anxiety among information officials 
that the administration’s motives would be misunderstood by foreign audiences. By the 
middle of that year yet another report had warned that “unbelievable as it may seem, 
the Soviets appear to be steadily convincing the mass of the people of many lands that 
in the USSR lies the great white hope of the future, while the US constitutes the dark
oz:
terror.” By December, 1947 the depth of Soviet animosity toward American policies 
had become a key frame for information policy directives:
Under present circumstances its efforts necessarily centre on 
counteracting Soviet propaganda attacks and reaffirming the policies, 
institutions, beliefs and ways of life of the American people...United 
States information operations should not imitate the propaganda pattern 
of the Soviet Union. Otherwise there is a danger of other peoples 
equating the US with the USSR and presuming that this country is 
merely competing with the latter for the right to dominate them, and is 
equally responsible with the Soviet Union for creating a situation that 
may lead to war.87
In the discourses of international informational diplomacy in this period the journalistic 
paradigm of VOA operations had thus been reformulated. Rather than an embodiment 
of American ideals and a forum for open debates or self-criticism, the journalistic 
credibility of the Voice was seen as simply a persuasive technique or veneer to enhance 
the persuasive purchase of pro-US information.
85 Heil, Voice o f America, p. 47.
86 Mose Harvey, Moscow Embassy, to William T. Stone & staff, (July 3, 1947), p. 1; IIA. 1938-53; RG 
59, NARA.
87 Unattributed, “US Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda,” (December 1, 
1947), p. 2; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
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In 1947 VOA officials were increasingly returning to the logic of ideological 
struggle as the rationale for US informational diplomacy, depicting the Communist 
enemy as having developed a totalising, efficient and manipulative approach to 
propaganda that impelled equally vigorous counter-action by the US. Another 
memorandum to Stone framed the quest to secure international ideological influence as 
the central feature of the post-war order, and consequently as a national security 
consideration.
The USA and the USSR, both great powers and the only great powers 
and each standing as the protagonist of a politico-socio-economic 
system in opposition to that of the other, cannot equally survive equally 
well in the present day world. In other words, because the USA and 
USSR alone rate as ‘great’ powers and because the ideologies they stand 
for are incompatible, no arrangement, no agreement to live together in 
the world as equals is possible. The power and influence of one of the 
other must diminish. No ‘balance of power’ between the USA and the 
USSR is possible.88
The recommendations within this memorandum suggested that a wartime information 
posture was once again warranted: “In the use of media the value of repetition must be 
given top priority. A few themes about the US pertinent to conditions in each country, 
of interest to people we want to influence should be hammered at continuously from 
every angle.” Another report suggested that the Cold War constituted a type of 
emergency unprecedented even during the Second World War: the apolitical approach 
taken by the founders of the Voice and the officials in the first information programs 
was now unsuitable because it:
did not take into account the present need for counteracting a 
campaign of misrepresentation and distortion of US aims and 
policies, and did not suggest the means required to facilitate the 
attainment of our national objectives in the face of the unscrupulous 
measures and techniques currently employed against us by 
elements seeking to discredit the US...To report the truth 
objectively and factually continues to be the basic principle
88 W. R. Tyler, “Notes on the OIC Program,” to William T. Stone, (April 22, 1947), p. 1; IIA. 1938-53; 
RG 59; NARA.
89 Ibid., p. 7.
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of our news broadcasts, and Wireless Bulletin. However, to present 
the policies and practice of the US without reacting or referring 
to the charges brought to bear against us, is no longer enough. The 
sponsors of the anti-America campaign have traded on our reluctance 
to engage in polemics and have enjoyed the advantage of attacking 
us without correspondingly specific and hard-hitting refutation...
It has become evident, particularly in the last six months, that US 
information policy must take into consideration this attempt to turn 
world opinion against the United States, and devise means of 
counteracting it.90
This franker consideration of a propagandistic format for the presentation of US 
broadcasts during 1947 was a significant development in how informational diplomats 
were implicitly constituting Washington’s wider global role in the course of 
formulating policy. It highlighted the transition from discourses of informational 
diplomacy emphasising the Voice’s democratising and integrative functions in 1945 to 
representations of America’s involvement in ideological warfare and international 
information as a narrower instrument of influence by the end of 1947.
Yet efforts to frame VO A as a journalistic institution which strove to be 
truthful and incorporate multiple perspectives continued into 1947. As E. H. Biddle 
advised Stone in late 1947, the question of whether the US should adopt a ‘slanted’ 
perspective or simply hold up a ‘mirror’ on world politics should not yet be considered 
a settled issue. Although it was “axiomatic” that a great power such as the US would 
adopt some kind international information policy, Biddle that, as with the British 
experience of informational diplomacy,
experience has convincingly demonstrated that a ‘freedom of 
information’ policy, i.e., straight, unslanted news and the freest 
possible cultural exchange apart from its superior moral value, 
is the best and most repaying policy. Furthermore, there exists 
convincing proof that the most effective governmental information 
and cultural exchange programs actually have been conducted on 
this basis.91
90 Unattributed, “US Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda,” (December 1, 
1947), p. 1; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
91 E. H. Biddle, Letter to William T. Stone, (August 25, 1947), p. 17; IIA 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
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Even under conditions of Cold War ideological warfare the liberal, democratic values 
first articulated by the Voice officials in New York were recalled as framing principles 
during the articulation of new information initiatives. Hence, according to the Biddle 
memorandum, a key asset of the Voice was its appeal to the masses abroad, and the 
station should strive to demonstrate to the peoples of the world practical workings of 
American democracy:
A great many phases of US life on the ‘grass roots’ level- which we 
take for granted- are manifestations of US democracy at work and 
illustrate techniques and methods applicable to similar activity at the 
grass roots level abroad. We should explore ways and means of 
publicising these phases of US life abroad to those groups which can 
utilise our experience. Detached and scholarly explanations of our 
own high-level activity- national government etc. are often interesting 
but ineffective.92
Overall, these representations of journalistic practice did hinder the palpable shift 
toward and embrace of instrumentalism within VOA’s policies during 1947. Alan 
Winkler defines this phase in US information policy as one in which State Department 
gradually accepted a need to actively publicise the basic message that US was “a 
powerful and righteous nation.” Consequently, its information and cultural policies 
“were sometimes complicated by an unfortunate sense of superiority.” The concept 
of America’s leadership of the free world, defined both in terms of Washington’s 
military strategic posture and its role as the democratic protagonist in the ideological 
struggle, was the key premise in US informational diplomacy documents during this 
period. Analysing the discourses of informational diplomacy reflects how notions of 
‘superiority’ and liberal absolutism came to shape Washington’s information policy 
posture during the early rhetorical struggles with the USSR, and thus contributed to the 
momentum of the early Cold War. Because US policy-makers found it necessary to 
simultaneously specify the material impacts of US information and frame their work as
92 W. C. Johnstone, “Observations Concerning the Information and Cultural Program,” to William T. 
Stone, (December 1, 1947), p. 8; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
93 Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda, p. 157.
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morally superior to propaganda, the constitution of Washington’s informational role in 
the post-war order clearly rested on a rather paradoxical, exceptionalist set of 
propositions.94
The constitution of America as a protagonist in the Cold War struggle through 
logics of alterity was a key feature of the discourses of US information and Soviet 
propaganda during this period. Frequent references to the Soviet practice of distorting 
the truth and undermining international freedom of information, linked to depictions of 
the USSR and the United States as ‘protagonists’ in a global struggle, constituted an 
understanding of the Cold War in propaganda terms as a Manichaean struggle between 
the two most powerful and complex agents in the international system.95 Freedom of 
information and the journalistic paradigm of free debate and openess were upheld as a 
testament to America’s hopes for global emancipation in this period, and to its strong 
moral sensibility as an international agent (in contrast to the illiberal, manipulative and 
immoral USSR).
More thoughtful US officials seemed to note the contradictions posed by 
VOA’s return to a posture of information war. There were fears in this context that 
America’s distinctive and progressive identity as a global power was being 
compromised by Washington’s engagement in ideological tit-for-tat and the 
increasingly strident tone of American informational policy. Informational policy­
makers continued to argue that the US must eschew propaganda techniques and 
manipulative intentions, but this sentiment was increasingly obviated by the urgent 
instructions issued to the Voice by Washington in which the information program was 
told to take all measures necessary to undermine Soviet political influence in contested 
regions such as Eastern Europe. As one memorandum from the US Embassy in 
Moscow queried in mid-1947: “We doubtless make men everywhere marvel and envy, 
but do we offer them something which they can adopt and follow that they and their 
children can live?”96
94 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony o f American History, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952).
95 See, e.g.: Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of 
US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly 37, (no. 3, 1993).
96 Mose Harvey, Moscow Embassy, to William T. Stone & staff, (July 3, 1947), p. 3; IIA. 1938-53; RG 
59, NARA.
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Washington’s emergence as a protagonist in the Cold War was, as we shall 
see, not a simple, uncontested or unambiguous process. Although ideas about the 
exceptional way in which the US had used international information during the Second 
World War and post-war settlement were intrinsic to Washington’s claim to be the 
moral protagonist in the struggle against Communism, there were also internal 
quandaries as to whether participating in Cold War antagonisms compromised these 
intrinsic American ideals in the first place.
1948: A Legal Basis for US International Information
The year 1948 was an important turning point for the American international 
information programs in several key respects, most notably due to the impacts of 
legislation passed by Congress that gave VOA a firmer role in US foreign policy and 
increased funding. In articulating the role of international information within US 
foreign policy, 1948’s legislation gave VOA a more unambiguously instrumental role. 
Although some critics objected to the way in which international information had been 
tied to US national interests rather than the more nebulous goal of serving as an 
exemplar of free debate and a source of unbiased information to other societies, the 
‘journalistic’ function of the Voice was largely a rhetorical phenomenon from this 
period onwards. Underpinning the developing consensus that VOA must be more 
instrumental and more deeply implicated in the Cold War struggle was a logic of 
alterity that situated the USSR as an irretrievably corrupt and manipulative 
propagandist, and conversely licensed the US to exercise ‘leadership’ on behalf of 
democracy and freedom. Washington sought to demonstrate this leadership with a 
strident persuasive effort directed at America’s allies, its enemies, and increasingly too 
at a third category of ‘neutral’ states that were proving highly obstructive and 
problematic within US Cold War thinking.
In January 1948, a Congressional fact-finding mission returned from a tour to 
study economic and political conditions in Europe that had been taken to consider 
legislation proposed by Senator Alexander H. Smith and Representative Karl Mundt to
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expand the American informational diplomacy program. The Smith Mundt Bill, as it 
came to be known, passed through the Republican-dominated Congress in the same 
month and through the Senate six months later. It instructed the Department of State to 
“promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase 
mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries.” 97 
After Smith Mundt, the Voice’s broadcasting languages were increased. The station 
added several new Middle Eastern services, and its English language broadcasting was 
expanded. Smith Mundt was unambiguous in its intention. It saw informational 
broadcasting as an instrument of American national interests rather than an exemplar of 
democratic practices for other nations to emulate if they so chose. However, the 
passage of the Bill masked the continuing objections to any American ‘propaganda’ 
effort that were still held by some sectors of the US public, as the US academic Ralph 
Block observed:
In a world in which propaganda has increasingly overshadowed 
diplomacy as an instrument for influencing the course of 
international events, Americans remain uneasy in making 
concessions to its use, even as an instrument of defence. Indeed, 
it is possible that more Americans approve of the use of the 
atomic bomb in defensive warfare than approve of the use of 
propaganda to forestall war.98
Despite these concerns, the impact of the Smith Mundt Bill on the objectives and 
approach taken within the US information program were significant. US international 
information, cultural and educational policies were recognised and funded to a level 
commensurate to the globe-spanning ‘ideological struggle’ in the context of which their 
functions were increasingly represented. The Smith Mundt Bill became a major 
constraint to the independence that the VOA had retained during the Second World 
War, by enhancing Presidential control of the US information program. Shawn Parry-
97 Heil, Voice o f America, p. 47. The Smith Mundt Bill also reaffirmed the ban on VOA broadcasting 
any material to a domestic audience.
98 Ralph Block, “Propaganda and the Free Society.” The Public Opinion Quarterly 12, (no. 4 Winter, 
1948) p. 678. David Krugler charts Congressional reservations about broadcasting in some depth. He 
notes that “the ease with which the VOA’s authorisation [Smith-Mundt] became law is deceptive. 
Considerable suspicions about the information program and personnel remained.” See Krugler, Voice of 
America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, p. 70.
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Giles has argued that the more strident and Executive-oriented nature of US 
informational diplomacy brought about by the Smith Mundt Bill ultimately exacerbated 
the emerging Cold War conflict. “The increased control of the first two Cold War 
presidents over multiple communication channels secured a unified message about 
communism, routinised covert operations...and naturalised a propaganda apparatus as 
an integral part of the government’s Cold War operations.”99
Beginning with publicity surrounding the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill in 
January, 1948 turned out to be a year punctuated by expansive statements about the 
geopolitical purpose and promise of the American international information program. 
The term ‘Cold War’ came into routine use in information policy debates in the course 
of 1948. After successfully lobbying Congress to support the Smith Mundt Bill in 
January, Benton spent much of 1948 seeking to persuade the American public and 
major media organisations to join America’s global crusade against Communism.100 
However, Benton’s claims about the benefits of an ongoing international information 
operations were set back by a scandal over poor-quality VOA broadcasts that year. A 
series that had been outsourced to CBS and NBC after the war entitled ‘Know North 
America’ was the source of the offending material, which included features that 
described Pennsylvania’s Quakers as “a social problem,” and described Wyoming’s 
Native Americans as living “naked and feathered.”'01 During the State Department 
Appropriations hearing of that year William Benton argued that the grave 
responsibilities that had been assumed by the information programs could not be 
dismissed on the grounds of the scandal. In a Cold War context:
the United States needs friends and supporters, and to have friends
99 Parry Giles, The Rhetorical Presidency, p. xxiv.
100 Associated Press and United Press were steadfastly opposed to government broadcasting in this 
period, and refused to supply their news services to the Voice even though they still supplied these 
services to the Soviet propaganda agency TASS. Barrett, Truth is Our Weapon, p. 60.
101 The offending broadcasts were from the ‘Know North America’ series. The congressional report on 
the broadcasts charged that the corporations had “failed to correctly interpret the spirit of and intent of 
the Congress” that had engaged them as government broadcasters, and charged that the material had 
“incensed, as well as disgusted” the people of the United States. United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Investigation o f the State Department Voice 
o f America Broadcasts, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1948). See also George V. 
Allen, “The Voice of America,” Department o f State Bulletin 3336, (November 7, 1948); Krugler, Voice 
o f America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, pp. 80-4.
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the United States needs to be understood; its policies and the 
background that gives rise to these policies.. .Trust is built upon 
knowledge, sympathy has its roots in familiarity, and suspicion 
breeds in ignorance. Is it right, is it safe, for us to assume that the 
other peoples of the world know enough about us to trust 
our lead?102
Benton was succeeded as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs by 
former US Ambassador to Iran George V. Allen in 1948. Like Benton, Allen proved an 
articulate and influential advocate of informational diplomacy, yet he propounded an 
even more unambiguously instrumental approach to the diplomacy of culture and 
information than Benton had and played a key role in the hardening of VOA’s anti- 
Communist tone in this period. During his tenure as Assistant Secretary of State, US 
information policy directives were predicated by a vision of the global order as 
composed of two mutually exclusive and inherently opposed ideological blocs, and an 
inherently illegitimate ‘neutralist’ camp that required a particularly concerted
i rvo
persuasive effort on Washington’s part. Within these underlying terms of alterity the 
US was now obliged to unify and lead the free world, to consider possibilities for 
outright war between the superpowers that the ‘neutral’ states were perhaps unwilling 
to contemplate. Hence, the articulation of Cold War circumstances supplied a 
warranting argument in favour of a more selective, strident and single-minded tone in 
American international informational broadcasting.
After regaining responsibility for its programming from CBS and NBC, as a 
consequence of the increasing proportion of career diplomats in staffing the information 
programs, and owing to Allen’s oversight, the Voice’s operations were calibrated even 
more closely with US foreign policy imperatives in 1948.104 Broadcasting directives in 
this period frequently instructed that VOA’s approach “should not be such as to create 
the belief that the US is conducting an ideological crusade... We should avoid entering 
into sterile ideological debates, blow for blow retaliation, or the use of propaganda
102 William Benton, Statement to Senate Appropriations Subcommittee; Departments of State, Justice, 
and Commerce Appropriation Bill for I948\ Y4.Ap6/2:st2/948; (Washington DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 1948).
103 George V. Allen, “US Information Program,” Department of State Bulletin 3218, (July 18, 1948), p. 
90.
104 Heil, Voice of America, p. 49.
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patterns like those of the Soviet Union.”105 George Allen later recalled in hindsight that 
despite these expressions of broadcasting openness, the approach at the Voice became 
much more propagandistic in this period. He reflected that “perhaps our tone wasn’t 
justified. A calm, persuasive tone is much better than a mere calling of names.”106
The European Recovery Program or Marshall Plan was announced in 1948, 
and policies adopted in this context sought to make aims and objectives of US 
economic aid known internationally through an extended cultural and information 
program. Although Benton had left office, he continued to laud the US cultural and 
information programs in this period, likening them to a ‘Marshall Plan for Ideas.’ The 
information programs were defined in this context as having a vital responsibility in 
seeking to “close the mental gap between ourselves and the rest of the world” so that 
the nature of US economic assistance would be properly interpreted by targeted
1 07populations.
With the Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1949 and Washington’s subsequent 
declaration of support for the Tito regime, including a pledge of American assistance 
against any future Soviet aggression against it, American information programs to 
Yugoslavia were instructed to immediately cease their critique of Communist ideology 
and do as much as possible to consolidate the Yugoslav break from the USSR. 
Fostering ‘heretical’ forms of Communism became a new platform for the US 
international information program, as a mechanism which “could, without military 
action, reduce and eventually eliminate preponderant Soviet power from those areas 
which have fallen under USSR control as a result of World War II.”108 This was a 
significant watershed in the compromise of the Voice’s journalistic role in favour of a 
more pragmatic approach. The implications of such a move in light of the proposition
105 Unattributed, “US Information Policy with Respect to Soviet Anti-American Propaganda Campaign” 
(November 13, 1949), pp. 2-3; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
106 George Allen quoted in Heil, Voice of America, p. 49.
107 James P. Sewell, Unesco and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 97; Jan Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation (The League 
Experience and the Beginnings of Unesco), (Warsaw: Zaklad Narodwy Im. Ossolinkich, 1962), p. 152.
108 Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff, “Special Guidance Paper #25: Yugoslav-USSR Relations,” 
(November 15, 1949), p. 2; Policy Papers and Meetings, 1949-1950 (PPM 1949-50); General Subject 
File 1947-1950 (Subj 1947-50); Files of the Assistant Sec of State for Public Affairs, 1947-1950 (ASPA 
1947-50); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and 
Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA).
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that the US rejected power politics and moral pragmatism were not explicitly debated 
by VOA staff, but they did feed into an underlying tension within US informational 
diplomacy discourse during the late 1940s. As the discussion in the section below will 
show, the liberal, journalistic rendition of VOA’s approach were still present as framing 
principles when informational officials articulated the principles of US broadcasting 
policy into the early 1950s. However, the practices adopted at VOA had clearly 
diverged from the openness, objectivity and multiple perspectives that the journalistic 
paradigm implied. Continuing to frame VOA in this way appeared to have an 
important symbolic function, however, in connecting the traditions of American 
political culture to the Cold War circumstances in which US foreign policy was being 
crafted. As I illustrated in the foregoing discussion, articulating a commitment to 
journalistic practices enabled VOA officials to continue to see their work as legitimate 
and superior to the manipulative practices of other national information services, 
particularly that of the USSR.
1950: The Campaign of Truth, the Cold War and the Demands of Pragmatism
In May 1950 President Harry Truman proclaimed that America would pursue 
a ‘Campaign of Truth’ against Soviet expansionism, which was to consist of an 
expanded international information effort, as well as a renewed focus on cultural and 
educational exchanges. The rhetoric associated with the Campaign synthesised the 
journalistic and diplomatic paradigms of US radio diplomacy, and hence the ideas of 
free debate and strenuous advocacy were combined, on the grounds that Washington 
possessed an underlying truth that must be propagated to combat Communist tyranny. 
In announcing the Campaign, Truman depicted the Cold War as “a struggle, above all 
else, for the minds of men. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the 
Communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortion, and lies are systematically used 
by them as a matter of deliberate policy.” To public audiences Truman claimed that 
America still inherently repudiated the propaganda instrument. It would confront 
Soviet propaganda with “truth- plain, simple, unvarnished truth- presented by
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newspapers, radio, and other sources that the people trust.” The US information 
programs would therefore assume the responsibility to:
present the truth to the millions of people who are uninformed or 
misinformed or unconvinced. Our task is to reach them in their daily 
lives, as they work and learn.. .This task is not separate and distinct 
from other elements of our foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all 
we are doing to build a peaceful world. It is as important as armed 
strength or economic aid.109
Edward Barrett, who had succeeded Allen as Assistant Secretary of State, noted that by 
1950 the President and the foreign policy establishment in Washington had come to 
believe in the connection between effective foreign policy and favourable international 
opinion.110 In this context, Barrett stressed the significance of American-authored 
information within the Cold War global context:
The time has come to stop taking halfway measures in the international 
information field. Call it getting to know each other, or even call it 
propaganda (in the best sense of the word), if you will. The fact 
remains that the time has come for an all-out effort in this field not only 
by our government but by other free nations and by private groups.* 111
The period during which Campaign of Truth was announced was a difficult 
phase for the Truman administration. There had been charges in the media that the 
President was not waging the Cold War struggle in a sufficiently strident manner. 
There were numerous McCarthyite attacks on, and investigations of, the State 
Department for potential ‘un-American’ activities, and criticism in Congress over the 
‘expendable’ status of Taiwan in the administration’s newly-announced Far East 
security policy. In this period, the Communist threat could no longer be identified only 
with the Soviet Union, but could be found in China, Korea and elsewhere, and also, it
109 Harry Truman, “Going Forward With A Campaign of Truth,” Department o f State Bulletin 3832, 
(May 1, 1950), p. 669.
110 The information programs had also recently gained an ally in the new Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson.
111 Edward W. Barrett “Truth Campaign Needs Support of Private and Government Groups/ Mobilization 
of American Strength for World Security,” Department o f State Bulletin 4012, (November 6, 1950), p. 
735.
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was thought, had infiltrated the US via subversive left-wing groups within American 
society. The more strident informational policy developed for Asia was, therefore, 
partially intended to dispel the image of the geo-strategic ‘siege mentality’ that many 
enthusiastic Cold Warriors had criticised Truman for. The Campaign of Truth was 
framed in such a way as to convince the public that the White House had adopted at 
least one assertive strategy to recover the upper hand from the USSR.112 The broadcast 
hours and languages of VOA in Asia were to be increased during 1950: Vietnamese 
language programming was added in July, and the Korean and Cantonese services were 
extended in September, the latter with a psychological warfare component in relation to 
the Korean War that had begun two months before. As a consequence of the additional 
languages and extended range of the Voice’s signal, and most likely also as an 
indication of the Campaign’s more strident tone, correspondence from VOA listeners 
increased dramatically that year. By mid-1950 the number of letters received per 
month had doubled within the space of one year to 20,000 per month.113
VOA also began to openly incorporate public relations specialists into the US 
information programs in an advisory capacity from 1950.114 Structured propaganda 
content analysis became a frequent feature of internal evaluations of both US and 
Soviet broadcasts from 1951.115 Targeted programming to specific social groups was 
revived as a broadcasting technique in this period. Instructions for the Argentinean 
service, for example, indicated that American information must appeal to:
the young men and women.. .rising to influence under the Peron 
regime who have not yet adopted the anti-American attitudes of 
some of their leaders. This group will be of importance to us even 
if the Peron regime is over-thrown.. .Of special importance are the
112 The highly influential National Security Council Memorandum #68, was also written between April 
and May 1950, also gained an enthusiastic reception by the administration partly because it seemed to 
symbolise in international affairs the beleaguered situation that the administration was subject to in 
Washington. Krugler, Voice o f America and the Domestic propaganda Battles, Ch. 4, especially pp. 96- 
7, 114.
113 Barrett, Truth is Our Weapon, p. 77.
114 Edward W. Barrett, “Need for Public Assistance in the Campaign of Truth,” Department of State 
Bulletin 4041, (December 18, 1950), pp. 968-70.
115 Research Center for Human Relations, New York University, “Broadcast in English to Europe in the 
‘Cold War’ and Korean Periods (Spring 1950 and Winter 1950-1),” 1951; IIA- 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
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primary and secondary school teachers, and the small businesses.116
The directives suggested that the US ought to foster attraction but simultaneously 
express disapproval in relation to Peron’s supporters: the US ought to be:
making [Argentinian opinion leaders] feel welcome within the 
community o f nations; to show that the United States is not 
trying to dominate Latin America but that there is room for a 
nation of superior economic and mental level on this hemisphere 
in a position of respect; yet at the same time not to show the 
United States as either approving the regime in Argentina or 
kowtowing to her for political motives.117
Elsewhere, saturation techniques were recommended to enhance the effectiveness of 
US informational diplomacy. Given the steadily declining influence of Britain and 
France in Egypt the US information programs were instructed “to permeate Egyptian 
channels of communication and make American influences felt at all levels of Egyptian 
life.”118
With Allied military campaign in Korea suffering major setbacks toward the 
end of 1950, US information guidelines reflected the sentiment that the US was falling 
behind in all its spheres of international interest, and reinforced the urgency of the 
representations of ideological struggle within informational diplomacy debates.
Korea has shown that the USSR is militarily strong as well as 
morally uninhibited. Military strength added to ruthlessness, 
oppressive conduct form a terrifying combination particularly to 
nations and peoples sensitive to the realities of power. The 
upshot o f all this is that the US today finds itself in a precarious 
propaganda position. The line which we have been propagating so 
assiduously threatens to boomerang (not because of inherent 
logical facilities but rather because it was not accompanied by the 
required military strength) at least until such a time as our 
information media can reflect establishment of impressive and 
reassuring facts of strength. For while one can afford the luxury
116 Morril Cody, “Argentina: Country Papers on USIE program requested in January 1950,” p. 1; PPM 
1949-50; Subj. 1947-50; ASPA 1947-50; RG 59; NARA.
117 Ibid., p. 1.
118 John Devine, “Egypt: Country Papers on USIE program requested in January 1950,” p. 4; PPM 1949- 
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of reacting to evil with righteous indignation when one is strong, 
great power directed by evil strikes terror in the hearts of the weak 
and the exposed.119
Once again, the constitution of an American identity, defined by the alterity of the 
Communist other, can be observed within these discourses of US informational 
diplomacy. The righteous and reassuring global presence of US power was held up in 
contrast to the Soviet practice of using ‘terror’ to prey on the ‘weak.’ The particular 
threat that the USSR represented was that it matched the US in its ability to (at least 
temporarily) influence world public opinion, but also presented a dire moral challenge 
due to its ‘evil’ ideological principles. The move toward a moral vocabulary of the 
Cold War struggle was a particularly resonant discursive shift in the context of 
Washington’s grand strategy, since it constituted an inducement to project American 
influence abroad to guarantee US national security as well as its moral integrity. By 
1950 more equivocal Congressional support for the information programs had also 
developed, reflected in a letter written by a large group of US Senators to the President 
in August, which endorsed the Campaign of Truth and advocated the expansion of the 
information programs in the context of the Korean struggle:
we urge upon you that a psychological and spiritual offensive against 
the Kremlin, devised to bring the Russian and American people 
into contact and into relations of mutual brotherhood.. .We are now 
saying this in an indirect and partial way through the Voice of 
America. We need more funds and a great expansion of facilities. 
But more than money, we need a new vigour, a new imagination, a 
new directness and plainness of speech. We need the message to be 
continuously, indefinitely reiterated. We need to use means new and
191old, thought of an unthought of, traditional and revolutionary.
119 Lewis Revey, “Holding the Political and Psychological Initiative,” to Philips (first name unrecorded), 
August 16, 1950, p. 2; PPM 1949-50; Subj. 1947-50; ASPA 1947-50; RG 59; NARA.
120 As such, these developments factor into Campbell’s point about the existential and moral reading of 
the Cold War in US ‘security’ texts of the late 1940s and early 1950s. David Campbell, Writing 
Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998).
121 United States Senate, to President Harry S. Truman, August 19, 1950, pp. 1-2; President’s Official 
File; Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence MO.
253
The now widespread instrumental rendition of the Voice’s functions in this period now 
saw the traditional reluctance of the US to be viewed as propagandistic and a tool to 
attract an international audience, not a stricture imposed upon it by the tenets of 
American political culture.
In contrasting the Campaign of Truth’s hard-hitting and emotional approach 
with the journalistic style of British international information, Ralph K. White noted: 
“The Voice of America is definitely more hard-hitting, more outspokenly anti- 
Communist, than the BBC, and this policy has reaped dividends in Iron Curtain 
countries where the audiences crave hope and vicarious expression of their own 
hostility to the Stalinist tyranny.”122 By presupposing that a more strident form of 
informational agency could still be regarded as within the bounds of existing 
representations of the Washington’s informational approach, US policy-makers could 
thus legitimately endorse techniques that amounted to ‘propaganda’ at same time as 
condemning the USSR’s use of similar techniques as totalitarian and immoral. A 
relational logic of alterity was again at work in constituting Washington’s international 
posture: Moscow and Washington were equally powerful as co-protagonists in the Cold 
War struggle, in a way that London for example was not, yet they were also in a 
relationship of deep moral antithesis and antagonism. A more hard-hitting approach 
could be acceptable because Washington possessed an underlying truth and an 
emancipatory force, while in contrast the fact that Soviet propaganda was inherently 
manipulative condemned Soviet actions as absolute tyranny.
The Voice’s funding for the 1951 fiscal year had increased from $9 million to 
$13 million, with an incidential appropriation of $50 million to construct a ring of 
short-wave transmitters around the Soviet Union to overcome jamming of the US radio 
signal.123 The expansion of the Voice’s language services and programming brought 
with it the burden of more frequent and detailed assessments of VOA’s objectives, 
approaches and effectiveness. After the costliness of the post-war cuts, resources could
122 White grants that the BBC had a more news worthy reputation than the Voice, but that the Voice’s 
emotional appeal was greater. Ralph K. White, “The New Resistance to International Propaganda,” The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 16, (no. 4, Winter, Special Issue on International Communications Research 
1952-3), p. 547.
123 Heil, Voice o f  America, p. 49.
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finally be devoted to more consistent oversight of the international information 
programs, particularly given that assessments of international public opinion had come 
to be seen a basis on which to measure the outcomes of the diplomatic struggle within 
which the US had become embroiled. Policy directives for the Voice were often 
contradictory and inconsistent due to unsettled policy oversight arrangements, although 
Smith Mundt had done much to overcome these disruptions. Although the Truman 
administration had endorsed the international information program as an indispensable 
instrument of Cold War diplomacy, some scepticism toward VOA’s work remained 
among diplomatic traditionalists in the State Department and the Foreign Service.124 
George Kennan, for instance, had cautioned his fellow policy-makers in Washington 
that US efforts to undermine the government of the USSR through international 
information were unlikely to be effective:
talking by one nation to another about the latter’s political affairs is a 
questionable procedure, replete with possibilities for misunderstanding 
and resentment.. .It is a shallow view of the workings of history which 
looks to such things as foreign propaganda and agitation to bring about
1 9 Sfundamental changes in the lives of a great nation.
Kennan’s judgement of the impact of more long-term cultural and social message of the 
Voice was more positive, however. Just as Reinhold Niebuhr had conceded 15 years 
earlier, Kennan also noted that although there was often a misplaced faith in the 
prospects for preventing war in an immediate sense, the Voice’s legitimate functions in 
faithfully representing America’s cultural characteristics could do little harm, and 
might be of some long-term benefit to US interests.126
Nonetheless, an ongoing rhetorical effort was undertaken in order to 
distinguish the intentions of US international information from those of the Soviet
124 ‘Diplomatic traditionalism’ also characterises Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s attitude to 
international information after 1953, and the decision by Dwight Eisenhower to establish an US 
information agency outside the State Department that year.
125 Kennan, quoted in Hans Speier, “International Political Communication: Elite vs. Mass,” World 
Politics 4, (no. 3, April, 1952), p. 306.
126 Ibid., p. 306. We shall see in the next chapter that Niebuhr’s view of cultural diplomacy had 
developed considerably by the 1950s. He joined the US National Commission for Unesco and became a 
prominent public advocate of US participation in multilateral cultural cooperation.
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‘propaganda machine’ at the Voice. As the Subcommittee on Overseas Information 
Programs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations wrote in 1952:
Our term ‘Information program’ is hardly applicable to the Soviet Union.
All information and mass communication media there are an integral part 
of a gigantic, all-embracing propaganda machine which is geared not to 
the furtherance of understanding and good will among nations but to 
enlarging the cleavage between the governments and peoples of the 
Communist and non-Communist world.127
In 1952 the ambiguity of VOA’s role was compounded when the station came under 
investigation by four separate Congressional committees, all of them associated with 
McCarthy’s House Committee on ‘Un-American’ Activities. In the six months prior to 
the start of formal hearings on the Voice in February, 1953, numerous rumours 
circulated in Washington suggesting Communist infiltration within VOA, many of 
them fuelled by disgruntled or opportunistic Voice employees. Although the 
investigations ultimately found no evidence of Communist subversion in VOA, the 
hearings were disruptive and ultimately tragic for the Voice: planned upgrades of short­
wave signal relay stations were delayed, and one VOA engineer, investigated but later 
cleared of any wrongdoing, was driven to suicide.128
In the midst of this difficult period for the Voice, a new President was also 
assuming power. Dwight D. Eisenhower proved a keen advocate of international 
information as a pillar of US grand strategy, having observed the impacts of 
psychological warfare during his military career and as commander of initiatives such 
as Operation Torch. Plans to extensively reform the information programs were 
announced shortly after Eisenhower’s election, and when he assumed office three new 
advisory committees assessed the issue of how the US information programs ought to 
be administered. In consultation with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
Eisenhower concluded that information belonged in an independent Executive Agency
127 Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs of the United 
States, The Soviet Propaganda Program, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1952).
128 See Heil, Voice o f America, pp. 51-3. See also Robert W. Pirsein, The Voice o f America: An History 
of the International Broadcasting Activities of the United States Government 1940-1962, (New York: 
Amo Press, 1979). Piersein also charts how the head of the VOA’s religious programming desk was 
subject to an investigation because he was rumoured to be an atheist.
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so it could be flexible in policy terms, closely monitored by the President and the 
National Security Council, and would not (at the insistence of Dulles) burden the State 
Department with additional complex functions. The proposals led to the establishment 
of the United States Information Agency (USIA) on August 1, 1953. With this 
development, information policy was subject to far greater Executive control than ever 
before, and the Voice’s more strident approach to broadcasting was formalised for the 
duration of the Cold War conflict.129
Conclusion
In this chapter I have charted the key bureaucratic and policy developments 
associated with the Voice of America radio station, taking a strong interest in the ways 
in which VOA’s functions were discursively represented in internal policy memoranda 
and public statements. The character and operations of the Voice were characterised in 
wide-ranging terms: as an expression of America’s liberal political culture; a basis from 
which to articulate US geopolitical objectives; a supplementary media outlet in regions 
where there was no independent media or where state media was propagandistic; and as 
a mechanism to communicate and demonstrate the principles of democracy abroad.
As I have argued in the discussion above, even the everyday functions of the 
Voice posed a challenge for policy-makers in relation to the established scepticism on 
the part of the US government and people toward propaganda practices. The 
manipulation of public opinion had been depicted by scholars and commentators during 
the inter-war period as contravening American political culture because it undermined 
both the rationality and morality of democratic society. Under the pressures of the 
Second World War, however, it became clear that the US could not feasibly avoid 
adopting some form of international informational policy. At issue for the officials 
engaged to found the Voice operations, was not simply the fact that that the US public 
might object to an information program: Executive war powers had already ensured 
that that the station would operate for the duration of the war at least. Rather, the
129 Heil, Voice o f America, pp. 58-9. As noted above, Eisenhower’s use of international information is 
surveyed insightfully in Parry-Giles, The Rhetorical Presidency.
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challenge for supporters of American informational diplomacy was to articulate a new 
understanding of America and its legitimate role and behaviour in world politics. The 
staff of the US information programs fashioned the existing critiques of propaganda 
into a positive statement of VOA’s function, as an expression of the liberal sentiments 
that had led Americans to condemn propaganda in the first place. By contending that 
the US had a singularly honest and open identity as an agent of ‘information’ rather 
than distortion and manipulation, the vindicationist sensibility that was emerging within 
US foreign policy planning at a general level was also affirmed. Significantly, 
connecting the domestic and international strictures of American political behaviour in 
this way constituted a more extensive definition of the purview of American foreign 
policy than a narrow, instrumental conception of American ‘propaganda’ would have 
presupposed. The idea that the US was an exceptional kind of informational diplomat 
in turn enabled Washington to contemplate far-reaching restructuring plans at the end 
of the war.
Most of the key memoirs and histories of VO A have noted that during the 
early Cold War the Voice’s work moved closer to the propaganda practices that it had 
sought, during 1942-45, to repudiate. By adopting an account of policy discourse as 
productive of the global roles and forms of agency that states pursue in world politics, I 
have supplemented these accounts by analysing the contested process through which 
this shift occurred. The discursive practices of the US information program had 
initially made possible the founding of US international informational diplomacy by 
suggesting how a journalistic approach of free debate and self-criticism could be 
adopted as a way to affirm American political culture, rather than adopting 
manipulative propaganda practices that would undermine it. But at the same time, this 
paradoxical rhetorical construction created constraints, tensions and ambiguities within 
the US international information program. The discourses of the Voice and the US 
information programs illustrated how the United States could be scripted as a morally 
exceptional international agent, based on the intentions of its information program 
rather than the operational features of VO A. The contradiction between these liberal 
intentions and the selection practices demanded by the Cold War was, however, seen by 
some officials as a major problem for the Voice. These critics clung to a conception of
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what America was and how it should behave as an informational diplomat that owed 
more to the journalistic ethos of VOA in the Second World War than the posture of 
Cold War ideological struggle that had developed in Washington. For these critics, 
America’s identity as a liberal power was increasingly belied by the selective, 
repetitive, strategic and extensive format of VOA broadcasting after 1948. Although 
these contributions to US information policy debates in the late 1940s provide a useful 
corrective to accounts of America’s Cold War posture as somehow inevitable or 
uncontested, they ultimately had little substantive impact. Instead, VOA ultimately 
adopted a strident posture of information warfare, an absolutist faith in the export of 
liberalism, and began to see a close relationship between geo-strategic priorities and US 
information policy.
In the next chapter I examine the discursive practices of US cultural 
diplomacy in a multilateral context: Unesco. In this discussion I shall assess how 
America’s approach to multilateral cultural diplomacy was articulated. This case also 
allows me to assess how Washington’s allies and co-members in Unesco responded to 
US initiatives. In the case study to follow I will show that it was not only the internal 
contradictions debated by US policy-makers as Washington assumed a posture of 
global cultural hegemonic that posed rhetorical challenges, but also the perspectives of 
other actors that were articulated through the Organisation. Unesco’s multilateral 
structure had provided other states with a mechanism to question and challenge the 
assumptions and representations that accompanied the projection of US cultural power 
in the post-war period. As the discussion to follow will show, it was an opportunity 
that was seized.
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CHAPTER FIVE
‘A FORUM IS ALSO A BATTLEGROUND:’1 2US DIPLOMACY IN 
UNESCO, 1943-1953.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation 
(Unesco) was bom out of a series of discussions on post-war cultural and educational 
reconstruction that took place in London from 1942. The talks were initially composed 
of exiled European cultural and educational officials and their British counterparts. An 
American delegation joined the talks in 1943 after the British Board of Education began 
to officially sponsor the meetings. US involvement supplied vital political and 
financial backing to the proposals, so that they could be considered as a basis for a 
permanent post-war cultural and educational institution rather than being confined to 
post-war reconstruction alone.3 The Department of State’s planning for multilateral 
cultural diplomacy situated the proposed institution as source of post-war moral and 
political renewal: it would seek to foster a global “state of mind conducive to 
establishing and maintaining and enduring peace.”4 Within a year the London talks 
were formally incorporated into plans for the overarching United Nations Organisation 
(UN) under discussion at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington. With its non-govemmental 
origins and the diverse interests that had been subsumed within the early proposals for 
post-war cultural cooperation, Unesco had a rather sweeping and nebulous set of 
proposed functions and approaches at this planning stage.
1 Allen, George V, “Abstract of Speech to be Given by Mr Allen at San Francisco,” (April 19, 1948), p. 
4; Policy Papers and Meetings, 1947-50 (PPM 1947-50); Subject Files 1945-1952 (Subj. 1945-52); 
Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1947-1950 (ASPA, 1947-50); General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park MD (NARA).
2 ‘Unesco’ is not capitalised here, in keeping with some of Unesco’s own documentation in the period 
and so as not to disrupt the flow of the text for the reader.
3 Scientific cooperation was a later addition to the Unesco proposals. The scientific component of 
Unesco’s work is not emphasised in this chapter, largely because scientific cooperation was not the 
touchstone for controversy that education and culture became. US efforts to impose global controls on 
atomic science, for instance, mostly played out outside Unesco.
4 Waldo Leland, Unesco and the Defenses o f Peace, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1945),
pp. 1-2.
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As the wartime proposals were refined into a draft constitution for a United 
Nations Special Agency for culture and education, it became clear that although Unesco 
shared several characteristics with the League of Nations International Committee for 
Intellectual Cooperation,5 the Unesco proposals differed from this earlier forum for 
multilateral cultural cooperation in one significant respect. Unesco was, according to 
one European delegate to the Organisation’s Executive Board, “designed to fulfil a 
conscious political purpose. It [would] not work just to promote education, science and 
culture in themselves,” rather it had the “avowed.... aim of building and strengthening 
peace.. .throughout the world.”6 7As Assistant Secretary of State William Benton stated 
to the first Unesco General Conference, Unesco’s central objective in its capacity as a 
UN agency was to promote cultural and educational interaction in a democratic way, in 
order to build a “firm peace built on genuine understanding among the peoples of the 
world.” From 1946 the Organisation embarked on projects that embodied this spirit of 
democracy and peace-building, including educational and cultural reconstruction, adult 
and child literacy projects, school text book revision, book distribution and library 
support, and sponsorship of international academic congresses.
However, the concepts of perpetual peace and democratic progress that 
Unesco sought to cultivate proved highly vulnerable to conflicting interpretations by 
the national delegations that comprised Unesco’s members. The Organisation was 
prone to internal conflicts over its policies and philosophy from the outset. Many of 
these controversies over Unesco’s goals and approach were sparked by the US national 
delegation’s particular sense of entitlement, given the large proportion of funding it 
supplied and the vital sponsorship Washington had given to the UN system in general,
5 As Jan Kolasa notes, Unesco did not adopt any single philosophy in this period, but it resembled the 
League Institute insofar as the various renditions of Unesco’s guiding philosophy resembled the 
universalist tenets of inter-war cultural cooperation, particularly the first Unesco Director General’s 
‘evolutionary scientific humanism,’ and the dialectical materialism emphasised by Yugoslav delegate to 
the Executive Board Vladislav Ribnikar. Jan Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation (The League 
Experience and the Beginnings o f Unesco), (Warsaw: Zaklad Narodwy Im. Ossolinkich, 1962), pp. 152- 
3. In some contexts, Ribnikar is referred to as ‘Vladimir.’ I use the Serbo-Croat version of this name 
within my discussion, in keeping with the usage in the proceedings of the first Unesco General 
Conference: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/14593e.pdf. I would like to thank Glenda 
Sluga for pointing out this potential source of confusion.
6 Gian Franco Pompei, “History of the Organisation,” in In the Minds o f Men: Unesco 1946 to 1971, 
(Paris: Unesco, 1972), p. 16.
7 William Benton, “First General Conference of Unesco,” Department o f State Bulletin 2701, (December 
1, 1946), p. 996.
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to determine how the basic objectives and approaches of the Organisation would be 
translated into policy. From 1946 American representatives regarded Unesco in 
increasingly instrumental terms and attempted to direct the Organisation towards 
projects that supported Washington’s vision for the post-war order. This instrumental 
view became particularly apparent during 1947-48 when the US delegation sought to 
make Unesco a conduit for pro-Western information in the context of the Cold War. 
This provoked efforts to counterbalance US influence in the Unesco General 
Conference and administrative offices. Ill-feeling toward the US deepened in mid-1950 
when American diplomats attempted to persuade the Unesco Executive Board to 
undertake a pro-Western global information campaign about the Korean War. 
Although the war was undertaken with the legal sanction of the United Nations Security 
Council, many Unesco members felt that for Unesco to engage in an information 
campaign while the fighting raged would constitute ‘war propaganda’ and unduly 
compromise the Organisation’s credibility as a vehicle for open global interchange. 
From 1951 further controversy emerged over US support for extending Unesco 
membership to right-wing authoritarian states such as Spain, while membership was 
being withheld from Communist China.
What kind of discursive practices were adopted by American diplomats as 
they formulated US positions within Unesco prior to 1953? I shall show in this chapter 
that similar process of self-representation of America as a liberal, reciprocal power to 
that which had been undertaken in the context of the bilateral cultural relations 
programs enabled Washington’s early engagement with Unesco. Stanford University’s 
Grayson Kefauver, a prominent figure in Unesco’s planning, had defined the proposals 
in 1945 in reciprocal terms by stating that the US delegation saw Unesco an 
“international clearing-house for the exchange of ideas and information not merely
o
between governments but especially between peoples everywhere.” The new realities 
of international interdependence and total war, a function of technological change and 
the ravages of world war, was situated as a warranting argument in favour of
8 Grayson N. Kefauver, “Proposed Educational and Cultural Organisation: Interview with Grayson N. 
Kefauver,” Department o f State Bulletin 2386, (September 16, 1945), p. 407.
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Washington’s diplomatic and financial sponsorship of Unesco in the immediate post­
war period. In this context, Unesco was represented as an important part of 
Washington’s post-war efforts to facilitate the spread of democracy and deepen the 
bonds of cultural understanding between national populations so as to guarantee the 
peace. However, as the State Department began to move away from this concept of 
openness from 1947 and increasingly adopted a more instrumental view of its own 
cultural and informational diplomacy functions, it encountered particularly acute 
rhetorical tensions and diplomatic challenges in exporting this vision to Unesco.
Operating in a multilateral context exposed some key tensions that 
accompanied the way in which US policy-makers characterised Washington’s interests, 
identity, and role during the early Cold War struggle. Here it was not simply that the 
State Department’s increasingly instrumental view of cultural diplomacy challenged 
established endogenous conceptions of America’s liberal posture of cultural reciprocity. 
The criticisms made by other national delegations to Unesco in response to American 
policy proposals added an additional challenge for the US delegation in their discursive 
effort to connect Washington’s post-war geopolitical strategy to America’s 
longstanding commitment to liberalism and freedom of opinion. Once again, the 
representational practices of US policy-making in this period, particularly the narration 
of America cultural influence, frequently turned on an underlying effort to classify 
Washington’s foreign policy as distinct from, and morally opposed to, propaganda, and 
thus to situate the US as a different kind of dominant power from the imperialistic or 
self-aggrandising practices of others. The irony here was that the State Department’s 
approach to multilateral cultural cooperation was more politicised, more 
‘governmental’ in Unesco parlance, in this founding phase than that of the founding 
member states from Europe. US diplomats framed Washington’s effort to cultivate 
global cultural influence, in line with the broader terms of its emerging posture of 
international hegemony, as the means to bring about a state of international stability, 
modernisation and political interdependence in the immediate post-war period. 
However, as the analysis below will suggest, stating these credentials seemed to be a 
strategy designed to license Washington’s effort to bring its diplomatic and financial 
influence to bear in order to pursue narrower ideological interests through Unesco.
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As the US delegation sought to direct Unesco’s program toward distributing 
anti-Communist information and educational materials from 1947-48, the significance 
of individual rights and democracy, as declared at Unesco’s founding moment, were 
cited as a justification for Unesco to adopt a more overtly ideological policy program. 
However, by 1950 the terms in which the US delegation framed their approach to 
Unesco had become overtly instrumental, with cultural and ideological warfare 
apparently seen as the underlying premise of the Organisation. In confidential sources, 
American diplomats in Paris characterised Unesco as a ‘lever’ in the struggle against 
the Soviet Union, noting that the US had an exceptional obligation to exercise 
‘leadership’ within the Organisation. Similarly, they emphasised that a US-led 
‘militant pacifism’ must prevail over the irresponsible neutralist posture that several 
other Unesco members had articulated in relation to the Cold War. At the same time, 
US diplomats continued to couch their public statements, and some internal documents, 
in the universalist, reciprocal principles that the Unesco constitution articulated. The 
rhetoric that informed Washington’s diplomatic position within Unesco as the Cold 
War deepened thus increasingly straddled contradictory elements: policy-makers wrote 
in general terms to affirm the democratic, apolitical premise of the Organisation, while 
simultaneously urging the Organisation at an operational level toward a rather one­
sided, ideological set of policies on the other.
A key event that highlights the tension within America’s rhetorical position on 
Unesco and the Cold War was the US delegation’s effort to establish a pro-United 
Nations information effort by Unesco in relation to the Korean War. American 
diplomats framed the US-led action in Korea as a defence of democracy in the context 
of a global struggle against Communism. In this context it was stated that the US 
delegation’s main priority in proposing that Unesco adopt a global information program 
was to “tirelessly...urge Unesco on to a more affirmative and effective action [for 
democracy] and also continue to evaluate these activities with a view to improved 
action in future similar cases, which seem bound to arise.”9 It is evident that US
9 Unesco Relations Staff, Department of State, “Report on the Unesco Secretariat’s Carrying Out of 
Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea,” (7 March, 1951), p. 13; Records of the Unesco 
Delegation, 1950-54 (Unesco 1950-4); Records of the Paris Embassy, France (Paris Emb.); Records of 
the Foreign Service Posts, Record Group 84 (RG 84); National Archives, College Park, MD (NARA).
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interests in Unesco in this period were being articulated through the prism of the 
containment doctrine, which had recently emerged as the prevailing rationale of US 
security policy. As the representational practices surveyed below will show, under the 
Manichaean terms of containment and the Cold War struggle ‘neutrality’ was 
increasingly scripted as inherently illegitimate and subversive position for Unesco and 
its members to adopt. This American ideological absolutism was also evident during 
membership controversies that arose during 1950-51, as the US attempted to construe 
its ideological objectives as the fulfilment of Unesco’s democratic constitution and 
commitment to multilateralism in a similarly self-serving way. The US delegation was 
diplomatically isolated as it selectively lauded multilateralism and universalism when it 
was likely to favour the entry of right-wing authoritarian states liable to favour US 
perspectives within Unesco, but at the same time vigorously opposed Communist 
China’s repeated requests for membership.
This chapter’s discussion of the discursive practices that accompanied US 
membership of Unesco considers how Washington’s pursuit of ideological and 
administrative influence within the Organisation was discursive represented both in 
internal and public contexts. I take a particular interest in how US officials situated 
America as a global cultural leader in the context of Unesco during the post-war period. 
During the multilateral talks from 1942 to 1945 that led to Unesco’s founding, 
Washington established a strong administrative and budgetary base within the 
Organisation. The US delegation sought to vindicate this influence by affirming the 
humanistic and democratising principles that the key European members had 
articulated as the guiding philosophy of Unesco in these planning phases. However, 
the US delegation differed from many of the European delegates in its view that the 
Organisation must work closely with national governments and must be more obviously 
engaged with international politics than the League Committee had been. The US 
delegation promoted this viewpoint in order to ensure that Unesco would be congruent 
with America’s emergent global role as a democratising and integrationist hegemonic 
power during the closing stages of the war, and thereby secure support for Unesco in 
Washington. Many of the principles that had informed American bilateral cultural
265
diplomacy such as reciprocity, internationalism, the democratic foundations of US 
political culture, and an intention to pursue substantive international reforms in the 
interests of peace, could therefore be situated as a source of congruity between the 
existing rationale of American cultural diplomacy and the purposes that had been 
proposed for Unesco.
In 1946 Unesco’s first General Conference was held in Paris, and as the 
discussion below will highlight, at the Conference the US delegation framed Unesco as 
a reflection of the post-war settlement and of the ‘positive project’ that the embedding 
of American power and liberal norms within the international system was understood to 
signify.10 There were several parallels between this rendition of the purposes of 
American engagement with Unesco and the rationale of national cultural and 
informational programs pursued by the Department of State. I show how, from 1947, 
the US delegation placed a particular emphasis on the informational functions of the 
Unesco by arguing that ‘freedom of information’ should be a key objective within 
Unesco policy and the post-war order. As the Department of State’s Howland Sargeant 
had observed in a mid-1948 memorandum, from the standpoint of US interests, the 
gravity of the Soviet ideological threat in Europe constituted “a logical and convincing 
[indication] that Unesco will wither on the vine and die if it does not face up to some of 
the immediate explosive issues of our times.”* 11 Assistant Secretary of State George V. 
Allen also saw Unesco as a framework through which to prosecute Washington’s Cold 
War information interests. In a draft public address Allen had written: “[w]e recognise 
in Unesco an international forum of academy, where speech is free. We recognise, 
however, that a forum is also a battleground. We go to it prepared not only to defend, 
but to advance our principles, forcefully and vigorously.”12 This effort to situate 
information functions as a key feature of Unesco’s program met with little success:
10 As I have noted in foregoing chapters, I use the term ‘positive project’ to denote the prevailing 
sentiment in Washington that its national interests were not exclusive (or ‘zero-sum’ in contemporary 
parlance) but rather working toward mutual benefit by fostering global cooperation and interdependence.
11 Howland Sargeant, Memorandum for George V. Allen, (May 3, 1948), p. 1; Policy Papers and 
Meetings, 1947-50 (PPM 1947-50); General Subject File 1947-50 (Subj. 1947-50); Records of the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs 1947-50 (ASPA 1947-50); General Records of the 
Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, College 
Park MD (NARA).
12 Allen, George V, “Abstract of Speech to be Given by Mr Allen at San Francisco,” (April 19 1948), p. 
4; PPM 1947-50; Subj. 1947-50; ASPA 1947-50; RG 59; NARA.
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several key European members felt it was both an undue extension of political interest 
into Unesco’s apolitical functions and a violation of its multilateral purpose.
My discussion will then examine how the US delegation articulated its 
proposals for Unesco policy in the lead-up to the pivotal Beirut Conference in 1948. 
Attempts by the US delegation to secure a more explicitly ideological policy program 
for the Organisation were enabled by internal debates that represented US anti- 
Communism as entirely congruent Unesco’s ‘democratic’ premise. The discourses of 
US foreign policy more broadly were increasingly locating America as the apex of 
global civilisation and morality in contra-distinction from the USSR, and ‘freedom of 
information’ was explicitly situated in these discourses as a way of propagating 
‘civilised’ ideas to combat Soviet propaganda. The US renewed its efforts to exercise 
its influence over the Organisation’s position on ideological conflict in 1949: one 
dispatch to the Assistant Secretary of State, for instance, emphasised America’s 
incumbency to lead the Organisation. The dispatch thereby noted the “growing 
importance of Unesco and [the US government’s] vital interests in the Organisation and 
its objectives carry with them the obligation to assume a leading role in the
I Tproceedings.”
However, attempts in 1951 by US diplomats to frame their proposals for an 
information effort explaining the Korean War in pro-Western terms won scant 
multilateral support in Unesco. The normally acquiescent British delegation went so 
far as to distance itself from the American position during the controversy. The Korean 
War episode thus highlights that while Washington had already come to accept that 
there was an active, strident and ideological approach to bilateral cultural diplomacy 
and information in this period, representations of ideological struggle and the defence 
of the West did not serve to effectively co-opt diplomatic support for the US in a 
multilateral context. Finally, this chapter will examine how US diplomats engaged 
with Unesco in relation to the divisive question of extending Unesco membership to 
right-wing authoritarian states, and how the delegation belied its universalist rhetoric 
with more instrumental, self-regarding policy proposals.
13 Letter to George V Allen, (no author), (November 8, 1949), p. 1; Unesco 1945-49 (U 1945-49); 
Department of State Decimal Files (DF); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 
(RG 59); National Archives, College Park, MD (NARA).
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The Origins of Unesco: Discursive Practice in Instituting of Multilateral Cultural 
Cooperation
Multilateral proposals for a permanent post-war cultural and educational 
institution arose out of a series of meetings that were held in London during the course 
of 1942, which brought together exiled ministers and educators from occupied Europe. 
The meetings had initially convened to discuss questions of post-war cultural and 
educational reconstruction, particularly in Axis-occupied regions, but became a basis 
for formal diplomatic meetings after 1943 and came to be known as the Conference of 
Allied Ministers of Education (CAME). Europe’s intellectual and cultural elite had 
reflected during the war on the importance of propaganda techniques in Hitler and 
Mussolini’s political successes. Drawing on this general trend, the London discussants 
sought to determine how international education programs could be used to prevent a 
repeat of the spiral into aggressive nationalism that had occurred in the 1930s. Past 
efforts at cultural and educational cooperation under the auspices of the League 
Committee and the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation were criticised in 
this context for their preoccupation with ‘high culture’ and failure to engage with mass 
cultural and political issues that had instead been co-opted by totalitarian regimes. 
These early statements articulating a popular and politically substantive basis for 
Unesco’s functions opened an aperture for the US to seek a key role in the discussions, 
given that its existing bilateral cultural diplomacy program had framed American 
international objectives in similar terms of popular impact and substantive political 
reform.
After mid-1943 the inclusion of the US as one of eight new provisional 
CAME members extended the purview of the discussions beyond Europe and led to a 
shift in emphasis away from post-war cultural and educational reconstruction toward 
considering the scope for a permanent cultural and educational relations organisation to 
strengthen the post-war peace. By October, 1943, a Unesco Executive Bureau of 
diplomatic representatives was constituted in London to work full-time on refining the
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CAME proposals into a draft constitution. At this stage both the United States and the 
USSR were involved in the planning of Unesco as fully-fledged members of CAME, 
and both played prominent roles in the planning debates. By 1944, the London 
proposals had been incorporated into the planned United Nations Organisation: the 
Chinese delegation to the second Dumbarton Oaks Conference had successfully 
proposed that the CAME proposals should be considered as the basis for a United 
Nations Special Agency under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC).14 During 1944-45 scientific cooperation was incorporated into the 
proposals, although advocates of a post-war multilateral scientific organisation, 
particularly its key proponent Cambridge biochemist Joseph Needham, had initially 
hoped a separate multilateral scientific congress would be founded after the war.15
While the London proposals were refined into a concrete draft constitution 
over the course of 1944, the USSR had expressed increasingly strong concerns that the 
Organisation’s activities might infringe Soviet educational sovereignty, and eventually 
withdrew from CAME. Despite several requests from the Executive Bureau to return 
for the founding conference of Unesco in 1945, the USSR did not return to Unesco 
until 1954.16 The popular focus of Unesco, particularly its emphasis on childhood and 
adult education, was hailed as a key principle of the Unesco proposals during this 
period. CAME members, particularly those officials from the US who took part in the 
talks, were thus able to represent their work as an effort to envisage how “education for 
democracy throughout the world” could be promoted. 17
14 The November Conference was the first founding conference for a UN agency to be held outside the 
US.
15 James Sewell’s account provides a good, concise history of how science became incorporated into 
Unesco. Science has often been downplayed in accounts of this phase of Unesco because it was a modest 
component of Unesco’s program, and one in which ideological schisms were relatively absent. The US 
delegation saw less at stake in the scientific components of Unesco’s program than it did in mass 
communications and educational cooperation, consequently it is not prominent in my discussion of 
discourses of US engagement with Unesco. Needham, as head of the Sino-British Science Cooperation 
Office and a member of several other international scientific congresses, was a key advocate of 
international scientific interchange during this period. James P. Sewell, Unesco and World Politics: 
Engaging in International Relations, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 48-52.
16 On Soviet education concerns see ibid., pp. 61-2. On the attempts to persuade the USSR to rejoin the 
discussions at the founding conference see John A. Armstrong, “The Soviet Attitude Toward Unesco,” 
International Organization 8, (no. 2, May 1954), pp. 217-8.
17 John Studebaker quoted in Frank Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural 
Relations, 1938-50, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.77. For a brief account of the
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Institutionalising the ‘Positive Project: ’ Unesco Planning in the Department of State
The Department of State had supported the CAME proposals since the US 
joined the discussions in 1943, and there was strong enthusiasm for the proposals 
within the Division of Cultural Relations and the various Offices engaged in post-war 
planning, such as the Office of Special Political Affairs and the Office of European 
Affairs. Of these agencies, it was the Division of Cultural Relations that was given 
oversight of American participation in the CAME meetings. The Division had brought 
a prominent international education advocate Grayson Kefauver, from Stanford 
University, to Washington on a full-time basis in 1943 as a consultant on multilateral 
educational and cultural cooperation. Kefauver became an articulate advocate of the 
scope for global peace through education within US preparatory discussions. Meetings 
of the US International Educational Assembly in 1943 in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and a 
conference between educators at Hoods College in New York City in 1944, were both 
able to supply advice to the State Department in relation to the CAME proposals. They 
situated US participation in post-war educational and cultural interchange as essential 
to the post-war peace, and emphasised the progressive and apolitical purposes the 
proposed institution must serve.'8 The Division of Cultural Relations established a 
Subcommittee on Post-War International Organisation to consider this advice in 
relation to the London proposals in 1944. From 1944, the Division of Cultural 
Relations also sought input on the London proposals from its General Advisory 
Committee, as well as consulting with officials from various other US foreign policy 
agencies such as the Office of War Information, the Division of Military Government,
projects set up by Unesco’s to further the study of international relations see Richard McKeon, “The 
Pursuit of Peace Through Understanding,” The Yale Review 38, (no. 2, December 1948), pp. 263-4.
18 The Harper’s Ferry meeting was the more influential of the two, and incorporated international 
members. The discussions had, recalled Waldo Leland, “brought together thirty-one educators of the 
United States and twenty-four from foreign countries. No one in the Assembly possessed representative 
authority, but all were amply qualified to express the views of colleagues and to speak on the basis of 
firsthand knowledge.” Leland, Unesco and the Defenses o f Peace, p. 7. On the variety of US 
organisations and views concerning international educational cooperation see: “Enclosure No. 3 to 
despatch No. 1476 of 27//3/44 from the Embassy at London, England: Plans for the Creation of an Inter- 
Allied Bureau for Education,” (March 27, 1944); 860-PIO-329, Post World War II Foreign Policy 
Planning: State Department Records of Harley A Notter, (Washington DC: Congressional Information 
Service, 1987).
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the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, and the State Department’s 
geographical divisions.
The need to mobilise global popular sentiment to consolidate the post-war 
settlement was a key theme emphasised by both the official and non-government US 
advisory bodies on Unesco, and this discourse enabled US interests in relation to the 
post-war settlement to be rendered cognisant with multilateral cultural and educational 
cooperation. As one address from the head of the State Department’s Division of 
African Affairs had emphasised:
Without the intellectual tools to which our civilization has become 
accustomed, economic and social disorganization is intensified and 
moral despair easily sets in.. .this Government should participate in 
an international program to help the war-tom countries.. .in repairing 
the moral, spiritual and physical damage.19
A 1943 report prepared for the General Advisory Committee also argued that 
international structures to promote popular education would ensure that liberal 
sentiments would be enshrined as a pillar of the post-war global order. This argument 
drew partly on the failures of inter-war multilateral cultural institutions to generate the 
bonds of popular international understanding that might have prevented the Second 
World War.20
Assistant Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish was a key supporter of US 
involvement in the London meetings. He represented Washington’s interest in joining 
the proposed post-war educational and cultural organisation during this founding phase 
in terms of substantive global progress and democracy-building. Here he noted the 
overlap between US foreign policy’s ‘positive phase’ of building institutions and 
promoting liberalism for the mutual benefit of all states and the premises of the Unesco 
proposals. MacLeish lobbied Congress to support Unesco because ultimately it was 
only with the reorientation of nationalist passions that the coming global order could be
19 Henry S. Villard, “The Positive Approach to an Enduring Peace,” Department o f State Bulletin 2256, 
(January 28, 1945), p. 140.
20 I. L. Kandel, “Memorandum on the Organization of Intellectual Cooperation,” 1943, pp. 1-2; Box 6 ff 
5; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of 
Denver.
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guaranteed to be a peaceful one. Fascism had revealed that rapid communications and 
mass ideologies were instruments capable of shattering peace on a global scale. 
Consequently:
The difference between Unesco and its predecessors [would be], in 
part, a material evolutionary difference. Men who regarded 
international activity in the field of education as impossible in 1919 
now regard it as not only possible but essential.. .the greater 
directness of Unesco’s approach to the problem lies, in my opinion, 
in the new realisation, not abroad in the world, that the mutual 
understanding of the peoples of the world is essential to the hope of 
peace- that in a world armed with weapons of such terrible 
destructiveness as those which men contrived during the last war, the 
only hope for peace lies in the mutual understanding not of Foreign 
Offices alone but of the peoples themselves.21
In a 1945 publication entitled Popular Relations and the Peace MacLeish had observed 
that an active defence against propaganda’s role in stoking international disagreement 
and war was a vital function of Unesco from Washington’s perspective: “What is 
essential...is not to correct each mischievous inaccuracy, each intended falsehood, each 
outburst of divisive propaganda. What is essential is to see to it that the peoples of the 
world know each other as peoples, that they understand each other as peoples.”22 
Elsewhere MacLeish argued that, while the Uneco proposals “broke new ground” in the 
organisation of international life and “moreover...the stated objectives of the new 
organisation are objectives which have been regarded, hitherto, as idealistic rather than 
practical,” they would nonetheless be essential in enabling Washington to prevent the 
kinds of crises that had led to war in the past.23
The US delegation that would attend Unesco’s founding conference was 
briefed in similar terms. Without a strong international commitment to moulding 
international public opinion, war-devastated regions would “tend toward internal 
disorder and external difficulties and may create new threats to the economic stability 
and political security of the world, upon which in fact depend the well-being and peace
21 Archibald MacLeish, “Statement by Archibald MacLeish to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives,” Department of State Bulletin 2508, (April 14, 1946), p. 629.
22 Archibald MacLeish (1945) quoted in Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation, p. 148.
23 MacLeish quoted in ibid., p. 140.
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of the American people.” Hence, in the Department of State’s view “the rebuilding of 
essential educational and cultural facilities of the war-tom countries in the period 
immediately following hostilities is an important service in the national interest of 
international security.”24
In addition to this vision of post-war progressivism articulated by Divisional 
planners in relation to the CAME proposals between 1943 and 1945, internal State 
Department memoranda had also made the point the proposed institution could be a 
useful instrument of US foreign policy. It was noted that US national interests in the 
post-war era depended upon a ‘consensus’ among the global public on the ‘ideas and 
values’ that should guide their political and economic future.25 In setting out 
Washington’s operating assumptions for Unesco and its proposed cultural program in 
Europe, one State Department report claimed that an integrated approach to economic 
development and cultural/educational reconstruction was imperative for any post-war 
settlement conducive to US national interests:
The concern of the Department of State in this field is deepened by 
the fact that the early achievement of decent living conditions and a 
normal social life in the liberated and enemy countries will increase 
the likelihood of general international security and enhance the 
possibility of mutually beneficial exchanges of goods and services.26
This report sought to articulate the connections between Unesco and the broader 
multilateral global system that the US sought to institute during the post-war period, 
particularly in terms of the ‘collective security’ principles the settlement. At this 
planning stage, questions had also been asked (but not definitively answered) as to 
whether the USA and the Eastern Bloc, with their irreconcilable political and economic 
philosophies, could work together in an institution for cultural and political
24 Department of State, “Letter to the Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference of the 
Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments, March 29, 1944,” p. 2; Miscellaneous Subject Files 
1939-50 (Subj. 1939-50); Records of Harley Notter (HN); General Records of the Department of State, 
Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives, College Park, MD (NARA).
25 Assistant Secretary of State Shaw, “Cultural Cooperation Program of the Department of State,” 
Department o f  State Bulletin 2125, (May 13, 1944).
26 B. Fosdick, (reviser, no author), “Statement of Policy on Participation in Educational and Cultural 
Reconstruction by the Department of State,” p. 1; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG RG 59; NARA.
27 Here I note that collective security was a rhetorical feature, but I do not wish to suggest that the United 
Nations Charter was a document pledging collective security in the strictest sense.
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• 28interchange. Consequently, in addition to the liberal internationalist rendition of US 
objectives in relation to multilateral cultural cooperation, there were also undercurrents 
of instrumentalism and a desire to ensure that Unesco would not stray from the 
promotion of Western ‘democratic’ values that enabled State Department officials to 
pursue engagement with Unesco.
The American delegation that attended the founding conference of Unesco in 
London in November, 1945 was headed by Senator J. William Fulbright, and included 
officials from the Division of Cultural Relations and the US education sector such as 
Archibald MacLeish and Grayson Kefauver. The delegation brought with it to London 
a US-authored draft constitution for Unesco, which evoked similar principles of 
reciprocity and liberalism to those that had been espoused in the context of America’s 
bilateral cultural diplomacy policy after 1936. The US draft constitution also affirmed 
the importance of mass participation alongside a doctrine of cultural ‘humanism’ as a 
practical basis for affecting substantive political reform in the post-war order.29 As the 
preface to the US draft constitution emphasised:
The cold-blooded and considered destruction by the enemy countries 
of the cultural resources of great parts of the continents of Europe and 
Asia...have created conditions dangerous to civilization, and, therefore, 
to peace, not only in the countries and continents ravaged by the enemy 
powers, but throughout the entire world. To deprive any part of the 
inter-dependent modem world of the cultural resources, human 
and material, through which its children are trained and its people 
informed, is to destroy to that extent the common knowledge and 
the mutual understanding upon which the peace of the world and its
TOsecurity must rest.
28 This is reflected in the transcript of a Press conference of the United States Delegation to the CAME. 
Luther H. Evans, The United States & Unesco: A Summary o f the United States Delegation Meetings to 
the Constituent Conference o f the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in 
Washington and London, October-November, 1945, (Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceania Publications, 1971), pp. 
10- 1.
29 These humanist ideas saw culture as a mechanism for reconciliation and bonding between societies, as 
opposed to the ‘anthropological’ view that was shortly to become dominant in US Cold War thinking of 
culture as a source of irreconcilable divisions between nations. On the expression of humanist principles 
in Unesco’s founding see, e.g.: Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation. On the distinction 
between cultural and anthropological theories of culture in this period see Julie Reeves, Culture and 
International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004).
30 Evans, The United States & Unesco, p. 150-1.
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Archibald MacLeish had reflected that with the US-authored constitutional proposals, 
Washington wished to convey its desire “to repair, in so far as is possible, the injury 
done to the common cultural inheritance of the world by the Fascist powers.”31 
Building on wartime discourses of a global ideological struggle of democracy against 
totalitarianism, the representation of American national interests in this context 
emphasised the cultural divisiveness of totalitarianism, and conversely constituted the 
US as defending the general principles of Western civilisation and assuming a leading 
role in the process of cultural rehabilitation in Europe. The global sweep and 
multilateral structure of the Unesco proposals were depicted as a mechanism to enable 
the US to take up this wider global cultural responsibility. In this context, the 
discourses of US participation in Unesco in this preparatory phase articulated a 
conception of America as entitled and obliged to exercise ‘leadership’ within the 
Organisation. This self-perception licensed an American strategy of diplomatic 
influence and ideological dominance within the Organisation during the mid-1940s, 
which subsequently provoked an effort by the other national delegations to counteract 
US initiatives, and led in turn to more strident US assertions of its ‘entitlement’ to lead 
Unesco.
The question of whether Unesco would be composed of diplomatic 
delegations or whether it should be a non-governmental institution like the League 
Committee was expected to be a significant point of debate at Unesco’s founding 
conference in 1945. At issue within the ambiguous question of membership was how 
closely the various parties to the talks were envisaging the Organisation would 
cooperate with national governments to secure its objectives. There was strong French
30 Ibid., pp. 150-1.
11 Archibald MacLeish, Preamble of 1944 draft constitution, quoted in Kolasa, International Intellectual 
Cooperation, p. 131. On the destruction and restoration of cultural artifacts see also: Harley A. Notter 
and Charles A. Thomson, “Joint Memorandum from the Division of Cultural Relations and the Division 
of Political Studies: The Restoration of Cultural Objects,” (Jan. 21, 1943); 506-2, Post World War II 
Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records o f Harley A Notter, (Washington DC: 
Congressional Information Service, 1987). On intellectual rehabilitation see: Abbot, Buck, and 
Archibald MacLeish, (first names unrecorded), to the President (January 22, 1944); 1375-3, Post World 
War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records o f Harley A Notter, (Washington DC: 
Congressional Information Service, 1987).
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and British support for the idea of including non-government representatives within the 
proposed institution (especially in light of the cosmopolitan nature of Unesco’s 
premise). However, given that unofficial membership had been adopted by the League 
Committee and was seen to be the source of its failures, the US delegation took the 
position that the institution ought to be composed of diplomatic representatives so as to 
remain politically relevant. The US delegation argued that the kind of cultural 
rehabilitation functions that Unesco would take on should take place within a 
governmental paradigm. This was something of a departure from the philanthropic, 
apolitical discourse of cultural diplomacy that the Division of Cultural Relations had 
upheld in its early stages, but in keeping with the political structures of post-war order 
that Washington was seeking to institute in other spheres of international relations. The 
influential British delegation’s support for a non-government representation was a 
significant obstacle to the US delegation’s intention to see Unesco as an inter-state 
institution. The British had argued that Unesco would lack credibility and impact if it 
was not globally regarded as aloof from the inequalities of national power.32 
Ultimately, a compromise incorporating diplomatic and non-government representation 
was adopted: the Secretariat and Executive Board would be composed of both 
individuals and diplomatic delegates; the General Conferences would be made up of 
national diplomatic delegations; while the individual Unesco National Commissions 
would seek as much as possible to incorporate private institutions and individuals. In 
terms of policy-setting within Unesco, however, subsequent events indicate that the 
State Department’s view that the Organisation should provide a conduit between 
government interests and mass public sentiment prevailed in operational terms. The 
National Commissions played only a small role in the formation of Unesco policy, and 
the formulation and funding of policy initiatives centred on the General Conference and 
the Executive Board.
32 Despite the fact that the British stood to benefit from governmental representation (particularly if 
proportional to financial contributions), their delegation was in favour of Unesco being composed of 
individuals. On US debates about the merits of national representation see: Evans, The United States & 
Unesco pp. 27-33.
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The doctrine of international freedom of information was a prominent and 
divisive rhetorical feature of US diplomacy in Unesco toward the end of the 1940s. As 
early as 1944 Adolf Berle had claimed that the ‘emblematically’ American values of 
unfettered political debate and free communications ought to be adopted as a key pillar 
of the post-war order, even despite the possibility that information hostile to the United 
States might be more freely projected as a consequence. Drawing on the assumption 
that US political culture had superior qualities to offer as an ideological basis for the 
post-war order, MacLeish observed how:
freedom of communication, freedom of exchange of ideas, [which] 
is basic to our whole political doctrine.. .The only possible protection 
against misuse of international communication, or misinterpretation 
of international communication, is not less communication but more.34
Similarly, the head of the US delegation to Unesco’s Preparatory Commission, Esther 
Buranuer, had also framed Unesco’s significance as its ability to convey “the 
determination of peoples throughout the world to establish truth as a guide to public 
action...the peoples of the world don’t always know the truth, but the common search 
for it....will save the world.”35 In a speech on ECOSOC, under which Unesco would 
be constituted, a Department of State spokesperson had observed that one of the most 
significant benefits of the UN system was its ability to propagate America’s historical 
commitment to a liberal democratic creed.
The constant goal of the American people has been the attainment 
of a society marked by greater individual liberty granted to all men... 
The Bill of Rights in the American Constitution is a great landmark
33 Adolf A. Berle Jr (probable author); “Agreement on the Principle of Freedom of Information,” 
(September 6, 1944), p. 2; 1375-6, Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department 
Records o f Harley A Notter, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987). Another US 
memorandum on the US information programs notes the way in which the USSR implicitly contested US 
ideology by propounding the notion of freedom of thought and information, which “clearly...could not 
be meant in the sense in which it is understood in the United States.” Arthur W. McMahon, 
“Memorandum on the Postwar International Information Program of the United States,” (July 5, 1945), 
p. 12; 860-PIO-507, Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A 
Notter, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).
34 Archibald MacLeish, “Popular Relations and the Peace,” Department o f State Bulletin 2247, (January 
14, 1945), p. 50.
35 Esther Buranuer quoted in Sewell, Unesco in World Politics, p. 97. Emphasis in original.
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on the road to human liberty. It has been an inspiration to many 
freedom-loving men of many nations. While the attainment of civil 
liberty in each country is a struggle which the citizens of each country 
must wage for themselves, nevertheless we believe that it is possible 
and right for freedom-loving peoples to give help to those who aspire 
to freedom.36
The principle of freedom of information was also articulated in American Unesco 
policy discourse as a mark of the State Department’s rejection of self-interested 
‘propaganda’ practices as an instrument of foreign policy. In this context, the 
representation of the US and Unesco’s purposes as both seeking freedom of 
international information was a way of representing US engagement in Unesco as a 
basis to promote truth and embody its opposition to propaganda. Once again, the 
discourses of US participation in Unesco were enabled by their connection to 
established principles of liberalism and exceptionalism already in play within the 
existing bilateral cultural program.
As the foregoing discussion has illustrated, the terms according to which 
Unesco planners within the US regarded the proposed Organisation had several key 
premises. Whereas the Division of Cultural Relations had embraced a non­
governmental paradigm prior to the Second World War, within internal debates on 
Unesco’s form and function American policy-makers envisaged the Organisation as a 
conduit for global cultural rehabilitation incorporating a strong element of political 
influence. US policy planners envisaged political and economic reconstruction, as well 
as cultural rehabilitation and free communications as the foundation for an enduring 
post-war peace. Cultural rehabilitation and freedom of information were both key 
functions of Unesco articulated in such a way as to draw on the broader ‘positive’ 
rendition of US foreign policy functions, which as I noted above was a way of 
characterising US interests as internationalist and progressive in the post-war phase. In 
this way State Department planners were able to engage with Unesco because they
36 Henry S. Villard, “The Positive Approach to an Enduring Peace,” Department o f State Bulletin 2256, 
(January 28, 1945), pp. 136-7. Freedom of information was also assuming some dominance in domestic 
US foreign policy discourses in this period: during the Congressional election of 1944 both parties 
framed freedom of information as a principle that should rightly occupy a key place in the US’s foreign 
policy, and a congressional resolution to internationalise the First Amendment to the US Constitution 
was also adopted that year.
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situated it within extant depictions of Washington’s novel and extensive approach to a 
post-war order organised around the principles of multilateralism and liberalism. This 
suggests that US hegemony, or ‘leadership,’ was clearly an emergent concept within 
the framing of the US delegation’s vision for Unesco, with US sponsorship of the 
proposals both implicitly and overtly situated as the means to prevent the collective 
peril that another world war would pose.
Founding Debates: Post-war Reconstruction and the Framing of Multilateral 
Cultural Cooperation
The founding Conference of Unesco was held in London in November 1945, 
and opened with an address by the British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, co-authored 
by Archibald MacLeish, which famously declared that Unesco’s mandate was nothing 
less than to supply the foundations of a lasting global peace. Unesco was premised on 
the fact that ‘wars begin in the minds of men’ and that it was only there that substantive 
‘defences of peace’ could be erected. Although 44 national delegations attended what 
came to be known as the November Conference in 1945, the founding debates of 
Unesco were dominated by the larger European and US delegations and the disputes 
that had emerged between them over what Unesco’s basic purpose and philosophy
T O
should be. Rhetorical practices came to the forefront of the negotiations as the key 
delegations attempted to situate their national claims as the truest and most workable 
interpretation of Unesco’s rather nebulous, universalist premise. These debates were 
partly a function of changes to post-war European balance of power. The French 
delegation had seen itself as being entitled to dominate the post-war regime of 
international cultural diplomacy, as the main governmental supporter of multilateral 
cultural cooperation prior to 1945. This was a view the United States and Britain, the
37 Unesco, Constitution. 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL ID=15244&URL DO=DO TOPIC&URL SECTIQN=201.html
38 As Sagarika Dutt notes, this was the source of the politicisation of Unesco in the early years “Since it 
was created by western states, in the initial years, the western states, especially the US, felt justified in 
using Unesco to further their political interests and purposes, which in the 1940s and 1950s was mainly 
the containment of communism.” Sagarika Dutt, The Politicisation o f the United Nations Specialised 
Agencies: A Case Study of Unesco, (Lewiston NY: Mellen University Press, 1995), p. 44.
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latter claiming a right to influence proceedings as the key sponsor of the CAME 
proposals, did not share. However, the founding of Unesco was an arena of world 
politics in which France saw an opportunity to recover its lost prestige and diplomatic 
influence after the Vichy occupation and the economic depredations of the war. 
Consequently, few opportunities were missed by the French delegation during the 
planning of Unesco to emphasise their nation’s claim to historical leadership in the field 
of cultural diplomacy over those of the British and, to a lesser extent, the Americans.39
The location of the November Conference in London had provoked disputes 
between Britain and France in the lead up to the meetings, culminating in a sarcastic 
communique sent by the French Foreign Ministry to the British Foreign Office 
observing that since cultural diplomacy was “a question which has always engaged its 
attention and that of French intellectuals...France could not fail to appreciate the offer 
made to its Government by the British Government that [Britain] associate herself as a 
Host Nation.”40 At the Conference itself, the French delegation hoped at the very least 
to ensure that Paris would be named the permanent seat of the Organisation. The 
French delegate Leon Blum lauded France’s ‘old’ claim to host the institution, since 
“France’s claims are older than those of other nations.. .French culture has always been 
marked by a tendency towards universality...Paris...remains one of the cities in the 
world where the future Organisation would find a natural seat.”41 As sponsor of the 
meetings since 1943, and determined to see Unesco play a more popular role than the 
French-dominated and elite League Committee had, the British delegation opposed 
French assertions of such claims to global cultural leadership during the November
l9 On the general objectives of post-war French diplomacy see William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: 
Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954, (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1998). For a good account of how the State Department viewed French behaviour 
see Charles Ascher, “Forces in the Development of the Work-Plan of Unesco,” (January 13, 1950); 
Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb; RG 84; NARA. Jan Kolasa’s account provides a particularly good overview 
of these tensions and the heritage of the League Committee within the proposals the delegation from 
France had brought to London. See: Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation. On the European 
tendency to respond to post-war US military and economic domination of the continent, and particularly 
the complex and contradictory factors that came with post-war German cultural self-assertion (beyond 
Unesco), see: Rebecca Boehling, “The Role of Culture in American Relations with Europe: The Case of 
the United States’s Occupation of Germany,” Diplomatic History 23, (no. 1, Winter 1999).
40 Letter from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador in Paris, August 21, 1945, 
reprinted in Leland, Unesco and the Defenses o f Peace, p. 214.
41 Leon Blum quoted in Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, p. 77.
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Conference.42 The slight against the British hosts that these French claims represented 
was apparent in these founding debates. London’s The Times newspaper had 
consequently reported that “it would.. .be dishonest to disguise the divergent views that 
are held regarding the policy, functions, and financing of the proposed organisation.” 43 
The possibility of disputes between France and Britain had been foreshadowed in US 
planning meetings ahead of the Conference, with US policy-makers noting that this 
should be seized by the US delegation as an opportunity for the New World to exercise 
its influence by presenting US ideas as compromise solutions where possible.44
The sense of entitlement and cultural universalism that Leon Blum’s 
statements reflect was not limited to the French position at the November Conference. 
The US delegation had also approached the meetings well aware that a large proportion 
of the funding for the Organisation would be provided by the US government and 
believed this should grant the US delegation considerable leverage in shaping the 
functions of Unesco. As the discussion above has highlighted, they were also 
convinced that the internationalist character of American cultural and educational 
principles in the context of the post-war project in US foreign relations was entirely 
congruent with Unesco’s premises. As I noted in the context of my discussion of the 
bilateral cultural diplomacy program, State Department officials depicted Washington’s 
role in the post-war period as a ‘positive project’ in the sense that new institutions and 
substantive bonds of international inter-dependence were being put in place, and in that 
historical trajectories were perceived to have vindicated this posture of American global 
leadership. It became apparent to the US delegation at the conference that, despite its 
sponsorship of post-war reforms, the view that the US should be entitled to lead Unesco 
was not wholly shared by the other national delegations and the post of interim Director 
General of Unesco was not given to an American.
The post was instead given to the British educational diplomacy advocate 
Julian Huxley. An American, Walter Laves, was appointed interim Deputy Director
42 In his memoir of the founding of Unesco, US delegate to the November Conference Luther H. Evans 
proffers a possible explanation for British frustration with the French proposals: a lack of coherent 
proposals of their own. Evans characterised the British delegation as “the most incredibly disorganised 
and undisciplined delegation at the Conference.” Evans, The United States & Unesco, p. 133.
43 “Common Tasks in Education,” The Times, (October 17, 1945).
44 Evans, The United States & Unesco, pp. 27, 34.
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General. Another piece in The Times speculated on the reasons for this rebuff: 
concerns already existed on the part of the British and French delegations about the 
institution’s vulnerability to financial domination by the US. Although it had 
previously been agreed that funding for Unesco would be provided on the same 
proportional scale as the United Nations, many members of Unesco were concerned 
that the assumption of almost half of all funding for Unesco by the US would be 
particularly damaging to the Organisation’s apolitical mandate. There were few other 
alternatives in the immediate post-war period, however, and British commentators 
noted that this structuring of funding:
places the proposed organisation in a vulnerable position, making 
it from the start an easy victim to national economics in the 
international field.. .it does nothing to provide safeguards against 
the domination or limitation of its purposes and functions by the 
richer and presumably more powerful nations.45
The issues of cultural prestige and diplomatic influence that were at stake in 
formalising multilateral cultural cooperation in the post-war order were thus clearly 
apparent during the founding stages of Unesco. While the US delegation sought to 
claim a legitimate right to influence in the institution by virtue of America’s 
universalist culture and financial burden, other members were already concerned that 
the US would exercise disproportionate financial, administrative and political influence 
within the Organisation. The future significance of Unesco as a framework through 
which declining or less powerful states sought to exercise prestige and counter-balance 
US hegemony in the cultural realm was foreshadowed at the Organisation’s founding 
conference.
Although the contending draft constitutions that had been brought to the 
founding conference had led to extensive debate on questions such as how Unesco’s 
representation policy and administration would be structured, these key administrative 
issues remained somewhat ambiguous in the completed Unesco constitution. Overlap
45 “Mutual Aid in Education: Issues of Relief and Reconstruction: The London Conference,” The Times, 
October 27, 1945.
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between the policy-making functions of the General Conference and the Executive 
Board subsequently became a source of confusion, and encouraged lobbying by 
member states that wished to influence Unesco’s program.46 Despite the controversy 
and cultural prestige-seeking that the November Conference had brought to the fore, 
compromises such as placing the headquarters of the Organisation in Paris and 
affirming Unesco’s commitment to post-war reconstruction projects created sufficient 
agreement for the draft constitution to be sent for ratification.47 The successful 
outcome of the November Conference was noted favourably in the US Congress. 
Representative Chester E. Merrow of New Hampshire, who had visited the November 
Conference, reported to the Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations that Unesco 
would serve as “one of the great foundation stones in the United Nations’ structure.” 
US participation in the Organisation was ratified by the Senate without significant 
controversy or delay. Polls cited in Congress in 1945 placed US public support for an 
institution that geared at deepening ‘world understanding’ at 85%.49 Archibald 
MacLeish, addressing Congress, reflected that Unesco’s significance to world politics 
would be its practical contribution as a mechanism for international peace and security, 
defining Washington’s global position and the sentiments of American citizens in 
internationalist terms:
A very large number of the delegates at the London conference 
were men and women who had played a leading part in the 
resistance movements of their countries under the Nazi occupation... 
They were determined that an attack should be made upon the 
problem of war and peace at the one level where success is possible- 
the level of human beings themselves... [Their view] is shared...by 
enormous numbers of men and women in the United States who 
believe, and believe with conviction, that the hope of the world lies
46 Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, p. 75. Unesco’s administrative ambiguities exacerbated its 
proneness to assertions of political influence by key powers. Political tensions looked set to continue, for 
although Paris had been designated as the seat of Unesco as a concession to France, the US and Britain 
had managed to position their nationals in the majority of administrative positions
47 Paris was not, strictly speaking, the permanent seat of Unesco. The constitution stipulated that with a 
2/3 majority in the General Conference the headquarters of Unesco could be relocated. It has never 
subsequently been moved.
48 Congressional Record quoted in Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation, 140.
49 Statement of Benton to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives reprinted as: 
William Benton, “The Role of Unesco in Our Foreign Policy,” Department o f State Bulletin 2508, (April 
14, 1946), p. 629.
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where the hope of America has always lain- in the things of the mind 
and of the spirit- in the education of children, and the full and just 
information of the citizens, and the fullest possible development of 
science and scholarship and the fine arts.50
Having drawn on such themes as the deepening of global interdependence and 
international understanding as well as the liberalisation of international information at 
Unesco’s founding, the US delegation would return to these themes in their 
characterisation of Unesco during subsequent years. As William Preston has observed:
The United States brought [to Unesco] a wish list of national political 
priorities linked to its traditional foreign-policy aims and its current 
status as the postwar world’s dominant power. It still believed in the 
open-door concept of informal empire, a ffee-trade/free-market 
position that regarded international organisations as important 
elements in reducing barriers to free flow of all kinds.51
Multilateralism was also a key point that enabled Unesco to be seen as an 
extension of US national interests in fostering liberalism and open interchange within 
the post-war world order. As Harley Notter had emphasised in 1943, the significance 
of Unesco’s multilateral structure in the context of US national interests was its ability 
to co-opt global support for Washington’s broader political purposes: “the smaller 
states with which the relationships are to be established [could] feel or be made to feel 
themselves associated as responsible participants in activities of mutual benefit.” In 
the US government’s domestic publicity on Unesco, the principles of reciprocity and 
the internationalist character of US interests were narrated as longstanding principles of 
American politics that had found concrete expression in the principle of inter­
governmental cultural multilateralism. To the American public, the Department of 
State emphasised that Unesco would capitalise on the:
50 Statement of Archibald MacLeish to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, reprinted as Archibald MacLeish, “The Role of Unesco in Our Foreign Policy,” 
Department o f State Bulletin 2508, (April 14, 1946), p. 629.
51 William Preston Jr., Hope and Folly: The United States and Unesco 1945-1985, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 37.
52 Harley Notter, Letter to Charles P. Thomson, (March 24, 1943), p. 1; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; 
NARA.
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very great significance... [of] the long-range furtherance of educational 
and cultural relations among nations. The Department wishes increasingly 
to encourage democratic international cooperation in developing reciprocal 
and desirable educational and cultural relations among the nations and 
peoples of the world, especially looking toward the promotion of free 
and friendly intellectual intercourse among them in the interest of 
international peace and security.53
In this context, Washington’s official publicity on Unesco seemed to emphasise the 
multilateral structure of the proposed organisation in order to articulate its overarching 
claim to legitimate, consultative, hegemonic dominance, rather outright international 
domination.
The official founding of Unesco was to take place at its first formal General 
Conference in Paris one year after the November Conference. Much had been left 
unexplained in terms of the administrative and decision-making functions of Unesco, 
and there were ongoing concerns in the international media during the lead up to the 
first General Conference that the wealthier member states could afford to permanently 
station diplomatic staff in Paris would unduly influence the Executive Board and 
Secretariat.54 The fact that more than two-thirds of the Secretariat staff were from 
Britain, France and the US seemed in any case to portend that the Organisation would 
have a distinctly ‘pro-Western’ character.55 The likelihood that Unesco would be 
answerable to Western interests also seemed to be confirmed by the Department of 
State’s planning for the first General Conference. As the US delegation prepared to 
travel to Paris, many of the key features Washington’s rhetorical position on Unesco 
had already been put in place, and drew on the positions taken within Washington’s
53 Department of State, “Participation of the United States in Emergency Educational and Cultural 
Rebuilding of the War-Torn United Nations,” Department o f State Bulletin 2094, (April 1, 1944), pp. 
299-300.
54 Indeed, as Sewell observes this kind of lobbying had been going on in relation to the Preparatory 
Commission that had been constituted in London after the November Conference to examine ongoing 
administrative issues in the lead up to the first General Conference. “The interval between the London 
conference and the first General Conference was further to reveal participants’ inclinations and shape the 
character of their nascent organisation. Provisional work by a Preparatory Commission staff was left to 
the responsibility of signatory states whose governments were willing to post interim delegates in 
London.” Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, pp. 83-4. On the work of this commission, and the role of 
UK scholar and delegate Alfred Zimmern at the Preparatory Commission see: C. H. Dobinson, “Unesco- 
The Greatest Hope of the Twentieth Century,” The Journal o f Education, (January 9, 1946).
55 Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation, p. 144.
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bilateral cultural diplomacy program. Concepts of global interdependence; the 
internationalist character of US interests and embedded US hegemony; multilateralism; 
freedom of international communications; and the democratising influence of US 
political culture were all emphasised US foreign policy discourse as the US formulated 
its policy positions ahead of the 1946 General Conference.
‘The Greatest Hope of the Twentieth Century:’ 1946-7 56
Unesco formally came into being on November 4, 1946. After taking its 
preamble from Atlee’s speech and asserting that peace, like war, originates in the minds 
of humanity, the Unesco constitution went on to define the Organisation’s purpose as 
seeking substantive reform of the international system and multilateral cooperation. 
Unesco was:
to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration 
among the nations through education, science and culture in order 
to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for 
the peoples of the world.. .by the Charter of the United Nations.57
The final constitution had stipulated that Unesco would consist of a General 
Conference to set the broad outlines of policy, an Executive Board that would refine 
these broad initiatives into specific policy proposals, and a Secretariat to implement the 
Unesco program. Consequently, much of the debate at the first General Conference 
considered how to transform the vague procedural framework agreed to in London into 
an effective administrative and policy-setting structure. A budget of $6,950,000 was
CO
approved for the first year’s program, with more than 40% to be supplied by the US.
56 Dobinson, “Unesco- The Greatest Hope of the Twentieth Century.”
57 Unesco, Constitution. 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL ID=15244&URL DO=DO TOPIC&URL SECTIQN=201.html
58 Unesco, “General Conference 1st Session, Held at Unesco House, Paris, From 20 November to 10 
December, 1946,” http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/114580e.pdf pp. 256-7. In two years 
the budget had risen only marginally, by less than $1 million, with large contributors such as the US and 
Britain allocating far less to Unesco than to their national cultural programs. See Unesco, “Records of 
the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation 3rd
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In Unesco’s first year a large administrative staff and broad range of policy activities 
were put in place by the 24-member Executive Board.
From the formal founding of Unesco onward, the US delegation worked 
consistently toward strengthening the governmental paradigm with the Organisation. 
What this suggests is that multilateral cultural diplomacy was being increasingly 
regarded by the US delegation through the prism of US national interests and its wider 
foreign policy positions, rather than as a vehicle for apolitical cultural cooperation, 
defined in terms of long-range reforms to the global order. By seeking to enhance the 
role of official representatives within the Unesco Executive and Secretariat organs, the 
US delegation sought to bring discrepancies of national power to bear on the policy 
functions and ideological positions adopted by Unesco. This shift toward viewing 
Unesco as a vehicle for American interests is also evident in the tension that developed 
at the 1946 conference between the US view that Unesco’s role was to bring about 
‘cultural democracy,’ and support Western political interests, and the interim Director 
General Julian Huxley’s conception of Unesco as a vehicle for ‘evolutionary scientific 
humanism.’ American national interests also underpinned the US delegation’s repeated 
efforts to situate international information functions as a key part of Unesco’s program. 
Although international freedom of information was espoused as a liberal initiative by 
the US delegation in the context of these efforts, the distribution of information was 
perceived in Washington as a basis to give Unesco a more direct role in the waging of 
the post-war ideological struggle. The evidence suggests that this was precisely how 
other members of Unesco viewed American proposals, and accounts for the opposition 
to US information proposals that most of the other national delegations expressed.
The key issue at the 1946 General Conference was to establish a basis for 
Unesco’s first practical initiatives. Unesco’s proposed program had been set out by the 
Executive Board in the run up to the Conference according to the doctrine of 
‘evolutionary scientific humanism:’ a theory of world politics developed personally by 
the interim Director General Julian Huxley. In this view international cultural and
Session, Beirut, 1948,” vol. 2: Resolutions, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/11459e.pdf 
p. 39.
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educational exchange should be a vehicle for international integration and 
modernisation that would, over the long term, foster peace.59 Huxley’s philosophy 
looked toward the “emergence of a single world culture,” and situated science and 
education as a framework of international interaction that could resolve the “two 
opposing philosophies of life from the West and from the East.”60 He also strongly 
repudiated the view that Unesco should take a position on economic philosophy, to the 
annoyance of the US delegation. Huxley had argued that:
[f]rom acceptance of certain principles or philosophies, Unesco is 
obviously debarred.. .Neither can it espouse one of the politico- 
economic doctrines competing in the world today to the exclusion 
of the others- the present various of capitalistic free enterprise,
Marxian communism, semi-socialist planning, and so on. It cannot 
do so, partly because it is contrary to its charter and essence to be 
sectarian, partly for the very practical reason that any such attempt 
would immediately incur the active hostility of large and influential 
groups, and the non-cooperation or even withdrawal of a number 
of nations from membership.61
Between 1946 and late 1948 William Benton and other members of the US delegation 
in Paris registered their displeasure with diffuseness and anti-ideological stance that 
Huxley’s philosophy entailed. They made their concerns about the doctrine plain in 
lobbying the Executive and Secretariat to ensure that Huxley published any statements 
of evolutionary scientific humanism as personal remarks rather than official Unesco 
positions. Rather than a diffuse, evolutionary doctrine of cultural harmony, it was clear 
the US delegation was envisaging that a more political approach to the diplomacy of 
culture, education and science, as part and parcel of the Allied post-war settlement, 
would be taken by Unesco.
59 Huxley’s philosophy was ultimately criticised from several quarters and Huxley was dissuaded from 
seeking election to the first full Director Generalship of Unesco. To distinguish himself from Huxley and 
from the US position, the first elected Director General of Unesco, former Mexican foreign minister 
Jaime Torres Bodet, articulated a third overarching term for Unesco’s work: ‘practical humanism,’ the 
connotations of which remained inscrutable.
60 See Julian Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy, (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press 
America, 1947); Charles S. Ascher, “The Development of Unesco’s Program,” International 
Organization 4, (no. 1, February 1950), pp. 18-9.
61 Julian Huxley quoted in Brenda Tripp, “Unesco in Perspective,” International Conciliation 497, 
(March 1954), pp. 341-2.
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As a counterweight to Huxley’s teleological theory of cultural interaction and 
apparent reluctance to associate Unesco with a ‘pro-Western’ ideology, Benton became 
an entrepreneur for the concept of ‘cultural democracy’ as an alternative premise for 
Unesco’s work. To the General Conference in Paris, Benton had therefore declared:
Men have struggled for centuries to bring into being the ideal of 
political democracy.. .More recently men have struggled for 
economic democracy. I propose for Unesco the development of 
adequate means to a third goal: the goal of cultural democracy; the 
opportunity for all to share in the ideas and the knowledge that will 
enable them to participate intelligently in the affairs of the world 
community.62
Benton’s concept represented the international sphere as progressing toward pluralist 
integration in similar terms to those which underpinned the State Department’s bilateral 
cultural diplomacy. In his report on the Paris Conference to the State Department, parts 
of which were published, Benton drew parallels between the cultural principles that 
Washington claimed to represent and what Unesco ought to strive for, locating ‘cultural 
democracy’ as firmly in the spirit of America’s civic cultural tradition.63 In 
Washington’s terms, Unesco’s policy program should adopt cultural democracy as its 
operating principle, and consolidate its range of activities to ensure that mass 
participation and democratic politics was consistently applied in all Unesco’s programs. 
As Benton had declared to the General Conference:
Unesco is founded on the belief that neither the forced unification of the 
world of the spirit, nor the forced standardisation of the world of the mind 
can give men peace, but only a world democracy of mind as well as spirit. 
The cultural democracy which Unesco proposes is a democracy of mind 
and spirit in which every culture shall be free to live and develop in itself 
and in the great community of common culture.64
62 William Benton, “Speech to the First General Conference of Unesco;” “General Conference 1st 
Session, Held at Unesco House, Paris, From 20 November to 10 December, 1946,” 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/14593e.pdf, p. 64.
63 William Benton, “Report on the First General Conference of Unesco,” Department o f State Bulletin 
2720, (January 5, 1947).
64 William Benton, “Speech to the First General Conference of Unesco;” “General Conference 1st 
Session, Held at Unesco House, Paris, From 20 November to 10 December, 1946,” 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145Z14593e.pdf, p. 64.
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In his subsequent report to the American government and public Benton situated the 
doctrine of ‘cultural democracy’ as a basis to ensure that the nebulousness of Unesco’s 
premises would not obstruct its role in consolidating the Allied peace settlement, and 
thus by implication its ability to support US national interests:
Unesco’s projects should be few in number at the start. They should not 
overtax the financial ability of the smaller countries during this critical 
year of financial strain. They should be practicable. They should meet 
squarely the test question: will this project contribute to peace?65
Benton’s rhetorical posture at the 1946 General Conference reflects the 
increasing prominence of the concept of ideological struggle in Washington’s approach 
to Unesco. He had referred in 1945 to an emerging “struggle over the empire of ideas,” 
and shortly after had observed that in the post-war era “the great stakes of 
diplomacy...involved the winning over of ‘peoples.’”66 Upon his return from Paris, 
Benton had thus characterised Unesco as:
a political force of the first magnitude.. .It can be a major force in the 
security program of the United States, and in the furtherance of the 
broad objectives of American foreign policy- peace and prosperity 
among all peoples of the world.. .It was also a political conference.
That fact is of great importance to the American people. Power in 
today’s world is not merely economic power and military might. It 
also lies in the field of ideas. As older empires lose economic and 
military power, and as new ones emerge, they are eager to gain strength 
on this new frontier- the frontier of the mind- where peace and security 
can be waged.67
65 Benton, “Report on the First General Conference,” p. 20.
66 William Benton quoted in Preston, Hope and Folly, pp. 39, 48. Benton frequently employed a 
narrative structure in making such assertions. In the following quotation, he draws explicitly on America 
as an exceptional power in historical terms: “today the peoples of the world wield greater power by far 
than ever before. All of us know, 170 years of American example are at least partially responsible for 
this rise in power of the peoples of the world...the world’s best hope for peace lies in their rising to 
power. That is why it is vital to our interest that the peoples of other nations- and not merely their rulers- 
acquire an understanding of the United States.” William Benton, “Understanding Among Peoples,” 
Department o f State Bulletin 2493, (March 17, 1946), p. 409.
67 Benton, “Report on the First General Conference,” pp. 20-1.
290
Benton’s report on the Conference noted that for all its broad objectives Washington’s 
interest in seeing Unesco adopt ‘realistic’ approach to waging peace. He noted in the 
context of emerging global ideological division that international freedom of 
information must be a key priority for Unesco.68 In similar terms, one State 
Department report on the United Nations system had recommended that the US secure 
a multilateral treaty on international freedom of information. The national interest in 
such an agreement was thus that “if its principles were to embrace all modem forms of 
information, including the press, the radio, and the motion picture, and if approved by a 
large number of states, [such an agreement] would constitute a realistic foundation for 
more adequate exchange” of ideas about the global order and the sources of war.69 Just 
what was a ‘realistic’ foundation for the exchange of ideas was defined within the 
bounds of America’s own ideology and national interests, however. In the Unesco 
context it became evident that there was a discrepancy between the kinds of principles 
that were seen to indicate Washington’s liberal global posture and toleration of free 
debate in the context of America’s internal foreign policy discourse, and what the other 
national delegations to Unesco found acceptable in the context of Unesco’s humanistic 
premise.
Benton had demonstrated his commitment to international information as a 
key feature of US foreign policy by establishing a special Committee of Consultants on 
Mass Media earlier that year, which was intended to ensure that the American National 
Commission for Unesco and the American diplomatic legation in Paris were provided 
with detailed policy advice on:
the quality of international communication through the mass media 
and.. .the means by which the mass media may be of more positive 
and creative service to the cause of international understanding and 
therefore of peace.70
™ Ibid., pp. 20-1.
69 Dorothy Fosdick, “International Understanding: A Foundation for the Peace,” Department of State 
Bulletin 2273, (February 25, 1945), pp. 296-8.
70 US National Commission for Unesco, Report of the US National Commission for Unesco With Letter 
of Transmittal from Assistant Secretary Benton to the Secretary o f State, (United States Government 
Printing Office: Washington DC, 1946), pp. 13-4.
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However, US efforts to situate international freedom of information and ‘creative’ 
informational initiatives as a key objective in Unesco policy proved divisive within the 
Organisation. While Washington viewed the distribution of information as a basis to 
ensure that the post-1945 peace settlement could be consolidated through the promotion 
of democratic perspectives, other national delegations were concerned that Washington 
already had excessive influence over information and media in the post-war global 
order. US information proposals prompted outright objections by the Yugoslavian 
delegation, which argued that the types of ‘information’ commenting on global politics 
that the US wished to see more freely distributed was not likely to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of dialectical materialism as a political philosophy. The head of the 
Yugoslavian delegation (who later joined the Executive Board), Vladislav Ribnikar, 
consequently branded American-sponsored freedom of information principles as an 
imperialistic strategy intended to push Unesco into circulating anti-Communist 
propaganda. He publicly queried why Unesco made:
no reproof against those who preach war, their press, their 
broadcasts, their publications; nor is there any word on the 
possible means, either for dealing with such enemies of peace 
and co-operation or for opposing the destructive activity of 
Fascist and pro-Fascist elements which, in many countries, are 
still able to exist.. ..a whole series of proposals by the Preparatory 
Commission, misusing the principle of ‘free flow of ideas,’ 
provides for the penetration of the masses by a propaganda devised 
by the adversaries of peace and the instigators of new wars.72
British commentators also publicly criticised the US delegation’s particular 
preoccupation with what was proving a divisive policy. British MP John Hardman 
publicly stated in 1947 that Unesco should work toward a pluralist global information 
order celebrating cultural self-determination rather than the global distribution of
71 Benton, “Report on the First General Conference,” p. 21. There were perhaps grounds for the 
Yugoslavian concerns. As Jan Kolasa observes: “Western civilization in its capitalist version was 
markedly predominant both at the London Conference and during the subsequent years of the existence 
of Unesco.” Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation, p. 161.
72 Vladislav Ribnikar (1946) quoted in Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, p. 141.
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American-authored statements.73 Later that year, after further efforts by the US Unesco 
delegation to foster a proactive informational program within Unesco, which included a 
failed plan in August for Unesco to establish its own short-wave radio station,74 the 
Polish delegation put forward a resolution in the General Conference to criminalise 
‘war propaganda.’75 The Polish proposal was broadly regarded as a rebuff of the US 
position on freedom of information. It was eventually defeated by the US delegation 
because the definition of ‘war propaganda’ was seen as deliberately wide, and hence 
likely to restrict their plans to see Unesco distribute information that favoured Western 
interests.76 While the rhetoric of freedom of information was universalist in scope, the 
implication that the United States, with considerable private and government resources 
to bring to bear, would be able to dominate the global information order was the subtext 
both within the position taken by the American delegation and its critics within Unesco.
During the 1946-47 period the United States delegation continued to take the 
position that US hegemony could legitimately be pursued within Unesco’s multilateral 
structure according to the terms of America’s cultural universalism. Prevailing 
representations of American interests in fostering democracy and multilateral 
consensus, as reflected in their rhetoric of media freedom and ‘cultural democracy,’ 
were seen as entirely congruent with the pursuit of diplomatic dominance within the 
Organisation. The broader discourses of US cultural diplomacy and information that 
have been observed in preceding chapters regarded Washington’s effort to cultivate 
influence through the diplomacy of culture and information as the fulfilment of 
international interests and democratic vindication, rather than ‘power politics’ or 
imperialism. These fed into the rhetorical position adopted by the US Unesco 
delegation that US influence would do no more than further the cultural rehabilitation
73 John Hardman (1947) quoted in Ibid., p. 99.
74 This possibility had been debated, and rejected, during the founding conference of Unesco in 1945. 
Department of State, “Is Unesco the key to International Understanding?,” (Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, 1946).
75 One article branded the delegations from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia ‘substantive refugees’ 
in Paris who lived in fear of being recalled home and hence kept the lowest possible profile at Unesco 
meetings. See T. H. White, “Unesco is Dying”, Continental Daily Mail, (July 25, 1950). This is ironic 
given that exiled Czech, and Polish officials had been associated with the Unesco project from 1942.
76 Clare Wells, The UN, Unesco and the Politics o f Knowledge, (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 66-9.
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and democratic goals of Unesco. After strong lobbying at the 1947 General 
Conference, a Unesco information program was placed high on the agenda in the 
Executive Board’s discussions of Unesco’s policy program in 1948. However, this 
occurred in the context of Washington’s increasingly strident anti-Communist posture 
in other areas of foreign policy, and thus generated concerns among a number of the 
national delegations that an effective diplomatic counter weight to US hegemony must 
be found so that Unesco would not be a forum for Cold War antagonisms. The exercise 
of US power and its efforts to move Unesco into more politicised terrain such as 
informational diplomacy encouraged the formation of a ‘post-colonial’ voting caucus 
within the 1948 General Conference.
Beirut, 1948: ‘Demonstrating Forcefully [America’s] Desire to Collaborate’77
1948 was a significant watershed for whether Unesco could pursue its 
cultural, educational and scientific policy program beyond the international ideological 
fault-lines that had developed in other arenas of world politics. As I illustrated in the 
previous chapters, the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill through the US House of 
Representatives in January that year signalled the culmination of a broader shift in 
terms of how instrumentally Washington was framing the US national cultural and 
informational diplomacy programs. In the lead-up to Smith Mundt, US cultural and 
informational diplomacy had increasingly been characterised as part of an urgent and 
necessary response to the extension of Communist ideology in Eastern Europe. In 
some cases, this provoked disputes between enthusiastic Cold Warriors within the 
cultural and informational programs and those individuals who remained attached to a 
more reciprocal and apolitical vision of US practices. However, unlike the debates 
about the appropriate tone and style of US cultural diplomacy that emerged within the 
Division of Cultural relations, it was predominantly the Cold War posture that shaped 
how the US delegation (with its higher proportion of staff who were career diplomats) 
approached Unesco. The notion that Washington had an obligation, as a victorious 
power, to exercise ‘leadership’ within the Organisation was a prominent feature of the
77 Letter to George Allen, (no author), (November 8, 1948), p. 1; U 1945-9; DF; RG 59; NARA.
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American policy documents of the period, and was often articulated in the context of 
narratives that situated the Allied victory in 1945 as the global vindication of liberal 
democratic politics symbolised by the American revolution itself. The 1948 General 
Conference also reflects the emergence of a new form of alterity within US cultural 
diplomacy discourse, which cast Cold War ‘neutrality’ as a subversive and dangerous 
ideological category within, and beyond, the Unesco framework. In this context US 
officials characterised the efforts by other national delegations to ensure that Unesco 
remained aloof from the ideological schism between the superpowers as a recalcitrant, 
obstructive and inherently illegitimate diplomatic position. A distinctly instrumental 
rendition of US interest in Unesco was articulated during 1947-48 as a consequence, as 
the US sought to use Unesco as a lever against Cold War neutrality and the Communist 
threat. The domineering diplomatic style the US delegation adopted was evident to the 
other national delegations. Consequently, the 1948 Unesco General Conference, held 
in Beirut, witnessed perhaps the earliest instance of an organised anti-American voting 
caucus within the United Nations system.
American policy debates and publicity on Unesco from early 1948 clearly 
reflect a hardening American stance on international ideological issues and the 
increasingly instrumental lens through which multilateral cultural cooperation had 
come to be regarded. Escalating Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet 
Union had led to the Soviet blockade of West Berlin from June that year. Covert 
psychological warfare was being situated in several spheres of US foreign policy 
thinking as a basis on which to rollback Soviet advances in propaganda and intellectual 
prestige, particularly in Europe. The US position had been spelled out in National 
Security Council Memorandum 10/2 in June, 1948, which instructed the newly-formed 
CIA to launch a covert counter-propaganda and cultural subversion program against the 
Soviet Union.78 In a US national delegation policy paper ahead of the General
78 The CIA’s budget increased nearly fourteen-fold between 1949 and 1952, highlighting the significance 
of counter-propaganda and subversion in the prosecution of the early Cold War. Frances Stonor- 
Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World o f Arts and Letters (New York, 1999), pp. 39- 
1. A historiographical debate exists on the Berlin blockade, which emphasises the ways in which the 
crisis was constructed as a symbol of global ideological conflict in US diplomatic discourse. See, e.g.: 
William Stivers,“The Incomplete Blockade: Soviet Zone Supply of West Berlin, 1948-9,” Diplomatic
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Conference in Beirut in November, 1948, it was observed that US diplomatic efforts to 
impress its vision for a Unesco-authored information program on the Executive Board 
had not gone far enough in light of the perils of Soviet expansionism.
It is felt...that Unesco’s contribution to [transmitting information] 
should be increased. To date, Unesco has devoted more effort to the 
study of technical means in the field of mass communications than it 
has to the positive promotion of freedom of information and a 
beginning should be made during this year to achieve a better balance 
in Unesco’s approach to this work.79
Several advisory studies of technical and organisational issues for international 
communications had been initiated by Unesco in 1948 as a consequence of the program 
recommendations that the US delegation had secured at the 1947 General Conference. 
However, US diplomats were frustrated that Unesco’s Executive Board had avoided 
commenting in a substantive way on the errors of Communist propaganda and the 
escalating tensions caused by the USSR in Germany and elsewhere.80 In the lead-up to 
the Beirut Conference, French commentators had branded the US doctrine of freedom 
of information “mass media imperialism,” while the British had speculated it was “an 
effort to spread US culture by a mass media network.” Even American commentators, 
such as Alan Barth, articulated some concern that if freedom of information meant the 
penetration of global information networks by the US “some pretty serious excesses, 
banalities, outright untruths and offences against decency and good taste” might be 
perpetrated against the unwitting global public.81 However, the State Department 
remained committed to the principle of international freedom of information as a basis
History 21, (no. 4, 1997); Carolyn Eisenberg, “The Myth of the Berlin Blockade and the Early Cold 
War,” in ed. Ellen Schrecker, Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse o f History After the Fall of 
Communism, (New York: New Press, 2004).
19 United States Delegation to Unesco “Third Session of the General Conference of Unesco Beirut, 
November 17, 1948: Position Paper on Unesco Program Concerning Freedom of Information,” 
(November 17, 1948), p. 2; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.
80 United States Delegation to Unesco, “Third Session of the General Conference of Unesco Beirut, 
November 17, 1948: Position Paper on Unesco Program Concerning Freedom of Information,” 
(November 17, 1948), p. 2; U 1945-4; DF; RG 59, NARA. See also John B. Whitton, “Cold War 
Propaganda,” The American Journal of International Law 45, (no. 1, January 1951), pp. 151-3. The US 
failure to implement its views of Unesco’s proper information functions was subsequently recalled by the 
former director of Unesco’s information exchange division Theodore Besterman, Unesco: Peace in the 
Minds o f Men, (London: Methuen and Co., 1951), p. 63.
81 Alan Barth and other unattributed quotations in Preston, Hope and Folly, p. 55.
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to direct Unesco’s policies towards what they saw as ideologically relevant outcomes in 
the context of the Cold War. While some internal State Department correspondence 
still sought to present freedom of information as the basis of liberal, pluralist and 
integrated global order, an instrumental conception of international communications, in 
line with Washington’s obligation to supply ‘leadership’ to the free world in the context 
of the Cold War struggle, appeared to predominate. The US delegation had, in this 
vein, signalled a willingness to exert strong institutional pressure to ensure their 
proposals would get off the ground.
The Untied States must still carry the major burden of putting across 
its concept of the role of mass communications in Unesco. Only by 
strong US insistence was it possible to push through the convention 
for the exchange of audio-visual aids- and then it passed by such a 
narrow margin that it will need much more nursing by us before it 
becomes effective. We will have to supply leadership in ideas 
(constructive not negative criticism) and personnel to carry them 
out.82
In addition to these efforts to direct Unesco policy, US diplomats also 
unsuccessfully proposed that a freedom of information policy be adopted by ECOSOC, 
and during 1945-46 had sought to include freedom of information in the mandate of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights. Eleanor Roosevelt was sent to Geneva to head a 
subcommittee within the Commission on freedom of information and the press. Most 
significant were calls for a multilateral UN Conference on Freedom of Information, 
eventually held in Geneva during 1948, to consider a multilateral treaty that had been 
drafted by William Benton and others. The Conference failed to secure any substantive 
agreement on freedom of information, however, prompting the State Department to 
place even greater emphasis on furthering this objective through Unesco.
The 1948 Unesco General Conference in Beirut was in this context shaping up 
as a significant test of the durability of Unesco’s apolitical mandate. The location of
82 Arthur A. Compton, to George Allen, “Confidential Report on Third Session Unesco General 
Conference, November- December 1948,” p. 2; D 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.
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the conference in Beirut foreshadowed the rise of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a 
point of controversy in Unesco in addition to witnessing the emergence organised 
opposition to US power. Holding the General Conference in Lebanon at a time when 
war with the newly partitioned region of Israel had broken out prompted an 
extraordinary conference of the Executive Board ahead of the Conference. It 
considered the question of whether Beirut, the capital of a state engaged in the conflict, 
was still a suitable destination for the conference given Unesco’s overarching 
commitment to peace.83 It was decided to keep Beirut as the location, though the 
‘deteriorating’ political context in the Middle East remained a concern for some 
national delegations.84 Despite the fact that the Beirut Conference in many ways 
announced the arrival of Cold War antagonisms within the Organisation, no 
representatives from the Soviet bloc actually attended Beirut: the Polish, 
Czechoslovakian and Hungarian delegations had made it known that they objected to 
the conference location, branding Lebanon “an aggressor” against Israel in “violation of 
UN high policy.” 85
Washington had taken the controversial step of extending diplomatic 
recognition to the Republic of Israel at its independence that year. However, the US 
delegation’s response to Lebanon’s step of turning back a non-government Israeli 
delegation of observers when they reached Lebanon’s border was not particularly 
decisive. British documents on the issue suggest that the UK delegation had planned 
not to support Israel’s application for membership in Unesco in keeping with its general 
policy of diplomatic non-recognition of Israel. US delegates therefore urged the British 
to follow the humanist ‘spirit of Unesco’s constitution’ and join the US in supporting
83 Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure “Report on General Political Relations During 
Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut,” p. 1; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.
84 J. L. Henderson, Unesco in Focus, (New York: Anti-defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 1949), p. 33.
85 Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure “Report on General Political Relations During 
Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut” p. 2; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA. The 
Yugoslavian delegation had not been widely viewed as a proxy for Soviet interests within Unesco during 
this founding period, Ribnikar’s celebration of dialectical materialism notwithstanding, and in any case 
Yugoslavia had been expelled from Cominform, cementing the break between Tito and Stalin, in June 
1948.
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Israel’s application.86 By the beginning of the conference, however, the US had 
abandoned its lofty sentiments on the issue, recognising instead the need to build 
support for its own positions on Unesco’s information functions among the existing 
Unesco members, a significant proportion of which were Arab states. A rumoured 
post-colonial caucus composed of Latin American and Middle Eastern Unesco 
members, with the support of France and Italy, had also raised concerns in Washington 
that the ‘Western’ values the US had sought to promote within the Organisation could 
be undermined. A preparatory report had instructed the US delegation to drop its 
support of Israeli candidature as a consequence of these concerns, instructing them to 
be attentive to the concerns of Arab states and find any available:
possibility of influencing them separately and also weaning them 
away from the Latin-American block. In future conferences much 
can be done with this group (which is basically sympathetic to the US) 
by careful exposition of our views and a show of understanding for theirs.87
What particularly troubled the United States delegation was the intellectual and 
ideological support that the French and Italian delegations had given to what was 
perceived as the nascent anti-American post-colonial movement. The post-colonial 
states, as one report observed, were “greatly influenced by French intellectual 
leadership,” and had individually voiced their objections to the US proposals for 
freedom of information on the grounds that the principle would overwhelm their 
publics with anti-Communist ‘mass persuasion’ material.88 In branding themselves as
86 “Report on Executive Board Meeting of 15 October 1948,” (no author); “Third Session of the Unesco 
General Conference, Beirut, November, 1948;” F0924/648; UK National Archives: Public Record 
Office, Kew.
87 Arthur A. Compton , to George V. Allen, “Confidential Report on Third Session Unesco General 
Conference, November- December 1948,” p. 1; DF 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA. On the emerging 
voting bloc (which secured agreements against the US’s wishes on cultural centers and language issues in 
Beirut), see also: Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure “Report on General Political 
Relations During Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut,” pp. 4-5; DF 1945-49; DF; 
RG 59; NARA.
88 Controversy over American administrative norms emerged at a number of points during the period 
under discussion here, and American reflections on this matter contrast American and European or 
British views on the role of a chief executive. As far as can be gleaned from the American delegation’s 
impression of this tension, the American view was of a more proactive role for the chief executive (or 
Director General) in directing policy and setting priorities. Opposition to America’s interpretation of the 
Director General’s role by the French, Italian and British delegations was therefore often put down to 
contrasting administrative traditions by the US, rather than a genuine concern about the concentration of
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‘post-colonial,’ the counter-hegemonic caucus seemed to critique US proposals on the 
very same anti-imperialist grounds that Washington had claimed for its own foreign 
policy posture at the end of the war.89
The following extract highlights the extent to which the US delegation viewed 
the post-colonial movement as an affront to its rightful position of leadership within 
Unesco, and goes so far as to suggest that external issues be brought to bear on their 
national governments to undermine the caucus:
It should be noted that the characteristics of [Unesco] leadership is shifting 
slightly to the Tatin’ (both American and European) from its original 
‘anglo-saxin’ [sic.] domination. One of the most effective ways of 
dealing with this group is to maintain effective US participation at all 
times by forceful well-briefed persons with great influence. On really 
vital issues, many (if not most) Board members can be influenced 
through their governments (but this must be done discreetly and not too 
often).90
Whereas the US had claimed, through its bilateral cultural diplomacy, to be the 
supporter and exemplar of self-determination and political interdependence to the 
peoples of the Third World during the war, under Cold War conditions these liberal 
principles appeared to have found their limits.
At the 1948 General Conference the US delegation also expressed concerns 
that, since their efforts to promote freer communications had been ineffective, a more 
direct exertion of diplomatic influence should be undertaken to keep Unesco anti- 
Communist in character.
Every effort should be made to assure better US representation in 
top positions. The US should put up outstanding candidates for, 
1. DDG. [Deputy Director General] 2. Head of Administration... 
3. Head of Mass Communications Department, and, 4. Head 
of Public Information. It would also be useful to develop further
power within the institution. See e.g.: Arthur A. Compton, to George Allen, “Confidential Report on 
Third Session Unesco General Conference, November- December 1948,” p. 2; Unesco 1945-49; DF; RG 
59; NARA.
89 Considering that France retained parts of its formal empire at the time, this was a particularly ironic 
way to subvert US hegemony.
90 Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure “Report on General Political Relations During 
Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut,” p. 2; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.
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candidates for intermediate positions in these fields and others 
of importance such as the Executive Assistant to DG, Secretary 
of Executive Board, External Relations Officer for National 
Commission, etc.91
The US delegation’s attempt to place American Walter Laves in the position of the first 
elected Director General went awry early in the Conference, and eventually the US 
delegation switched their support to the post-colonial bloc’s choice of Jaime Torres 
Bodet, who had previously occupied the posts of both Foreign and Education Minister 
of Mexico. As Charles Ascher notes, the State Department had assumed, as it had in 
London, that having been saddled with 40% of the costs of Unesco, it would have been 
understood by the other delegations an American was entitled to the office.92
After Torres Bodet was confirmed as Director General the US delegation 
departed from notions of multilateral consensus, and the State Department advised that 
external US-Mexican relations could be brought to bear on the Director General (even 
though he was not, strictly speaking, a diplomatic representative) to ensure US interests 
would receive the attention they were due.
[T]he key part played by the US in the election of Torres-Bodet as 
Director General should be recognised and used. In him we have 
a leader who is not necessarily going to be sympathetic to the US 
views. He appears to be independent and more than slightly 
influenced by his Latin-French background.. .It would appear that 
our best method of procedure would be to present carefully 
considered views to him on basic issues that would appeal to him 
on the basis of their merits. Being a man o f no small political 
experience, he should also be susceptible to political influence 
(applied appropriately) on the most vital matters,93
Assistant Secretary of State George Allen headed the delegation to Beirut, and his 
subsequent statements reflect an explicitly instrumentalist discourse of US interests in 
Unesco. As Allen observed in 1949, “while Unesco draws its mandate from the will of
91 Ibid., p. 3.
92 Charles S. Ascher, Program-Making in Unesco 1946-1951: A Study in the Processes of International 
Administration, (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1951), p. 10.
93 My emphasis added. Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure “Report on General Political 
Relations During Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut,” p. 3; U 1945-9; DF; RG 59; 
NARA.
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the peoples of the world, it must be operated.. .as a part and parcel of the system of the 
United Nations.”94 Unesco came to be seen as an instrument of Western purposes 
based on prior notions that America was entitled to exercise leadership as a victorious 
power in the Second World War, and on the grounds that the US delegation (with its 
emphasis on governmental representation) had seen Unesco as an inevitably political 
institution anyway. Unesco was represented less and less as forum of consensus and 
openness, and increasingly as a tool for Washington’s more immediate concerns in 
waging the ideological struggle against Communism.
James P. Sewell has noted that by the late 1940s, with the Unesco 
administrative organs having settled into established patterns of operation and with the 
Organisation as a whole seeking to concentrate its policy program, the national 
delegations and individuals involved in Unesco had also come to accept that:
However endlessly Unescans proclaimed the non-political character 
of their enterprises, Unesco unavoidably exposed political sensitivities.
To the extent that Unesco proposals carried potential for serious change 
in anyone’s status quo- and from the beginning such change was the 
hope of many- they.. .stimulated political reactions. Beneath the rhetoric 
of international solidarity more candid voices conceded and occasionally 
relished the political opportunities offered by Unesco.95
The 1948 General Conference in Beirut had provided a stark indication of the 
inevitably political character of Unesco’s work. A brief to the US delegation after the 
Conference indicated that a language of ideological struggle and America’s entitlement 
to lead post-war cultural cooperation had become the prevailing basis on which Unesco 
was regarded in Washington.
The growing importance of Unesco and our vital interests in the 
Organisation and its objectives carry with them the obligation to 
assume a leading role in the proceedings of the Conference....
The members of the Delegation should, individually and collectively, 
take the initiative in supplying information based on the resources 
and experiences of this country which may be of assistance in 
promoting the objectives of Unesco.
94 George Allen (1949) quoted in Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation, p. 155. 
93 Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, p. 139.
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From the outset the United States has demonstrated forcefully 
its desire to collaborate in this program through substantial 
contributions of thought, effort and funds on the part of its citizens, 
both public and private. Through these efforts the United States 
has assumed leadership in the preliminary tasks of Unesco and 
will undoubtedly be called upon to continue to maintain this role 
of leadership if Unesco is to accomplish its purpose. However, in 
a truly cooperative international enterprise such as this one an 
overriding influence by any single country would obviously detract 
from the usefulness of the Organisation, and it is important to avoid 
giving the impression that the United States wishes to wield such 
influence.96
While discourses of ideological struggle had come to be the dominant framework 
through which Washington’s posture toward multilateral cultural cooperation was 
constituted, there were few indications that the other members of Unesco regarded the 
Cold War in the same urgent terms. The US delegation thus appeared to be constituting 
America’s international cultural posture not as one of reciprocity and interchange, but 
rather in such a way as to situate culture as the frontline within a global struggle or 
crusade. Whether other delegations disagreed appeared to be less relevant under these 
Cold War terms of American engagement with Unesco; what mattered instead was that 
the Communist threat must be confronted in all spheres of international relations. The 
‘wrecking’ implications, as Clare Wells has termed it, of the way in which the US 
delegation sought to make Unesco as a forum of ideological struggle were revealed 
even more starkly during 1950, in the form of disputes that emerged over how Unesco 
should respond to the Korean War.97
‘Special Project K:’ Korean War Information and the Exercise of US Hegemony98
The Korean War was a pivotal moment in the first decade of United States’ 
post-war foreign policy. Washington viewed the conflict as a test of America’s wider 
credibility as the chief defender of the ‘free world,’ with the added challenge that the
96 Letter to George V Allen, (no author), (November 8, 1949), p. 1; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA. My 
emphasis added.
97 Wells, The UN, Unesco and the Politics o f Knowledge, p. 13.
98 ‘Special Project K’ features in several US policy documents as a term for the effort to ensure 
Unesco would distribute information on the Korean war.
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Communist adversary was no longer confined to the Soviet Union but had now spread 
to Asia, and to regions that some sectors of Washington regarded as directly within the 
US sphere of influence. As the conflict took an increasing toll on American lives and 
expenditure, Washington was confronted with a significant publicity challenge at a 
domestic level. Positive international opinion also proved difficult to sustain, given 
deepening international concerns about the risk of outright war between the nuclear­
armed superpowers, and the position of neutrality that many states felt compelled to 
adopt in response to these fears. Although the US intervention had been legally 
mandated by the United Nations Security Council, disagreements within Unesco about 
how to comment on the conflict indicated that many delegations felt that the UN action 
in Korea had been provocative, or at the very least that Unesco must stand aloof from 
the Cold War in order to work toward diffusing it over the long term." A posture Cold 
War neutralism had also been articulated since 1948 by many of the national 
delegations to Unesco, especially the diplomatically self-assertive France, as a basis to 
reclaim Unesco from US domination. The US proposal that ‘Unesco-authored’ Korean 
War information be distributed seems almost tailor-made as a rallying point for these 
efforts to counterbalance US diplomatic influence and its ideological view of Unesco’s 
work. Consequently the US delegation found itself in somewhat of a bind when 
presenting their Korean War proposals to Unesco. If it failed to secure its objective, the 
US delegation risked undermining Unesco’s standing in the eyes of Congress and the 
American public, and might provide an opportunity to enthusiastic Cold Warriors to 
brand Unesco as a vehicle for subversive influences and call for a complete US 
withdrawal from the Organisation.
The invasion of South Korea by the Communist North on June 25, 1950 had a 
catalysing impact in Washington by seeming to supply a vindication that the extension 
of Communism was all but guaranteed unless strong counter-balancing in all spheres of
99 As Gaddis notes, initial international support for the conflict is often downplayed in historical 
accounts, and the Truman administration was restrained in escalating its response into a war with China 
by its allies. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 75.
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international activity was pursued by the US.100 US President Harry Truman’s message 
to Congress on the outbreak of war had also charged that the global psychological 
implications of the conflict were paramount in the way Washington sought to respond 
to the invasion: “Korea is not only a country undergoing the torment of aggression- it is 
also a symbol. It stands for right and justice.”101 The language of officials within the 
American cultural relations sphere who had previously asserted progressive 
internationalist sentiments, such as Waldo Leland, Unesco Executive Board vice­
chairperson and former chief administrator of the Library of Congress Luther H. Evans, 
and George Stoddard from the University of Illinois, had also hardened in the two years 
following the Smith Mundt Bill into a doctrine of cultural and ideological 
‘containment.’ Stoddard, for instance, had by 1950 taken to referring to Unesco as a 
‘counterforce’ in a ‘war of ideas,’ rather than the sponsor of global integration and 
pluralism. William Benton had left the Department of State to run for election to the 
US Senate, and in his election campaign in early 1950 he condemned Unesco’s 
‘aloofness’ from the global ideological struggle at hand, urging the Organisation to take 
up the role of a “political instrument in the Cold War.” From the Senate, he argued that
100 As John Lewis Gaddis has argued, wider support within the government for the broader outlines of the 
Containment doctrine was assured in the wake of the attack “in large part because of the remarkable way 
in which the Korean War appeared to validate several of NSC-68’s most important conclusions. One of 
these was the argument that all interests had become equally vital; that any further shift in the balance of 
power [however] small, could upset the entire structure of post-war international relations. There was 
almost immediate agreement in Washington that Korea, hitherto regarded as a peripheral interest, had by 
the nature of the attack on it become vital if American credibility elsewhere was not to be questioned. 
‘To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack’ John Foster Dulles warned, ‘would start 
[a] disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war.’” John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f 
Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar American National Security Policy, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), p. 109. In other work Gaddis has noted that the Korean War led Truman to take 
up the propositions of NSC-68 and its recommendations that the US should triple its defence spending 
and undertake a much greater publicity effort to undermine Communism. Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 76. 
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Unesco’s goals must be “identical with American policy,” and that the Organisation 
should seek to “pierce the iron curtain” by adopting a short-wave radio policy and 
broadcasting into Eastern Europe.103 Assistant Secretary of State Edward Barrett 
similarly constituted the Korean War as a global public opinion issue:
Few realise that the US-UN decision to resist in Korea was, broadly 
speaking, a propaganda decision. On world military maps Korea was 
not strategically important; indeed the United States could not hope 
to hold it in the early days of a world conflict. Economically and 
politically, it was less vital to America than other areas. What was 
important and what all hands recognised was that a failure to resist 
unprovoked aggression would be interpreted world-wide as a sign of 
weakness.. .It would be an invitation to neutralism or to Communism. 
As expected, the quick decision to defend Korea had an electrifying 
effect throughout the free world. In Asia, millions took it as the 
first sign that the UN and US meant business, that they could be 
counted on for help in an emergency, and that resistance to 
Communism was hence worthwhile.104
Unesco was now situated well within US discourses of global ideological struggle and 
the instrumentalism of cultural, educational and scientific diplomacy in Cold War 
terms. In this context neutrality was classified as an obstacle to the peaceful 
functioning of the global order that had already been jeopardised by the prospect of 
Communist expansion in Asia. By declining to take a position against the threatening, 
immoral Soviet ‘other,’ non-alignment was constituted as a troublesome, subversive 
and obstructionist position in the context of US efforts to defend democracy and 
freedom internationally. Within this framework of meaning about the nature of the 
Cold War, the strident, polarising and patently obstructive positions that had been taken 
by the US delegation after 1948 begin to make sense. America’s moral position in the 
Cold War was the basis upon which Benjamin Cohen, an American and the Assistant 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, was still able to characterise Washington’s 
Unesco strategy as a legitimate effort to combat complacency among uncommitted 
states and undermine the recalcitrance of the neutralists. America’s role was a
103 William Benton quoted in Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, p. 140.
104 Edward Barrett, quoted in Leon Gordenker, “United Nations Use of Mass Communications in Korea, 
1950-1951,” International Organization 8, (no. 3, August 1954), p. 336.
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crusading one. Consensus was no longer the overriding objective in Unesco; rather 
America had an obligation to show leadership and to “awaken the conscience of the 
world with regard to security.” Washington was scripted, in this context, as having 
legitimate grounds in “organising...every means of information” to forcefully 
communicate the “reasons for the struggle.” 105
As a consequence of the instrumental vision of Unesco’s functions and the 
ideological significance of the Korean War that had been articulated by the State 
Department, shortly after the outbreak of the war US diplomats proposed to the Unesco 
Executive Board that a world-wide information program justifying the UN police action 
be undertaken as an urgent priority. The US delegation to Unesco had reported that on- 
transmitting their suggestions to the Unesco Secretariat an angry ‘excitement’ ensued, 
and that:
Although there had been some warning that such a suggestion 
might be expected in view of previous conversation on this subject, 
it was immediately interpreted, by those all too ready to criticise 
‘American domination of Unesco,’ as a US effort to change the 
nature of Unesco... This brought an immediate negative reaction 
from the French Foreign Office in the form of a telephone call...
The opinion of the French is that any Unesco action on this matter 
should be taken upon requests received from the appropriate organs of 
the UN. 106
The US delegation, with the sanction of Director General Torres Bodet, convened a 
special session of the Unesco Executive Board to consider the proposals to be held that 
August. Even before the meeting convened, US diplomats had requested the Unesco 
Executive Board unilaterally declare its support for UN actions in Korea, which was 
declined. The Director General was the focal point for US lobbying, given that he 
had been quoted publicly just a few days before the outbreak of war in Korea
105 Cohen quoted in Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, p. 149.
106 United States Delegation to Unesco, Pans, to Department of State, Cipher “Paris 166 (Unesco Series) 
August 4, 1950 ‘Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Week Ending July 29, 1950,’” pp. 2-3; 
Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84, NARA.
107 US officials went so far as to write the statements they wished Torres Bodet to present on the Korean 
situation. Sewell, Unesco in World Politics, pp. 148-9.
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proclaiming Unesco’s neutrality in the global clash of economic ideologies, stating that 
all the components of the Organisation’s program must “take care to become neither 
auxiliaries nor victims in the disputes by which the world is tom .” 108 At the Unesco 
General Conference in Florence that May, Torres Bodet was also reported to have 
claimed that Unesco must not be subject to selfish national interests, but rather was to 
be “a union of nations moving forward to a definite ideal under his leadership... all one 
needed was freedom to act along the right lines.” 109
At the same Conference, however, the US had successfully proposed a 
resolution which articulated, albeit vaguely, a new rendition of Unesco’s information 
function stipulating it would “reaffirm...its decisions...within the limits of its 
acceptance, to cooperate closely and actively in the programme of peace of the United 
Nations.” 110 Internal US correspondence noted Torres Bodet’s contrary views, and 
instructed the US delegation that any available political leverage over him on the 
Korean information issue should be sought and exploited. As one advisory report 
noted: “in this connection it would be interesting to know how much he is influenced 
by the philosophy of ‘Neutralism’ and how much by the pressure of or desire to please 
those opposing the US point of view.” * 111
Although many of the national delegations to Unesco might have supported 
some kind of response to the Korean War on Unesco’s part, none publicly endorsed the 
adversarial information program that the US favoured in the lead-up to the Executive 
Board meeting. As the US delegation had observed in preparing for the talks:
It seems apparent that [Torres Bodet’s] feeling is shared widely among 
Europeans who emphasise the concept of Unesco as an international 
cultural organisation rather than primarily a political instrument. In the 
field of reconstruction, however, the Secretariat has already begun an 
effort to try to work out plans for the development of a campaign for 
scientific, educational and cultural reconstruction in Korea and it appears
108 Torres Bodet quoted in Julian Huxley, “Unesco: The First Phase,” Manchester Guardian, (August 10 
1950).
109 Alan Morehead (1950) quoted in Sewell, Unesco in World Politics, pp. 144-5.
110 Unesco General Conference resolution (1950) quoted in Kolasa, International Intellectual 
Cooperation, p. 155.
111 Unesco Relations Staff, Department of State, “Report on the Unesco Secretariat’s Carrying Out of 
Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea,” (March 7, 1951), p. 4; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 
84; NARA.
308
that a special program along these lines would obtain substantial support, 
although it is generally recognised that such a program is long range and 
could not be expected to have a substantial effect during the present ‘hot 
war’ phase of the Korean crisis.112
After a month of lobbying for an informational policy on Korea one dispatch from the 
US delegation to Washington explained the recalcitrant position taken by some Board 
members: “the Executive Board, contrary to the wishes of the American Representative 
and even of the Director General, had in mind a somewhat limited rather than a broad 
interpretation of these two resolutions as far as the use of Mass Communications was 
concerned.”113 The US delegation dismissed these concerns about the odious 
implication in supplying war information, suggesting that fears were “more apparent 
than real...around the question of where information stops and propaganda begins.”114 
This symbolises how instrumentalist Washington’s approach to Unesco had become by 
1950. As we have seen in the foregoing case studies, the question of how to categorise 
America’s own policies as ‘information’ not ‘propaganda’ had been a significant 
concern within the US cultural and international information programs after 1936.115 
The symbolic value of the anti-propaganda frame is attested by the ongoing rhetorical 
effort within the cultural and informational programs to maintain it. As the language of 
global survival and ideological crisis pervaded the making of US foreign policy in 
1950, strenuous informational advocacy was now being countenanced as an essential 
function of ideological warfare.
Torres Bodet had been presented with a difficult dilemma during the 
controversy. Although the US had been the deciding factor in placing him in office and 
had lately impressed upon him that Washington’s ongoing financial support of Unesco
112 United States Delegation to Unesco, Paris, to Department of State, Cipher “Paris 166 (Unesco Series) 
August 4, 1950 ‘Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Week Ending July 29, 1950,’” pp. 2-3; 
Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.
113 Unesco Relations Staff, Department of State, “Report on the Unesco Secretariat’s Carrying Out of 
Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea,” (March 7, 1951), pp. 2-3; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; 
RG 84; NARA. On Torres Bodet and the Unesco secretariat’s views of the role of Unesco in Korea, 
which conflicted with the U S’s more expansive vision, see Sewell, Unesco in World Politics, p. 149.
114 United States Delegation to Unesco, Paris, to Department of State, Cipher “Paris 179 (Unesco Series) 
August 29, 1950 ‘Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Week Ending August 25, 1950,’” p. 1; 
Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.
115 See, e.g.: Howland H. Sargeant “Major Tasks of Unesco in Establishing Communication Among 
Peoples of the World”, Department o f State Bulletin 4055, (January 1, 1951).
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was at stake, the Director General also understood the potentially damaging 
implications for Unesco if it adopted a wartime informational program at the 
Americans’ behest. 116 Ultimately, it was Torres Bodet who proposed a compromise 
resolution to the August Executive Board meeting. His compromise affirmed Unesco’s 
commitment to a post-war reconstruction role in Korea, which most Board members 
favoured, but also rather ambiguously suggested that some current informational 
functions might be necessary to pave the way for the reconstruction functions. The 
compromise was approved by the Board, but subsequent public and private comments 
by a number of delegations indicated that the information corollary was unpopular. 
The British, for instance, professed to be ‘considerably embarrassed’ by indications that 
the American delegation “appear to wish to involve Unesco in propaganda work.” 117 
Elsewhere, British Foreign Office officials reflected that Washington’s goals for 
Unesco were becoming increasingly expansive and impractical as the Cold War 
struggle deepened. One memorandum predicted that by pushing the boundaries of the 
Organisation’s policy program, Washington had nobody but itself to blame for its 
thwarted proposals. 118 Twenty-three of the national members of Unesco formally 
submitted comments on the resolution: only six were positive, four were openly 
negative and four expressed no opinion but merely acknowledged the communique. 
Two states had also added provisos that they accepted that UN action in Korea was 
warranted, but the involvement of Unesco in the conflict was not. As Jan Kolasa notes, 
the response ‘spoke for itself:’ “The involvement of Unesco in the Korean war on the 
side of United States policy revealed...that this organisation had transgressed its 
original assumptions of political neutrality.” 119
116 See, for example: United States Delegation to Unesco, Paris, to Department of State, Cipher “Paris 
162 (Unesco Series) July 27, 1950 ‘Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Weekly Period Ending 
July 21, 1950,’” p. 3; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.
117 Draft Telegram “August 1950: Unesco and the Korean Situation;” FO 371/88901; UK National 
Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.
118 D. S. Cape , Draft Letter to F. R. Cowell, (August 16, 1950), pp. 1-2; FO371/88901; UK National 
Archives: Public Record Office, Kew. See also: Unesco Relations Staff, “Report on the Unesco 
Secretariat’s Carrying Out of Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea,” (March 7, 1951), pp. 2-3; 
Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb..; RG84; NARA. On Torres Bodet and the Unesco secretariat’s views of the 
role of Unesco in Korea, which conflicted with the US delegation’s instrumental view of culture see also 
Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, p. 149.
119 Kolasa, International Intellectual Cooperation, pp. 156-7.
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The State Department took the Director General’s compromise resolution as a 
victory, however, and subsequently pushed for a stronger operational interpretation of 
the information provision in the Executive Board resolution. US delegates reported to 
Washington that a process had begun by which it could “[u]se the Korean case as a 
lever to improve and strengthen the orientation of the Secretariat toward the UN and 
‘Peace and Security.’” Drawing on the presupposition that Unesco had an inevitable 
ideological function, the American Unesco staff railed that “Militant Pacifism, not 
‘Neutralism’ nor academism should be the prevailing spirit” of Unesco’s program.120 
The dispute also led the US delegation to articulate some longer-term objectives for the 
institution as an ideological instrument:
the Korea question is having a salutary effect in creating a more 
realistic atmosphere among some rather fuzzy thinking people in 
the Secretariat concerning its position in the present day world. The 
expression has been used that the Secretariat members are now more 
than ever before being forced to ‘stand up and be counted’ as to their 
personal politics in favour of either the Eastern or Western form of 
democracy. This salutary effect has the accompanying problem, 
however, of causing considerable unrest among the Unesco staff- 
I believe that this can serve as a point in our favour if we adopt a 
calm, logical and energetic attitude in support of our views. It is 
needless to emphasise the importance in this connection of the 
appointment of a first class American DDG.121
By January, 1951, provisional funds amounting to $175,000 out of the Unesco 
Executive budget had been drawn for the conduct of “emergency relief and eventual 
reconstruction in the field of education, science and culture for the people of Korea” as 
well as, crucially, for “information through Unesco media and through all Unesco’s 
educational facilities...on the necessity for Collective Security.” Shortly after,
120 The placing of ‘peace and security’ and ‘neutralism’ in quotation marks by the Unesco staff is an 
interesting feature of this document. It suggests that the public and private sides of US language 
pertaining to the Cold War were increasingly bifurcated. Unesco Relations Staff, “Report on the Unesco 
Secretariat’s Carrying Out of Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea,” (March 7, 1951), p. 12; 
Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb; RG 84; NARA.
121 United States Delegation to Unesco, Paris, to Department of State, Cipher “Paris 167 (Unesco Series) 
August 9, 1950 ‘Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Week Ending August 4, 1950,’” p. 5; 
Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.
122 Unesco Relations Staff, “Report on the Unesco Secretariat’s Carrying Out of Unesco Executive Board 
Resolutions on Korea,” (March 7, 1951), p. 1; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.
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printing began on Unesco-authored publicity interpreting the conflict in pro-United 
Nations terms, despite the fact that the project was still unpopular and Executive Board 
meetings were “sometimes far from calm.”123
Ironically, after forcing through its unpopular policy to propagate information 
on behalf of the US action in Korea, the Department of State began to question 
Unesco’s usefulness for furthering Washington’s national interests. In the middle of 
1951, for instance, one American delegate to Unesco warned his superiors that Unesco 
should be a minor priority for the Department of State since the organisation had lost 
credibility with some of its most important official and public supporters in Europe.124 
James P. Sewell characterises how Washington now regarded Unesco in succinct terms:
United States leaders had advanced their institutional engagement 
rather convulsively with an intention of controlling important 
Unesco policies; now, having failed, they disengaged discemibly 
if not conclusively on grounds that Unesco had refused to make 
itself relevant to the ‘real’ world.1/5
Cold War Antagonisms, 1951-53: Membership Controversies and the End of Non- 
Governmentalism in Unesco.
From 1951, membership controversies and the intrusion of Cold War 
antagonisms within Unesco signalled that the humanist, apolitical vision that had been 
articulated for the Organisation at its founding had been convincingly undermined. The 
Soviet Union had almost never mentioned Unesco in its official media during the 
1940s, in keeping with its generally isolationist stance on bilateral cultural relations in 
these years, but broke its silence after 1950 with a series of articles in several 
publications condemning American ‘dollar imperialism’ and its attempt to use Unesco 
as a proxy for its ideological self-interest.126 Membership controversies arose over the
123 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
124 Arthur A. Compton, Letter to Charles A. Thomson, (February 9, 1951), p. 2; Unesco 1950-4; Paris 
Emb.; RG 84; NARA.
125 Sewell, Unesco in World Politics, pp. 150-1.
,26 Armstrong, “The Soviet Attitude Toward Unesco,” pp. 217-33. This is supported by at least one other 
account stressing Soviet cultural isolationism prior to 1952. Frederick C. Barghoorn and Paul W. 
Friedrich, “Cultural Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 8 (no. 3, April 1956).
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deposition of instruments of acceptance for ECOSOC and Unesco by Francoist Spain
(despite the fact that the Falange regime had once refused to allow a Unesco human
rights display to enter the country), and by Japan, Austria and West Germany’s
accession to full membership. Washington declared its support of Unesco membership
for these right-wing authoritarian states, and had thereby provoked strident criticisms in
the official media of the Eastern Bloc former Unesco members and the USSR, as well
as condemnation of the US position from exiled Spanish intellectuals and their
supporters in Europe. Comment in the Soviet media had strongly condemned the
defeat (by thirty votes to four, with thirteen abstentions) of a Czech proposal at the
1950 General Conference to replace the delegation of Nationalist Taiwan with one from
Communist China, a proposal that had been framed in relation to Unesco’s founding
commitment to humanism and international understanding.127 As Armstrong notes in
his study of Soviet diplomacy in Unesco: “It may seem paradoxical that, at the same
time that they used the appeal of universality as a device to enlist sentiment for the
admission of communist China, [Eastern Bloc] spokesmen [s/c.] bitterly opposed this
same sentiment when it favored the admission of nations which they sought to exclude
from UN bodies.”128 Yet the same could be said of how Washington constituted its
interests in relation to the criteria for Unesco membership in these years, as its
exceptionalist sense of its own entitlement to exert leadership within the organisation
had led to a highly selective interpretation of Unesco’s universalist membership
principle. In 1952 the Eastern Bloc members officially withdrew from Unesco in
protest, and though the Yugoslavian delegation remained, Vladislav Ribnikar resigned
1
in protest over membership issues from the Executive Board.
In 1952 a budget freeze imposed by the British and American delegations was 
accompanied by demands by Washington and London that the Unesco program be 
concentrated on politically relevant issues. This led to Torres Bodet’s permanent
127 Sewell, Unesco in World Politics, p. 145
128 Armstrong, “The Soviet Attitude Toward Unesco,” p. 229.
129 On the Eastern Bloc withdrawal see: Polish Ambassador in Paris, Letter to the Unesco Director 
General, (December 5, 1952); “Admission of New Members to Unesco; Admission of Spain in Spite of 
Protests; Withdrawal of Poland From Unesco; Speculation as to Reasons for Portugal’s Not Applying to 
Join;” F0371/95913; UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.
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resignation from the post of Director General.130 He was replaced by Luther H. Evans, 
an American, who immediately sought to distance himself from the excesses of US 
anti-Communism by publicly opposing Senator Joseph McCarthy’s attacks on the State 
Department. The appointment of an American to this key position appeared 
nevertheless to critics of US dominance within Unesco as yet another manifestation of 
America’s effort to channel the activities of international cultural cooperation into anti- 
Communist propaganda. British Foreign Office records note France’s ‘fury’ at the 
election: the “strength of anti-American sentiment...inspired by the evident fact that 
[Evans] would not be the staunch upholder of French culture and the French language 
which the French had in Torres Bodet.”131 Meanwhile, Unesco continued to be framed 
in largely instrumental terms by Washington, with policy-makers representing 
multilateral cultural diplomacy as an arena for ideological struggle rather than a 
framework for apolitical cultural cooperation. Ensuring that Unesco staked a clear, 
‘pro-Western’ position in the Cold War struggle was thus stated as the central priority 
for the Department of State’s Unesco staff in a memorandum of August, 1952: 
neutralism and anti-Americanism were characterised as the most urgent obstacles to the 
US in the immediate future, implying they were essentially the same thing. Here, 
once again, a triangular framework of alterity is evident in US foreign policy discourse 
in relation to Unesco. US officials constituted American interests here both in relation 
a totalising, immoral and threatening Communist ‘other,’ but also as the vanguard of 
the free world in relation to the recalcitrant, obstructive and irresponsible neutralist 
‘other.’
Washington’s instrumental view of Unesco in this period was also reflected in 
the US delegation’s support for a proposal forwarded by the British delegation 
(strongly opposed by France), to amend Unesco’s constitution so that the Executive 
Board and Secretariat would become a body of government representatives. Luther
130 The Director General had made a dramatic resignation speech after disputes at the General 
Conference that had been held Florence in 1950, but was convinced to return just days later.
131 “Unesco Director General,” (no author), (June 19, 1953), p. 1; FO371/107236; UK National Archives: 
Public Record Office, Kew. “Candidates for Director-Generalship of Unesco; Election of Dr Luther 
Evans, of the USA, as Director General at a Special Session of Unesco in July 1953,” (no author); 
F0371/107236; UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.
132 Robert S. Smith, to Charles A. Thomson “Report on Trip to the United States, July 21-August 8, 
1952,” (August 13, 1952), p. 3; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.
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Evans, as Sewell notes, had been a longstanding proponent of govemmentalism within 
Unesco, and he was in a clear position to promote US interests in subsequent years.133 
He had represented the Organisation in this period as “definitely an intergovernmental 
organisation, subject to the limitations and procedures inherent in official action...The 
fact remains that Unesco works for its Member States, that it works largely through the 
governments of Member States.”134 As T. V. Sathyamurthy notes, the prevailing 
approach within the Department of State and the American Unesco National 
Commission symbolised that US interests in multilateral cultural cooperation, and 
America’s cultural diplomacy in general, “had come a long way from the idealism that 
had characterised it at the beginning.” As such “[tjhere was no longer any mention of 
breaking down national sovereignty,” and Unesco was seen “no longer [as] a non- 
political organisation of the United Nations.”135
The Soviet Union and the Soviet Republics of Belorussia and Ukraine applied 
to join Unesco in 19 5 4.136 The Department of State, in keeping with its posture of 
diplomatic dominance and its overarching view of Unesco as a political instrument, 
greeted the news with instructions that the US representatives within Unesco should 
“do all possible to fill vacant high ranking posts in Unesco, in order to forestall a 
Russian demand to place its nationals in these posts.”137 As an ex-Secretariat member 
of Unesco from New Zealand reflected, the developments of 1951-52 and the 
subversion of cultural diplomacy by the superpowers for their own strategic and 
political gains had signalled that “[w]hatever the future holds, it is certain that, from 
now on, Unesco will be of greater significance to politicians as well as to scholars.” 
Similarly, of this period one historian has subsequently noted that “For years the fa9ade 
of nongovemmentalism [had] stood despite its widening fissures” but even this 
crumbled by the early 1950s.139
133 They were successful in implementing this provision before the USSR’s entry into Unesco in 1954.
134 Luther H. Evans (1957) quoted in Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, p. 166.
135 T. V. Sathyamurthy, The Politics of International Cooperation: Contrasting Conceptions of Unesco, 
(Geneva: Droz, 1964), p. 158.
136 Armstrong, “The Soviet Attitude Toward Unesco;” Barghoorn and Friedrich, “Cultural Relations and 
Soviet Foreign Policy.”
137 Charles A Thompson, Office Memorandum, (April 20, 1954); Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; 
NARA.
138 Clarence Beeby quoted in Sewell, Unesco in World Politics, p. 170.
139 Sewell, Unesco and World Politics, p. 169.
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Conclusion
The course of American diplomacy within Unesco between 1946 and 1953 
reflected the broader shifts in how the practices and significance of US cultural 
diplomacy and international information was represented in the course of US foreign 
policy-making. The US had framed its hopes for the Unesco during the planning stages 
of the Organisation in the terms that had also been used to characterise US bilateral 
cultural diplomacy: reciprocity; non-govemmentalism; voluntarism; and engagement 
with popular education and culture. Multilateralism was heralded as a co-optive 
organising principle that reflected the liberal and exceptional character of US national 
interests themselves. After the founding of Unesco in 1946 the US delegation 
continued to presuppose its engagement with international cultural cooperation in 
similar terms: noting how cultural cooperation was central to ensuring the post-war 
settlement could be translated into a basis for long-term global peace and prosperity. 
As William Preston has suggested, these internationalist sentiments were central to the 
self-narration of US cultural diplomacy:
In spite of the strong currents of national interest lurking below the 
smooth surface of benevolence, the United States maintained a deep 
seated conviction that Unesco would itself avoid politics. Having 
successfully masked its own ideological agenda from itself and 
mastered the art of cognitive dissonance, the US expected to join 
an organisation committed to its own liberal definition of the 
postwar world.
Within this discourse of US engagement with Unesco, the Organisation “would serve 
US ends through strictly technical international means devoid of partisan advantage.”140 
At the same time, however, from the founding debates of Unesco onward it was clear 
that the United States delegation had an emergent ‘governmental’ approach to 
international cultural cooperation in mind, which differed from that of European 
participants such as Britain and France. In declaring an interest that Unesco be
140 Preston, Hope and Folly, p. 41.
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composed of official delegations, the US position actually sought to subordinate 
cultural, educational and scientific cooperation to political interests, and thereby limited 
the prospects for free debate and compromise between different viewpoints in practical 
terms. The articulation of this governmental paradigm conveyed the premise that US 
leadership was both necessary and legitimate for the viability of multilateral cultural 
cooperation itself. Both ‘govemmentalism’ and the notion that US hegemony was 
indispensable to the ongoing viability of Unesco were emphasised as the US delegation 
sought to pursue Cold War antagonisms through Unesco during the late 1940s.
The year 1948 pivotal for both Unesco and American bilateral cultural and 
informational diplomacy in general. It witnessed the culmination of strands of foreign 
policy thinking within Washington that revived the discourse ideological struggle as the 
key rationale for US cultural and informational diplomacy. In January, 1948 cultural 
and informational diplomacy began to occupy a more prominent role in the spectrum of 
American foreign policy with the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill. However, for 
Congress to remain satisfied that cultural and informational diplomacy was relevant to 
US national interests the programs were somewhat divested of the progressive liberal 
sentiments that had initially shaped how US officials constituted Unesco’s role.
Of the three case studies examined in this dissertation, the case of US Unesco 
policy most sharply illustrates how extensive and significant this discursive shift toward 
instrumentalism within US cultural and informational diplomacy was. The policy 
proposals that the US delegation put forward in Unesco in 1948 and 1950 represented 
the practical expression of an instrumentalist (rather than ‘positive’) view of the 
functions of multilateral cultural diplomacy and Washington’s national interest in it. 
The notion of Unesco as a ‘lever’ in the global struggle against Communism, the 
dismissal of concerns that Unesco-sponsored ‘information’ might be construed as 
‘propaganda,’ and the eventual rejection of non-govemmentalism as a constitutive 
principle for Unesco were significant departures from the approach that characterised 
US cultural diplomacy during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. By 
1950, as Frank Ninkovich observes, within Washington’s bilateral and multilateral 
cultural diplomacy programs:
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the rhetoric of idealism masked the pursuit of power.. .Although standard 
liberal prescriptions were clearly inadequate to treat postwar disorders, the 
accumulated force of tradition remained, and it was powerful enough to 
prevent the adoption of alternative policies and institutions based nakedly 
on the principles of power politics.141
Here, Ninkovich points to the enabling function that the rhetoric of idealism played, in 
that American policy-makers appeared to still see themselves as agents of liberalism 
and democracy, even despite the domineering diplomatic strategies that they resorted to 
within Unesco’s organs. The significance of Unesco in my study is that it highlights 
the kinds of international responses that were elicited by the discursive constitution of 
America’s posture of cultural and informational diplomacy during 1936-53. While the 
cases of bilateral cultural diplomacy and unilateral US information policy-making 
illustrate how discourses of US cultural and informational practices managed to sustain 
progressive ^^//'-representations of American foreign policy, when it came to 
convincing the other members of Unesco that US remained an ‘internationalist’ agent 
despite Cold War conditions, American rhetoric had considerably less purchase.
In the next chapter, which concludes this study, I shall explore the 
commonalities and contrasts across the case studies examined in this dissertation, and 
engage with the conceptual and theoretical implications of the historical findings of the 
foregoing chapters. In this discussion, I shall revisit the theoretical ideas explored in 
chapter one in order to specify some general conclusions that can be drawn from my 
case studies, and articulate possibilities for further research applying a constructivist 
theoretical framework to cultural and informational diplomacy.
141 Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas, p. 168.
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CONCLUSION
We’ve sold the world everything from soap to Senator Byrd’s apples.
We’ve sold them our machines and our technology. We’ve sold 
them our movies, our music, and our dentistry. We have sold them 
everything but the most important item of all, our spiritual heritage 
of freedom and our intense belief in it.1 23
Novus Or do Seclorum.
Although many Americans believed there were significant moral and 
political grounds precluding Washington from utilising propaganda before 1945, the 
US cultural and informational diplomacy programs that were adopted during this time 
nevertheless turned out to be highly successful in communicating abroad the political, 
cultural and global values that America claimed to stand for. From a contemporary 
vantage point it is obvious that despite the apparent reluctance with which 
international persuasion practices were regarded, even by the officials that 
implemented them, the cultural and informational diplomacy programs undertaken by 
Washington in 1936-53 had a significant constitutive influence over America’s 
changing global role during this phase. To a great many of the world’s people 
during the twentieth century, especially in the context of the Cold War, the United 
States came to symbolise the purest practical realisation of the political values of 
freedom, democracy, justice and prosperity that the world has seen. What I have 
sought to show in this study is that there are threads that connect the posture of 
reluctance initially articulated in relation to cultural and informational diplomacy to 
the global cultural and political hegemony that Washington has subsequently 
exercised. Once cultural and informational diplomacy gained initial acceptance as 
tools of foreign policy, US policy officials utilised policy discourse in such a way as 
to unlock deep reserves of American energy and idealism that could be brought to 
bear in US foreign policy at a broader level. Most importantly, this was because 
cultural and informational diplomats fashioned their work around a shared
1 William Benton, “Statement,” Expanded International Information and Education Program, Hearing, 
5 July, 1950; (Y4 1483 F76/2:In3/2); Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 5.
2 Reverse of the Great Seal of the United States, translation: a new order o f the ages.
3 See, e.g. Joseph Joffe, “Who’s Afraid of Mr. Big?” The National Interest 64, (Summer, 2001); 
Robert J. Lieber, and Ruth E. Weisberg, “Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis,” 
International Journal o f Politics, Culture and Society 16, (no. 2 2002).
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vindicationist premise that by claiming a position of post-war global leadership, 
“America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.”4
This study has sought to demonstrate that while it might seem that some 
vexatious, contradictory or even tangential ideas had been raised in policy-debates 
concerning US cultural and informational diplomacy in their founding phase, these 
debates provide a way to understand how Washington regarded the changing 
purposes and principles of American power at a broader level during the 1936-53 
period. The historical material surveyed in the foregoing chapters shows, 
furthermore, that the articulation of two ideas was particularly important in unlocking 
Washington’s capacity and enthusiasm to engage in cultural and informational 
diplomacy. These were political traditions situating America as a liberal political 
community and a historically exceptional nation. These two aspects of US political 
culture had strong rhetorical and symbolic currency as principles of American 
identity and foreign relations in the context of the cultural and informational 
programs themselves, and in relation to political and public audiences beyond them. 
These principles had important implications for the kinds of cultural and 
informational strategies that Washington adopted, as well as functioning to enable 
new conceptions of US grand strategy to be articulated and accepted at a broader 
level.
Because of their far-reaching and often contradictory nature, the policy 
debates that accompanied the formulation of American cultural and informational 
diplomacy during 1936-53 are an important source of insight onto the transformation 
of US foreign policy in this period. In debating what was the most desirable basis for 
Washington’s international persuasion practices US policy-makers tended to situate 
cultural and informational diplomacy not simply as a co-optive tool of international 
influence to be pursued pragmatically, but also as a symbol of the American nation 
itself. Frequently there were contending interpretations of America and its national 
interests articulated in the course of cultural and informational policy debates, which 
attests to the overall significance of cultural and informational policy-making as a site 
at which US national interests were constituted and often contested in this phase of 
transition. US cultural and informational officials can also be observed rearticulating 
a shared conception of America and its rightful global role in response to the
4 Woodrow Wilson cited in Anatol Lieven, American Right or Wrong: An Anatomy o f American 
Nationalism, (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), p. 33.
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momentous upheavals within the global order during 1936-53, particularly the rise of 
Soviet power during the late 1940s. Consequently, the foregoing chapters represent a 
survey of how US cultural and informational diplomats developed policy in response 
to their domestic political culture as well as the international context. I illustrate in 
the process that there was a prevalent tendency among US foreign policy-makers in 
1936-53 to find the solution to international problems within the terms of America’s 
own historical trajectory and domestic political culture.
The research questions that have guided this study were, firstly, how did 
officials articulate American cultural and informational diplomacy in the context of 
foreign policy-making during the 1936-53 period? Secondly, I asked to what extent 
these representations can be seen to have enabled the broader cultivation of 
international influence by Washington during 1936-53. In this concluding discussion 
I shall reflect on my findings in relation to these questions, and summarise the most 
significant features of the discourses that I have observed at work in shaping and 
constituting US cultural and informational practices.
I shall present these findings in relation to three key geographical regions, 
summarising below how the representation of US cultural and informational 
diplomacy shaped Washington’s posture of engagement with the Third World 
(predominantly Latin America and Asia), the Soviet Union and Western Europe. In 
each section, the ways in which discursive narration, framing, predication and alterity 
functioned to structure and enable US cultural and informational diplomacy practices 
will be emphasised. I note, for example, that alterity is a particularly helpful concept 
for understanding how Washington came to regard the USSR as its moral and 
ideological antithesis after 1947-8, showing how the information programs and US 
involvement with Unesco were directed to ideological warfare on the strength of 
these representations. On the other hand, the narration of America and its 
relationship with other states took centre stage in enabling Washington to extend its 
influence to the Third World and affect the ‘cultural modernisation’ of less developed 
societies, particularly during the Second World War. The historical relationship 
between America and Europe was also a prevalent representation that was mobilised 
in the form of alterity, narratives and predicates in the post-war period as a 
justification for the extension of US power on that continent. I shall also show that 
US conceptions of Europe were multifaceted and played out in different ways at
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different points within the 1936-53 period. After completing my summary of the 
discursive practices of US cultural and informational diplomacy in relation to the 
Third World, the USSR, and Europe, I shall turn to a summary of the ways in which 
US cultural and informational policy-makers represented America itself, in broad 
terms, according to the tenets of American liberalism and sensibility of 
exceptionalism.
In chapter one I indicated that this study has theoretical implications for 
constructivist approaches to IR, in that my analysis of discursive practices within the 
context of US cultural and informational diplomacy contributes to and extends the 
constructivist theorisation of the functions of language in foreign policy-making. I 
also emphasised that my analysis has implications for current debates on US ‘soft 
power’ and ‘public diplomacy’ within International Relations, and that the 
methodological approach I have used is intended to build a bridge between IR 
scholarship and existing debates within Diplomatic History on cultural practices and 
the nature of world order. In the second part of this conclusion I shall therefore 
reflect on the contributions that I have made to these three areas of academic debate, 
and on the possibilities for further research that have been opened by this study’s 
approach and findings.
The Story of America: Narrating America’s Cultural and Informational 
Influence
The genesis of US cultural diplomacy emerged from its relationships with 
the Latin American nations, and I have argued above that the 1936 provisions for US 
bilateral cultural exchanges within the Western Hemisphere became in key respects a 
template for the broader cultural diplomacy program that followed. Implicit within 
Washington’s hopes that cultural diplomacy could foster prosperity and harmony in 
Latin America was a claim to American leadership and modernisation in relation to 
Latin America and the post-colonial world.5 The rhetoric attached to the 1936 treaties 
fashioned a justification for cultural diplomacy from the underlying story of the self
5 To reiterate a point that I emphasised in chapter two: I adopt the term ‘modernisation’ in relation to 
the discourses of US-Third World engagement in foreign policy-making deliberately, in order to draw 
parallels with the academic debates of the early Cold War within US political science. These 
discourses emphasised notions of social harmony, political stability and material development in the 
Third World. See, e.g.: Mark T. Berger, Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and US 
Hegemony in the Americas 1898-1990, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 13-4.
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within American political culture. Hence, the ‘New World’ was scripted as the 
political template for less advanced societies, and within this logic it was possible for 
America’s economic advancement and political liberalism to be benignly exported to 
nations still mired in the struggles of history and modernisation. This principle, often 
articulated as a justification of America’s claim that Latin America was its legitimate 
sphere of influence, had long been in circulation within US foreign policy discourse. 
It informed the nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine that sought to exclude European 
imperial influence from the Western Hemisphere, and was reframed as a principle of 
Hemisphere interdependence and interchange within the Good Neighbour Policy 
during the 1930s. By recalling that the US had been historically responsible for 
guaranteeing the independence and prosperity of the Western Hemisphere, and 
claiming that a special form of solidarity consequently existed between US and the 
other republics of the Hemisphere, the 1936 cultural agreements were conceptualised 
within the terms of an integrating, modernising narrative of the history of the 
Americas. Here, Washington’s historical repudiation of imperialism and a liberal 
sentiment that power should not be overtly concentrated in US hands also informed 
how cultural and informational diplomacy was envisaged and articulated in relation to 
Latin America in these early years.
In policy documents American cultural diplomacy was articulated as being 
inherently attuned, as Cordell Hull put it in late 1939, to
the fullest the contributions which each of us in the American 
family can make to the others...Never has there been greater 
realisation that each of us has much to contribute to the other; 
never has there been greater mutual respect or greater 
comprehension.6
Similarly, a report to the Congress of 1942 asserted that a community of interest and a 
shared ‘New World’ identity meant that US cultural diplomacy with Latin America 
would be inherently non-coercive and based on a posture of reciprocity. American 
cultural and educational activities in Latin America aimed for the:
diffusion of understanding and mutual knowledge between 
the Americas through the establishment of personal relations
6 Cordell Hull quoted in J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings o f US Cultural Diplomacy 
1936-1948, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 140-1.
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between intellectual and scientific leaders of the New World.
It seeks to assure that community of interests essential to the 
safety and well-being of the Western Hemisphere... It is hoped... 
that through a cumulative process of friendly contacts any 
barriers of cultural isolation between the Americas will be 
reduced and the main currents of thought and the outstanding 
contributions of the New World to sciences and letters be better 
understood.7
The framing of US cultural diplomacy within a community of interest, identity and 
solidarity within the New World permitted cultural diplomacy to be first 
countenanced as a possibility for US foreign policy, and helped to constitute 
Washington’s broader posture of engagement with Latin American within the 
economic, political, military and cultural spheres in benign terms.
By situating their work as cultural diplomats according to the same 
progressive historical forces from which America’s independent, liberal community 
had itself been bom, US officials avoided the clear-eyed embrace of power politics 
that the pursuit of cultural influence within Latin America might otherwise have 
required. A liberal disinclination to exercise imperial dominance was frequently 
stated, in both public and confidential policy contexts, alongside this narrative of 
America’s historical incumbency to exercise international influence. The US 
Secretary of State could thus confidently reassure the US people that Washington’s 
cultural relations activities “would be non-political and non-patronising 
activities...[and] are truly the means of implementing a foreign policy of a 
democratic people whose national interest is the maintenance and orderly 
development of their democracy.” 8 Reciprocity was a key framing principle for US 
cultural diplomacy in this period, in that it connected this broader narrative of 
America’s liberal progressivism and exceptional history to practical policy initiatives.
As Tzvetan Todorov’s work emphasises, narrative is a form of discursive 
practice encompassing descriptive, chronological and transformational elements that 
has important implications for how agents situate themselves and others in social 
contexts.9 It is important to reflect on just how vivid this transformational vocabulary
7 Department of State, “The Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations: A Report to the 
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session, 
January 1942,” (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 3.
8 Edward R. Stettinius, “United States Programs for the Promotion of Mutual Understanding With 
Other Peoples of the World,” Department o f State Bulletin 2078, (March 4, 1944), p. 218.
9 Tzvetan Todorov, “The 2 Principles of Narrative,” Diacritics 1, (no. 1, Autumn 1971).
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was during the early phases of the US cultural diplomacy program in relation to Latin 
America. As Stanley Hombeck contended in 1942, global transformation and 
advancement was a key warranting argument for Washington’s cultural and 
informational programs:
It is not our American concept that there should be a static world 
or a frozen status quo. As a nation we have always had in mind 
the evolution of society, of political institutions, of economic 
instruments and devices accomplished through cooperation and 
conciliation, through the pacific settlement of controversies and 
through the general improvement of all conditions, national 
and international, by peaceful methods and processes.10
The New World/modemising narrative and reciprocity frame attached to US cultural 
diplomacy in the Latin American context informed the ways in which Washington 
constituted its role as the exemplar and agent of political and economic modernisation 
in other Third World contexts, notably China. In similar terms to the narration of 
political interdependence in the Western Hemisphere, the relationship between the 
US and China was plotted as part of a historical process of integration and 
identification. In this rendition American intervention in Chinese politics was 
enabled by virtue of America’s qualities of modernity and democracy, and because it 
had a long-standing commitment to the repudiation of formal colonialism. This idea 
also informed wartime US cultural and informational programs in India, which gave 
obvious American support to the Indian independence movement even at the risk of 
sparking civil war and undermining the Allies’ strategic position in the Pacific 
theatre.
US cultural and informational diplomacy to China presents a particularly 
interesting illustration of how policy-makers resolved the question of whether 
America’s own firm commitment to democratic principles might be infringed by 
engaging in cultural diplomacy with authoritarian states was first debated. Here, 
cultural modernisation entered into the lexicon of US cultural diplomacy, in that it 
allowed democracy to be situated as the outcome rather than the proviso of US 
cultural engagement. As the material presented in the foregoing chapters has shown, 
by articulating America’s modernising, democratising influence over China in this
10 Stanley K. Hornbeck, “Why We are Fighting and For What,” Department o f State Bulletin 1745, 
(May 23, 1942), p. 462.
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way Washington envisaged China becoming a regional power and partner to the US 
in post-war East Asia. The cultural programs were seen to be affecting, through the 
extension of technical assistance, information and cultural norms, “enlightened and 
far-sighted leadership” over China for the mutual benefit of the Chinese people, the 
US, and the broader East Asian region." As Office of War Information guidelines 
contended, America’s interest was in China’s adoption of rational economic, 
educational and political beliefs akin to its own.
To strengthen China internally, we must first of all try to convey to the 
Chinese a realisation of all the advantages to be derived from, and the 
techniques to be used for, the political organization of a country on a 
truly democratic basis. For this purpose we must present a picture of 
the workings of a genuine democracy elsewhere. We should also make 
plain the hope of the American people that China will develop toward 
real democracy in the political sense without interruption...[US policy 
should] convey a realisation of what the individual can gain from, and 
the techniques available for, the political organisation of a country on a 
truly democratic basis. 12
The technocratic, modernising imperatives that were situated as the objective of US 
cultural and informational programs represent a manifestation of the vindicationist 
terms upon which Washington was beginning to constitute its interests in relation to 
the Third World. The vindicationist premise of US cultural diplomacy in this period 
also informed the ways in which the American delegation sought to direct Unesco 
toward ‘realistic’ or politically relevant projects in its post-war reconstruction and 
development activities, and scripted as an entitlement America’s leadership position 
within the institution. As William Benton’s statements most clearly illustrate, the 
reconstruction of war ravaged and Third World regions was to be undertaken
11 Joseph W. Ballantine, “Cultural Factors in the Far Eastern Situation,” Department o f State Bulletin 
1740, (May 9, 1942), pp. 397, 402.
12 Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, “Guidance for OWI Informational Work in 
Unoccupied China, October 24, 1944,” pp. 1-2; Chronological File, 1944-45; Records of Archibald 
MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, 
College Park, MD. Strengthening the democratic consciousness, as well as appealing to the aspirations 
and emotions, of the Chinese people was also alluded to in an undated report by Gerald F. Winfield, 
“A Report on The Effect of OWI’s Radio Program on Public Morale in Peiping During the Period of 
Japanese Occupation,” (November 12, 1945), pp. 5-6; Records Relating to the China, Burma, India 
Theatre, 1942-5; Records of the Historian; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 
208, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.
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according to the ideological template of the Western powers, specifically the US, that 
had won the war.13
As American fears about the advance of Communist influence in China 
intensified in the late 1940s, and in keeping with the broader script of ideological 
struggle that US policy-makers were articulating in response to the extension of 
Soviet power into Central Europe, America’s effort to foster democratic progress in 
China was reconstituted as a geo-strategic necessity. As US political advisor John 
Fairbank had argued just a short time before the Communists seized power in China, 
Washington
must offer Asia more explicitly some of the promise of American 
life which vitalizes our own faith and makes us inexorably opposed to 
totalitarianism. Where our main approach to post-war China has been 
economic, military, and political, we must now make it more 
vigorously ideological. Ideals are weapons which we have neglected. 
The ideal of a better life for the common people of Asia today is 
dynamite, whether or not Communists use it.14
The revolutionary conflict in China escalated rapidly between 1948 and 1949, 
culminating in the seizure of power by the Communist party led by Mao Zedong and 
the expulsion of the Nationalist regime to Taiwan. John Lewis Gaddis’ recent work 
on US diplomatic history in this period has observed that many US officials 
countenanced and even accepted the prospect of a Communist regime in China before 
1949.15 However the revolution was a profound shock to the exponents of Chinese 
modernisation and democratisation within the US cultural programs, since they had 
constituted their work around the example of America’s political development and 
presupposed that China was on a similarly unobstructed path to democratisation. US 
cultural diplomacy with China all but ceased as a consequence of these frustrated 
hopes, the information program was turned essentially to combative Cold War 
purposes, and the US sought to diplomatically isolate Communist China in Unesco 
and other multilateral frameworks. While American culture and informational
13 William Benton, “Speech to the First General Conference of Unesco;” “General Conference 1st 
Session, Held at Unesco House, Paris, From 20 November to 10 December, 1946,” 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/14593e.pdf, p. 64; William Benton, “First General 
Conference of Unesco,” Department o f State Bulletin 2701, (December 1, 1946).
14 John Fairbank, “Toward a Dynamic Far Eastern Policy,” Far Eastern Survey 18, no. 18 (Special 
Issue: White Paper on China), p. 211. Article retained within the papers of Elmer Davis; Box 4;
Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.
15 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), Ch. 3.
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diplomats professed the liberal, reciprocal and open approach to engagement with the 
Third World, the China case illustrates that these had limits and a posture of 
leadership and entitlement to determine the ideological terrain of the post-war order 
was also emergent in the prevailing terms upon which US cultural and informational 
practices were constituted.
The Soviet Other: Logics of Alterity and the Cold War Protagonists
As was the case with the prevailing representations of Third World societies 
as objects of America’s transformational, modernising imperatives, the representation 
of the Soviet adversary within the US cultural and informational programs drew the 
rhetorical device of narration. America’s historical incumbency to use its cultural and 
ideological influence to foster stability and interdependence within the global order 
was prevalent in the articulation of US Cold War interests, although this was 
accompanied by a different set of presuppositions and categories of classification that 
constructed the USSR as the moral antithesis of America. In the construction of Cold 
War alterity, the USSR was situated in terms of equivalence with the United States in 
its capacity for global influence. Policy and legislative debates from late 1946 to 
early 1948 thus emphasised that America’s failure to seize the ideological initiative in 
Europe had left the Soviet Union free to exercise its considerable capacity for cultural 
and intellectual expansionism. What distinguished the two superpowers was that the 
Soviet Union could be identified with the US in terms of its global influence and 
persuasive fervour, but was fundamentally estranged from the United States along a 
moral axis. As the propaganda scholar Ralf Block had suggested in 1950:
the most important Soviet weapon, more important than its atomic 
weapon, is the vast illusion, fortified by an equally vast body of 
dogma, which Soviet imperial communism spreads through its world 
wide machinery. The latent idealism of peoples everywhere is the 
target of an ideological fabrication about the humanitarian objectives 
of Soviet communism unmatched by even the propaganda of Hitler 
or Goebbels.16
16 Ralph Block, “Propaganda as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” Department o f State Bulletin 3884, 
(June 19, 1950), p. 989.
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Arguments such as Block’s emphasising the sophistication and extensiveness of 
Soviet publicity techniques turned on prior self-representations of the US as a 
reluctant propagandist and the superior moral qualities that this reluctance implied. 
The shadowy, totalising nature of Soviet ‘propaganda’ was pitted as the antithesis of 
Washington’s more modest, occasionally ineffective but truthful, democratic and 
unselfish approach to international ‘information’ and ‘cultural exchange. ’ 17 As 
Robert Sherwood had asserted:
Soviet propaganda today is both global and total. It is both 
voluntary and mercenary. It is centrally planned, but it is diversified 
in the channels through which it flows, and by the audiences it tries 
to reach. It is flexible though it operates within a definite set of 
premises. It pursues immediate- though often inconsistent- tasks, but 
has the unity of long-range aims. It is rational, though it appeals much 
more to the emotions, national sensitivities, and baser instincts. 18
Washington, unlike the manipulative Soviet propagandists, mobilised 
information that appealed to the rational mind and to humanity’s better nature. 
American ideals were classified not as a system of brainwashing but rather “as an 
ideology [only] in the sense of a set of beliefs in self-government and its corollaries.” 
As such the key premise of US information was that “foreign peoples are to be 
influenced through their reason and their convictions against the false promises of 
Soviet communism.” 19 As George Allen similarly assured the American public: “Our 
social, political, and moral patterns would not permit us to use the Soviet type of 
propaganda.” 20 Yet despite these efforts in US policy discourse to construct the 
differences between how the USSR (with deceit) and the US (through freedom of 
information and truth) were seen to be propagating their ideas, it was frequently the 
very same principles of justice and freedom that were being claimed by the two
91superpowers. The relation of alterity through which US policy-makers regarded the
17 See also Lewis Revey, “Holding the Political and Psychological Initiative,” to Philips (first name 
unrecorded), (August 16, 1950), p. 2; Policy Papers and Meetings, 1949-50; Subject Files, 1947-50; 
Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1947-50; General Records of the United 
States, Record Group 59; National Archives, College Park, MD.
18 Robert E. Sherwood (1942) quoted in Alan M. Winker, The Politics o f  Propaganda: The Office o f  
War Information 1942-1945, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 18.
19 Block “Propaganda as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” p. 989.
20 George V. Allen “Progress of Human Liberty in Democratic Forms” Department o f State Bulletin 
3116, (April 11, 1948), p. 519.
21 Nigel Gould Davies, “The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 27, (no. 2, 
April, 2003).
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Soviet Union thus also turned on the perversion of Western ideals within Soviet 
propaganda:
Russia, through its clever propaganda in the past 30 years, has been 
selling the world a phony package. The Russians are the world’s 
greatest plagiarists. They have stolen or bastardized the great ideas 
of the West- peace, democracy, justice, national independence- our 
phrases that exult and sing of our freedom, and corrupted them to the 
end of tyranny.22
Debates over the operational tone and approach that should be adopted within the US 
cultural and informational programs were thus far from marginal to the emergence of 
Washington’s posture of Cold War antagonism. Distinguishing the US’s approach in 
these operational terms enabled US informational and cultural officials to demarcate 
their political and ideological purposes from those of the USSR, and to articulate their 
claims to global public support on this basis.
The doctrine of freedom of information had strong resonance in this context, 
because it located the pursuit of American informational and cultural influence within 
the broader global democratising and emancipatory project that Washington had 
articulated during the post-war settlement. Archibald MacLeish had thus defined the 
free exchange of ideas as ‘basic’ to America’s entire ‘political doctrine,’ while Joseph 
Grew had stated that one of America’s urgent tasks in the post-war era was to see that 
information could be a ‘force for good.’23 In the case of Voice of America and 
Unesco policy, however, we have seen that nascent within the doctrine of freedom of 
information was the idea that the US should be more free to distribute its own 
information than exponents of Communism or Cold War neutrality. Speaking on the 
US’s information policy, Secretary of State James Byrnes thus characterised 
Washington’s international information policy in the following terms:
While we adhere to the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs, 
we assert that knowledge of what other people are thinking and doing 
brings understanding; and understanding brings tolerance and
22 In this America would use both ‘cold logic’ and ‘warm truth’ against the Soviet propaganda 
onslaught. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Expanded International Information and 
Educational Program: Hearing, 5 July 1950, p. 5; Y4 F76/2: In3/2; (Washington DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 1950).
23 Archibald MacLeish, “Popular Relations and the Peace,” Department o f State Bulletin 2247, 
(January 14, 1945), p. 50; Joseph Grew, “Freedom of Information,” Department o f State Bulletin 2346 
(June 17, 1945), p. 1098.
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willingness to cooperate in the adjustment of differences... [However] 
the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs does not mean the 
approval of local tyranny. Our policy is intended to protect the right 
of our neighbours to develop their own freedom in their own way. It 
is not intended to give them free reign to plot against the freedom of 
others.24
Once again, the seemingly innocuous exercise of articulating the information 
program’s operating principles took on a broader constitutive significance in terms of 
America’s global role. The orienting frames and premises of US information policy 
in relation to the Cold War continued to cast America as a liberal world power, even 
as Washington was taking more forthright practical steps to ensure that its own ideas 
reached international audiences.
The foregoing chapters have not supplied an account of the development of 
Washington’s posture as a Cold War protagonist as a wholly straightforward or 
uncontested process, however. As a report on the cultural programs of 1947 noted, 
despite the pressures of global ideological conflict, forestalling Soviet propaganda did 
not necessarily have to detract from the ‘positive project’ of democracy-building and 
the fostering of international interdependence within the programs: “We do not need 
to abandon one objective in order to work toward the other.”25 There were many 
figures, such as Ben Cherrington and Archibald MacLeish, who were sceptical at the 
outset of the proposition that the US could engage in ideological warfare and remain 
true to its cherished political values. Proponents of the idea that the Voice’s truthful 
and self-critical ‘journalistic function’ must be upheld, even under conditions of Cold 
War antagonism, thus cautioned that America’s tone “should not be such as to create 
the belief that the US is conducting an ideological crusade...We should avoid 
entering into sterile ideological debates, blow for blow retaliation, or the use of 
propaganda patterns like those of the Soviet Union.”26 Interestingly, in the context of 
Unesco, where a post-colonial voting bloc emerged as an explicit challenge to 
America’s efforts to make multilateral cultural cooperation a tool of ideological
24 James Byrnes, “Neighbouring Nations in One World," Department o f State Bulletin 2419, 
(November 4, 1945), p. 709.
25 W. R. Tyler, “Memorandum on an Overseas Information Service,” Jan 7, 1946, p. 2; Records 
Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of 
State, Record Group 59; National Archives, College Park MD.
2o “US Information Policy with Respect to Soviet Anti-American Propaganda Campaign,” (no author), 
(November 13, 1949), pp. 2-3; Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938- 
1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park MD.
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conflict, there was less internal debate as to the appropriateness of America’s Cold 
War posture. The overarching urgency of securing Unesco’s compliance with US 
ideological objectives and an underlying sense of entitlement to lead the Organisation 
limited the scope for self-criticism and debate among the American Unesco staff.
As Frank Ninkovich has reflected, and as my survey of the history of US 
cultural and informational diplomacy in the late 1940s has also shown, liberalism 
remained the most intelligible script according to which the diplomacy of 
international persuasion was conceptualised in Washington during early Cold War. 
As my analysis of how the USSR was regarded in internal policy debates has shown, 
power politics and ideological rivalry could initially only be countenanced within the 
boundaries of this liberal discourse as Cold War antagonisms developed.27 
Longstanding representations of US liberalism and progressivism continued to license 
the pursuit of global cultural and informational influence, and in their own way 
actually deepened America’s conviction that the Cold War struggle must be world­
wide and totalising in scope. Framing US cultural and informational diplomacy 
according to the descriptors of liberalism, progress and freedom supplied a symbolic 
license, and often even symbolic inducement, for Washington to partake in the 
military interventionism, strategic containment and ideological warfare that 
comprised the Cold War more unreservedly than would otherwise have been the case.
In with the New (World): The Construction of Europe in US Cultural and 
Informational Diplomacy
The representations and propositions that accompanied US cultural and 
informational interactions with Europe were largely subsumed within a narrative of 
America as the New World in relation to its European progenitor during the 1936-53 
period. A shared political and philosophical heritage as well as strong pre-existing 
religious and cultural ties played into US perceptions of its own privileged cultural 
and historical status in relation to Western Europe. Once again, the notion of 
America as the New World- a relational identity premised on the political failures of 
the European ‘Old World’- predicated the approach that US cultural and 
informational policy-makers took in devising policies for Europe. Within US cultural
27 Frank Ninkovich, The Diplomacy o f Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-J 950, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ‘Epilogue.’
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and informational discourse logics of alterity were at play in terms of how America’s 
cultural and informational engagement with Europe was constituted. Equivalence 
was drawn between the US and Europe in terms of their complexity and philosophical 
heritage as international actors, but at the axiological (‘value-judgement’) level 
Europe remained in a stunted, unfulfilled and historically regressive ideological state. 
US public and intellectual debates about the political and moral implications of 
propaganda as a political practice, as I noted in chapter two, mobilised images of 
European imperial acquisitiveness and ethnic divisiveness to articulate a critique of 
propaganda within the terms of American political culture. After Washington had 
adopted practices of official political persuasion of its own and had been drawn into 
European politics by the war, the spiritual and political pathologies of Europe became 
a warranting argument in favour of American oversight of Europe’s ideological 
reorientation. The tragic spectacle of two world wars in the space of thirty years 
having been caused by European political and cultural antipathies was thus articulated 
as a basis to vindicate the position of economic, military and political influence the 
US occupied vis-ä-vis Western Europe in 1945. In this context, implementing an 
American-authored vision of the post-war European economic and political order was 
entirely legitimate; American principles were
capable of universal application as rules of national and international 
conduct. In their application by other nations and in willingness and 
preparedness on the part of all peacefully inclined nations to join 
together and make them effective lies the greatest hope of security, 
happiness, and progress for this country and all countries.29
As one British memorandum reflected in 1940, “[w]hat enabled [Washington] to put 
in the immense effort she did, was a wave of emotional enthusiasm, a desire to pass 
on to suffering Europe the blessings of freedom and democracy. Easy to sneer at, 
[but] not if the intensity of the effort is realised.”30
28 Brands’ characterisation of US international doctrines as veering from extreme reluctance to be 
involved internationally to extreme interventionism and embeddedness is illustrated here. H. W. 
Brands, “Exemplary America versus Interventionist America,” in At the End o f the American Century: 
America ’s Role in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Robert L. Hutchings, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998).
2g Cordell Hull, “Our Foreign Policy in the Framework of Our National Interests,” Department o f State 
Bulletin 1995, (September 18, 1943).
30 B. Ward Perkins, “We Must Keep Our Regard for the Americans,” (Februrary 8, 1940); CO/1745/9; 
UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.
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The historian Max Lemer published a long treatise on US political culture 
during the 1950s that illustrates the historical frame through which US commentators 
and policy-makers had approached the post-war moment in relation to Europe. 
America had long regarded as its political culture as “the naked embodiment of the 
most dynamic elements of modem Western history,” and as such it had always 
encompassed an “acceptance of the European ties and does not reject them.”31 As the 
State Department’s Harley Notter had declaimed:
It is in the ‘New World’ where a new dynamic culture has risen. 
The term means two things. It means the United States, where out 
of fusion of many transplanted cultures, plus the peculiarly 
influential culture of the original immigrants... an American culture 
has risen and has momentum.32
Notter went to assert that during the war the US had been forced to assume the mantle 
of defending and extending Western civilization against the Axis threat. This played 
into the emergence of America’s posture of Cold War influence within Western 
Europe. A 1950 article on US information policy written by Ralf Block shows how 
the historical trajectory of US-Westem European relations was reformulated in Cold 
War terms:
By the trend of world events, rather than by design, the United 
States emerged from war in a position of power and authority. 
That position made unavoidable its assumption of responsibility 
in its own defence for survival of the concepts fundamental 
to Western civilization.33
Freedom was one of the most important underlying principles within the scripting of 
America’s role as the fulfilment of the moral and political creeds of the West. In this 
context, freedom of information was articulated in the late 1940s in such a way as to
31 Max Lerner, America as a Civilization: Life and Thought in the United States Today, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 65. See also Todorov’s concept of alterity, which offers an interesting 
way to conceptualise this form of self-reflexivism. Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest o f America: The 
Question o f the Other, trans. Richard Howard, (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).
32 Harley Notter, statement in: General Advisory Committee of the Division of Cultural Relations., 
“Planning for the Cultural Relations Program: Statement at General Advisory Committee of the 
Division of Cultural Relations of the Department of State, Minutes of Meeting,” (September 17-18, 
1941), p. 62; Miscellaneous Subject Files 1939-1950; Records of Harley Notter; General Records of 
the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives, College Park MD.
33 Ralf Block, “Propaganda as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” Department o f State Bulletin 3884, 
(June 19, 1950), p. 987.
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mobilise the lexicon of Western values and simultaneously pave the way for the 
extension of American ideological influence in Europe in the context of the Cold War 
propaganda struggle. Economic freedom was similarly prevalent within the 
discursive construction of US cultural and informational influence in post-war 
Europe. By inculcating Allied occupied and war-devastated nations in the values of 
free markets and property ownership, US policy-makers saw the promotion of 
capitalism as having primacy in the post-war context as a foundation for European 
democracy and interdependence.
We have also seen in the foregoing chapters that American foreign policy­
makers scripted their own practices as emblematically liberal by playing up the 
distinction between US cultural and informational diplomacy from the purposes of 
European colonial propaganda. This fundamental contrast between the exploitative 
European imperialism and Washington’s emphasis on democracy, self-determination, 
and the repudiation of propaganda fed into the ways in which Washington articulated 
its post-war plans to the Third World, as well as into how Washington saw 
continental Europe’s level of entitlement to exercise diplomatic influence in post-war 
institutions.34 As the Cold War deepened the framing of Europe as acquisitive of 
diplomatic influence and exploitative of post-colonial states was applied to the policy 
positions taken by France, Italy and other social democracies in Unesco. French and 
Italian social democracy and Cold War neutralism were classified as ‘bizarre,’ 
irresponsible and deliberately obstructionist to an almost pathological degree in this 
context. Under the terms of American Cold War cultural and informational 
discourse, and the triangular alterity between the ‘free world,’ the Communist system 
and obstructive neutralism, the obstructions posed by continental European neutrality 
and social democracy were scripted as necessitating that Washington exercise greater 
global leadership. In this context, cultural and informational diplomacy was seen as a 
mechanism for Washington to point out to the European public that it was in the New 
World that the fulfilment of Western principles had actually taken place, and that it 
was America that could guarantee their freedom and prosperity for decades to come. 
Britain occupied a somewhat contradictory place in the context of this framework of 
US representations of cultural and informational diplomacy both to European publics, 
and in relation to the practices of European governments. On the one hand, British
34 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 351-2.
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colonialism was depicted as an unjust system and informed how Washington’s own 
plans for post-war decolonisation were presented to Third World publics. On the 
other hand, in relation to France’s vision of Unesco as a bastion of ‘high’ culture and 
its subsequent expressions of Cold War neutrality, US diplomats frequently alluded to 
an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ solidarity between America and Britain in terms of their 
administrative and policy positions in relation to Unesco.
The transition in US cultural diplomacy from representing US culture as a 
‘democratic’ alternative to Europe’s rarefied, ‘ethnic’ and ‘high’ cultures to the 
promotion of America’s own ‘high’ culture provides an interesting window onto 
Washington’s changing view of its political and ideological interests in Europe. 
America’s distinction from Europe was played up in the context of US cultural 
diplomacy during the early phase of the period studied here. The accessibility, lack 
of pretension and the inherent democracy embodied within American culture was 
initially cast as an advantage for Washington in seeking to appeal to the people of the 
Third World and to some sectors of the European public.35 As one British 
memorandum from the mid 1940s had reflected, there was a palpably popular basis 
for US cultural diplomacy. There was a “very vigorous and ‘American’” tone and an 
“extremely wide” definition of culture, with an emphasis on popular culture and 
‘practical’ or ‘technical’ instruction rather than intellectual achievement.36 However 
the idea that America could exercise intellectual and high cultural prestige in Europe 
that developed during the early Cold War was, in a significance sense, a claim to 
cultural rapprochement with the European nations as an equal. Just as Washington’s 
broader diplomatic role was seen to have matured to the point where the US now 
guaranteed Europe’s economic, political and strategic future, American cultural 
diplomacy discourse seemed, with this emphasis on high culture, to have turned
35 In 1943 Waldo Leland thus defined the programs as concerned with “all intellectual, aesthetic, and 
educational interests” rather than those of elite cultural and intellectual practitioners. Waldo Leland, 
“International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present Problems,” University of 
Denver Social Science Foundation Papers, 1943, p. 2; Box 2, File 28; Records of the Division of 
Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at 
Fayetteville.
36 Text of speech by Assistant Director of the US Division of Cultural Relations Willian Schurtz, and 
notes. Report of T M. Snow, report to Anthony Eden, (April 10, 1943); FO 371/34209, UK National 
Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.
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toward a strident refutation of longstanding images of America as Europe’s 
backward, coarse and superficial offshoot.37
As the foregoing discussion has suggested, cutting across all three 
geographical categories of American cultural and informational influence were 
discourses that affirmed America’s repudiation of propaganda and its aspiration to 
exercise a moral, liberal progressive form of agency as a world power. In the face of 
the undemocratic connotations that had been attached to ‘propaganda’ during US 
public debates during the 1920s and 1930s, American foreign policy officials could 
only go about establishing programs of international persuasion in the 1940s by 
claiming that it was not the practice of persuasion as such that was problematic. 
Rather, it was their adoption by other acquisitive states in pursuit of ‘power politics’ 
or self aggrandisement and the tactics of deceit, manipulation and one-sidedness that 
they had developed. Contrastingly, American cultural and informational discourse 
was predicated by the fact that liberalism was taken as the foundational principle for 
US foreign relations. In the next section I shall thus reflect on the impact of the 
claims about the distinction between cultural and informational diplomacy and 
‘propaganda’ that US policy-makers articulated. The practice of setting the US apart 
as an exceptional kind of agent in the realm of international persuasion was a 
symbolic move that actually enabled a much more far-reaching posture of hegemony 
to be contemplated in Washington than might otherwise have been if pragmatic 
propaganda was taken as the rationale for American cultural and informational 
diplomacy.
37 A survey of these pejorative views of US culture in the decades before to the Cold War see: Richard 
Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since 
World War II, (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 10-16. Of course, the projection of high culture was 
not without complexities and contestation in Washington. See, eg. Frank Ninkovich, “The Currents of 
Cultural Diplomacy: Art and the State Department 1938-1947,” Diplomatic History 1, (no. 3, Summer 
1977).
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Exceptionalism and Liberalism: American Identity and the Practices of Cultural 
and Informational Diplomacy
The French sociologist Jacques Ellul remarked in 1965 that democratic 
governments were inherently ‘ineffectual’ at propaganda because “to the extent that 
the democratic propagandist has a bad conscience...he cannot do good work.”38 If 
we accept Ellul’s terms, my study has shown how America’s liberal ‘conscience’ was 
articulated, and thereby eased, by internal and public policy discourse. As William 
Hocking of Harvard University had argued during this period, to remain true to its 
values America would need to find an entirely ‘new style’ of international persuasion 
that reflected its liberal democratic principles.39 Secretary of State George Marshall 
had similarly observed:
I deplore the use of the world ‘propaganda,’ however technically 
correct that may be because it presumes, I think, and it certainly 
does for me, the feeling that you are engaged in cunning practise 
to put over your bill of goods.. .the most important principle in this 
matter...is that we confine ourselves to the truth, just the particular 
truth.. .it is most dangerous... [to use] any procedure which ha[s] the 
character of propaganda, as we sometimes think of it. I think any 
propaganda machine is an unfortunate thing for a government like 
ours to have set up.40
The discursive representation of US cultural and informational policy-making thus 
encompassed characterisations of propaganda as a ‘threat to American virtue’41 as a 
liberal power, with the US information and cultural programs to deliver their political 
message only ‘indirectly.’42 At the very least, the term propaganda required revision
38 Jacques Ellul, cited in Gary Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VOA in 
International Politics, 1956-64, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996), p. 9.
39 On Hocking’s position see: J. Michael Sproule, Propaganda and Democracy: The American 
Experience o f Media and Mass Persuasion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
pp. 178-81.
40 George Marshall, “Statement,” Expanded International Information and Education Program, 
Hearing, (July 5, 1950); (Y4 1483 F76/2:ln3/2); Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 
1950, p. 5.
41 W. R. Tyler, W. R., to William T. Stone, “Notes on the OIC Program,” (April 22, 1947), pp. 1-2; 
Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the 
Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives, College Park MD.
42 Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, “Operational Guidance on OWI 
Documentary Films,” (November 24, 1944), p. 1; Chronological File, 1944-45; Records of Archibald 
MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General 
Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, 
College Park, MD.
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or qualification when US policy-makers referred to their own work: hence, 
propaganda “coming from America, with unmistakable American sincerity, is by far 
the best form of propaganda.”43 This was because US policy-makers tended to see 
their work as “the natural expression of the democratic principles on which and for 
which we stand...to build the good life which flows across national boundary lines.” 
American politics and culture were an example for “democratically minded people” 
across the world to interact under conditions of “cultural exchange- not cultural 
penetration.”44
Taken together, the diplomatic histories of the bilateral cultural relations, 
international radio, and Unesco programs surveyed within my study tell a story about 
the ways in which Washington’s liberal attributes as a cultural and informational 
agent provided crucial symbolic license in the pursuit of influence through cultural 
and informational diplomacy. It has been a key finding of this study to note how the 
process of easing America’s ‘bad conscience’ over the illiberal implications of 
propaganda, actually generated a more expansive and transformational rendition of 
Washington’s foreign policy interests that encouraged the adoption of a posture of 
global hegemony after 1945.45 Articulating alternative categories for US foreign 
policy practices such as ‘cultural diplomacy’ and ‘informational diplomacy’ rested on 
shared assumptions about the singularity of American political culture, and thus about 
the privileged, internationalist character of US national interests themselves. Even 
during the Cold War, I have shown in the foregoing case studies that Washington’s 
considerably more strident, instrumental, selective and even distorting approach to the 
diplomacy of information and culture could be valorised as politically unselfish, 
morally benign, and a source of historical renewal and progress. The emergence of 
Washington’s posture of Cold War ideological struggle represents one of the most 
important themes within this study because it is during the Cold War that the 
symbolic license and inducement supplied by the discourses of liberalism and
43 Sherwood quoted in Alan Winkler, The Politics o f Propaganda: The Office o f War Information 
1942-1945, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 76.
44 Report of the Chair of the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange cited in Henry J. 
Kellerman, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange 
Program Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954, (Washington DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 1987), p. 7.
45 See also, Ninkovich, Diplomacy o f Ideas, pp. 168-9. As Alan Winkler has reflected, the policies and 
messages adopted within cultural and informational diplomacy programs in the 1938-45 period 
“revealed what the nation considered important as it strove to reconcile its basic values and the 
requirements of war.” Winkler, Politics o f  Propaganda, p. 7.
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exceptionalism seems most apparent. Reinhold Niebuhr’s reflections that America’s 
ideals constituted both its greatest asset and its gravest peril in acting upon the world 
stage provide a prescient way of summing up this finding, and thus bear quoting at 
length.
Our moral perils are not those of conscious malice or the explicit 
lust for power. They are the perils which can only be understood 
if we realise the ironic tendency of virtues to turn into vices when 
too complacently relied upon; and of power to become vexatious 
if the wisdom which directs it is trusted too confidently. The ironic 
elements in American history can be overcome, in short, only if 
American idealism comes to terms with the limits of all human 
striving, the ffagmentaries of all human wisdom, the precariousness 
of all historic configurations of power, and the mixture of good and 
evil in all human virtue... [Our] idealism is too oblivious of the ironic 
perils to which human virtue, wisdom and power are subject. It is too 
certain there is a straight path toward the goal of human happiness; 
too confident of the wisdom and idealism which prompt men and 
nations toward that goal; and too blind to the curious compounds of 
good and evil in which the actions of the best men and nations abound.46
In the next section I shall assess the implications of my argument and 
approach in relation to existing literature within International Relations and 
Diplomatic History, and suggest how this work has opened scope for further research 
into the significance of cultural and informational diplomacy as sites through which 
states constitute their identities.
Discourses of Attraction: Theoretical Implications of the Representation of 
America in Cultural and Informational Diplomacy and Implications for Further 
Research
This study has been situated within a strand of International Relations 
literature that seeks to demonstrate how language is productive of agency in 
international political life and social contexts in general. Discourse analysis draws 
attention to the meanings and understandings through which foreign policy objectives 
and approaches are formulated, and seeks to show how in the process of articulating
46 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony o f American History, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952), p. 
133.
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present conditions particular courses of action become possible while others are 
implicitly deemed unacceptable or rendered unthinkable. The most important general 
theoretical implication of this study is that while the discursive practices and 
constructivist literature had not hitherto been applied to the practices of cultural and 
informational diplomacy, significant and new analytical insights can be gained in 
doing so. In the process I also sought to bridge the divide between the cultural turn in 
Diplomatic History and constructivist International Relations scholarship by drawing 
extensively on the existing research and theoretical arguments within these historical 
debates.
Existing constructivist perspectives on the function of discourse in foreign 
policy have addressed a range of cases and processes, but most often these have been 
undertaken with the objective of assessing how state identity-formation represents a 
process of estrangement between the national ‘self and threatening, international 
‘others’ by charting the articulation of ‘threats,’ ‘crises’ and ‘insecurity’ in foreign 
policy discourse.47 This study has highlighted how progressive/pluralist logics 
representing the US as a locus for persuasion, attraction and renewal were developed 
as a response to the conditions of insecurity and disorder that the US confronted 
during the 1936-53 period. I have thus shown that the articulation of the American 
‘self did not always seek to estrange, distance or find threatening the international 
‘other.’48 Similarly, while my focus has largely been on the constitutive functions of 
foreign policy discourse within Washington, my analysis in chapter five has sought to 
show that although it is often overlooked by scholars of international organisations, 
Unesco presented a forum in which perhaps the earliest instance of counterbalancing 
against US hegemony took place.
47 Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics o f North-South Relations, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy 
and the Politics o f Identity, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Iver 
Neumann, Russia and the Idea o f Europe: A Study o f Identity and International Relations, (London: 
Routledge, 1996); Jacinta O’Hagan, “’The Power and the Passion’: Civilizational Identity and Alterity 
in the Wake of September 11,” in Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical 
Elaborations, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Jutta 
Weldes, “The Cultural Production of Crises: US Identity and Missiles in Cuba,” in eds. Jutta Weldes, 
et. al., Cultures o f  Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production o f Danger, (Minneapolis: 
University o f Minnesota Press, 1999).
48 Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003); Lene Hansen, “The Clash of Cartoons? The Clash of 
Civilizations? Visual Securitization and the Danish 2006 Cartoon Crisis,” Paper presented at the 48th 
Annual International Studies Association Convention, Chicago, USA, February 28- March 3 2007.
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It is hoped that in bringing a constructivist theoretical framework to bear on 
the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy I have demonstrated that there 
is further scope for analysing the constitutive functions of discourse within cultural 
and informational diplomacy in relation to other historical periods and agents. Two 
avenues in particular for extending my constructivist approach to the study of cultural 
and informational diplomacy have, in my view, been illuminated in the preceding 
chapters. Firstly, in chapter two I noted how British official and public attitudes to 
‘propaganda’ during the inter-war period reflected similar elements of liberal 
reluctance to those propounded across the Atlantic. Although Phillip M. Taylor and 
Nicholas Cull have both provided some particularly insightful historical research into 
the history of British propaganda, there is scope to assess how discourses of 
liberalism were used in the constitution of British cultural and informational foreign 
policy, and how this differed from the American case.49 Further research might also 
usefully be undertaken within a constructivist conceptual framework on the 
competition that arose between British Imperial and American information agencies 
in Asia during the Second World War, as they sought to convey their contending 
visions for post-war order.
Having analysed how discourses of cultural and informational influence 
shaped the way in which Washington pursued a posture of hegemonic engagement at 
a broader level after 1945, the second implication of my study is the significance of 
vindicationism as a constitutive principle in US foreign policy and the light this 
finding sheds on Washington’s contemporary foreign policy challenges. It is striking 
that similar grammars of American vindication to those identified in my study are 
echoed in the premises that Joseph Nye and others situate as the basis of America’s 
global cultural and political attractiveness in the contemporary period. It seems clear 
that assertions of US cultural universalism continue to shape US foreign policy 
discourse, especially in relation to the concept of American soft power:
when a country’s culture includes universal values and its policies 
promote values and interests that others share, it increases the 
probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the
49 Phillip M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999); Nicholas Cull, Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign 
Against American 'Neutrality’ in World War II, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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relationships of attraction and duty that it creates.50
These assumptions are not Nye’s alone; the concept of soft power has resonance 
because it fits in with established patterns of characterising America and its claims to 
influence within the international system. Yet as my study has sought to show, the 
language in which foreign policy is characterised and debated is powerful. Language 
shapes how agents think and act, and in the case of Washington’s cultural and 
informational diplomacy in the late 1940s expansive claims and universalist rhetoric 
became a substitute for self-criticism and compromise. As US policy-makers and the 
foreign policy commentary community grapple with the contemporary challenge of 
how America might once again build trust and legitimacy within foreign public 
opinion, they might do well to recall that the celebration of virtue, particularly one’s 
own, can easily slip into the vice of hubris.
50 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004),
p. 11
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